IRAQ
From Fear to Freedom
IRAQ
Iraq gets away
Whenever his steps are widened
In the exiles
Iraq slows down
Whenever a half a window is opened
I say: Ah
Iraq shivers
Whenever a shadow passes
I conceived either a muzzle to surveil me
or a labyrinth.
Iraq which we miss
A half of his history
is songs and eyeliner.
And the other half
is Tyrants.

العراق
العراق الذي يبتعد
كلما انسعت في المناقي خطة
والعراق الذي يبتعد
كلما افتحت نصف
باقديه
قلت: أو
والعراق الذي يبتعد
كلما مر طل
تختيب قوة تترصدني
أو ماه
والعراق الذي نفتح نصف تاريخه أعانه
وكحل...
وصفة طفاه

—Adnan Al-Sayegh
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq represents a threat to the peace and security of the world because it is the crossroads where weapons of mass destruction, state support for terrorism, international aggression, and a sustained assault on human rights converge in a single place, under a single tyrant. In an address to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush said:

The history, the logic, and the facts lead to only one conclusion: Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

The international community has now taken an important step to meet the threat that Iraq poses by rising up and speaking in a single voice through the United Nations to demand disclosure and destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction—immediately and unconditionally. Furthermore, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441—adopted on November 8, 2002, by a unanimous vote of 15-0—confirms that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations, and states that any additional breaches will result in serious consequences. Following the Security Council’s action, President Bush said:

The resolution approved today presents the Iraqi regime with a test—a final test. Iraq must now, without delay or negotiations, fully disarm, welcome full inspections, and fundamentally change the approach it has taken for more than a decade.

Since his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his contempt for the international community by flouting not only repeated demands to eliminate his chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons but also international demands for Baghdad to cease persecution of its own people, release foreign prisoners, return stolen property, and end its illegal exploitation of the oil-for-food program. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is a human rights catastrophe, where thousands of citizens are routinely subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution. Freedom of speech, religious practice, political association, privacy, and due process under law—all are nonexistent. The regime has attacked and exploited religious communities in Iraq as ruthlessly as it has any other group that opposes its rule or attempts to assert a measure of independence. Baghdad has conducted a brutal campaign of protracted arbitrary arrest and summary execution against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi’a Muslim population. Iraq’s military and security services are used to ethnically cleanse whole areas of Iraq, displacing an estimated 1 million people throughout the country, brutally persecuting minorities and those perceived as dissenters. In these attacks, Iraqi forces frequently employed chemical weapons against unarmed Iraqi civilians. Saddam Hussein has relentlessly pursued the acquisition of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—despite the efforts of international...
INSPECTORS AND COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS, AND AT THE EXPENSE AND CONTINUED SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE. ■ IRAQ REMAINS A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM AND HAS CONTINUED ITS LONG-STANDING POLICY OF PROVIDING TRAINING, POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND SANCTUARY FOR A VARIETY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. ■ THE IRAQI REGIME HAS ALSO LONG CONDUCTED AN ACTIVE PROGRAM OF TERRORIST TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION—MUCH OF IT BASED AROUND AN AREA KNOWN AS SALMAN PAK. MOREOVER, STRONG EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT AL QAEDA TERRORISTS ESCAPING FROM AFGHANISTAN HAVE FOUND REFUGE INSIDE IRAQ. ■ CORRUPTION IS ENDEMIC IN IRAQ, A COUNTRY THAT FUNCTIONS IN MANY WAYS AS A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS FAMILY. OIL SMUGGLING, HIDDEN SURCHARGES ON OIL SALES, AND OTHER MANIPULATIONS OF THE U.N.-SANCTIONED OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM ARE THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF SADDAM’S ILLICIT REVENUES. ALL OF THESE ILLICIT FUNDS GO TO HIS FAMILY AND SUPPORTERS—NOT TO IMPROVE THE WELFARE OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE. ■ AFTER TAKING FULL POWER IN 1979, SADDAM HUSSEIN LAUNCHED HIS COUNTRY INTO TWO DISASTROUS CONFLICTS—the IRAN-IRAQ AND GULF WARS—that BROUGHT NOTHING BUT HARDSHIP, DEATH, DEFEAT, AND NATIONAL HUMILIATION TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE. ■ THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO SEE A FUTURE IRAQ THAT IS DEMOCRATIC, PARTICIPATORY, UNIFIED, AND AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THAT RISES TO BECOME A RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ■ A NEW GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ—WITHOUT SADDAM AND HIS REPRESSIVE CIRCLE OF FAMILY, CLANS, AND SUPPORTERS—WOULD GIVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOGETHER TO HEAL THE WOUNDS OF THE PAST DECADE AND HELP IRAQI CITIZENS REBUILD THEIR SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC LIVES. THE IRAQI PEOPLE DESERVE NO LESS.

Iraqi Kurdish men walk in the mass graveyard and memorial in Halabja City.
PART 1. THE LESSONS OF HALABJA: AN OMINOUS WARNING

Only after the first wave of air and artillery bombardments had driven the inhabitants to underground shelters did the Iraqi helicopters and planes return to unleash their lethal brew of mustard gas and nerve agents.

It was March 16, 1988, and the Kurdish village of Halabja, which lies near Iraq’s border with Iran, had the misfortune of being on the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War, then in its eighth year. The inhabitants, who numbered about 50,000 or more at the time, knew the hard realities of conventional war firsthand, but they had no preparation for the nightmare that descended upon them—and continues to wreak havoc upon the survivors and their offspring today.

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, who has written extensively about Halabja, pointed out in a radio interview:

“You have to understand something here that’s so diabolically clever. The Iraqis knew that gas is heavier than air and would penetrate cellars and basements more effectively by launching a conventional artillery attack on the town for several hours. In other words, they knew that people would do what they always did during an artillery barrage and run to their basements. They were stuck in their basements, and then (the Iraqis) launched the chemical weapons attack...turning them, really, into gas chambers.

As the gas spread and animals died and birds dropped out of trees, the panicked families, many blinded by the chemical agents, gathered up hysterical, gasping children, tried to escape downwind. Goldberg, writing in the New Yorker magazine, relates the account of one survivor, Nouri Hama Ali, who led his family toward Anab, a resettlement center outside Halabja for those whose villages had been destroyed by the Iraqi Army:

“On the road to Anab, many of the women and children began to die. The chemical clouds were on the ground. They were heavy. We could see them.” People were dying all around, he said. When a child could not go on, the parents, becoming hysterical with fear, abandoned him. “Many children were left on the ground, by the side of the road. Old people as well. They were running, then they would stop breathing and die.”

When the pictures of the contorted, often bleached civilian victims first reached a horrified world, the assumption was that several hundred had died in part of a pattern of much larger-scale chemical attacks on Iranian forces. But time and investigation have proved otherwise.

The current consensus among experts inside and outside government is that as many as 5,000 died in the March 1988 attack on Halabja. Moreover, the methods used in the attack appear to underscore the regime’s interest in using chemical agents to terrorize population centers.

Victims of the regime-ordered chemical attacks on the civilians of Halabja in northern Iraq, March 1988.

AL-ANFAL

Halabja was neither an aberration nor a desperate act of a regime caught in a grinding, stalemate war. Instead, it was one event in a deliberate, large-scale campaign called Al-Anfal to kill and displace the predominately Kurdish inhabitants...
of northern Iraq. In an exhaustive study published in 1994, Human Rights Watch concluded that the 1988 Anfal campaign amounted to an extermination campaign against the Kurds of Iraq, resulting in the deaths of at least 50,000 and perhaps as many as 100,000 persons, many of them women and children.

Baghdad launched about 40 gas attacks against Iraqi Kurdish targets in 1987-88, with thousands killed. But many also perished through the regime’s traditional methods: nighttime raids by troops who abducted men and boys who were later executed and dumped in mass graves. Other family members—women, children, the elderly—were arrested for arbitrary periods under conditions of extreme hardship, or forcibly removed from their homes and sent to barren resettlement camps. As Human Rights Watch details, Iraqi forces demolished entire villages—houses, schools, shops, mosques, farms, power stations—everything to ensure the destruction of entire communities.

Poison’s Legacy

The 1988 chemical attack on Halabja has left behind a cruel and persistent legacy.

Initially, the vicious brew of mustard gas—a blistering agent that affects the membranes of the nose, throat, and lungs—and such nerve agents as sarin, tabun, and VX, attacked the villagers’ eyes and respiratory tracts. Some survived with scarred lungs; others were blinded, either temporarily or permanently.

But the chemicals also contaminated the food and water supply, and surveys conducted by the Halabja Medical Institute (HMI) have documented that the health effects on the population have been devastating and long lasting: from increased cancers, notably colon cancer, and respiratory diseases, to heightened levels of miscarriages and infertility among women. And perhaps most tragic: extraordinarily high levels of severe and life-threatening abnormalities among the children of Halabja.

