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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A NEW ERA

DECEMBER 2002
“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom — and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity....

“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

— George W. Bush
President of the United States
September 20, 2002

With those words President Bush submitted his National Security Strategy (NSS) to the U.S. Congress September 20th. Each administration is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to submit an annual report to Congress setting out the nation’s comprehensive strategic security objectives. The tradition began with President Harry S Truman in 1950 with NSC-68, a report that focused on the United States and the then-Soviet Union and calling for a doctrine of containment that dominated the ensuing Cold War. Each president since then has submitted a similar document to Congress in varying forms and with varying degrees of specificity.

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the newly developed Bush NSS through a series of articles, commentary, and references from national security experts within the administration, the Congress, and the academic sector.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice discusses the NSS in broad terms while Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage examines its relationship to alliances and allies; General Richard Myers looks at the NSS from today’s threat environment; Under Secretary of State Alan P. Larson explains the economic security component; and Professors Robert Lieber and Keir Lieber give a thoughtful analysis; while Professor Richard Kugler looks at the NSS and the impact of globalization.

U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, a publication of the Office of Political Security in the State Department’s Office of International Information Programs, is intended to examine and advance an understanding of current trends in U.S. foreign policy issues for a global audience.
CONTENTS

FOCUS

A BALANCE OF POWER THAT FAVORS FREEDOM 5
By Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 10
By Richard L. Armitage
Deputy Secretary of State

THE U.S. MILITARY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14
By General Richard B. Myers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19
By Alan P. Larson
Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs

CONGRESSIONAL FOCUS

SPEAKING TO OUR SILENT ALLIES: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23
By U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives

REGIONAL FOCUS

AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN 28
By James Fisher-Thompson
Washington File Staff Writer, Office of African Affairs
Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State

COMMENTARY

THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 32
By Keir A. Lieber
Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, and
Robert J. Lieber
Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University
A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD  
By Richard L. Kugler  
Professor and Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

U.S. USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD  
By Richard F. Grimmett  
National Defense Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, U.S. Congressional Research Service

FACT SHEET

OVERVIEW OF AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY  
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INTERNET SITES  
Spotlighting other views and Internet links to resources on related issues

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The Office of International Information Programs of the U.S. Department of State provides products and services that explain U.S. policies, society, and values to foreign audiences. The Office disseminates and publishes five electronic journals that examine major issues facing the United States and the international community. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide statements of U.S. policy together with analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. All issues appear in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish language versions, and selected issues also appear in Arabic and Russian. English-language issues appear at approximately a one-month interval. Translated versions normally follow the English original by two to four weeks.

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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center were the bookends of a long transition period. During that period those of us who think about foreign policy for a living searched for an overarching, explanatory theory or framework that would describe the new threats and the proper response to them. Some said that nations and their militaries were no longer relevant, only global markets knitted together by new technologies. Others foresaw a future dominated by ethnic conflict. And some even thought that in the future the primary energies of America’s armed forces would be devoted to managing civil conflict and humanitarian assistance.

It will take years to understand the long-term effects of September 11th [2001]. But there are certain verities that the tragedy brought home to us in the most vivid way.

Perhaps most fundamentally, 9/11 crystallized our vulnerability. It also threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats we face today. Today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of terrorists — less from strong states than from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security — a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called “Good War,” or the Cold War.

President Bush’s new National Security Strategy offers a bold vision for protecting our nation that captures today’s new realities and new opportunities.

It calls on America to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom. As the president says in the cover letter: we seek to create the “conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.”

This strategy has three pillars:

• We will defend the peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes.

• We will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good relations among the world’s great powers.

• And we will extend the peace by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe.

Defending our nation from its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government. And the United States has a special responsibility to help make the world more secure.
In fighting global terror, we will work with coalition partners on every continent, using every tool in our arsenal — from diplomacy and better defenses to law enforcement, intelligence, cutting off terrorist financing, and, if needed, military power.

We will break up terror networks, hold to account nations that harbor terrorists, and confront aggressive tyrants holding or seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that might be passed to terrorist allies. These are different faces of the same evil. Terrorists need a place to plot, train, and organize. Tyrants allied with terrorists can greatly extend the reach of their deadly mischief. Terrorists allied with tyrants can acquire technologies allowing them to murder on an ever more massive scale. Each threat magnifies the danger of the other. And the only path to safety is to effectively confront both terrorists and tyrants.

For these reasons, President Bush is committed to confronting the Iraqi regime, which has defied the just demands of the world for over a decade. We are on notice. The danger from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal is far more clear than anything we could have foreseen prior to September 11th. And history will judge harshly any leader or nation that saw this dark cloud and sat by in complacency or indecision.

The Iraqi regime’s violation of every condition set forth by the U.N. Security Council for the 1991 cease-fire fully justifies — legally and morally — the enforcement of those conditions.

It is also true that since 9/11, our nation is properly focused as never before on preventing attacks against us before they happen.

The National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate. But some threats are so potentially catastrophic — and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are untraceable — that they cannot be contained. Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacrament are unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes “imminent.” So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized.

Preemption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats. As George Shultz recently wrote, “If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don’t wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense.” The United States has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense — from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994.

But this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light — to the United States or any other nation — to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

To support all these means of defending the peace, the United States will build and maintain 21st century military forces that are beyond challenge.

We will seek to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States and our allies.

Some have criticized this frankness as impolitic. But surely clarity is a virtue here. Dissuading military competition can prevent potential conflict and costly global arms races. And the United States invites — indeed, we exhort — our freedom loving allies, such as those in Europe, to increase their military capabilities.

The burden of maintaining a balance of power that favors freedom should be shouldered by all nations that favor freedom. What none of us should want is the emergence of a militarily powerful adversary who does not share our common values.

Thankfully, this possibility seems more remote today than at any point in our lifetimes. We have an
historic opportunity to break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the world since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century. Today, the world’s great centers of power are united by common interests, common dangers, and — increasingly — common values. The United States will make this a key strategy for preserving the peace for many decades to come.

There is an old argument between the so-called “realistic” school of foreign affairs and the “idealistic” school. To oversimplify, realists downplay the importance of values and the internal structures of states, emphasizing instead the balance of power as the key to stability and peace. Idealists emphasize the primacy of values, such as freedom and democracy and human rights in ensuring that just political order is obtained. As a professor, I recognize that this debate has won tenure for and sustained the careers of many generations of scholars. As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categories obscure reality.

In real life, power and values are married completely. Power matters in the conduct of world affairs. Great powers matter a great deal — they have the ability to influence the lives of millions and change history. And the values of great powers matter as well. If the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, the world would look very different today — Germany today might look like the old German Democratic Republic, or Latin America like Cuba.

Today, there is an increasing awareness — on every continent — of a paradigm of progress, founded on political and economic liberty. The United States, our NATO allies, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, Japan, and our other friends and allies in Asia and Africa all share a broad commitment to democracy, the rule of law, a market-based economy, and open trade.

In addition, since September 11th all the world’s great powers see themselves as falling on the same side of a profound divide between the forces of chaos and order, and they are acting accordingly.

America and Europe have long shared a commitment to liberty. We also now understand that being the target of trained killers is a powerful tonic that makes disputes over other important issues look like the policy differences they are, instead of fundamental clashes of values.

The United States is also cooperating with India across a range of issues — even as we work closely with Pakistan.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terror and is reaching toward a future of greater democracy and economic freedom. As it does so, our relationship will continue to broaden and deepen. The passing of the ABM [1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treaty reducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear that the days of Russian military confrontation with the West are over.

China and the United States are cooperating on issues ranging from the fight against terror to maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. And China’s transition continues. Admittedly, in some areas, its leaders still follow practices that are abhorrent. Yet China’s leaders have said that their main goal is to raise living standards for the Chinese people. They will find that reaching that goal in today’s world will depend more on developing China’s human capital than it will on China’s natural resources or territorial possessions.

And as China’s populace become more educated, more free to think, and more entrepreneurial, we believe this will inevitably lead to greater political freedom. You cannot expect people to think on the job, but not at home.

This confluence of common interests and increasingly common values creates a moment of enormous opportunities. Instead of repeating the historic pattern where great power rivalry exacerbates local conflicts, we can use great power cooperation to solve conflicts, from the Middle East to Kashmir, Congo, and beyond. Great power cooperation also creates an opportunity for multilateral institutions — such as the U.N., NATO, and the WTO [World Trade Organization] — to prove their worth. That’s the challenge set forth by the president to the U.N. concerning Iraq. And great power cooperation can be
the basis for moving forward on problems that require multilateral solutions — from terror to the environment.

To build a balance of power that favors freedom, we must also extend the peace by extending the benefits of liberty and prosperity as broadly as possible. As the president has said, we have a responsibility to build a world that is not only safer, but better.

The United States will fight poverty, disease, and oppression because it is the right thing to do — and the smart thing to do. We have seen how poor states can become weak or even failed states, vulnerable to hijacking by terrorist networks — with potentially catastrophic consequences. And in societies where legal avenues for political dissent are stifled, the temptation to speak through violence grows.

We will lead efforts to build a global trading system that is growing and more free. Here in our own hemisphere, for example, we are committed to completing a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. We are also starting negotiations on a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union. Expanding trade is essential to the development efforts of poor nations and to the economic health of all nations.

We will continue to lead the world in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS — a pandemic which challenges our humanity and threatens whole societies.

We will seek to bring every nation into an expanding circle of development. Earlier this year the president proposed a 50 percent increase in U.S. development assistance. But he also made clear that new money means new terms. The new resources will only be available to countries that work to govern justly, invest in the health and education of their people, and encourage economic liberty.

We know from experience that corruption, bad policies, and bad practices can make aid money worse than useless. In such environments, aid props up bad policy, chasing out investment and perpetuating misery. Good policy, on the other hand, attracts private capital and expands trade. In a sound policy environment, development aid is a catalyst, not a crutch.

At the core of America’s foreign policy is our resolve to stand on the side of men and women in every nation who stand for what the president has called the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity” — free speech, equal justice, respect for women, religious tolerance, and limits on the power of the state.

These principles are universal — and President Bush has made them part of the debate in regions where many thought that merely to raise them was imprudent or impossible.

From Cairo and Ramallah to Tehran and Tashkent, the president has made clear that values must be a vital part of our relationships with other countries. In our development aid, our diplomacy, our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation, tolerance, and human rights. And we look forward to one day standing for these aspirations in a free and unified Iraq.

We reject the condescending view that freedom will not grow in the soil of the Middle East — or that Muslims somehow do not share in the desire to be free. The celebrations we saw on the streets of Kabul last year proved otherwise. And in a recent U.N. report, a panel of 30 Arab intellectuals recognized that for their nations to fully join in the progress of our times will require greater political and economic freedom, the empowerment of women, and better, more modern education.

We do not seek to impose democracy on others, we seek only to help create conditions in which people can claim a freer future for themselves. We recognize as well that there is no “one size fits all” answer. Our vision of the future is not one where every person eats Big Macs and drinks Coke — or where every nation has a bicameral legislature with 535 members and a judiciary that follows the principles of Marbury vs. Madison.
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey show that freedom manifests itself differently around the globe — and that new liberties can find an honored place amidst ancient traditions. In countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar, reform is underway, taking shape according to different local circumstances. And in Afghanistan this year, a traditional Loya Jirga assembly was the vehicle for creating the most broadly representative government in Afghan history.

Because of our own history, the United States knows we must be patient — and humble. Change — even if it is for the better — is often difficult. And progress is sometimes slow. America has not always lived up to our own high standards. When the Founding Fathers said, “We, the people,” they didn’t mean me. Democracy is hard work. And 226 years later, we are still practicing each day to get it right.

