Senior Fellow and Director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy
Con to the question "Should the US Have Attacked Iraq?"
"The U.S. decision to use force against Iraq was both rash and senseless, ignoring the fundamental premise that force should be the last, not the first, option. There was no near-term threat to the U.S. or to U.S. interests, let alone a clear and present danger. Yet Washington repeatedly passed up opportunities to use diplomacy or to build a coalition. Rather, it approached the problem assuming that, as the world’s dominant military power, it had no need to gain the cooperation of the international community already organized to meet such challenges."
"The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy In Focus, Feb. 2004
Experts PhD's, JD's (lawyers), Judges, Members of Congress, Ambassadors, Consulate Generals, heads of government, Cabinet-level positions, military generals/admirals, Chief Weapons Inspectors, members of legislative bodies with significant involvement in, or related to, the US - Iraq conflict. [Note: Experts definition varies by site.]
Involvement and Affiliations:
Professor of International Security Studies, Chairman of the International Relations Department, the National War College
Senior Fellow and Director of the National Security Program, Center for International Policy
Division Chief and Senior Analyst, Office of Soviet Affairs, CIA, 1966-1990
Senior Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1974-1976
Intelligence Adviser to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Vienna and Washington