Chemical Weapons

**Mustard:** A liquid agent that gives off a hazardous vapor, causing burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. Iraq used mustard gas numerous times between 1983 and 1988. The most serious of the long-term effects arise because mustard gas is carcinogenic and mutagenic; there is no antidote.

**Tabun:** A colorless to brownish liquid that is a non-persistent nerve agent similar to a pesticide. Depending on exposure, reactions include obstructed vision, difficulty in breathing, muscular twitching, sweating, vomiting, diarrhea, coma, convulsions, and absence of breathing leading to death. It has been weaponized and used by the current Iraqi regime.

**Cyanide:** A highly poisonous chemical agent that, whether inhaled, ingested, or in contact with the skin, affects the body’s use of oxygen. Reactions include difficulty in breathing, convulsions, coma, and possibly death.

**Sarin:** A colorless liquid or vapor that, depending on exposure, can cause obstructed vision, difficulty in breathing, muscular twitching, sweating, vomiting, diarrhea, coma, convulsions, and absence of breathing leading to death. High exposure may be lethal, as witnessed by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system. Iraq has admitted to producing 100 to 150 metric tons of sarin, weaponized in sarin-filled artillery shells, 122-millimeter rockets, and aerial bombs.

**VX:** An oily liquid that is persistent, clear, and odorless and is considered among the most toxic substances ever made. Airborne VX can kill in minutes, but the main uptake is through the skin. Reactions include obstructed vision, difficulty in breathing, muscular twitching, sweating, vomiting, diarrhea, coma, convulsions, and absence of breathing leading to death. The Iraqi regime aggressively tried to hide the extent of its VX stockpile from U.N. inspectors. It produced about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990. In 1998, U.N. weapons inspectors discovered evidence of VX on Iraqi missile warheads.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation.
One of the first outside medical experts to study the impact of the poison gas attacks on Halabja was Christine Gosden, a British professor of medical genetics who first traveled to northern Iraq in 1998 and founded the Halabja Medical Institute. In a 1998 Washington Post article, she wrote:

What I found was far worse than anything I had suspected, devastating problems occurring 10 years after the attack. These chemicals seriously affected people’s eyes and respiratory and neurological systems. Many became blind. Skin disorders which involve severe scarring are frequent, and many progress to skin cancer.

Working in conjunction with doctors in the area, I compared the frequency of these conditions such as infertility, congenital malformations and cancers (including skin, head, neck, respiratory system, gastrointestinal tract, breast, and childhood cancers) in those who were in Halabja at the time with an unexposed population from a city in the same region. We found the frequencies in Halabja are at least three to four times greater, even 10 years after the attack. An increasing number of children are dying each year of leukemias and lymphomas.

In a summary of its research on the attacks, HMI reached these conclusions:

While these weapons had many terrible direct effects such as immediate death, or skin and eye burns, Iraqi government documents indicate they were used deliberately for known long-term effects, including cancers, birth defects, neurological problems, and infertility. Inexpensive in terms of death per unit cost, there is evidence that these weapons were used in different combinations by Ba’ath forces attempting to discern their effectiveness as weapons of terror and war.

Mike Amitay, executive director of the Washington Kurdish Institute, spells out one of the important lessons of Halabja: “After the events of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax crisis, it is clear that no one is immune from weapons of mass destruction. The people of Iraqi Kurdistan represent the largest civilian population ever exposed to such weapons. The benefit to the international community from learning about their experiences is incalculable.”

Halabja and Anfal are not simply history lessons but portents of what Saddam and his regime may hold for the future. In the immediate aftermath of the Halabja attack, for example, it is clear that Iraqi soldiers, wearing protective gear, returned to study the effectiveness of their attacks by dividing the city into grids and then determining the number and location of the dead.

For the Iraqi regime, Halabja appears to have been a testing ground.
PART 2. WMD: THE DEADLIEST THREAT OF ALL

Saddam Hussein’s quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been systematic and relentless—undeterred by military defeat, U.N. Security Council resolutions, international inspections, economic cost, political isolation, comprehensive sanctions, or the impact on the welfare of his own people. The persistence and scale of Iraq’s efforts to acquire these weapons is so striking that it has led many observers to conclude that Saddam does not regard them simply as attributes of national power, but as essential to his ambitions for personal power.

In other words, for Saddam to give up VX gas or biological agents such as botulinum toxin would be to undermine the very foundation of fear and terror with which he rules the Iraqi people and threatens his neighbors.

The regime’s lies about its efforts to develop and conceal its weapons of mass destruction have been equally systematic. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on September 19, 2002, Saddam Hussein wrote: “We hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.”

Every part of this statement is suspect. In April 1991, as a condition for the cessation of hostilities following Iraq’s defeat and ejection from Kuwait by coalition forces, Baghdad unconditionally accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which required Iraq to declare and destroy or “render harmless” its weapons of mass destruction, and to forego the development or acquisition of such weapons in the future. To implement 687 and subsequent Security Council resolutions, the United Nations established the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to have special responsibility for nuclear matters.

Throughout the 1990s, Iraq engaged in a policy of obstruction, concealment, and outright harassment of UNSCOM weapons inspectors—all designed to hide and preserve a significant portion of its infrastructure, warheads, stockpiles, and expertise related to its WMD programs. An October 2002 report from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” states: “Baghdad’s determination to hold on to a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of U.N. inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs.

Only under sustained pressure from U.N. weapons inspectors did Iraq’s declarations of its weapons and stockpiles become more accurate. Even so, according to the CIA report: “Iraq has never fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.”

UNSCOM finally withdrew permanently from Iraq in 1998 after determining that Iraqi harassment and duplicity made it impossible for inspectors to continue their work. UNSCOM has been succeeded by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), created by a Security Council resolution in December 1999.

Iraq has refused to accept UNMOVIC inspectors for the past three years. When Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus stepped down as the first head of UNSCOM in 1997, he said: “The present leader of Iraq has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. These grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery... It is highly doubtful that any alternative Iraqi leadership would continue to pursue a weapons of mass destruction program, considering that the consequences of such a policy would be sanctions, political isolation, and loss of huge financial revenues from blocked oil exports.”
Chemical Weapons

Iraq launched an ambitious chemical weapons program beginning in the 1970s, and deployed such hideous weapons in both the eight-year Iran-Iraq War and the Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds. According to documented accounts, Iraqi military forces attacked Iranian and Kurdish targets with various combinations of mustard gas and tabun and sarin nerve agents, employing aerial bombs, 122-millimeter rockets, aerial spray dispensers similar to those used by crop-dusting aircraft, and conventional artillery shells. In addition to many thousands of Iraqi Kurds, estimates are that more than 20,000 Iranians died in Iraqi chemical attacks.

Before their forced departure from Iraq in 1998, U.N. weapons inspectors oversaw the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemicals used in the manufacture of such chemical-war agents, and seven types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile warheads.

Despite these impressive totals, there is powerful evidence, from multiple sources, that Iraq possesses a stockpile of chemical agents that probably includes VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard gas. Moreover, it is highly likely that Iraq has concealed chemical precursors, production equipment, and documentation necessary to sustain its chemical weapons programs.

At least two significant pieces of public evidence support this contention. One is a 1998 Iraqi Air Force document, discovered by UNSCOM, showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it claimed to have used during the Iran-Iraq War—in other words, an attempt to hide these bombs from outside discovery. The second, according to the October 2002 CIA report,

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**DOCUMENTED IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1983</td>
<td>Haij Umran</td>
<td>Mustard gas</td>
<td>fewer than 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November 1984</td>
<td>Panjwin</td>
<td>Mustard gas</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February-March 1984</td>
<td>Majnoon Island</td>
<td>Mustard gas</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1984</td>
<td>Al Basrah</td>
<td>Tabun</td>
<td>fewer than 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1985</td>
<td>Hawizah Marsh</td>
<td>Mustard gas/Tabun</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1986</td>
<td>Al Faw</td>
<td>Mustard gas/Tabun</td>
<td>8,000-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1986</td>
<td>Umm ar Rasas</td>
<td>Mustard gas</td>
<td>more than 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1987</td>
<td>Al Basrah</td>
<td>Mustard gas/Tabun</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1987</td>
<td>Sumar/Mehran</td>
<td>Mustard gas/nerve agents</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1988</td>
<td>Halabja</td>
<td>Mustard gas/nerve agents</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Saddam Hussein began to acquire unconventional weapons in 1974, when, as vice president, he formed and funded the elite Committee for Strategic Development, according to author Said K. Aburish.
is that Iraq has never accounted for approximately 15,000 artillery rockets that were the primary means for delivering nerve agents, or for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas.