We have the ability to forge a 21st century that lives up to our hopes and not down to our fears. But only if we go about our work with purpose and clarity. Only if we are unwavering in our refusal to live in a world governed by terror and chaos. Only if we are unwilling to ignore growing dangers from aggressive tyrants and deadly technologies. And only if we are persistent and patient in exercising our influence in the service of our ideals, and not just ourselves.
Late last month, as Americans prepared to celebrate Thanksgiving, the people of Sri Lanka also had much to be grateful for. On November 25th, the representatives of 22 nations — including the United States — came together in Oslo, Norway, to pledge political and financial support for Sri Lanka’s peace process, the best hope in many years of bringing an end to two decades of violence and terror.

That day was a clear reminder that even for a small nation such as Sri Lanka, resolving conflict takes the support of a coalition of international partners. That day also served as a reminder that no country can expect to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorism, as well as the conditions that can nurture such violence, without help from other nations and institutions.

Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, the United States stands alone as a nation of unmatched diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural might. As a people, we have greater capacity and capability to protect and advance our interests in the world than at any other time in our history. As a nation, we have greater responsibility to exercise leadership than at any other time in our history.

Nonetheless, for all of our clout and influence, the United States faces some of the same security challenges that countries such as Sri Lanka face.

Indeed, no nation can hope to tackle successfully the decisive challenges of this age alone.

This is a fundamental, underlying principle of President Bush’s National Security Strategy. Beyond devoting a chapter to the strategic importance of alliances and partnerships, the document underscores on nearly every page the necessity of cooperating with other nations, institutions, and organizations. International cooperation is an indispensable ingredient, whether the strategy is focused on fighting the war against terrorism, sustaining regional stability, expanding trade and development, maintaining friendly ties to global powers, or dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, infectious disease, and international crime.

The U.S. commitment to international cooperation reflects not only pragmatism, but also a principle, one that runs through our history and our vision of the future. As the President’s National Security Strategy makes clear, U.S. foreign policy will serve not just the American people, but “the cause of human dignity” on every continent. This is an ambitious agenda, one that will require us not only to prevail in the war against terrorism, but also to apply the lessons we learn and relationships we build in this war to every other challenge we will face in the 21st century. As the lead agency in developing and maintaining international relations now and for the

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

By Richard L. Armitage
Deputy Secretary of State

“September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps some good has come out of those terrible events,” says Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage. “In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignment in which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining our priorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just on winning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states.”
future, the Department of State, in particular, is playing a key role in implementing this vision. And as the president’s representative in this effort, Secretary of State Colin Powell is taking his responsibility for building these relationships and orchestrating the efforts of the Department with the utmost gravity and industry.

A basic responsibility for any government is to protect the governed. President Bush’s top strategic priority, therefore, is to protect the American people from another terrorist attack. As the recent bombings in Bali and Kenya illustrate, however, terrorism is a grim reality around the world, and a threat to all nations and peoples. Therefore, our response — and the effect of our policies — must be global. While the United States will always reserve the right to act alone in its own interests, our national security is enhanced when other countries choose to play a constructive, proactive role in helping the United States protect itself. Given the global ambitions of terrorists, national security today is a function of how well all countries protect each other, not just how well one country protects itself.

And while coalition warfare is as old as war itself, today’s coalition against terrorism is unprecedented in scale and in scope. In a monumental diplomatic undertaking, the United States has joined with some 180 other nations to counter the threat of terrorism using all of the tools available to us — intelligence, finance, law enforcement, and military operations. The United Nations set the stage for such a comprehensive coalition by passing Security Council Resolution 1373, which obligated all nations to actively combat financing, recruitment, transit, safe haven, and other forms of support to terrorists and their backers, as well as to cooperate with other nations’ counterterrorism efforts.

America’s global network of alliances and partnerships, many configured for Cold War challenges, quickly adapted to this post September 11th security environment. In the immediate aftermath, for example, NATO, ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and United States] and the Organization of American States for the first time invoked 50-year-old self-defense mechanisms. Indeed, NATO forces drawn from European nations flew patrols over American skies in the days and months following the attacks. Other multilateral institutions changed course to meet pressing needs. The Financial Action Task Force, originally constituted to track funds fueling the international narcotics trade, took the lead in the hunt for the money trails that lead to terrorists. The G-8 nations moved to secure global networks of commerce and communication, including by stationing customs inspectors in each others’ ports through the Container Security Initiative. New relationships also came into play. For example, U.S. diplomats for the first time negotiated with the states of Central Asia for access and overflight rights to American and coalition forces.

This mutually reinforcing mix of ad hoc alliances and more formal arrangements has led to a sustained and successful campaign over the past 14 months. Coalition military operations have excised al Qaeda from Afghanistan, destroying its infrastructure and killing or capturing many of its operatives. The rest remain in hiding and on the run. Intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation have led to the arrest or detention of nearly 2,300 suspected terrorists in 99 nations, and have prevented many, though unfortunately not all, attacks on civilian targets around the world. More than 160 countries have frozen more than $100 million in assets belonging to terrorists and their supporters. In each of these efforts, foreign policy professionals have played a key role in securing the necessary agreements and actions.

Beyond waging war and building the long-term capacity to fight terrorism, the current international coalition also has been essential to the liberation of Afghanistan. Although this effort is partly humanitarian, it is also an important security measure. For too long, Afghanistan served as both the proving grounds and the launching pad for terrorists. Peace and stability for Afghanistan is in the direct interests not only of the 23 million inhabitants of that country, but also the neighboring nations who suffered from destabilizing waves of drugs, criminals, and refugees from that territory, and all of the nations of the world whose investment in the rule of law has been put at risk by al Qaeda’s activities.
Decades of war have taken an extreme toll on Afghanistan. The country lacks everything from basic infrastructure to civil society institutions, all of which will take considerable resources to restore. Consider that rebuilding a paved road from Kabul to Herat will cost an estimated $260 million — at least — and that one project alone will take the concerted resources of Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Today, it will take a sustained international political and financial commitment from the community of nations, and the hard diplomatic work to get and sustain this commitment, to keep Afghanistan from chaos.

The twin campaigns to defeat terrorism and reconstruct Afghanistan are stretching global resources and testing international resolve. U.S. leadership — and especially the diplomatic leadership of the Department of State — has been essential to mobilizing both the resources and the resolve, with far-reaching results. As the National Security Strategy notes, “in leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21st century.”

Like terrorism, many of the challenges of the 21st century will be transnational in nature, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the need to ensure that all nations can benefit from a globalized economy, to the spread of infectious diseases. Even internal unrest will continue to have regional consequences. These transnational problems will require transnational solutions, and the current war is helping the United States to develop the requisite patterns and habits of cooperation.

Cold War alliances and rivalries, reinterpreted for the age of terrorism, are showing promising signs of flexibility. In particular, as the National Security Strategy notes, the United States may have a new opportunity for a future where “main centers of global power” cooperate more and compete less. From Russian President [Vladimir] Putin’s immediate offer of condolences and support after the 9/11 [September 11, 2001] attacks, U.S.-Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism has been path-breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. The United States has also forged new relationships with China, which has provided valuable assistance in tracking terrorist finances. In both cases, the overlap in our current efforts is opening new possibilities for dialogue in areas that have traditionally been difficult, including regional security issues, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights concerns, and key trade issues, such as accession to the World Trade Organization.

Multilateral institutions also are showing signs of new growth. Following extensive U.S. diplomatic efforts, the United Nations passed Resolution 1441, for example, taking a tough new stand against the threat posed by Iraqi possession of chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons. NATO, too, has retooled to meet today’s needs. At the recent summit in Prague, NATO invited seven European nations to join as new members, reaffirmed its commitment to developing updated military capabilities, and emphasized its new and deepening relationships with Russia, Central Asia, and other regions beyond Europe.

The international recognition that underlying corrosive conditions — such as repression, poverty, and disease — present a threat to international stability is also spurring the growth of new cooperative mechanisms. U.S. leadership is key to these efforts, as well, but will only truly be effective insofar as it leverages commitments from other nations. HIV/AIDS, for example, presents a staggering public health crisis and ultimately a risk to the stability of many regions. The United States made the initial and single largest donation to a new Global Fund, kicked off by the G-8 [Group of Eight industrialized nations] and endorsed by the United Nations, to prevent the spread and deal with the effects of the disease. That Fund has now reached a total of $2.1 billion [$2,100 million]. At the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey and other such venues, the United States has helped to forge new approaches to international aid, based on principles of accountability, fiscal responsibility, and good governance. Indeed, the U.S. has established the $5,000 million Millennium Challenge Account — a 50 percent increase in the
U.S. commitment to foreign assistance — which will be dispensed according to these basic tenets.

Ultimately, these habits and patterns of cooperation will persist because of the dual imperatives of pragmatism and principle. First, cooperation in dealing with transnational challenges is in the self-interest of so many nations, and second, nations have a dedication to certain shared values. Terrorists, for example, present a clear and direct threat to the rule of law, to international norms and standards for human dignity, and in the end, to the international system of states itself.

September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps some good has come out of those terrible events. In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignment in which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining our priorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just on winning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states. Every nation in the world — from Sri Lanka to Afghanistan to America — stands to benefit.

By General Richard B. Myers
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

One hundred years ago, those involved in the nation's national security business wrestled with many of the same, or certainly similar, issues that we face today, says General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Then and now, regional powers can threaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then, as now, internal strife from religious hatreds, ethnic rivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead to bloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops often play a role in the crisis to restore peace.”

This article is based on remarks made by General Myers at a recent event at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Let’s look back at September, when the nation was shocked by an extremist’s attack. In the aftermath, the president declared that the extremist struck at the “very heart of the American republic.” And as happens after events like that, of course Wall Street took a dive. Certainly the motivation for that attack in part came from how others perceived America and our role in the world. For example, the Philippines was caught up in a conflict between their Muslim and Catholic communities. And U.S. forces were there to help.

Now, some may think I am talking about September 2001. Actually I was referring to September of 1901. The point is that there are parallels over time.

A hundred years ago, the extremist attack that I was referring to was done by an anarchist who hated America and all it stood for. He took out his wrath by assassinating President William McKinley. Today, of course, we probably wouldn’t call him an anarchist — he’d be an extremist or perhaps a terrorist. It was also a hundred years ago that the nation debated America’s Manifest Destiny, as it brought in new territories of Wake and Guam and Hawaii and they all came under the American flag. Of course, the parallel today is the debate over the part the United States will play in globalization.

In 1901, the U.S. armed forces had to adapt to meet the new challenges. President Teddy Roosevelt championed many of the efforts that today we would call transformation. The U.S. Navy was ranked fourth or fifth in the world. In the Atlantic, the German Navy had 12 battleships to the U.S.’s eight. And to fix this, Roosevelt built 24 new capital ships. This fleet was called “the Great White Fleet” that set sail in 1907. The Army underwent similar changes when they went to the Enfield rifle. They also purchased new bayonets because the old ones would bend in hand-to-hand combat.

But it’s not the hardware change that makes such efforts transformational; it is the intellectual and organizational changes. Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Elihu Root, created the [National] War College at Fort McNair in order to give military officers the mental agility to anticipate events in this new international environment. He also set up the army staff, so that the army could have a cadre of planning experts on hand. This ensured that the army had the flexibility to meet the new challenges of going from strictly a U.S.-based force to one that would have worldwide interests.

My point is that 100 years ago, those involved in our nation’s national security business wrestled with many of the same, or certainly similar, issues that we face today. Then and now, regional powers can threaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then, as now, internal strife from religious hatreds, ethnic rivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead to
bloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops often play a role in the crisis to restore peace.

But compared to 100 years ago, our 21st century security environment has, I think, two profound changes that makes it different. First is the presence of transnational actors. They find sanctuary by design within the borders of hostile states. Or they find sanctuary by default within the borders of failing states or in ungoverned areas.

