"Organizations are less likely to learn from their successes than their failures, but the greater danger in the case of the invasion and initial occupation of Iraq is that too much significance will be read into the experiences of the victors. There are two basic reasons why we should be wary of this possibility. The first is that the Iraq War may effectively be the last of its kind, at least for the three allies. Nowhere else in the world is the United States, Great Britain, or Australia likely to go to war against a conventionally armed enemy whose armed forces substantially resemble those of the Warsaw Pact. Rogue states are becoming a rare commodity, those that remain are unlikely to seek to emulate the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, and against neither Iran nor North Korea is it probable that the United States and its allies would
willingly launch a war at all resembling the invasion of Iraq."
"Investing in the Art of War: Human Dimensions of Military Transformation after Iraq," paper presented at the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, Mar. 5, 2005
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