Iraq continues to expand dual-use sites that, in the view of experts, could be quickly converted to chemical weapons production. The Fallujah II facility, one of Baghdad’s principal production plants for chemical agents prior to the Gulf War, has now been upgraded with new chemical reactor vessels and other production equipment. Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water treatment, and evidence indicates that a significant amount of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes.

UNSCOM supervised destruction of a major Iraqi biological weapons production facility at Al-Hakam, as well as destroying a variety of bioweapons and materials such as bacterial-growth media necessary to produce biological agents. Nevertheless, Iraq once again engaged in a pattern of systematic deception concerning its development and stockpiling of biological agents.

UNSCOM experts concluded that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amounts UNSCOM destroyed of Bacillus anthracis (the agent that causes anthrax) and botulinum toxin, which paralyzes respiratory muscles.

The evidence for Baghdad’s efforts to sustain and expand its biological weapons program is substantial. According to the CIA report, the Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which employs a sophisticated air filtration system, was used to produce biological agents before the Gulf War. UNSCOM destroyed equipment at the facility associated with biological weapons but left other equipment in place. In 2001, without U.N. approval, Baghdad announced that it would renovate the facility to produce vaccine to treat an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, even though it could much more easily and quickly import all the vaccine it needed.

Iraq has greatly expanded the storage capacity of the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, which records now was used to store cultures, agents, and equipment for biological weapons before the Gulf War. Similarly, authorities are rebuilding the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Facility, which was used to manufacture the deadly agent ricin.

Iraq acknowledged conducting 14 open-air tests of biological weapons from January 1991 to March 1998. At the same time, Baghdad provided no persuasive evidence of an extensive and ongoing effort to develop biological weapons.
Evidence that it had unilaterally destroyed its biological agents and munitions, as it claimed to have done.

UNSCOM also discovered a document showing that Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission wanted to develop mobile fermentation units that could serve as bioweapons laboratories on wheels. A recent defector interviewed by Vanity Fair magazine said that he assembled a fleet of Renault trucks—indistinguishable from conventional refrigerator trucks that transport food—outfitted for biological weapons. “They look like meat cars, yogurt cars,” he explained. “And inside is a laboratory, with incubators for bacteria, microscopes, air conditioning.”

The use—or misuse—of large-scale industrial facilities is only part of the problem. The testimony of a number of defectors, including civil engineers and military officers, suggests that the regime is continuing to disperse biological, chemical, and nuclear facilities in or under civilian sites such as residences, downtown buildings, and some of the more than 40 palaces and luxury residences built for Saddam and his retinue. These are the types of facilities that UNSCOM was unable to investigate before being ordered to leave Iraq.

One defector, Saeed al-Haideri, has described biological and chemical sites located in government companies and private villas—even beneath Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad. Specifically, al-Haideri has alleged that two so-called presidential sites in Radwaniya—from which Iraqi authorities barred U.N. inspectors in 1997—contained sealed, airtight,
underground structures built by a Yugoslav company.

Former UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler observed in a television interview:

The degree of resistance that the Iraqis showed to our investigation of their biological weapons program exceeded all other deceptions and resistances. So I had to conclude that, for Saddam, biological weapons were his weapons of choice. He seems to be really attracted to the idea of killing people with germs, because they tried so hard to keep us away from their biology program.

GOING NUCLEAR

After the Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency succeeded in dismantling 40 nuclear research and development sites in Iraq, including three dedicated to the production of weapons-grade uranium. Not one of these nuclear facilities was known to the world prior to 1991.

Those inspection efforts ended with the forced departure of all IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors in 1998. As a result, no on-the-ground verification of Baghdad’s nuclear program has been possible for four years. But the evidence from defectors, purchases of dual-use equipment, and documented efforts to acquire illegal nuclear-related materials on the black market lead to only one conclusion: Iraq’s worldwide effort to buy, steal, or develop a nuclear weapon is back in full operation.

Saddam’s nuclear ambitions is the former head of Iraq’s nuclear program, Khidhir Hamza, who defected in 1994. Hamza has described how Saddam ordered a massive nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, which quickly grew from 500 scientists and technicians to more than 5,000. Hamza has also described the almost routine manner in which the Iraqi regime hid its program from IAEA inspectors:

When the inspectors started arriving, we would just lock the doors to the areas where we were working. We would take the inspectors on a path that was constructed so that we could bypass the locked doors. Behind the locked doors was where we were working to enrich the uranium to design the bomb.

During 2001 and 2002, Baghdad has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes that most intelligence experts believe are intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium.

A September 2002 report from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain enriched uranium or other fissile material.

A former Iraqi nuclear director Hamza expressed the same view in a 2000 interview:

I do not know if they have the uranium, but the design is there. The construction would be difficult and probably take a few months. It all depends on how they get the fissile material.

Saddam can either start a fissile material program in Iraq—the enrichment program—in which case it may take him two or three years to have it. Or he can get it from abroad, like from Russia. Then he will have it immediately.

BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

Iraq has fired ballistic missiles at four states in the region: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, and Iran. Weapons inspectors have demonstrated that Iraq has the ability to deliver chemical weapons via such missiles.

Iraq has worked strenuously to develop ballistic missiles that exceed the 150-kilometer-range limit established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. To accomplish this, Baghdad has employed the same duplicity that it has used to hide its weapons of mass destruction programs.

At the time of the Gulf War, Baghdad was already developing longer-range missiles based on the technology of the Soviet-designed Scud missiles that Iraqi forces fired in large numbers. After the war, Iraq never fully accounted for its missile program, and discrepancies in its accounting strongly suggest that the armed forces retain a hidden force of Scud-type missiles, as well as launchers, guidance systems, and other components.

In recent years, Iraq has continued to work on two types of short-range ballistic
missiles that fall within the 150-kilometer limit established by the United Nations. But there is convincing evidence that Baghdad is working assiduously to violate this limit.

At the Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Facility, the regime is building a test stand for liquid-fuel engines larger than the equipment used for older Scud engine tests. According to the CIA report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs: “The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.”

The same pattern is appearing at two solid rocket-motor facilities at Al-Mustasim and Al-Hamoun, with new or rebuilt structures whose size suggests they will house—and hide—systems prohibited by the United Nations.

According to defectors and other sources, Iraq’s goal is to build a ballistic missile capable of carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads with a range of 900 to 1,100 kilometers—sufficient to strike cities in the Gulf and Middle East such as Riyadh, Ankara, Tehran, Amman, Cairo, Alexandria, Tel Aviv, and even Nicosia, Cyprus.

Iraq has continued to explore other means of delivering chemical and biological weapons, notably attempts to convert aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) equipped with spray tanks that could be loaded with chemical or biological agents.

More broadly, Iraq has been able to import dual-use equipment or simply divert funds from the Oil-for-Food Program to procure equipment that supports its WMD, missile, and conventional weapons programs.

Since December 1999, acting under a new U.N. Security Council resolution, UNMOVIC has been screening Iraqi contracts for goods and services. It found that more than 100 contracts contain provisions for dual-use items that could be diverted into programs for weapons of mass destruction.

PART 3. A HUMAN RIGHTS CATASTROPHE

In his 1970 Nobel lecture, Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who understood the nature of totalitarianism as well as anyone, said: “Violence does not and cannot exist by itself; it is invariably intertwined with the lie.”

REGIME OF LIES

The central lie that Saddam Hussein has perpetrated is that he is a champion of the Iraqi and Arab people. To the contrary, he has championed only himself and his own power. He has brought only disaster, humiliation, and repression to the Iraqi people, war and invasion to his neighbors, and threats of mass killing to the world.

Far from championing any Arab cause, Saddam is the preeminent killer and tormentor of his own people. Far from being a unifier of the Iraqi people or builder of a strong Iraqi nation, he has ravaged the communities that make up Iraqi society and transformed what was once one of the most educated and prosperous nations in the Middle East into an international pariah that functions only as an appendage to Saddam’s megalomania and repression.

In the words of Max van der Stoel, the United Nations’ former Special Rapporteur on Iraq, the Baghdad regime is “the most ruthless dictatorship and totalitarian regime ever seen by the world since the Second World War.”

Beginning as a political operative and enforcer for Iraq’s Ba’ath Party, Saddam Hussein has combined deviousness, ruthlessness, intimidation, and a willingness to employ brutality, torture, and murder...
in his rise to power. In many respects, Saddam’s career parallels that of one of his principal role models, according to those who have studied him: the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin. Like Stalin, Saddam has consistently employed terror and killing as chief attributes of his rule. Like Stalin, he has concentrated absolute power within his own cult of personality. And like Stalin, he has imprisoned, tortured, and killed not simply individuals, but entire groups of people perceived as actual or potential threats.