The second profound change is that belligerents of all types have access to dramatically more sophisticated tools. It’s probably an outgrowth of our great global telecommunications industry that gives hostile states and terrorists alike access to a treasure of information. The post-Cold War arms markets offer them many different types of weapons — advanced radars, sophisticated submarines, and so forth. Unfortunately, these markets also include weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and the know-how to make them and use them. And this proliferation of advanced technology accentuates a trend in warfare that has a potentially profound impact on our security.

Since the time of Thucydides, the premise of conflict between nations is that the stronger states could defeat the weaker ones. That was the common wisdom. In the past 200 years, that’s been roughly true about 70 percent of the time. But as we saw in Vietnam, and the Soviets saw in Afghanistan, great powers can fail because there’s a mismatch in interest. What is a peripheral issue to a powerful state may be a core issue of survival to a weaker state. This disparity of interest, then, can get translated into a disparity of commitment. It’s one reason why a weak power can overcome a stronger nation’s designs.

And since 1980, one political scientist reports that this trend for the weaker to succeed has actually increased as the weaker states have come out on top almost half of the time in the last 20 years.

And now if you add weapons of mass destruction to the equation, you have a case where relatively weak actors may have access to lethal power that rivals what the strongest nations have. Weak actors can potentially inflict unprecedented devastation on a great nation. With weapons of mass destruction, they can hold at risk large portions of societies.

During the Cold War, we faced the threat of nuclear conflict with a superpower, but deterrence contained that threat because we placed at risk something the adversary held very dear. That was, in essence, their very existence. Today, if a weak power is a terrorist network with weapons of mass destruction, deterrence won’t work most of the time. When they’re willing to commit suicide to further their agenda, what do they value that we can place at risk?

This dilemma reflects the unprecedented nature of today’s security environment. And to meet these very daunting challenges, the president recently published a new National Security Strategy. In support of that, let me tell you about three broad considerations of the military’s role in supporting our new national security strategy.

The first consideration is that the United States military has got to accomplish a multitude of tasks. We must promote security, of course, to fight and win our nation’s wars. But nothing is more central to our mission today than to defend this nation here at home. And that’s why we’ve made a series of very significant changes to the way the President tells us how to go about our business. We call that the Unified Command Plan. It’s how the president says, “Here’s what I want your various commands to do.”

One of the central things we’ve done is establish U.S. Northern Command. It stood up on October 1, 2002, so it’s a little over a month old. And to say it knows exactly where it’s going would be a mistake. It’s got about a year before it gets up to what we think would be its full operational capability. We gave it the mission to deter, prevent, and defeat aggression aimed at the United States. And should the necessity arise, from an act of war or an act of God, Northern Command will provide the talents and the skills of our armed forces to assist and, in most cases, be subordinate to civilian authorities for whatever the crisis of the moment is.
Key to Northern Command’s effectiveness in carrying out the mission that I described is the flow of information. This applies not just inside the Department of Defense, and not just inside this new Northern Command, but to all the Federal departments and agencies that have something to do with keeping us safe.

In our new security environment, we know that everybody has a role — State, Treasury, Justice, Customs, intelligence agencies, the FBI and, I think, all the way down to local law enforcement agencies and departments.

Recently, I was fortunate enough to see a program that we’re experimenting with and that we hope to bring to fruition fairly quickly. It’s the project we call Protect America and it sounds simple. It involves integrating techniques in a way that has not been done, at least inside the government. It’s a web-based collaborative and interactive tool that offers a lot of promise in integrating data from different people and allowing people to interact with that data. It’s structured in a way that allows hands-off gathering of data until it becomes important to you.

These kinds of tools are absolutely essential if we’re going to come up with the agility and the flexibility to deal with the terrorist threat that we see today. What they’re going to enable us to do is to think faster than our adversary. And I would submit that early on in Afghanistan we were absolutely thinking faster than the adversary, and therefore we were very successful. I think you could make an argument now that we’re not thinking as fast as we need to think, that we’re not inside the decision loop, if you will, of the adversary. We need to speed that up.

Another complex factor is that it’s not just inside the United States that this information flow has to work very well. We’ve all got to be able to interact, at least in an informational way, certainly, with a common foundation, if we’re going to be effective against this terrorist threat.

I see our new Northern Command as the catalyst to help the rest of government develop these information-sharing techniques — from a cop on a beat somewhere who notices something interesting and unusual going on, to the Coast Guard which tracks shipping coming into our ports, to individuals who just want to call up and make a report. You’re going to have to have some way to manage it in order to avoid completely inundating the law enforcement network, and that’s what I’m suggesting. These are tasks that we’ve got to do today.

At the same time, we’ve got to ensure our military is ready for tomorrow. And it’s not something that we can do tomorrow, it’s something we’ve got to do today for tomorrow. So we made some other changes to our Unified Command Plan. We have a command in Norfolk, Virginia, called Joint Forces Command, and we’ve given them a primary job now of transforming our military in terms of our exercises and experimentation. And we removed one of the hats that this command used to have — and that was the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, which was a NATO command. We’ve done it with some controversy, but we’ve done it. And the way it will probably wind up is that that command in Norfolk will also have a NATO hat that will work transformation and the interoperability of the United States and European nations. This is still in the proposal stage, but that’s probably the way it’s going to work out.

The second consideration is our military’s role in this, the 21st century, and geography. The question you might ask is: Should the military be focused regionally or should we focus more globally? My unequivocal answer is yes. On the one hand, we’ve got to focus regionally because so often that’s where the interests are. That’s where we’ve got to maintain a local capability. The regional combatant commanders — the Pacific Command, the European, the Central Command, the Southern Command — they’re out there to promote stability, to foster good military cooperation between forces, and to provide that immediate crisis response force — from humanitarian up to conflict.

On the other hand, we know that there are certain threats that transcend regional and political borders. So our response must transcend those borders as well. And that means that we’ve also got to have a global
capability that’s equal to our regional capability, which we don’t have today in most respects. This is something that’s going to be evolving.

We did stand up a new U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha. We’ve always had a Strategic Command in Omaha, but what we did is give it a dramatically new mission by closing down what’s known as U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs and putting the two together with a brand-new command. We’re also looking at giving the command new missions that weren’t assigned before.

These missions, I think, reflect the kinds of global capabilities that we need, things like missile defense. There is a need to look at such issues as global strike, information operations, and command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on a global basis, not just regionally.

Let me explain the missile defense issue to you. Hypothetical situation: A missile is launched from Iraq into Israel. Iraq happens to be in one of our regional commands called Central Command. Israel happens to be in European Command. So immediately we have two commands involved, and perhaps Strategic Command.

Those kinds of events are inherently multi-command and more global in nature than they are regional. So to do the job right, we’ve got to have a global approach to how we integrate our missile warning, our command and control, the defensive options that we have, and the attack options, for that matter, that we have. And we need one commander that looks at this holistically on a global basis.

So those are a couple of examples that explain what we’re talking about in developing a more global view of the world. And it particularly has applicability when you think about dealing with terrorists because they’re not respecting any boundaries. They go back and forth very, very easily.

The third role is an issue that’s been talked about a lot lately. It’s in the national security strategy, and the military has a role. It’s the issue of preemption. At times, and especially if you pay attention to a lot of the articles that have been written, you wonder if folks have really read the national security strategy.

Because if you do, you’ll realize that the national security strategy really describes using all instruments of national power to prevent an attack. It describes how preemption must include strengthening our non-proliferation efforts, to use diplomatic and financial tools to keep weapons of mass destruction technology out of the wrong people’s hands. And it talks about ensuring our military forces are well-equipped to deal with the weapons of mass destruction environment. It would cause any belligerent who would want to use weapons of mass destruction to pause to think if they might be able to gain their desired effect. It clearly states that preemption doesn’t have to include the use of offensive military force at all.

I would submit that this concept isn’t really new to Americans. In fact, it was President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) who talked about it in the days before Pearl Harbor, before the U.S. was involved in World War II. It was during a fireside chat on September 11, 1941, where FDR talked about a Nazi sub that had attacked the destroyer USS GREER near Iceland. He told America, “Let us not say: We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in hitting home or if the crew and the passengers are drowned. The time for active defense is now.”

In addition, international law for a long time has recognized exactly what FDR described. A nation does not need to wait for attack before it acts. In FDR’s time, absorbing the unprovoked torpedo attack cost a couple of hundred lives of sailors and civilians. It certainly was a tragedy. But today absorbing a first blow of a chemical, or a biological, or a nuclear attack, radiological attack, could cost up to tens of thousands, perhaps more, of innocent lives. That would be a catastrophe. So the questions we’ve got to debate are: Can, or should we accept this risk? And in today’s dramatically different era, must a free people wait until the threat is physically present before you act? Or can you act if there is some sort of mix of latent potential and demonstrated motive
that you don’t think you’re going to be able to deter? Having an open discussion about these sorts of things is, I think, very, very important and very, very healthy.

In my view, any discussion we have in the future almost has to include weapons of mass destruction and the dramatic change they’ve brought to our security environment. If terrorists or hostile regional powers have them, they can hold at risk our society and certainly the societies of our friends and allies.

To help counter the threat, our Armed Forces are increasing our ability to operate in a coherent and in a global manner. We’ve got to have that global view and put this competency on a par with our regional capabilities. And we’ve got to talk about risk — the risk of action and, of course, the risk of inaction, and when the U.S. should act in its own defense.
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

By Alan P. Larson
Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs

"The National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of strengthening our economic security, expanding trade and investment, and promoting economic development," says Under Secretary of State Alan P. Larson. "We are working to achieve these goals through diplomacy and by sharing the experience of our own development, based on our political and economic freedoms. Success in achieving these economic policy goals is a core part of our National Security Strategy."

The President’s National Security Strategy aims to “help make the world not just safer but better.” And a world that is better will also be safer. National security and global economic prosperity are inexorably linked.

Economic strength and resiliency are the foundation of our national security. The economic dimension of the National Security Strategy focuses on three priorities:

First, we must assure economic security by making the U.S. and global economies more resilient to economic shocks.

Second, we must advance a global prosperity agenda by expanding trade and investment between nations.

Third, we need to ensure poor nations participate fully in the rising tide of prosperity.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

To ensure our economic security we must focus on four tasks in the coming years. We must develop diversified and reliable supplies of energy. We must make international transportation of people and goods safe and secure. We must cut off financing for terrorists. We must ensure stability of the international financial system and the economic stability of key allies.

Energy Security: The National Security Strategy pledges that, “We will strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy efficient technologies.”

We need to secure reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices in order to foster economic growth and prosperity, and to ensure that oil cannot be used as a weapon. We must deal with some hard facts about the international oil markets. Two-thirds of proven world oil reserves are in the Middle East. Europe and Japan, like the United States, rely on imports to meet a growing portion of oil needs. Aftershocks from global oil supply disruptions will ripple through the global economy. Finally, problem states control significant amounts of oil.

Our energy security requires a robust international strategy and close cooperation with other countries. Working with the International Energy Agency, we have already established a well-tested approach to prevent sudden disruptions in the oil market from damaging the world economy. In the mid- to long-term, we must continue to increase and diversify production of energy in the United States and in
reliable producing countries. As part of this effort, we are undertaking to improve the climate for oil sector investment in many countries, and are actively helping to improve the infrastructure necessary to gain access to relatively new suppliers, such as those in the Caspian and Central Asian region.

**Transport Security:** Safe air travel, maritime transport and secure borders are critical to our economic security and prosperity. We are working diligently with foreign governments and international organizations to ensure the safe flow of goods and people across our borders. Working with the International Civil Aviation Organization, we are developing and implementing an even more robust airport security audit program. We are strengthening cockpit doors on aircraft as quickly as possible. Tougher visa and travel industry personnel identification procedures are being put in place.

