Did Saddam Hussein have weapons of mass destruction after the 1st Gulf War?
Colin Powell, MBA, US Secretary of State at the time of the quote, stated in his Mar. 7, 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council:
"...[W]e all know, in 1991 the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise...
The point is that this document [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission report: "Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programs"] conclusively shows that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture these kinds of weapons, that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture not only chemical but biological weapons, and that Iraq had and still has literally tens of thousands of delivery systems, including increasingly capable and dangerous unmanned aerial vehicles."
The US National Ground Intelligence Center, a Defense Department intelligence unit, lists key points in a declassified (as of June 21, 2006) portion of an undated report on the recovery of Iraqi chemical munitions:
"Since 2003 Coalition forces have
recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded
mustard or sarin nerve agent.
Despite many efforts to locate and destroy Iraq's
pre-Gulf War chemical munitions, filled and unfilled pre-Gulf War
chemical munitions are assessed to still exist.
Pre-Gulf War Iraqi chemical weapons could be sold on
the black market. Use of these weapons by terrorists or insurgent
groups would have implications for Coalition forces in Iraq...
...While agents degrade over time, chemical warfare agents remain hazardous and potentially lethal..."
The UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), in a Sep. 2002 report titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government," stated:
"Much information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq’s continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War.
It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them."
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense at the time of the quote, stated in his Sep. 18, 2002 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee:
"But those who raise questions about the nuclear threat need to focus on the immediate threat from biological weapons. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq repeatedly insisted it did not have biological weapons. Then, in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law defected and told the inspectors some details of Iraq's biological weapons program.
Only then did Iraq admit it had produced tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other biological weapons. But even then, they did not come clean. UN inspectors believe Iraq had in fact produced two to four-times the amount of biological agents it had declared. Those biological agents were never found. Iraq also refused to account for some three tons of materials that could be used to produce biological weapons."
Hillary Clinton, JD, US Senator (D-NY) at the time of the quote, in an Oct. 10, 2002 floor speech on the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq," stated:
"In the four years since the inspectors left , intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program."
Georges Sada, former 2-star General in the Iraqi Air Force, states in a Jan. 25, 2006 interview on FOX News' Hannity & Colmes:
"SADA: Well, I want to make it clear, very clear to everybody in the world that we had the weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, and the regime used them against our Iraqi people. It was used against Kurds in the north, against Arabs — marsh Arabs in the south...
HANNITY: Some people say they were destroyed. Did we still have them leading up to the invasion?
SADA: No, he had a very good organization that Saddam was created to show some of them but to continue to hide.
HANNITY: So he had them.
HANNITY: Where were they? And were they moved and where?
SADA: Well, up to the year 2002, 2002, in summer, they were in Iraq. And after that, when Saddam realized that the inspectors are coming on the first of November and the Americans are coming, so he took the advantage of a natural disaster happened in Syria, a dam was broken. So he — he announced to the world that he is going to make an air bridge...
HANNITY: You know for a fact he moved these weapons to Syria?
Hans Blix, PhD, former Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), in a Sep. 18, 2003 Guardian article titled "Iraq Dumped WMDS Years Ago, Says Blix," stated:
"I'm certainly more and more to the
conclusion that Iraq has, as they maintained, destroyed all, almost, of
what they had in the summer of 1991. The more time that has passed, the
more I think it's unlikely that anything will be found."
The Commission of the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (CICUSRWMD), a presidential committee led by co-chairs Laurence Silberman and Charles Robb, stated in its Mar. 31, 2005 report:
"Extensive post-war investigations were carried out by the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). The ISG found no evidence that Iraq had tried to reconstitute its capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991; no evidence of biological weapon (BW) agent stockpiles or of mobile biological weapons production facilities; and no substantial chemical warfare (CW) stockpiles or credible indications that Baghdad had resumed production of CW after 1991."
Mohammed ElBaradei, JSD, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on July 27, 1998 stated in a communication to the United Nations:
"...IAEA, [International Atomic Energy Agency] through its extensive programme of inspection in Iraq, has assembled a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and has taken actions to destroy, remove and render harmless the known components of that programme and to verify, through an extensive programme of excavation, the remnants of equipment and materials unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
These activities have provided the basis for IAEA's statement that there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication Iraq has acquired or produced weapon-usable nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991)."
Hussien Kamel, former Director of Iraq's Industrialization Corporation in charge of Iraq's weapons program, stated in an Aug. 22, 1995 briefing with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
"I don't remember
resumption of chemical weapon production before the Gulf War. Maybe it
was only minimal production and filling. But there was no decision to
use chemical weapons for fear of retaliation. They must have a revision
of decision to start production.
All chemical weapons were destroyed. I
ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological,
chemical, missiles, nuclear were destroyed."
David Kay, PhD, former head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), in a Jan. 28, 2004 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the subject of "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," stated:
"SEN. BEN NELSON: All right. You know, you have indicated that you found no evidence of existing stockpiles of WMDs. Is it possible that they found their way to Syria? Is there any way of knowing whether they found their way to Syria or to another location?
MR. KAY: In terms of possibility, I mean, you can't rule out anything. The way I tried to direct our activities, I knew we were not going to get permission to conduct inspections in Syria, as much as I would professionally and personally have enjoyed it. I also knew that the intelligence we collected that showed movement of material across the Iraq-Syrian border didn't show what was in the containers.
So you try to answer that question by saying was there something to be moved back across the border? Look at production capability. It's totally inadequate for saying did they move small amounts, did they move technology, did they move documentation -- absolutely possible; I would say probable. But my personal belief is that they did not move large stockpiles, because I do not believe they had reconstituted a capability that had produced large stockpiles. So that's how you get at it...
My belief that they did not move large stockpiles of WMD to Syria is based on my conclusion that there were not large stockpiles to move..."