Said Aburish, journalist and author of several books, including Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, worked in several high-level government positions that brought him into close contact with Saddam:

*Without any doubt, everything Saddam did had Stalinist overtones. In particular, the reliance on the security system rather than the armed forces. The jealousy of the generals in the armed forces. The use of criminal elements within the country, incorporating them into the security system. And those people were sort of semi-literate thugs whose loyalty was to Saddam—without whom, they were nothing. And so he brought them in, he depended on them, and they did him service. Anybody he wanted to get rid of he got rid of.*

**Violence and Torture**

Iraq is a human rights disaster. By any accounting, the violence and brutality meted out routinely to dissidents, minorities, or those who have simply fallen out of favor is staggering. Human rights reports on Iraq, whether issued by the United Nations, foreign governments, or nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are consistent in depicting the relentless machinery for torture and arbitrary execution without even the pretense of due process. Those executed include military officers accused of plotting against the regime, as well as religious clerics suspected of disloyalty. Many others are simply individuals accused of theft, smuggling, prostitution, or what in other countries would be considered little more than petty crime.

These arbitrary killings—as many as 3,000 since 1997, according to the latest U.S. Human Rights Report on Iraq—also appear to be part of a program to “cleanse” Iraqi prisons that has been under way for the past several years. According to Human Rights Watch: “The authorities also executed numerous inmates at Abu Ghraib, al-Makasib, and
other prisons, including long-term untried political detainees and convicted prisoners.

Families of defectors and political dissidents are subjected to imprisonment, torture, and execution. In May 2001, for example, according to the U.S. Human Rights Report: “The government reportedly tortured to death the mother of three Iraqi defectors for her children’s opposition activities.”

Also in 2001, according to the report, the regime executed 37 political detainees for opposition activity. According to press reports, “Prominent Kurd writer Muhammad Jamil Bandi Rozhbayani was killed in March after a visit to his home by intelligence service personnel investigating his writings regarding the government’s Arabization and ethnic cleansing programs.”

Torture, which is categorically prohibited by law and the Iraqi Constitution, is standard practice faced by many of those arrested, both as punishment and to extract information. In its 2001 report, Amnesty International describes the methods used by Iraqi torturers:

Torture victims in Iraq have been blindfolded, stripped of their clothes, and suspended from their wrists for long hours. Electric shocks have been used on various parts of their bodies, including the genitals, ears, the tongue, and fingers. Victims have described to Amnesty International how they have been beaten with canes, whips, hosepipe, or metal rods and how they have been suspended for hours from either a rotating fan in the ceiling or from a horizontal pole, often in contorted positions, as electric shocks were applied repeatedly on their bodies. Some victims had been forced to watch others, including their own relatives or family members, being tortured in front of them.

**Disappearances and Prison Releases**

According to Amnesty International, Iraq has the worst record of unaccounted disappearances of any country in the world. Yet the authorities have simply refused to respond to inquiries and pleas from international organizations and neighboring countries about the fate of thousands of individuals.

The majority of the “disappeared” belong to the Kurdish peoples of northern Iraq, followed by large numbers of southern Iraq’s Shi’a community. Members of other minority groups, such as Assyrians, Turkmens, and Yazidi, are also among the long-term missing.

Baghdad has ignored repeated inquiries from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia about their citizens who were imprisoned during the occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91. Of 609 known cases of missing Kuwaiti citizens, for example, only three have been resolved. Baghdad continues to refuse to resolve the issue of an American pilot lost over Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.

Saddam’s unprecedented “amnesty” of thousands of prisoners in Baghdad on October 22, 2002, only dramatized the regime’s cruelty and brutality in the treatment of its own citizens. Many were freed, but many families were left alone, weeping and pleading with authorities to account for loved ones who never emerged from inside the prison gates.

What occurred at some of the prison gates, witnessed by international reporters just before they were ordered to leave Baghdad, was reminiscent of the human yearning manifest before the fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. New York Times correspondent John Burns described the chaotic scene at one Baghdad prison:

The crowd that gathered outside the gates built up to several thousands probably... within two hours 10,000 or 15,000. By mid afternoon, it was probably 50,000 or more. And they broke down the prison gates before the actual release had begun. They then stormed...
the cell blocks within the prison, and the most remarkable scenes developed. In my view what happened that day... was that the people of Iraq who have been subjected to considerable oppression became sovereign at the moment [before] those gates... They stormed the prison blocks, and as dusk fell, a situation developed in which the prisoners inside the prison began to panic attempting to get out.

They reached a cinder block wall with thousands of relatives outside. The relatives picked up large pieces of steel tubing from a construction site [and] began to break the cinder block wall down. At that point, an extremely frantic situation developed where you had prisoners climbing out through part of broken wall and being assisted by some of the guards, and at another breach in the prison wall other guards with other links of steel tubing trying to beat prisoners back—a complete panic.

**HUMAN RIGHTS WASTELAND**

Where the regime rules, freedom of speech, religious practice, political association, privacy, due process under law are all fundamentally nonexistent.

Baghdad’s newspapers and broadcast media, for example, are owned by the government, the Ba’ath Party, or persons close to Saddam himself. They basically operate as propaganda outlets. Two details illustrate the degree of control of the press in Iraq: criticism of Saddam is punishable by death; and Saddam’s son, Uday Hussein, as head of the Iraqi Union of Journalists, dismissed hundreds of members in 1999 for not praising his father sufficiently or frequently enough.

Even one’s personal or ethnic identity is subject to arbitrary attack: as part of its long-standing campaign to “Arabize” parts of northern Iraq, especially predominately Kurdish areas around the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, entire communities have been displaced and thousands of individuals forced to adopt new “Arab” identities. (Ironically, their new identification cards classify the converts as “second class Arabs,” so authorities immediately know their original ethnic identity anyway.) The regime has also worked to undermine the minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) communities.

A sustained campaign of murder, intimidation, harassment, and arbitrary arrest against the country’s Shi’a communities, especially in the southern part of the country. According to the 2001 U.S. Human Rights Report on Iraq:

The government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi’a Muslim population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the government has repressed severely the Shi’a clergy and those who follow the Shi’a faith.

The Iraqi regime’s campaign against the religious leaders and followers of the Shi’a Muslim population has been brutal and sustained. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2001 International Religious Freedom Report:

Since January 1998, the killings of three internationally respected clerics and an attempt on the life of a fourth have been attributed widely to government agents by international human rights activists, other governments, and Shi’a activists in Iran and Lebanon. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Murtada al Borojourdi, age 69, was killed in April 1998. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi, age 68, was killed in July 1998. Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al Hussaini escaped an attempt on his life in January 1999. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Sadr, age 66, was killed in February 1999.

Following the 1999 killing of al-Sadr, whose sons were also killed, protests broke out in Shi’a sections of Baghdad and cities with Shi’a majorities, such as Karbala, Nasiriya, Najaf, and Basra. The authorities retaliated with a campaign of savage repression, killing hundreds. More died when the government prohibited a
funeral for al-Sadr and security forces attacked spontaneous gatherings of mourners. As summarized in the U.S. Human Rights Report on Iraq:

Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of al-Sadr. In February 2000, security officials reportedly executed 30 religious school students who had been arrested after al-Sadr’s killing. In March 2000, numerous Shi’a who fled the country in 1999 and 2000 told Human Rights Watch that security forces interrogated, detained, and tortured them. In May 2000, six additional students who were arrested following the killing were sentenced to death.

The regime has continued its policy of harassment and heavy pressure on the southern Shi’a community, forcing populations living in the marsh areas to relocate to cities or other areas and arresting or detaining individuals of the Shi’a faith in the thousands. The authorities, according to the State Department 2001 religious freedom report, also use food and other goods under the Oil-for-Food Program to reward supporters and intimidate or punish opponents—notably in the southern provinces of Nasiriyah, Basra, and Amarah. As a result, the humanitarian condition of the Shi’a in the south continues to lag behind the rest of the population—despite recent increases in the volume and distribution of goods under the Oil-for-Food Program.

Baghdad consistently politicizes and interferes with religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina, and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who travel to holy sites inside the country such as Najaf and Karbala. Baghdad, for example, repeatedly rejected U.N. offers to provide vouchers or arrange for third-party payments to permit Muslim pilgrims wishing to make the Hajj or for other religious travel.

Baghdad has refused all such proposals that did not involve direct payments to the government. Instead, the regime has

THE REGIME

The following regime figures have been key in securing Saddam Hussein’s 23 years as president of Iraq. Both of Saddam’s sons have assumed increasingly prominent roles in Iraq. Free, fair, competitive, and regular elections have never been a goal of the regime.

Abid Hamid Mahmud: Presidential Secretary, 1992-present.
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri: Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, 1979-present.
Tariq Aziz: Deputy Prime Minister, 1979-present.
Taha Ramadan: Vice President; First Deputy Prime Minister, 1979.
Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti (half-brother of Saddam Hussein): presidential adviser; regime official, 1979-present.
Watban Ibrahim al-Tikriti (half-brother of Saddam Hussein): presidential adviser; regime official, 1980-present.
Qusay Hussein: (Saddam Hussein’s younger son): oversees all Iraqi intelligence and security services, the Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard. In 2001, was named Deputy of Ba’ath Party’s Military Bureau and elected member Ba’ath Regional Command.