We also must ensure that terrorists cannot surreptitiously transport either hazardous materials or themselves across our sea or land borders. We have partnered with countries around the world to implement the Container Security Initiative and other aspects of the G-8 (Group of Eight industrialized nations) Cooperative Action on Transport Security and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative. These steps will ensure we can screen the contents of containers coming into the United States to detect possible hazardous materials, weapons of mass destruction, and the terrorists who might use them against us. We must also support efforts to help the International Maritime Organization implement shipping and port facility standards around the world.

**Terrorism Finance:** Terrorists receive support through networks of financial backers and intermediaries. They raise money to support their operations through means such as common criminal activity, including fraud, extortion, kidnapping and corrupt trade. They also use front companies, skim profits off legitimate businesses, and abuse charities and non-profit organizations. They transfer funds through formal and informal financial systems, and through the smuggling of cash, precious metals, or gems. This exploitation of international financial networks and charitable organizations threatens public safety and undermines the viability of legitimate institutions. The international community must have a unified global strategy for denying terrorists access to the financial means to commit atrocities, and for using the financial trail to locate and disrupt terrorist cells.

The United States is leading international efforts, based on international norms developed by the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to create counter-terrorist financing regimes that identify and freeze terrorist assets, promote accountability and transparency in financial transactions, deny terrorists access to formal and informal financial systems, and prevent abuse of charitable fundraising mechanisms. Together with our allies, we will provide necessary technical assistance to countries engaged in the front-line of the struggle to disrupt terrorist financing.

**Financial Stability of Key Allies:** In the war against terrorism, we worked to secure the support of nations around the world. It is in our interest to make sure that those nations engaged in the front-line of this war are not threatened by economic and financial instability. We provide necessary support to these front-line states by working actively with other countries, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the private sector to prevent financial crises and to more effectively resolve them when they occur. Promoting regional trade will also play an important role in fostering economic growth among key front-line states, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We address financial disruptions (notably in Latin America) that threaten the economic stability of emerging markets. We work with the IFIs to provide advice and support to countries that are trying to pursue sound macroeconomic policies, provide greater transparency, adopt prudential standards, and keep debt levels manageable and inflation low.

**AN OPEN MARKET AGENDA FOR PROSPERITY**

The President has outlined a plan for igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade. The National Security Strategy notes
that “A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.”

Nations who would stand with us to address threats from terrorism and rogue states need strong economic growth and stability to be able to support our common efforts and values. The United States can strengthen this global coalition by promoting economic growth at home and in other developed nations, promoting the economic development of the poorer countries, and setting an open market agenda for prosperity.

To achieve this, we work with our major trading partners to spur growth and opportunity worldwide. We begin by solidifying the economic gains made under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with our closest neighbors, Mexico and Canada. One immediate consequence of stricter global security requirements was a temporary slowdown in the delivery of intermediate goods across the borders with our NAFTA partners. The United States developed smart border action plans with both Canada and Mexico, which will provide greater security while facilitating trade between the three NAFTA countries.

Europe and Japan are vital trade and investment partners. They are our staunch allies in the war against terror — and know that their own security is at stake. Concerted efforts by the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan are imperative in implementing the new World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda, which will add billions in new opportunities and help anchor trust in markets and in integration, and lead the world economy towards stability. Japan is mired in economic malaise and Europe is growing beneath its potential. The United States and the world need Japan and Europe to be strong and healthy. We are supporting Japan’s efforts to reform its critically ill banking sector so it will be able to fully exercise its potential for economic leadership and growth.

The economic aspects of our critical strategic relationships are becoming ever more important. Measures to expand trade and investment are now central to those relationships. China has become a member of the WTO. Russia is pursuing WTO membership. We are working closely to encourage greater private investment in that country.

The United States has developed a comprehensive strategy to promote free trade. In addition to our multilateral efforts in the WTO, we are moving ahead with regional and bilateral trade initiatives. We begin with a firm base of our success in the North American Free Trade Agreement. A Free Trade Area of the Americas is our next goal. Building on our successful bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan, we will work to complete agreements with Chile, Singapore, Australia, the Southern Africa Customs Union, and others.

**EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OF DEVELOPMENT**

Last March (2002) in Monterrey, Mexico, the President said, “The advance of development is a central commitment of American foreign policy. As a nation founded on the dignity and value of every life, America’s heart breaks because of the suffering and senseless death we see in our world. We work for prosperity and opportunity because they’re right. It’s the right thing to do. We also work for prosperity and opportunity because they help defeat terror.”

He added, “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism. Being poor doesn’t make you a murderer. Most of the plotters of September 11th were raised in comfort. Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror.”

The international community acknowledged earlier this year in Monterrey at the Conference on Financing for Development that developing countries have primary responsibility for their own development, but that we must be their partners in success. That success requires that all the resources for development be unlocked and used well, including domestic savings, public sector resources, trade and investment, and human talent and innovation.
Productive investment is essential for development. Foreign and domestic private capital far outweigh official development assistance as a source for development investment. Capital is a coward, however. It flees from corruption, bad policies, conflict, and unpredictability. It shuns ignorance, disease, and illiteracy. Capital goes only where it is welcomed and where investors can feel confident of a return on the resources they risk. To help create this secure investment environment, we must encourage other nations to live by the rule of law, follow sound economic policies, fight corruption with transparency and accountability, and invest wisely in their people.

Official development assistance can also play an important role in helping countries on the road to economic prosperity and political stability. At the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, President Bush unveiled his Millennium Challenge Account Initiative (MCA) which will increase our assistance to poor nations over the next three years to a new level — some 50 percent higher than it is today. The $5,000 million in new money will go every year to accelerate lasting progress in developing nations that govern justly, invest in their people, and promote economic freedom and enterprise. The MCA is an investment in our collective future. It will promote partnership with countries taking the often hard steps to real development, which includes promoting freedom and opportunity for their own people. It promotes shared efforts, shared values, and shared successes. The friendship and better lives of those it helps is our return on investment.

The United States can lead but cannot spur lasting development alone. We must work actively with the developing countries themselves, with other donors and with the IFIs to ensure a global effort to raise living standards in the poorest regions of the world. We must hold developing countries accountable in partnership for working to ensure that their people’s lives actually improve. We must hold ourselves accountable for providing effective help for those committed to development. We will continue to encourage the multilateral development banks to focus on increasing economic productivity in developing countries. We need measurable results from programs that improve agriculture, water treatment and distribution, education, health, the rule of law, and private sector development. The support for development assistance to the very poorest should be in the form of grants instead of loans.

Opening markets worldwide will also speed development for those countries making sound development efforts, including efforts to seize trade opportunities. Increasing the trade in both goods and services between developing countries where enormous unmet opportunity exists, as well as with other nations, will accelerate development and provide a foundation for a more secure and stable global economy. The expansion of beneficial trade involving developing countries has been a major driver behind unprecedented progress on reducing poverty in recent decades.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of strengthening our economic security, expanding trade and investment, and promoting economic development. We are working to achieve these goals through diplomacy and by sharing the experience of our own development, based on our political and economic freedoms. Success in achieving these economic policy goals is a core part of our National Security Strategy.
The newly revised National Security Strategy issued by the Bush Administration eloquently lays out a comprehensive agenda to guide U.S. foreign policy through the next decade and beyond. By linking together our fundamental principles, our long-term goals, and the challenges we will confront in the new century, this document provides an excellent and concise guide to thinking strategically about how the United States can best employ its resources toward promoting its interests around the world.

Of necessity, a study of such sweeping scope can devote only a limited discussion to each of its many subjects, inevitably prompting calls for more attention to be given to one facet or another. Each reader will have his other favorite to champion. One that I believe deserves much greater emphasis in our foreign policy decision-making is the role of public diplomacy.

The updated National Security Strategy proceeds from an understanding that the power of the United States is immense and unprecedented, but it also wisely notes that we cannot achieve all of our goals by acting alone, says U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee. “We must have allies to help shoulder the tasks, especially if we are to render our accomplishments secure.”

And public diplomacy is the most effective instrument we possess for engaging them.

Public diplomacy — the collective name given to efforts by the U.S. government to explain its foreign policy to the world and encourage greater familiarity with the United States by the populations of other countries — embraces international broadcasting, exchange programs, and a range of public information services, along with many other programs and functions by a surprisingly large number of agencies. But in addition to this essentially passive approach, there is an additional capacity and a larger purpose which have never been fully recognized, namely the use of public diplomacy to speak directly to the peoples of the world and enlist them in our long-term efforts to promote freedom, prosperity, and stability throughout the world.

If we are to achieve this ambitious goal, we must begin by reversing the long neglect that has consigned public diplomacy to the periphery of our foreign policy decision-making. Our initial focus must be on stripping away the encumbrance of misunderstanding and disinformation that has been allowed to distort the image of the United States abroad, distortions that now seriously threaten our influence and security. Only then can we begin to lay the foundation for a deep and lasting connection with the peoples of the world that is complementary to, but separate from, our relationships with their governments. The necessary elements for this historic task are already in hand.
Let me explain that task and the rewards that await us if we accomplish it.

As Americans, we are justly proud of our country. If any nation has been a greater force for good in the long and tormented history of this world, I am unaware of it. We have guarded whole continents from conquest, showered aid on distant lands, sent thousands of youthful idealists to remote and often inhospitable areas to help the world’s forgotten.

Why, then, when we read or listen to descriptions of America in the foreign press, do we so often seem to be entering a fantasyland of hatred? Much of the popular press overseas, often including the government-owned media, daily depict the United States as a force for evil, accusing this country of an endless number of malevolent plots against the world. Even as we strike against the network of terrorists who masterminded the murder of thousands of Americans, our actions are widely depicted in the Muslim world as a war against Islam. Our efforts, however imperfect, to bring peace to the Middle East spark riots that threaten governments that dare to cooperate with us.

How has this state of affairs come about? How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has allowed such a destructive and parodied image of itself to become the intellectual coin of the realm overseas? Over the years, the images of mindless hatred directed at us have become familiar fixtures on our television screens.

All this time, we have heard calls that “something must be done.” But, clearly, whatever has been done has not been enough.

I believe that the problem is too great and too entrenched to be solved by tweaking an agency here or reshuffling a program there. If a strategy is not working, we should not insist on more of the same. Instead, we must begin by rethinking our entire approach.

It is increasingly clear that much of the problem lies in our ineffective and often antiquated methods. For example, broadcasts on short-wave radio simply cannot compete with AM and FM channels in terms of accessibility, to say nothing of television, the most powerful medium of all. Shifting our efforts into these and other broad-based media, including the Internet and others, will take time and money, but this reorientation is a prerequisite to reaching our intended audience.

But there is a deeper problem. According to many observers, we have largely refused to participate in the contest for public opinion and thereby allowed our enemies’ slanders to go unchallenged. The effort to avoid controversy has come at the cost of potential persuasion and of much of the reason to listen to us at all.

The results are sobering. In testimony last year before the House International Relations Committee, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees our international broadcasting efforts, stated that “we have virtually no youthful audience under the age of 25 in the Arab world.”

We have several tasks, then. We must develop both the means of reaching a broader audience and also the compelling content that will persuade them to tune in. These objectives will not be easy to accomplish, especially in an increasingly competitive media environment, but they are prerequisite to our having an opportunity to present our case in clear and persuasive terms. Our work does not stop there, for we must make our case not once but over and over again and be prepared to do so for decades to come.

It is for that reason that I introduced legislation aimed at accomplishing these and other goals, legislation which I am proud to say has enjoyed broad bipartisan support and which the House passed unanimously last July. Unfortunately, we were not able to persuade the Senate of the merits of this legislation before both houses adjourned, but we shall take it up again in the 108th Congress.

This bill, H.R. 3969, is divided into three sections. The first reshapes and refocuses the State Department’s public diplomacy programs, including specifying a series of objectives to be attained and requiring an annual plan be formulated to determine how these are to be implemented. Far greater prominence will be given to public diplomacy
throughout all of the Department’s activities, and greater resources will be made available to ensure that these new responsibilities can be met.

The second section establishes a series of exchange programs focused on the Muslim world. Our purpose here is to lay the foundation for long-term change in a part of the world to which we have given far too little attention. As we respond to the immediate problems before us, we must remember that the task we face has no obvious endpoint.

The third section of the bill reorganizes our international broadcasting services in order to prepare them for far-reaching and innovative reforms. Given the importance of broadcasting to our larger purpose, we cannot afford to be constrained by how we have always done things. New approaches and enhanced resources will be central to any prospect of winning an expanded audience, and this bill is but the first step in that direction. To this end, the House has authorized $135 million to launch an ambitious effort into television broadcasting.

Let me now turn to what I believe should be the larger purpose of our public diplomacy efforts. To some, that purpose is self-evident: to provide objective news and information, to convey an accurate and positive image of America, and to present and explain U.S. foreign policy.

Unquestionably, these are essential functions. If we do them well, they will comprise an indispensable voice of clarity regarding our foreign policy, one otherwise absent from the world’s airways.

However, I believe that public diplomacy’s potential is even greater. To understand that, we must first understand that half of our foreign policy is missing.

Let me explain.

As the most powerful actor in the international system, the United States conducts the world’s only global foreign policy, one that dwarfs in extent and resources that of any other country. Its range extends across the entire spectrum, from the political and military to the economic and cultural, and centers on an elaborate array of relationships with virtually every sovereign government, from Russia to Vatican City, with scores of international organizations rounding out the total.

Nevertheless, for some years now, scholars have talked about the emergence in world politics of what they call “non-state actors.” While the nation-state remains the primary “actor” on the world stage, it is no longer the only one — and in certain instances, what nation-states do and don’t do is heavily conditioned by what those non-state actors do and don’t do.

Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1980’s is a powerful example of a “non-state actor” which had a dramatic and positive impact on the course of events. I needn’t remind you that al Qaeda has demonstrated a contrary ability to sow destruction.

Thus, it should be obvious to all that the dynamics of world politics are no longer determined by foreign policy professionals only. As important as they are, what they think and do is conditioned by what is happening in the hearts and minds of almost 7,000 million human beings on a shrinking globe in an age of almost instantaneous information. That is why public diplomacy — the effort to persuade those hearts and minds of the truth about our purposes in the world — must be a crucial part of our foreign policy effort.

My point is this: Our focus on our relations with foreign governments and international organizations has led us to overlook a set of powerful allies: the peoples of the world.

Uniquely among the world’s powers, a dense network connects the United States with the populations of virtually every country on the planet, a network that is independent of any formal state-to-state interaction. On one level, this is not surprising: as the preeminent political, military, and economic power, the presence of the United States is a daily fact of life in most areas of the globe. America’s cultural impact is even broader, penetrating to the most forbiddingly remote areas of the world, with a range continually expanded by the boundless reach of electronic media.
But there is an even deeper connection, a bond that derives from the universal values America represents. More than a simple wish list of desirable freedoms, at their core is the belief that these values have universal application, that they are inherent in individuals and peoples by right of their humanity and not by the grace of the powerful and the unelected. They provide hope even for those populations which have never experienced hope.

The advancement of freedom has been a prominent component of American foreign policy since this country’s inception. Given the nature of the American people, it is certain to remain so. But in addition to genuine altruism, our promotion of freedom can have another purpose, namely as an element in the United States’ geopolitical strategy.

Despite the laments and exasperations of the practitioners of Realpolitik regarding what they see as our simplistic and naive images of the world, we haven’t done so badly. That virtually the entire continent of Europe is free and secure today is largely due to America’s powerful and beneficent embrace, one that stretches from the landings in Normandy to the present day.

The history of the last century taught us many lessons, one of the most important being that the desire for freedom we share with others can be a remarkably powerful weapon for undermining geopolitical threats. The prime example is the Soviet Union.

Decades of enormous effort on the part of the United States and the West aimed at containing and undermining the threat posed by the Soviet empire enjoyed considerable success. But it was only with the advent of democracy in Russia and the other nations of the Soviet prison house that the communist regime was finally destroyed and with it the menace it posed to us and to the world as a whole. This should be a deep lesson for us, but it is one that curiously remains unlearned.

Candidates for the application of this lesson come readily to mind: the list of countries posing threats to the United States, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, contains no democracies. All are repressive, all maintain their rule by coercion. Given the closed nature of these regimes, the conventional tools available to the United States to affect the behavior of these and other regimes can seem frustratingly limited, often amounting to little more than a mix of sanctions, condemnation, and diplomatic isolation. Despite great effort on our part, each of these regimes continues its course toward the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, holding out the frightening prospect of a vast increase in their ability to do harm to the United States and its interests.

In our deliberations regarding our policy toward these and other challenges to U.S. interests, we should remember that the fate of the Soviet empire provides an instructive example of how peaceful change can be encouraged by those outside.

To secure its rule, the Soviet regime trained its vast powers on all who would dissent, dividing and isolating the population — and even sending in the tanks when necessary — in an effort to deny hope to any challengers. But the West was able to provide hope anyway, with the role of two individuals being especially important.

The first was the election of Pope John Paul II. His initial message to his countrymen in Poland told them: “Be not afraid.” From that beginning, a mass movement took shape, Solidarity was born, and the Polish regime began its unstoppable slide to oblivion. Poland is now free.

Equally significant was the election of Ronald Reagan. Against the advice of many, Reagan refused to tame his remarks about the Soviet Union. When he called the Soviet Union “an evil empire,” he was openly derided by many in the West as an ideologue or a warmonger and especially by those who asserted that our interests lay in an accommodation with the regime.

Many dismissed his declaration as “empty words.” But veterans of the democracy movement in the former Soviet Union point to his statement as a turning point in their struggle. For it was the first time that a Western leader had called the Soviet Union by its real name, had openly stated that the regime was illegitimate and proclaimed it mortal. It was an unambiguous statement that, at long last,
America was casting its lot with the powerless and not with the all-powerful regime, a declaration that we would never abandon the oppressed merely to secure better relations with their oppressors.

That infusion of hope, the unambiguous declaration that America was openly aligning itself with those who were struggling against impossible odds, helped set in motion the events which dissolved the Soviet Union, almost without a shot being fired. We know the importance of the role played by the West because those who led that resistance have repeatedly told us. We must understand that although the long decades of pressure by the West on Moscow were essential to its demise, in the end it was the victory of our allies within — the unfree peoples of the Soviet Union — which actually vanquished the empire.

I have used the term “alliance” when speaking of our relationships with peoples around the world. I do not use the term lightly, nor is it merely a figure of speech. Although our global responsibilities require us to maintain a full complement of official interactions with regimes around the world, and even to cultivate good relations with them, we must remember that our true allies are the people they rule over. We are allies because we share a common aim, which is freedom. And we have a common opponent: oppressive regimes hostile to democracy.

Does this mean that we must cast our lot with the uncertain prospects of the oppressed around the world and forgo cooperation with their ruling regimes? Must we renounce traditional foreign policy goals, and even our own interests, in the name of revolution? Obviously, the answer is no. Adopting such a course would be profoundly foolish and would quickly prove to be unsustainable. Our interests require that we cooperate with a range of governments whose hold on power does not always rest on the consent of the governed. The first and enduring priority of American foreign policy is and must remain the promotion of the interests of the American people; our desire to help others must not be confused with an obligation to do so. But neither should we ignore the necessity of maintaining our connections with the populations of those governments whose cooperation we need but whose tenure in power is not eternal.

This, then, is the purpose I would set for our public diplomacy and for our foreign policy as a whole: to engage our allies among the peoples of the world. This must include public pronouncements from the President and from the Congress that clearly state the long-term objectives of U.S. foreign policy. We must have good relations with the world’s governments, but this must be complemented by our speaking past the regimes and the elites and directly to the people themselves.

For all of America’s enormous power, transforming the world is too heavy a burden to attempt alone. But we are not alone. The peoples of the world represent an enormous reservoir of strategic resources waiting to be utilized. The formula is a simple one: we can best advance our own interests not by persuading others to adopt our agenda but by helping them achieve their own freedom. In so doing, we must always remember that although we have many vocal opponents, these are vastly outnumbered by the legions of our silent allies.
AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN

By James Fisher-Thompson
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According to President Bush’s new National Security Strategy, “Africa is important to peace and security worldwide and will receive all necessary help from the United States aimed at furthering its overall political and economic development,” says James Fisher-Thompson, a Washington File Staff Writer in the Office of African Affairs. Fisher-Thompson interviewed a series of current and former U.S. government officials and prominent American scholars specializing in African affairs on what the security strategy plan has to say about U.S. policy toward Africa.

U.S. officials as well as several noted Africanists, in separate conversations recently, agreed that President Bush’s new national security plan is clear evidence that a stable and democratic Africa remains a priority goal of the U.S. government. According to “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” a plan of action issued by the White House on September 20, Africa is important to peace and security worldwide and will receive all necessary help from the United States aimed at furthering its overall political and economic development.

The top Africa policy-maker at the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner, made that point at a talk he gave on conflict resolution at the Heritage Foundation in November 2002. “Africa is of great importance to this Administration, I’m pleased to say, and I think [this is] reflected in the President’s National Security report.” Looking toward the future, he added, “I think Africa is going to continue to play an important role in our national interests ... becoming much more viable to the United States” over time.

Brett Schaefer, Africa specialist at the Heritage Foundation, was not surprised at Africa’s place in the strategy plan. “I think the president has actually put quite an emphasis on Africa over the past year or so,” he said. “Then-Secretary [of the Treasury] Paul O’Neill went over there for an extended trip; Bush announced the Millennium Challenge Account [50 percent of which will go to Africa] and he announced the HIV/AIDS and water initiatives, both of which are targeted at Africa. So it was natural that Africa got the mention it did in the security paper.

“From a national security standpoint, the administration’s recommendations are quite consistent,” Schaefer added. “They are trying to focus on reducing conflict and instability within Africa, which is a large priority. And they want to work with their European allies to achieve those objectives, especially if there is a need for peace operations.”

On the latter point, Schaefer said, “Africa, as important as it is, obviously is not a place where America would seek to station vast amounts of troops. So the administration is trying to multiply its impact by working with other nations such as the regional powers it mentions in the strategy.”

In contrast, Steve Morrison, director of Africa programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said the plan’s emphasis on Africa is “pretty dramatic on several levels. First of all, at a conceptual level, it is a departure from business as usual because the new terrorism prevention strategy says: ‘Broken, chaotic places that we thought were marginal before are in fact now a priority because they are places that could provide venues for the
shadow networks of terror.” Second, “the explicit mention and designation of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Nigeria as key partners” is unique for such a policy document. And third, “the assertion that we would work very aggressively, with those four and others, within sub-regional settings to manage crises” is new.

Bush’s strategy plan “elevates the possible levels of achievement and lays out a much more ambitious range of diplomatic and political instruments America is now prepared to use to help Africans” to combat scourges like corruption, political instability, terrorism, and disease, he explained.

Chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee, Representative Ed Royce (Republican of California), commented on the plan’s importance saying, “I am pleased that the Bush Administration has articulated the critical importance of Africa to U.S. interests in its National Security Strategy. It is very important that we build strategic relationships with countries and regional organizations in Africa for our mutual security.”

On the economic level, the lawmaker added, “President Bush and I are united in our belief that one way to significantly increase political and economic freedom on the continent is through U.S. trade and investment.”

With the war on terrorism the U.S. government’s chief foreign policy priority, the Bush strategy paper emphasized that America can never be secure while economic hardship and political unrest abound. In a preface to the plan, President Bush said, “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

According to the plan, in Africa “promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority — combating global terror.” Therefore, it says, the U.S. government “will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.”