Uday Hussein (Saddam Hussein’s older son): editor of Babil newspaper and in control of all Iraqi media; National Assembly member; chairman of Iraq’s Olympic Committee; known for his violent and unstable behavior.
imposed a variety of schemes to squeeze money out of religious pilgrims and travelers by requiring them to pay fees directly to the Iraqi Central Bank. Estimates vary considerably, but it is clear that Iraq is exploiting religious travel and observances in ways that bring in millions of dollars annually.

An incident that appears in the September 2002 report of the Coalition for International Justice illustrates Baghdad’s cynical manipulation of religion for cash. After refusing yet another U.N. plan to fund travel for the Hajj in 1999, Baghdad bused some 18,000 Iraqi pilgrims to the Saudi border, where they were encouraged to demonstrate and demand that the Saudis release frozen Iraqi funds to pay for their trip.

Instead, King Fahd welcomed the Iraqi pilgrims and promised that Saudi Arabia would provide all arrangements free of charge. With no prospect of Saudi payments to the government from frozen funds or other sources, Saddam ordered the pilgrims back to Baghdad.

THE GOOD LIFE AT A HIGH PRICE IN IRAQ

Saddam Hussein spends much of the income he receives from domestic sources and illicit trade on his inner circle and security services. His inner circle has access to specialty stores and luxury automobiles, preferential access to medical care, and large monthly stipends.

He has authorized the construction of 48 palaces and luxury residences since 1991, the estimated cost of which is in the billions of dollars. Their construction occurred at a time when the regime announced that it could not spare construction materials for home building.

Anecdotal reports indicate that Saddam provides the elite military and security services responsible for protecting him with cash and other bonuses, including vast quantities of illicitly imported alcohol and cigarettes. These individuals reportedly are involved in corruption at all levels.

A joke making the rounds among Iraqis: how can you tell an honest general or politician? They’re the ones now driving taxis in Baghdad.

The contrast between the luxuries enjoyed by the elites and the stark conditions maintained by the regime elsewhere in the country is typified by the celebration of Saddam Hussein’s recent birthdays.

The 2002 birthday tribute to Saddam included a monument of the dictator—containing 76 kilograms of silver—astride a golden steed on top of a tank.

The weeklong celebration included fireworks, festooned streets, bagpipers, massed dancers in stadium performances, and helicopter gunship demonstrations.

In 2000, Saddam had a three-meter-high birthday cake, the ingredients of which would have fed 100 children for 30 days.
PART 4. TERRORISM, CORRUPTION, WAR

Iraq remains a state sponsor of terrorism, continuing its long-standing policy of providing training, political support, and sanctuary for a variety of terrorist organizations.

The reported “suicide by multiple self-inflicted gunshots” in Baghdad of one of the world’s most notorious terrorists, Abu Nidal, only underscores Iraq’s close connections with terrorists that go back decades.

It is therefore not surprising that Iraq was the only Arab-Muslim country that did not condemn the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. In fact, the Iraqi regime publicly celebrated the massacre of more than 3,000 people on American soil. This is, after all, the regime that attempted to assassinate former President George Bush after he left office, along with the Emir of Kuwait, during a visit to the Gulf.

THE TERRORIST CONNECTION

Iraq's involvement with terrorism is very disturbing. The testimony of defectors, supplemented by news accounts and other sources of information, points to a much more extensive and active program of terrorist training and organization—much of it based around an area south of Baghdad known as Salman Pak.

In a series of television interviews broadcast on the program Frontline, several former Iraqi military officers described Salman Pak as a highly secret terrorist training location for both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs. Sabah Khodada, a captain in the Iraqi army from 1982 to 1992, said:

Training includes hijacking and kidnapping of airplanes, trains, public buses, and planting explosives in cities. And the training also includes how to prepare for suicidal operations. For example, they will train them how to bend themselves with explosives and jump in a place and explode themselves.

Non-Iraqis were trained separately from Iraqis, Khodada said, and they were under strict orders not to talk or meet with the foreign national trainees. The special training in kidnapping and hijacking was conducted by the Iraqi intelligence services. In some cases, according to Khodada, small groups would receive very specialized training, for example, to learn English, Farsi, or Hebrew as part of their mission preparation.

Khodada also confirmed numerous press reports that Salman Pak had an entire Boeing 707 jetliner that was used for training in hijacking techniques—from smuggling weapons on board to methods for overpowering the crew and terrorizing passengers into cowed submission.

In the time since the September 11 attacks in the United States, intelligence reports have confirmed that al Qaeda terrorists escaping from Afghanistan are now present in Iraq.

In northern Iraq, for example, a fundamentalist group, Ansar al-Islam, with links to al Qaeda, has taken control of several villages and launched attacks against the local authorities.

In an address on October 7, 2002, President Bush said:

We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back for a decade.... Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.

SANCTIONS BUSTING AND CORRUPTION

One way to think about Iraq today is as a wholly owned subsidiary of Saddam Hussein and his family. Not only is corruption pervasive throughout the regime, but virtually all of it is used to enrich Saddam, his family, and the regime’s closest supporters.

Much of Saddam’s wealth comes from elaborate schemes to smuggle oil outside the U.N.-mandated Oil-for-Food Program, add hidden surcharges to oil sales, and conduct currency manipulations—all of which end up directing billions of dollars directly to Saddam and his regime.

The most recent and comprehensive study of these illicit sources of revenue, released in September 2002 by the Coalition for International Justice, estimates that since 1997, Iraq legitimately earned $6 billion annually through the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program—and another $2 billion each year illegally through smuggling, kickbacks, and other manipulations of the program. The study projects that the regime will take in $2.5 billion in illegal funds in 2002.

At a time when critics decry the impact of international sanctions on average Iraqis, it is important to understand that these illegal funds are not used for the
The welfare of the people of Iraq. These off-the-book monies are used solely to enrich the regime and its supporters, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and strengthen Saddam’s apparatus of control and repression.

The regime continues to undermine the Oil-for-Food Program. Baghdad repeatedly has ceased oil shipments arbitrarily for political purposes, starving the humanitarian program of funds. In addition, Baghdad began imposing illegal surcharges on each barrel of oil that it sells under Oil-for-Food. By disrupting the trade in oil, Baghdad deprives the Oil-for-Food Program of the resources necessary to provide for the humanitarian needs of Iraq’s citizens.

Saddam’s regime also smuggles $2 billion worth of oil outside Oil-for-Food every year. These resources—which should serve the Iraqi people—are diverted for Saddam’s personal use. The facts are clear: Iraq’s immense natural resources have been hijacked by this dictator for his own enrichment and to fund his reign of terror and pursuit of deadly offensive weapons.

The United Nations has attempted to make the flow of civilian goods more efficient through revisions of the sanctions program, and it has tried to eliminate the surcharges schemes by pushing the official price of Iraqi oil closer to the world price. But Saddam’s regime will continue to find ways of diverting and skimming billions of dollars from oil sales for its own use.

One estimate is that Saddam Hussein’s personal wealth exceeds $6 billion. His family and circle of supporters live inside a bubble of wealth and privilege that protects them from any of the hardships that the Iraqi people have suffered from decades of war, repression, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
One indicator of Saddam Hussein’s extravagance and megalomania is the extraordinary palace-building binge that he has engaged in since the end of the Gulf War. There are now more than 40 palaces and presidential residences scattered throughout the country, some of which, according to international visitors, feature gold-plated faucets, marble halls, and elaborate waterfalls and lakes.

Contrary to claims that some of these complexes are for the enjoyment of the Iraqi people, they are, in fact, exclusively for Saddam, his family, and his favored supporters. In April 1999, for example, Iraq inaugurated Saddamiat al Tharthar, 136 kilometers from Baghdad, featuring sports stadiums, an amusement park, and more than 600 homes—and open only to government officials.

The regime’s insensitivity to this indulgence and excess can be measured by reports from opposition sources that one of the architects who worked on presidential palaces in Saddam’s birthplace, Tikrit, was executed solely for describing the lavishness of the palaces to friends.

This is the same regime that then turns a pious face to the world and decries the humanitarian impact of sanctions upon the Iraqi people.

Making War

Saddam Hussein took complete power in a 1979 coup. He immediately led his nation to disaster and bloodshed in an eight-year war with Iran that ended in a stalemate. Saddam’s adventurism cost more than 300,000 Iraqi casualties—more than a million overall—and saddled Iraq with crushing debts that may have totaled more than $60 billion.