The section of the Bush strategy plan entitled “Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” cites three key “interlocking strategies” for U.S. policymakers:

- working with countries “with major impact on their neighborhoods, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia;
- coordinating with European allies and international institutions, which is “essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations”; and
- aiding Africa’s “capable reforming states and subregional organizations,” which “must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.”

For former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, the focus on Africa in the national strategy paper is “a pleasing development, but not a great surprise.” He said, “It’s good that he [Bush] stressed the development aspect because Africans are making serious attempts to reform, although Africa is not a source of terrorism like other regions of the world.”

Cohen, a former U.S. Ambassador to Senegal who now runs his own international consulting firm, said, “Africa suffered terrorist attacks [on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998], but these came from outside” the continent. “I can’t think of a single instance where there was an anti-American terrorist attack coming from Africa itself. And there were no Africans in these groups — al Qaeda or what have you — even though 50 percent of Africans are Muslims — and devout Muslims at that.”

Cohen said that “African nations are cooperating with U.S. authorities on the war on terrorism and are making the kinds of political and economic reforms that attract investors. So it’s only natural that this administration sees Africa as worthy of the type of development assistance that enhances trade and investment.”

Royce said, “By trading more with African countries, we increase the capacity of those governments and the standard of living of Africans, cooperatively
building a stronger state in which people can exercise their freedoms and terrorists cannot so easily thrive. It is noteworthy that trade with the continent increased last year, while trade with other continents either stagnated or declined.”

He added, “Aside from working with Congress on extending the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Bush Administration is also in the process of developing free trade agreements with Morocco and the countries of the Southern Africa Customs Union.” President Bush signed into law last August an amended version of the trade bill called AGOA II, which extends favorable trade benefits even further for more than 35 eligible nations in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to the points raised by Royce, the national security strategy outlines U.S. government assistance to the continent that includes:

• Ensuring that World Trade Organization (WTO) intellectual property rules are “flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria”;

• Stepping up development assistance in the form of the new multi-billion-dollar Millennium Challenge Account, 50 percent of which will go to eligible African nations that President Bush said “govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom”; and

• Proposing an 18 percent increase in U.S. contributions to the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s fund for poor countries, and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

“It’s a complicated business to get involved in African affairs, but the continent does need institutional development for cooperation and the United States can help” by working with foreign allies as well as regional organizations on the continent, said I. William Zartman, the director of the Conflict Management Program at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and former director of its African Studies department.

He said the security plan’s focus on coordinating with “European allies” is “absolutely on target, especially concerning the French.”

“It is time we worked with France to get over their part and our part of the ‘Fashoda complex,’ where they see any American activity or presence in Africa as an attempt to kick them out and where we see the French as leftover colonialists. We have got to discontinue this spitting war that has hurt us too much,” Zartman declared.

On the report’s call to strengthen “Africa’s capable reforming states and subregional organizations,” the SAIS scholar said, “I think the most important reform proposed for Africa over the last decade was the CSSDCA, or the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, otherwise known as ‘the Kampala Document.’ It was the most important blueprint for change on the continent and deserves our support.”

Zartman recently co-authored a book on the subject with fellow Africanist Francis Deng, called “Strategic Vision for Africa.” While CSSDCA has become somewhat fragmented, he said, a part of its “spirit” — the idea that intervention by a group of states into the affairs of another state can be justified because of gross humanitarian violations — has been taken up by the new African Union (AU), the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

This came about, the scholar explained, because CSSDA was modeled after the 1975 Helsinki Accords, whose emphasis on human rights eventually contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Like Helsinki’s “baskets” of issues, CSSDA has a number of “calabashes,” he explained, adding, “Interestingly, the development calabash seems to be pretty much replicated in NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development].”

NEPAD is a socio-economic framework for development formulated by leaders on the continent like South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki and now endorsed by the African Union (AU). Unique among similar African roadmaps for development, NEPAD includes a “peer review mechanism” that encourages political reform and transparency for eligible African nations.
The White House security plan singled out the AU for mention, saying, “The transition to the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a common responsibility for democratic political systems offers opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent.”

This “is an appropriate move,” said former assistant secretary Cohen, because, “the AU, as well as grassroots efforts like NEPAD, are making a genuine attempt to understand why African development has been lagging. They have discovered that that includes bad economic policies that have to be reformed and also that good governance and democracy have been lagging, which are needed to encourage investments.”

The brainchild of leaders like Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South African President Thabo Mbeki, NEPAD is as much a guide for development on the continent as it is a plan of action. Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner recently praised the program saying, “At the core of NEPAD’s theology ... is a notion that good governance is not only expected, but good governance is going to be required.”

Kansteiner said, “That’s a different perspective than what we’ve seen in the past, and we think it’s an important one — we embrace it fully.”

Cohen called NEPAD “very encouraging because it is not just the U.S. telling them what to do, but it is the Africans themselves recognizing that they have a problem and moving to correct it.”

With that in mind, the security plan’s focus on AGOA was also a good move, Cohen said, because “if you look at some of the trade statistics since AGOA started [two years ago], the countries that are doing best in terms of economic growth are the ones benefiting from AGOA. For example, South Africa is exporting BMW cars [to the U.S. market].”

This means that “a lot of South African workers and their families are doing better now because of AGOA,” Cohen said. And, he added, “I personally believe that is what Africa needs — more revenue from trade so that wealth can be created for governments to provide more social services and infrastructure like clean water and electricity.”

Heritage’s Schaefer agreed with Cohen on the benefits of AGOA, noting, “All in all, the trade act has been a very large success for the continent as far as exports are concerned.” The Africanist disagreed, however, on the importance of the newly formed AU. “I’m a little skeptical of the AU,” he said. “It seems to be a repackaging of the old organization in new paper.”

He added: “The promises sound great, but it [AU] has been reluctant to chastise one of the most horrific abusers of his own people on the continent — [Zimbabwe’s President] Robert Mugabe. This lapse seems to be a bright neon arrow pointing to the weakness of the organization, and that is [the fact that] African nations seem to be very reluctant to chastise each other.”

In order to keep Africa from being bypassed or “marginalized” in the new global economy — an important requisite to political well being and security, policymakers say — the U.S. Government has put its money where its mouth is. In 2001 alone, it contributed more than $1,100 million to development programs and humanitarian assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. It is the single largest donor to HIV/AIDS programs on the continent as well as the single largest contributor to assistance programs in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia. ®
President George W. Bush’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) report, released by the White House on September 20, 2002, has attracted great attention at home and abroad as a compelling statement of American grand strategy in the post-September 11th world. The new document, entitled, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” has been both praised as a clear, farsighted, and impressive response to the threats America now faces, and criticized as a radical and troubling departure from American foreign policy tradition. Although the new Bush NSS is a bold and candid proclamation of American objectives, much of the document articulates what has been implicit in American strategy since the United States became a great power a century ago. Moreover, what is new is generally reasonable given the nature and magnitude of the threats that have emerged in the post-September 11th international environment.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires the president to submit an annual report to Congress setting forth America’s grand strategy. Although the law calls for a “comprehensive description and discussion” of U.S. interests, goals, and capabilities, these reports have more often consisted of lofty rhetoric or uncontroversial restatements of official policy. Exceptions to this tradition exist. NSC-68, Paul Nitze’s classified report to President Harry Truman in 1950, drew a comprehensive picture of a monolithic communist threat of global domination that could only be met through a massive American military build-up and doctrine of containment. President Bill Clinton’s first NSS, although no NSC-68 to be sure, made the case for the administration’s widely cited doctrine of “engagement and enlargement.” On the whole, however, documents such as the NSS rarely mark a significant departure in U.S. strategy or spark public debate.

Four key themes of the Bush NSS have generated controversy. First, the NSS calls for pre-emptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, the NSS announces that the U.S. will not allow its global military strength to be challenged by any foreign power. Third, the NSS expresses a commitment to multilateral international cooperation, but makes clear that the United States “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary” to defend national interests and security. Fourth, the NSS proclaims the goal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe, especially in the Muslim world. The remainder of this article explores each of these themes in turn, paying particular attention to the logic, degree of change or continuity, and implications of each national security objective.
PREEMPTION

The Bush NSS advocates the preemptive use of military force against terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism that attempt to gain or use WMD. These are the most serious threats facing the United States and, according to the document, “...as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” The preemptive use of force in the face of imminent attack makes good strategic sense, and is supported by international law and the just war tradition. This aspect of the Bush doctrine is controversial, however, because it broadens the meaning of preemption to encompass military action “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” Critics argue that this attempt to include preventive military action under the category of preemption has no legal or practical basis, and thus see the Bush doctrine as a worrisome break from tradition.

The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact, there have been only a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last two hundred years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War in 1967 is perhaps the most cited example.) The current NSS declaration that “our best defense is a good offense” reflects a long-standing willingness to use military action before an actual attack is imminent. In addition to a number of cases of U.S.-supported regime change during the Cold War, a prominent example is President Kennedy’s naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962 to force the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles. In another case, the American campaign to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 was partly justified among U.S. policy-makers on the grounds of a future WMD threat from Iraq. As another example, the 1994 Agreed Framework accord with North Korea was negotiated under the implicit threat of American military action to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal.

Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive to make explicit the conditions under which America will strike first, and there are compelling reasons for blurring the line between preemption and prevention. The attacks of September 11th demonstrate that terrorist organizations like al Qaeda pose an immediate threat to the United States, are not deterred by the fear of U.S. retaliation, and would probably seize the opportunity to kill millions of Americans if WMD could effectively be used on American soil. A proactive campaign against terrorists thus is wise, and a proclaimed approach toward state sponsors of terrorism might help deter those states from pursuing WMD or cooperating with terrorists in the first place. Other critics have argued that the Bush NSS goes well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermine international law and lead other states to use U.S. policy as a pretext for aggression. The most common examples are that the broad interpretation of legitimate preemption could lead China to attack Taiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is not compelling, however, as these states are not currently constrained from taking action by any norm against preemption, and thus will not be emboldened by rhetorical shifts in U.S. policy.

MILITARY PRIMACY

The Bush NSS confidently acknowledges America’s unparalleled position of power in the world and unapologetically holds that a fundamental goal of U.S. grand strategy should be to maintain U.S. primacy by dissuading the rise of any challengers. “Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom....” And, in a passage that has stimulated much discussion and debate, the NSS declares, “...[O]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” Critics of the Bush NSS see in this proclamation a worrying move toward U.S. overconfidence and imperial overstretch.

The desire to maintain American primacy by seeking to prevent the rise of a peer competitor has guided U.S. foreign policy for the better part of the last
century. The basic strategic logic explains in large part why the United States eventually intervened in both World Wars, and why American forces were brought home after World War I, but were recommitted to the defense of Europe not long after the end of World War II (i.e., the presence of a peer competitor in the latter case, but not the former). Even the objective of seeking to preserve American military hegemony is not new. In 1992, a leaked Department of Defense strategic planning document offered a blueprint for precluding the rise of any peer competitor, using strikingly similar language to the current Bush NSS. (The 1992 document language was subsequently disavowed by U.S. officials, but the basic concept was not abandoned.)

There are compelling reasons to think that U.S. primacy is, in fact, good for global peace and stability, as well as far preferable to the alternatives. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this claim is the fact that a U.S. military presence is welcomed in a great number of areas around the globe. Regional state motivations may range from free-riding on the American security umbrella, to the pacifying or stabilizing impact of an American presence, but the basic effect is the same. Despite obvious and expected political tensions inherent in stationing U.S. forces abroad, many states see U.S. military primacy as necessary for stability, and preferable to the alternatives, especially in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

At the end of the day, this element of the new Bush NSS is less likely to reshape the contours of American foreign policy. For example, the United States is unlikely to take deliberate actions aimed at retarding the economic and military growth of potential great powers such as China. On the other hand, American defense spending is likely to continue to rise with the war on terrorism, thus further widening the military gap with potential competitors. This may actually dissuade potential adversaries from seeking to challenge the U.S. militarily.