Undeterred by his spectacular failure to achieve a single war aim against Iran—and in an effort to gain control of Gulf oil resources—Saddam again chose to recklessly squander the blood and wealth of his people. In August 1990, he invaded Kuwait and threatened further aggression against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. An international coalition of nations defeated his forces and liberated Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War, but those seven months of occupation revealed the brutal nature of the regime to the world. The litany of horror stories from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait provides grim parallels for the accounts of torture and killing in Iraq that appear in the reports of the human rights organizations today.

One Kuwaiti, who remained inside Kuwait to resist the occupation, described the Iraqi security forces simply as a “killing machine.”

More than 1.5 million people—roughly two-thirds of Kuwait’s prewar population—were forced into exile. When they returned with the coalition forces, they discovered a country that had been systematically looted and burned as Iraqi forces stripped schools, libraries, hospitals, and museums bare. Iraqi forces vandalized and pillaged the entire country before they were defeated and ousted.

As mandated by later U.N. resolutions, some of the looted items—notably museum collections—have been returned to Kuwait, and the international community has forced Iraq to pay war reparations out of a percentage of its oil income. But many precious artifacts, museum archives, and other looted items—and most painfully, Kuwaiti citizens—remained unaccounted for.

Environmental Crimes

Saddam did not stop with looting a country; he also engaged in large-scale and wanton ruin of the environment.

In perhaps the single most spectacular act of deliberate economic and environmental destruction in history, Iraqi military forces set fire to more than 1,100 oil wells in Kuwait at the end of the Gulf War in February 1991. These were not the acts of frantic or undisciplined troops, but a painstaking exercise in packing plastic explosives around the wellheads, wiring
Iraqi destruction in Kuwait, 1991:
With burning oil wells on the horizon, three Kuwaiti refugees head home from the Iraqi border. (Above left) A destroyed Iraqi tank sits near a series of oil well fires. (Above) Columns of flame and thick, toxic smoke spew forth from Kuwaiti oil wells set aflame by fleeing Iraqi troops.
them to central detonating units, and piling sandbags to direct the force of the blast inward to increase the destructive effect.

After the well fires were extinguished with an extraordinary international effort that lasted months, experts estimated that the burning oil wells spewed more than 5,000 tons of soot, 1 million to 2 million tons of carbon dioxide, 9,000 tons of sulfur dioxide, and an undetermined amount of toxic chemicals into the atmosphere. Black rains were reported in Turkey, and black snow fell in the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains.

Saddam did not stop with oil fires, but deliberately opened pipelines that dumped between 4 million and 11 million barrels of oil into the waters of the Gulf, making it by far the largest single discharge of oil into the sea ever recorded. The result was an oil slick 40 kilometers long and 12 kilometers wide. The oil coated more than 1,300 kilometers of shoreline in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and killed between 15,000 and 30,000 seabirds. The oil devastated other marine life, especially turtle populations. The long-term damage to the ecology of the Gulf region is still being monitored today.

Following his defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam’s forces suppressed uprisings in the Kurdish north and the predominately Shi’a south with extreme brutality marked by imprisonment, disappearances, and mass executions. North and south, Iraqi reprisals led to the destruction of homes and buildings, including mosques, and the razing of entire villages.

Baghdad continued its attacks and repression against southern Shi’a communities throughout the decade. Between September 1998 and the end of 1999, for example, Iraqi forces destroyed the southern villages of Albu ‘Aysh and Ar Rumaythah by targeting specific residences and businesses, but not government offices.

Iraq perpetrated a combined humanitarian and environmental atrocity with its assault in the Shi’a communities living in the marsh areas of the south, where Baghdad has pursued a strategy of draining the marshes and has forcibly relocated its residents.

For thousands of years, the marshes—roughly 5,200 square kilometers in area—provided all the necessities of life for tens of thousands of Arab marsh dwellers. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi military constructed causeways to move armored units and supplies more easily along the southern border area. This construction caused drying of the eastern third of the marshlands by the mid to late 1980s. After the 1991 Shi’a uprising, the Baghdad regime undertook an ambitious effort to drain and dry the entire region. With the completion of an east-west dam and a north-south canal, the major water supply to Al ‘Amarah marsh was cut off.

In 1995 the marshes sheltered 200,000 to 250,000 inhabitants—more than half of them Marsh Arabs, the rest, various internally displaced persons and oppositionists. Today, nearly all are displaced—fewer than 10,000 Marsh Arabs still survive the regime’s systematic destruction, bulldozing, and artillery bombardments. Thousands of others, including women and children, have been secretly executed by Iraqi forces, and yet another part of Iraq’s unique culture has been destroyed by Saddam Hussein.
Iraq’s marsh life was vibrant prior to 1980. Two Iraqi children (inset) sail a canoe in the Abu Shuweish marshland in 1994; in the background is the cracked mud of marshlands today. A Kurdish family moves to a refugee resettlement camp after being displaced by Iraqi forces following a failed rebellion against Saddam Hussein in 1991.
PART 5. DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE

The extended U.N. Iraqi debate, followed by unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441, occurred in the context of a decade-long effort by Saddam Hussein to systematically conceal, deceive, and lie to avoid complying fully with a single one of the more than 16 United Nations resolutions that he has been obligated to meet.

These earlier U.N. Security Council resolutions obligated Iraq to do the following:
- Withdraw occupation forces from Kuwait.
- Allow international inspectors to oversee the complete destruction of all weapons of mass destruction.
- Halt development of any new nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
- Destroy all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.
- Stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating inside the country.
- Account for missing Kuwaitis and other foreign nationals following the Gulf War.
- Return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for Gulf War damage.
- End repression of the Iraqi people.

Saddam Hussein has failed to meet any of these commitments. Moreover, the regime has not simply engaged in passive noncompliance but in active confrontation with the international community.

Beginning as early as June 1991, Baghdad undertook a seven-year campaign of deception and intimidation directed against U.N. weapons inspectors. Iraqi authorities physically blocked access to suspicious facilities, prevented installation of monitoring devices and taking of aerial photographs, destroyed documents, hauled incriminating equipment away from locations scheduled for inspection, and refused to comply with demands for the destruction of proscribed facilities and weapons components.

Finally, in October 1998, the regime ended all pretense of cooperating in any fashion with UNSCOM, forcing its inspection teams to leave the country. In retaliation, the United States and Great Britain launched air assaults known as “Desert Fox” in December 1998, targeting suspected chemical and biological weapons facilities.

Today, Saddam’s time is up. With Security Council Resolution 1441, the international community has signaled that compliance with U.N. weapons inspectors and the demands of the United Nations must be total, unconditional, and without any limits or restrictions.

If Iraq continues to obstruct and deceive, however, the consequences will be severe. As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated:

The international community can expect Iraq to test its will. Backing Resolution 1441 with the threat of force will be the best way to not only eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction but also to achieve compliance with all U.N. resolutions and reach our ultimate goal: an Iraq that does not threaten its own people, its neighbors, and the world.

We do not seek a war with Iraq, we seek its peaceful disarmament. But we will not shrink from war if that is the only way to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council has confronted Saddam Hussein and his regime with a moment of truth. If they meet it with more lies, they will not escape the consequences.
PART 6. BUILDING A FUTURE FOR IRAQIS

American schoolchildren learn that civilization began in Mesopotamia, where people first sowed the land and lived according to a written code of law. The Iraqis are a gifted and great people, with an ancient culture. They, like people everywhere, deserve freedom from tyranny.

Working with the international community, the United States seeks over the long term to establish a broad-based representative and democratic government in Iraq. This future Iraq would be a united—and

My kingdom and my ancestor’s patrimony, Expanding and expanding And I am waiting for the rediscovery. —Abdul Wahab Al-Bayati

Iraqi Muslims and Christians share Easter celebrations at the historical site of al-Malwiyya in April 1999.
unified—nation, with a government that would renounce terror and weapons of mass destruction, respect international laws and norms, give all religious and ethnic groups a voice, adhere to the rule of law, and become an example of peace and tolerance for the region as a whole.

“Our mission in Iraq will be to serve the interests and the hopes of the Iraqi people,” according to Zalmay Khalilzad, senior adviser to President Bush on Middle East and South Asian affairs. In Iraq’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, the United States will provide the necessary resources to meet any immediate humanitarian needs, maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity, and invest in the reconstruction required to put Iraq on the path to greater economic prosperity.

A free Iraq would also find itself in a transformed international environment. As outlined in a new book from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), How to Build a New Iraq, regime change in Baghdad would give the international community a chance to work collectively to heal the wounds of the past 11 years and help Iraqis rebuild their political and social life for the benefit of all of Iraq’s citizens, now and in the decades to come.

A new Iraq would be a welcomed partner within the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic States, and by the development, human rights, and civil society organizations anxious to see it progress.