**A NEW MULTILATERALISM**

The NSS declares that, “We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions....” The document goes on to say, “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone....”

Some have interpreted the new Bush doctrine as one of unabashed unilateralism befitting a Texas Lone Ranger, or as simply the rhetorical velvet glove covering the mailed fist of brute American power. These views are wrong. The Bush NSS is clear about the benefits and necessity of multilateral cooperation, especially with other great powers, and is thus more genuinely multilateralist than even the administration’s own recent behavior might suggest. What is different is that the Bush administration appears to reject the single-minded pursuit of multilateralism for its own sake; that is, as something inherently necessary for international legitimacy or morality. Instead, the Bush NSS holds that a basic willingness to “go it alone” is consistent with, and might even facilitate, productive multilateral cooperation. Here again, the break from the past can be exaggerated. Even the Clinton administration, which was self-consciously committed to multilateralism, frequently subordinated its multilateral principles in the pursuit of more direct national interests when the two clashed.

The explicit willingness to act alone makes good strategic sense. The Bush NSS stipulates that the global war on terrorism requires international cooperation among like-minded states. But it is also apparent that others will make their own calculations about the costs and benefits of working with (or against) the United States. Even those countries that bristle at U.S. unilateralism will often end up working with the United States if the alternative is to stand on the sidelines. A case in point is the recent unanimous passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 demanding full Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. Several permanent members of the Security Council (Russia, China, and France) as well as an Arab state (Syria) initially had varying disagreements with American policy, but ultimately opted to cooperate by voting in favor.
THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY

The Bush NSS is not just about power and security in any narrow sense. It commits the United States to spread democracy worldwide and promote the development of “free and open societies on every continent.” To this end, the document calls for a comprehensive public information campaign — “a struggle of ideas” — to help foreigners, especially in the Muslim world, learn about and understand America.

This commitment embodies deep-seated themes within American grand strategy and evokes long-standing American beliefs about foreign policy. In particular, the idea that the exercise of American power goes hand in hand with the promotion of democratic principles can be found in the policy pronouncements of U.S. presidents from Woodrow Wilson to John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton. This combination of values reflects both a belief in democracy and freedom as universal ideals (“The United States,” the document declares, “must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”), and a judgment that promoting these principles abroad not only benefits citizens of other countries, but also increases American national security by making foreign conflicts less likely.

The Bush NSS commits the United States to “actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” This objective is driven by the conviction that the fundamental cause of radical Islamic terrorism lies in the absence of democracy, the prevalence of authoritarianism, and the lack of freedom and opportunity in the Arab world. In the past, this idea might have been dismissed as political rhetoric. After September 11, even the United Nations in its Arab Development Report has identified the problem and called for ways to extend democratic institutions and basic human freedoms to the Muslim Middle East.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Bush National Security Strategy is an ambitious and important work and it is not surprising that the document has attracted considerable attention and wide debate. The NSS is broadly consistent with American strategic tradition while setting forth a coherent grand design for American policy in the face of new and dangerous threats. In scope and ambition it is a worthy successor to the most important previous statements. It is likely to remain for some time the definitive statement of American grand strategy in the post-September 11th world.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.
The long-awaited National Security Strategy provides a sophisticated portrayal of the emerging U.S. role in world affairs for the early 21st century. Contrary to the expectations of critics, it is neither hegemonic and unilateralist, nor ultra-militarist and focused on pre-empting enemies,” says Professor Richard L. Kugler of National Defense University.

“Instead, its assessment of U.S. interests and values results in a ‘distinctly American internationalism’ aimed at creating a balance of power that favors human freedom and makes the globalized world a safer and better place.”

The long-awaited National Security Strategy provides a sophisticated portrayal of the emerging U.S. role in world affairs for the early 21st century. Contrary to the expectations of critics, it is neither hegemonic and unilateralist, nor ultra-militarist and focused on pre-empting enemies. Instead, its assessment of U.S. interests and values results in a “distinctly American internationalism” aimed at creating a balance of power that favors human freedom and makes the globalized world a safer and better place. Intent on judging how to apply U.S. strengths, this strategy pays weighty attention to handling today’s dangerous security problems and countering the threats posed by terrorists and tyrants. But it also aspires to promote global economic progress, democracy, and human freedom in troubled regions. One of its key goals is to double the economies of poor countries within a decade. The strategy shows that the United States is a superpower willing to pursue new policies that cut against the grain of established practices when necessary. But it also makes clear that the United States will be a responsible leader of the democratic community and a full participant in alliances and multilateral institutions, including the United Nations.

The new U.S. strategy thus is amply endowed with lofty visions and balanced aspirations, as well as a bipartisan blend of continuity and change. It also is attuned to the rising dangers and still-existing opportunities ahead. The central issue is not its conceptual soundness, but whether it will receive the U.S. resources and support from key democratic partners that are needed to carry it out. An equally important issue is whether this strategy will be grappling with challenges that are amenable to progress or instead are mostly intractable. The manner in which these issues are resolved will determine whether this strategy achieves its ambitious goals fully, partly, or not at all. Only time will tell, but the coming years promise to be eventful because a newly assertive U.S. global involvement has arrived on the scene.

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION

What makes the National Security Strategy distinctly American is that it is truly global. Whereas most countries address mainly their own regions, the U.S. strategy covers virtually the entire world. This wide-ranging focus is partly the case because the United States has interests and values at stake nearly everywhere. Moreover, it has security commitments to many nations in multiple regions, widespread economic involvements, and membership in a host of global and regional organizations. The accusation that it prefers to act unilaterally is wrong. A leading architect of the 20th century’s most successful alliances and international bodies, the United States remains the most multilateral country in the world today.
Globalization plays a potent role in reinforcing this worldwide outlook because it is compelling the United States to think and act with many regions in mind. As used here, “globalization” does not mean an ideology or a policy, but instead a factual trend: the process of growing international activity in trade, finances, investments, technology, weapons, communications, ideas, values, and other areas. As a result, previously distant regions are being drawn closer together in growing ties, once-separate functional activities are influencing each other, the pace of change is accelerating, and interdependence is increasing. Events in one place are no longer isolated because now they can have big ripple effects elsewhere. In essence, the world is becoming a single stage upon which many actors — nations, multinational institutions, and transnational bodies — now play important roles and interact continuously. Many countries must now be internationalist in their outlook, and the United States more than all others.

As a deep-seated and irreversible trend, globalization in the information era may be the central driving reality of our times, one that creates a framework within which other powerful dynamics unfold. To a degree, globalization has been unleashed because the democracies emerged victorious in their prolonged struggle with totalitarian ideologies during the 20th century. The collapse of the Cold War’s bipolar order has opened the door to an upsurge of international activity, in a setting where representative government, free markets, flourishing trade relations, and multilateral collaboration have become the model for progress in many places. A few years ago, globalization was seen as uniformly positive because it stimulates economic growth and open societies, but recent experience shows that it has downsides. It can help destabilize countries, alienate traditional cultures, and make entire regions vulnerable to volatile swings in the world economy. It can leave less-fortunate countries resentful of their fates and dismayed at the barriers to progress facing them. In addition, it can provide disgruntled actors the technologies and other means to strike violently at long distances, against not only their neighbors but the United States and its allies as well.

Partly owing to globalization’s diverse effects, the world has become bifurcated. The democratic community, which totals about 30 percent of the world’s population but has 70 percent of its wealth, finds itself stable, united, and prosperous. But elsewhere, conditions are not nearly so good, and progress is less rapid. This especially is the case along the so-called “southern arc of instability” that stretches from the Middle East to the Asia littoral. This huge zone is rendered chaotic by a host of problems: security vacuums, power imbalances, poverty, ineffective governments, high unemployment, and extremist Islamic fundamentalism. The result is a breeding ground for today’s principal dangers, including terrorists, tyrants, rogue governments, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ethnic tensions, failed states, resource shortages, geopolitical rivalries, drug trafficking, and organized crime. As the National Security Strategy says, these problems and dangers must be brought under control if the future is to be peaceful and the opportunities of a globalized world are to be realized.

THE STRATEGY’S KEY FEATURES

The National Security Strategy is composed of features that are also distinctly American. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy pursued a combination of stable security conditions, democratization, and economic progress. The new strategy applies these hardy perennials of American doctrine to the fluid conditions existing today. In order to defend the American homeland against new threats and bring peaceful progress to zones of turmoil, the strategy’s eight key features call for efforts to:

2. Strengthen alliances to prevent and defeat global terrorism.
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
4. Prevent enemies from threatening peace with weapons of mass destruction.
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by promoting open societies and democracy.
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with main centers of global power.
8. Transform America’s military and other national security institutions.

In response to the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath, robust security measures figure prominently in this agenda. The National Security Strategy makes clear that the United States will act vigorously to defeat global terrorists and their sponsors, and to prevent them from attacking the U.S. homeland and America’s friends. The strategy says that the United States will not hesitate to act alone in conducting military strikes against terrorists. But it also proclaims that the United States will build coalitions with friends and allies, and that it will wage a war of ideas against terrorism, support moderate governments in the Muslim world, and seek to improve the harsh economic conditions that give rise to terrorism.

The National Security Strategy puts forth a similarly firm stance for dealing with WMD proliferation by rogue countries. It calls for robust homeland security measures, missile defenses, and upgraded military forces capable of proactive counter-proliferation measures. It makes clear that the United States will be prepared — on a selective and limited basis — to launch pre-emptive attacks against WMD-equipped rogue countries and terrorists that pose an imminent danger of attack. But the strategy also states that the United States will work multilaterally with partners in using diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and threat reduction assistance to discourage WMD proliferation. Likewise, the strategy calls for strong diplomatic efforts to help defuse regional tensions, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Indo-Pakistan conflict, that stimulate terrorism, WMD proliferation, and other dangers.

Accusations that the United States will act like a unilateralist hegemon in handling security affairs are rebutted by the National Security Strategy’s call for close multilateral cooperation with old allies and new collaborators. It emphasizes NATO’s need to prepare for new missions and to develop improved European military forces that can operate alongside transformed U.S. forces. In Asia, it calls for existing U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia to acquire a regional focus, and for use of ASEAN and APEC to help promote progress. Importantly, the strategy also calls for collaboration with such major powers as Russia, China, and India in handling security problems. Indeed, it asserts that the end of bipolarity has opened the door to peaceful relations among the major powers in ways that can help stabilize global geopolitics for many years, provided they resist the temptation to fall into rivalry.

Likewise, accusations that the United States is narrowly preoccupied with security politics and military affairs are rebutted by the National Security Strategy’s call for sustained efforts to promote democratization and economic development. About one-half of the world’s countries are democracies, covering North America, Europe, and major parts of Asia and Latin America. The new strategy hopes to spread democracy to new regions in order to advance human rights, provide better governance, and encourage free enterprise. It suggests that authoritarian governments can follow a gradual path to democracy by pursuing political reforms and open societies a few steps at a time. The strategy’s economic component envisions bilateral and regional agreements aimed at spreading prosperity from the wealthy democracies to such poor regions as Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and parts of East Asia. It does not envision an economic miracle for these regions, but instead faster annual growth in order to double their wealth in ten years. It says that if the wealthy democracies have healthy economies, this will help encourage growth among poor countries by promoting exports and imports. It judges that free trade, investments, capital flows, finances, and enhanced productivity are the best mechanisms for encouraging their growth. It also calls for greater U.S. economic aid through a new Millennium Challenge Account and grants rather than loans, coupled with help from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), but mainly to countries that are pursuing the effective governments and economic reforms essential for aid to be decisive. Along with this aid are to come efforts aimed at promoting public health, workers’ rights, education, new energy sources, and control of greenhouse gas emissions.
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

Although the National Security Strategy is controversial in some quarters and misunderstood in others, its prospects for success are reasonably good if it is carried out strongly and wisely. Commentators have noted that the new strategy shifts some policies in conservative directions: scuttling of the Kyoto global warming accord is an example. But the larger reality is that it remains firmly anchored in the bipartisan tradition that has guided American foreign policy for many years. Also important, it alters the status quo in favor of innovative departures that respond to new dangers and rapid changes abroad. Fresh policies that initially come across as unilateralist are often candidates for a new multilateralism: an example is U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which led to a new agreement with Russia on reducing offensive weapons even as thin missile defenses are fielded. As a result, the new strategy seems capable of commanding widespread consensus in the United States even though its specific features will be debated and doubtless will evolve as it matures.

A main strength of this strategy is its far-sighted vision and its effort to weave security endeavors and economic policies into a coherent whole. Basically the strategy hopes that by applying U.S. strengths, in concert with help from close allies and great powers, it can quell emerging threats and establish a foundation of stable security affairs in turbulent regions, upon which economic prosperity and democracy can be built. Progress in these areas, in turn, hopefully will further ameliorate security tensions in ways that encourage a new era of international collaboration. Beyond question, this ambitious and demanding agenda will require the entire U.S. government to take national security quite seriously in the coming years, and to apply the full set of instruments at its disposal. Adequate resources in all areas will also be essential.

The National Security Strategy calls for a defense transformation effort, backed by rising defense budgets, that will prepare U.S. forces for new strategic missions, including surprising contingencies in unfamiliar geographic locations. As transformation accelerates, U.S. forces will acquire information networks, new technologies, and new operational concepts that prepare them for joint expeditionary warfare. The effect will be to ensure that U.S. forces remain the world’s best, capable of swiftly defeating future adversaries. This endeavor, however, must be accompanied by efforts to reorganize other national security bureaucracies for new purposes, and to strengthen intelligence and global law enforcement. Commitment of sufficient resources to support U.S. diplomacy, economic assistance, trade policies, and other activities also will be necessary. Equally important, successful performance in the information age will be knowledge-based. The ability of the U.S. government to marshal the necessary brainpower — so that it can understand the global setting and accurately gauge the consequences of its actions — will be a critical factor in determining the success of the new strategy.

A continuing challenge facing the U.S. government will be that of staying focused on its long-term agenda while handling daily crises. Because the United States cannot carry out this agenda alone, success at mobilizing help from allies, and at reforming old Cold War alliances to perform new missions, will be critical. NATO’s successful Prague Summit of November, 2002 took a big step in the right direction by calling for a new Response Force and other military capabilities for power projection. The need for help also applies to big powers that stand outside the U.S.-led alliance system, including Russia, China, and India. Building better coalition partnerships with other countries in chaotic regions is another key endeavor. Although recent trends are encouraging, these tasks do not promise to be easily accomplished.

Even if allies and partners provide help, many of the world’s problems will be hard to fully solve anytime soon. Quelling specific threats may be feasible but difficult. Creating peaceful security affairs in multiple regions could be nebulous and complex. While European-Russian relations are hopeful, the
triple agenda of preserving tranquil relations with China in fluid Asia, dampening the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, and stabilizing the Middle East/Persian Gulf will be a tall order. Likewise, promoting economic prosperity and democracy everywhere promises to be frustrating and time-consuming. The new U.S. strategy thus has its work cut out, it likely will have to set priorities and acknowledge limits, and it may experience setbacks. But even if it is only partly successful in ways that bring safety to the United States and its allies coupled with measured progress in turbulent regions, it will have served its purposes and made a worthy contribution.
U.S. USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD

By Richard F. Grimmett
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This report reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force in a “preemptive” manner, an issue that has emerged from the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy of the United States. It examines and comments on military actions taken by the United States that could be reasonably interpreted as “preemptive” in nature, says Richard F. Grimmett, a specialist in the National Defense at the U.S. Congressional Research Service.

BACKGROUND

In recent months the question of the possible use of “preemptive” military force by the United States to defend its security has been raised by President Bush and members of his administration, including possible use of such force against Iraq. This analysis reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force in a “preemptive” manner. It examines and comments on military actions taken by the United States that could be reasonably interpreted as “preemptive” in nature. For purposes of this analysis we consider a “preemptive” use of military force to be the taking of military action by the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack or use of force by that nation against the United States. The discussion below is based upon our review of all noteworthy uses of military force by the United States since establishment of the Republic.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.

The historical record indicates that the United States has never, to date, engaged in a “preemptive” military attack against another nation. Nor has the United States ever attacked another nation militarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to U.S. citizens or interests first having been attacked, with the singular exception of the Spanish-American War. The Spanish-American War is unique in that the principal goal of United States military action was to compel Spain to grant Cuba its political independence. An act of Congress passed just prior to the U.S. declaration of war against Spain explicitly declared Cuba to be independent of Spain, demanded that Spain withdraw its military forces from the island, and authorized the president to use U.S. military force to achieve these ends. Spain rejected these demands, and an exchange of declarations of war by both countries soon followed. Various instances of the use of force are discussed below that could, using a less stringent definition, be argued by some as historic examples of preemption by the United States. The final case, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, represents a threat situation which some may argue had elements more parallel to those presented by Iraq today — but it was resolved without a “preemptive” military attack by the United States.

The circumstances surrounding the origins of the Mexican War are somewhat controversial in nature — but the term “preemptive” attack by the United States does not apply to this conflict. During, and immediately following the First World War, the United States, as part of allied military operations, sent military forces into parts of Russia to protect its interests, and to render limited aid to anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian civil war. In major military actions since the Second World War, the President has either obtained congressional authorization for use of military force against other nations, in advance of using it, or has directed military actions abroad on his own initiative in support of multinational operations such as those of the United Nations or of
mutual security arrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Examples of these actions include participation in the Korean War, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnian and Kosovo operations in the 1990s. Yet in all of these varied instances of the use of military force by the United States, such military action was a “response,” after the fact, and was not “preemptive” in nature.

CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS

This is not to say that the United States has not used its military to intervene in other nations in support of its foreign policy interests. However, U.S. military interventions, particularly a number of unilateral uses of force in the Central America and Caribbean areas throughout the 20th century, were not “preemptive” in nature. What led the United States to intervene militarily in nations in these areas was not the view that the individual nations were likely to attack the United States militarily. Rather, these U.S. military interventions were grounded in the view that they would support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed interference in the Western hemisphere by outside nations. U.S. policy was driven by the belief that if stable governments existed in Caribbean states and Central America, then it was less likely that foreign countries would attempt to protect their nationals or their economic interests through their use of military force against one or more of these nations.

Consequently, the United States, in the early part of the 20th century, established through treaties with the Dominican Republic, in 1907, and with Haiti, in 1915, the right for the United States to collect and disperse customs income received by these nations, as well as the right to protect the receiver general of customs and his assistants in the performance of his duties. This effectively created U.S. protectorates for these countries until these arrangements were terminated during the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Intermittent domestic insurrections against the national governments in both countries led the U.S. to utilize American military forces to restore order in Haiti from 1915-1934 and in the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924. But the purpose of these interventions, buttressed by the treaties with the United States, was to help maintain or restore political stability, and thus eliminate the potential for foreign military intervention in contravention of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

Similar concerns about foreign intervention in a politically unstable Nicaragua led the United States in 1912 to accept the request of its then-President Adolfo Diaz to intervene militarily to restore political order there. Through the Bryan-Chamorro treaty with Nicaragua in 1914, the United States obtained the right to protect the Panama Canal, and its proprietary rights to any future canal through Nicaragua as well as islands leased from Nicaragua for use as military installations. This treaty also granted to the United States the right to take any measure needed to carry out the treaty’s purposes. This treaty had the effect of making Nicaragua a quasi-protectorate of the United States. Since political turmoil in the country might threaten the Panama Canal or U.S. proprietary rights to build another canal, the United States employed that rationale to justify the intervention and long-term presence of American military forces in Nicaragua to maintain political stability in the country. U.S. military forces were permanently withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933. Apart from the above cases, U.S. military interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and in Panama in 1989 were based upon concerns that U.S. citizens or other U.S. interests were being harmed by the political instability in these countries at the time U.S. intervention occurred. While U.S. military interventions in Central America and Caribbean nations were controversial, after reviewing the context in which they occurred, it is fair to say that none of them involved the use of “preemptive” military force by the United States.

COVERT ACTION

Although the use of “preemptive” force by the United States is generally associated with the overt use of U.S. military forces, it is important to note that the United States has also utilized “covert action” by U.S. government personnel in efforts to influence political and military outcomes in other nations. The public record indicates that the United States has used this form of intervention to prevent some groups or
political figures from gaining or maintaining political power to the detriment of U.S. interests and those of friendly nations. For example, the use of “covert action” was widely reported to have been successfully employed to effect changes in the governments of Iran in 1953, and in Guatemala in 1954. Its use failed in the case of Cuba in 1961. The general approach in the use of a “covert action” is reportedly to support local political and military/paramilitary forces in gaining or maintaining political control in a nation, so that U.S. or its allies’ interests will not be threatened. None of these activities has reportedly involved significant numbers of U.S. military forces because, by their very nature, “covert actions” are efforts to advance an outcome without drawing direct attention to the United States in the process of doing so. Such previous clandestine operations by U.S. personnel could arguably have constituted efforts at “preemptive” action to forestall unwanted political or military developments in other nations. But given their presumptive limited scale compared to those of major conventional military operations, it seems more appropriate to view U.S. “covert actions” as adjuncts to more extensive U.S. military actions. As such, prior U.S. “covert actions” do not appear to be true case examples of the use of “preemptive” military force by the United States.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962

The one significant, well documented, case of note, where “preemptive” military action was seriously contemplated by the United States, but ultimately not used, was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. When the United States learned from spy-plane photographs that the Soviet Union was secretly introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba, missiles that could threaten a large portion of the Eastern United States, President John F. Kennedy had to determine if the prudent course of action was to use U.S. military air strikes in an effort to destroy the missile sites before they became operational, and before the Soviets or the Cubans became aware that the U.S. knew they were being installed. While the military “preemption” option was considered, after extensive debate among his advisors on the implications of such an action, President Kennedy undertook a measured but firm approach to the crisis that utilized a U.S. military “quarantine” of the island of Cuba to prevent further shipments from the Soviet Union of military supplies and material for the missile sites, while a diplomatic solution was aggressively pursued. This approach was successful, and the crisis was peacefully resolved. 8


3. There was no direct military attack by Spain against the United States prior to the exchange of declarations of war by the nations, and initiation of hostilities by the United States in 1898. See Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Background and Legal Implications. CRS Report RL31133, by David M. Ackerman and Richard F. Grimmett. A notable event, the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, provided an additional argument for war against Spain for those advocating it in the United States. The actual cause of the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, even today, has not been definitively established. More recent scholarship argues that it was most likely not due to an external attack on the ship, such as the use of a mine by an outside party, but due to an internal explosion.

4. 7 UST 196.

5. 8 UST 660.

6. 10 UST 379.


8. Section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, defines covert action as “An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

9. For detailed background regarding the issues surrounding the possible use of “preemptive” military force against the Soviet missile sites being established in Cuba, and the deliberative process engaged in by President Kennedy and his key advisors, see the published transcripts of tape recordings made during their White House meetings in The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.). Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press, 1997.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.
“Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace — a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

— President Bush
West Point, New York, June 1, 2002

The United States possesses unprecedented — and unequaled — strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.

For most of the 20th century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality.

That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our nation, allies, and friends.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty.

The U. S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will:

• champion aspirations for human dignity;
• strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
• work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
• prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
• ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
• expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
• develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
• transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

U.S. National Security Strategy: A New Era

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U.S. National Security Strategy

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