To help the Iraqi people prepare for the transition to a free Iraq, the United States has supported the creation of a series of Iraqi working groups known as the Future of Iraq Project, which bring together free Iraqis—those living outside the country and those in northern Iraq who are protected by coalition forces. The Future of Iraq Project gives them an opportunity to discuss and plan transition issues ranging from democratic principles and practices and rule of law, to the economy, oil and energy, and health and education matters.

As a State Department official said at a conference in June 2002: “The role of the U.S. government is to see what the Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans want. The impetus for change comes from you, not us. This is the job of Iraqis inside and outside [Iraq].”

These topics—from democracy and justice to water and agriculture—encompass a formidable list of challenges for a post-Saddam government. Yet the working groups have one enormous asset: a large, educated, and highly skilled population of free Iraqis who have lived for years outside the regime’s control and who can contribute their knowledge and expertise to building a new nation. Many of the working groups have already met and started setting priorities and agendas.

A meeting on transitional justice brought Iraqi jurists, Iraqi-Americans, and international experts together in Washington in July 2002 to plan for the restoration of justice and the establishment of the rule of law in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Iraqis deserve the opportunity to decide what laws and police services are necessary for their public safety. Saddam’s widely detested security apparatus, consisting of more than 400,000 agents, was created to protect him and his regime—and has no place in a future Iraq.

The democratic principles and practices group met outside London in Septem-
in March and April 1991, the coalition established both a no-fly zone and a safe haven north of latitude 36 degrees that prohibits all Iraqi military equipment and activity anywhere in the region.

The United States and Great Britain today enforce this northern no-fly zone and safe haven. (They also enforce an extended no-fly zone in southern Iraq to protect its predominately Shi’ite populations.) Beneath the wings of U.S. and British aircraft of the northern safe haven, two Kurdish political groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have established self-governing authorities characterized by levels of personal freedom, civic participation, and the rule of law unprecedented for the region. These societies, while not free of strife and economic hardship, can nevertheless serve as a harbinger of the benefits that freedom can bring to all of Iraq in a post-Saddam era.

According to New York Times reporter John Burns, who traveled through northern Iraq, opposition parties, independent newspapers, and satellite television all flourish. “All this is banned or restricted in Mr. Hussein’s Iraq,” Burns wrote. Equally important is what is missing: secret police buildings. These sites of torture and execution under Saddam, according to Burns, “sit abandoned now, or have been turned to benign uses.”

Barham Salih, head of the PUK government in northern Iraq, described the transformation in an interview with New York journalist Asla Aydintasbas for the online journal Salon:

Thanks to the relative peaceful environment we have seen for some time now—and no doubt thanks to the protection accorded to us by the U.S. and British military facilitated by Turkish coordination—we have been able to embark on a process of self-government. Something tangible in terms of a civil society and the rule of law is emerging from the ashes of genocide. I am not going to tell you that everything is rosy. We do have our problems. Democratic institutions will take a long time to grow. But in this terrible geopolitics and with the history we have, it’s remarkable what we have achieved.

Salih proudly notes that a region with one university and 804 schools in 1991 today has three universities and more than 2,700 schools. The universities—Sulaymaniyah, Salahuddiniah, and Dohuk—have a combined enrollment of more than 15,000 students whose backgrounds are not just Kurdish but ethnically diverse, including Turkmen, Assyrians, and Arabs who have chosen to escape Saddam’s oppression.

The number of medical doctors has more than doubled. And while the Iraqi regime blames international economic sanctions for increases in child mortality, the death rate for children in northern Iraq—which also falls under such sanctions—has dropped substantially.

Michael Rubin, an American scholar who traveled and taught in northern Iraq from September 2000 to June 2001, notes the rise in commerce and economic prosperity as well. “Most of the villages have been rebuilt,” he observed in a State Department interview, “and instead of people from northern Iraq going to Baghdad to go shopping, now it’s the other way around.”

In the town of Dohuk, he points out that the shopping center and university...
have been built on a former Ba’ath Party military base. “What they have done in the north,” said Rubin, “is take prime land used only by the Iraqi army, and they have given it to the people for something they can use. The same thing is true in Sulaymaniyah, where a huge park, called Azadi Park (Freedom Park), has been built on the Republican Guard base in the center of the city.”

Rubin points to another dramatic contrast between Saddam’s Iraq and the north: the rule of law and independent judiciary are taking root. Remarkably, these developments have not meant throwing out old legal codes or writing new ones. “These developments have evolved not through some new Kurdish law,” says Rubin. “Courts are basing their decision on existing Iraqi code. They are following the Iraqi Constitution.”

HERITAGE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Overcoming the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship will not be easy. All Iraqis recognize that justice and reconciliation constitute a formidable challenge.

Nevertheless, Iraqi society and the Iraqi people bring some remarkable assets to this challenge. Rend Rahim Francke, executive director of the Iraq Foundation in Washington, D.C., reels off an impressive list of strengths that Iraq’s history and heritage can bring to bear in building a new country.

First, she points out, Iraq has always had one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world, along with one of the highest percentages of university graduates. Second, Iraq has long had a relatively large and active middle class, coupled with a strong tradition of civil service and effective government institutions.

Over the last two decades, she says, “Saddam deliberately chose to emphasize differences and drive communities apart. We have to counter this effort and go back to building community tolerance and community relations.”

As one sign of the questing spirit of the Iraqis, Rahim Francke points to the upsurge in interest in Iraqi history to capture an older and more enduring sense of national identity and culture.

“You can’t imagine how many Iraqis are writing about their history—not Saddam’s history—but recovering their own, earlier history.” She cites the example of the 1920 revolution against foreign control, when Shi’a clerics and intellectuals rebelled against the British mandate and then reached out to the Sunni establishment. The 1920 revolt ended foreign rule and led to establishment of an Iraqi monarchy.

“People are now beginning to draw parallels between the 1920 and the 1991 uprisings,” she says. “A growing historical awareness is taking place among the Iraqi people, which I think is a tremendous asset.”

Rahim Francke says that Iraq, with its diverse ethnic and religious communities, is inherently a pluralist society, and building the concept and practice of civil society will be critical to the success of a post-Saddam nation. “We need to celebrate pluralism,” she says, “rather than repressing and negating it.”

Rend Rahim Francke is not alone in this view. The network structure of the Future of Iraq Project is designed to draw upon the impressive education and expertise of the expatriate community. “Many of them have reached significant positions in other countries,” says one U.S. expert. “They’re heads of corporations, doctors, lawyers, academics, authors, human rights experts.”

Moreover, the community of free Iraqis will know best how to draw on the knowledge and capabilities of the mid-level experts and civil servants who are not responsible for the crimes of the regime, and who constitute an invaluable resource in restoring a civil—and civilized—society to a future, free Iraq.

Four million Iraqi exiles are waiting for the opportunity to see the sun rise in the land of their fathers and mothers. As
Free From Fear

A long-time observer of Iraq has said on many occasions: “Nothing very good can happen as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.”

But when his regime is gone, the Iraqi people will have an opportunity to reclaim their nation and build institutions of democracy and prosperity that they could hardly dare to imagine under the grinding repression of Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein is the tormentor of his own people, a threat to his neighbors, and a menace to international peace and stability. His removal will not only eliminate a grave and gathering danger to the region and the world, but will once again permit the Iraqi people to shape their own future, in freedom and without fear.

The United States will support the Iraqi people in this effort. In a September 2002 interview with the Financial Times of London, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said that the United States will be “completely devoted” to the reconstruction of Iraq as a unified, democratic state after Saddam Hussein is gone.

On October 16, 2002, President Bush said:

I hope the good people of Iraq will remember our history, and not pay attention to the hateful propaganda of their government. America has never sought to dominate, has never sought to conquer. We’ve always sought to liberate and to free. Our desire is to help Iraqi citizens find the blessings of liberty within their own culture and their own traditions. The Iraqi people cannot flourish under a dictator that oppresses them and threatens them. Gifted people of Iraq will flourish if and when oppression is lifted.

When Iraq has a government committed to the freedom and well-being of its people, America, along with many other nations, will share a responsibility to help Iraq reform and prosper. And we will meet our responsibilities. That’s our pledge to the Iraqi people.

Two decades ago, Iraq’s history effectively stopped and became little more than the story of one man’s brutal pursuit of power. But the Iraqi people can now look forward to a time when they will be able to renew their national story and recover their own identities—as a free nation and a free people.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UN Action</th>
<th>Iraqi Action</th>
<th>Coalition Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 686, ordering cessation of hostilities</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 686</td>
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<td>3 Mar</td>
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<td>US, UK, France begin enforcing no-fly zone covering territory north of 36th parallel</td>
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<td>3 Apr</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 687, outlining provisions of cease-fire and setting up inspections</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Apr</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 688, ordering cessation of Baghdad's repression of Iraqi civilians</td>
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<td>6 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Apr</td>
<td>UNSC is created to carry out RES 687</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-21 May</td>
<td>IAEA conducts first nuclear inspection in Iraq</td>
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<td>29 May</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 692, establishing UN Compensation Fund / Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-15 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC conducts first chemical weapons inspection</td>
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<td>17 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 695, approving UN Secretary-General's plan to eliminate Iraq's WMD programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 700, approving guidelines for monitoring Iraqi arms embargo</td>
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<td>29-30 Jun</td>
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<td>29 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for flagrant violations of RES 687 in denying inspectors access</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jun-7 Jul</td>
<td>UNSC conducts first missile inspection</td>
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<td>2-4 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC conducts first biological weapons inspection</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 705, stating that Gulf War compensation paid by Iraq shall not exceed 30% of annual value of all exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 706, authorizing 6-month export of Iraqi petroleum products to finance purchase of humanitarian supplies</td>
<td>Iraq has never accepted RES 706</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 707, demanding that Iraq halt all nuclear activities and provide full disclosure of weapons programs</td>
<td>Iraq objects to RES 706 and 707</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 712, addressing various aspects of Iraqi petroleum sales in RES 706</td>
<td>Iraq has never accepted RES 712</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 712, addressing various aspects of Iraqi petroleum sales in RES 706</td>
<td>Iraq has never accepted RES 712</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Aug</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 723, endorsing the work of the UN Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 715, approving plans for system of ongoing monitoring to verify Iraqi compliance and to detect WMD reconstitution</td>
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<td>11 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 717, authorizing 6-month export of Iraqi petroleum products to finance purchase of humanitarian supplies</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Oct</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 718, designating proceeds of Iraqi petroleum sales to UN escrow account</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 719, endorsing the work of the UN Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Jan</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement stresses Iraq's restrictions of UN aircraft a material breach of RES 687</td>
<td>Iraq announces it cannot guarantee the safety of UN aircraft flying over Iraqi territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Jan</td>
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<td>Iraq removes equipment from the Kuwaiti side of DMZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Jan</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for material breach of RES 687 in preventing UNSCOM from flying to own aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Jan</td>
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<td>US, UK, France conduct air raids on Iraq anti-aircraft missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Jan</td>
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<td>US-UK fires missiles at industrial complex in suburban Baghdad</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-21 Jan</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 666, allowing UNIKOM to take direct action to prevent or redress violations in DMZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Feb</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 665, establishing UN Compensation Fund / Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 664, establishing UN Compensation Fund / Commission</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq's refusal of cameras material breach of RES 687, warns of serious consequences</td>
<td>Iraq refuses to allow UN monitoring cameras at weapons facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US launches cruise missile at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for assassination plot against former President Bush</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq's refusal of cameras material breach of RES 687</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Nov</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq border violations breach of RES 687</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 715</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Iraqi Action</td>
<td>Coalition Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Mar 1994</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 999 stating that compensation may be made to Iraqi citizens for loss of assets from demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait border</td>
<td>Iraq threatens to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, moves troops towards Kuwaiti border</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Oct 1994</td>
<td>Iraq submits “full, final, and complete declaration” on its biological weapons program</td>
<td>Iraq demands that U-2 flights end</td>
<td>US buildup of forces in region begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov 1994</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement welcomes Iraq recognition of Kuwait</td>
<td>Iraq formally recognizes Kuwait and UN border demarcation in compliance with RES 833</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Nov 1994</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 896 and the US, UK expand southern no-fly zone to 33rd parallel and strike targets in response to Iraq’s 31 August move into Kurdish-held territory</td>
<td>Iraq rejects RES 896</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Mar 1995</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1051 establishing export-monitoring mechanism and review for dual-use goods</td>
<td>Iraq rejects UNSCOM access to Ministry of Irrigation for 18 hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 1995</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1115 condemning Iraq’s interference with UN aerial inspections</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 896 of travel ban on US inspectors within 24 hours</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Jan 1996</td>
<td>UNSC issues presidential statement sending Rolf Ekeus to Baghdad to secure access</td>
<td>Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to two additional facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Apr 1996</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1082 demanding that Iraq grant immediate access to sites and terms Iraq’s actions as clear violations of UN resolutions</td>
<td>Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to revolutionary Guard facility and refuses to allow UNSCOM helicopter to monitor site</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Nov 1996</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1089 demanding that Iraq grant immediate access to sites and terms Iraq’s actions as clear violations of UN resolutions</td>
<td>Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to two additional facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 1997</td>
<td>UNSC's decision to expand southern no-fly zone to 33rd parallel and strike targets in response to Iraq’s 31 August move into Kurdish-held territory</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 896 of travel ban on US inspectors within 24 hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan 1998</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1134 condemning Iraq’s noncompliance and threatens travel ban for Iraqi officials</td>
<td>Iraq blocks UNSCOM access to presidential site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nov 1998</td>
<td>UNSC adopts resolution 1137 banning travel of Iraqi officials responsible for Iraq’s obstruction of UNSCOM inspections</td>
<td>Iraq warns that UNSCOM-U-2 missions will fly “at their own risk”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jan 1999</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement condemning Iraq’s military buildup of forces in region begins</td>
<td>Iraq rejects RES 896 of travel ban on US inspectors within 24 hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Feb 1999</td>
<td>UNSC adopts resolution 1153 expanding oil sales to $5.2 billion</td>
<td>Iraq threatens to halt cooperation with UN by August if UNSCOM report is unfavorable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>UN Action</td>
<td>Iraqi Action</td>
<td>Coalition Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 May 1998</td>
<td>UNSC presidential statement on transition of IAEA to long-term monitoring</td>
<td>Iraq’s RCC and Baath Party Command halt cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA, and no-notice inspections; monitoring activities are allowed to continue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jun 1998</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1175 authorizing the allocation of $300 million for oil spare parts</td>
<td>Saddam declares that UNSCOM will never be allowed back in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Sept 1998</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1194 condemning Iraq and suspending reviews of sanctions until UNSCOM is permitted to resume full operations</td>
<td>Saddam asks UN to certify that indirect negotiations with Iraq are not undermining the inspection process</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Oct 1998</td>
<td>UNSC press statement condemning Iraq, calls on UN to impose sanctions</td>
<td>Saddam agrees to UN demands that Iraq resume cooperation with UNSCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Nov 1998</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1205 ordering Iraq to resume cooperation with UNSCOM</td>
<td>Saddam allows UNSCOM to return to Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Nov 1998</td>
<td>UNSC team obstructed during inspections of suspected sites</td>
<td>Saddam accuses UN of attempting to destabilize Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-19 Dec 1998</td>
<td>UNSCOM reports to UNSC that it is unable to perform disarmament mandate, withdraws inspectors</td>
<td>Saddam threatens to withdraw from the inspection process</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Dec 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq declares that UNSCOM will never be allowed back in Iraq</td>
<td>Operation Desert Fox</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Jan 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq advises UN that it will not renew visas for US and UK Oil-for-Food monitors because it could not guarantee their safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Jan 1999</td>
<td>Hans von Sponeck visits southern Iraq and reports on damage caused by air strikes</td>
<td>Iraq rejects UN proposal for Hajj pilgrims</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Feb 1999</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General Annan orders all US and UK Oil-for-Food monitors out of Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq attempts to gain direct control over some oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq rejects UN Secretary-General offer to discuss weapons inspections</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Dec 1999</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1286 allowing Iraq to exceed oil sales ceiling</td>
<td>Iraq has yet to accept RES 1284</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Jan 2000</td>
<td>Hans Blix is appointed chairman of UNMOVIC</td>
<td>Iraq rejects UN proposal for Hajj pilgrims</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Mar 2000</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1293 doubling allocations for oil spare parts</td>
<td>Iraq attempts to gain direct control over some oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Apr 2000</td>
<td>UNMOVIC chairman Blix submits organizational plan to UNSC</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Apr 2000</td>
<td>UNSC approves UNMOVIC organizational plan</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Jun 2000</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General reports that Iraq has sufficient revenues to take care of food and nutrition and solve health problems; UNSC adopts RES 1302 improving implementation of humanitarian program</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Nov 2000</td>
<td>UN Sanctions Committee rejects Iraq's oil surcharge proposal</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Nov 2000</td>
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<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Nov 2000</td>
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<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<td>1 Dec 2000</td>
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<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Mar 2001</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General reports Iraq’s underproduction of oil is affecting critical humanitarian programs</td>
<td>Iraq suspends oil production</td>
<td>US, UK strike mobile early warning radar in response to increasing Iraq acts against coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Mar 2001</td>
<td>UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections</td>
<td>Iraq suspends oil production</td>
<td>US, UK strike mobile early warning radar in response to increasing Iraq acts against coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr 2001</td>
<td>UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections</td>
<td>Iraq temporary halts oil exports</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May 2002</td>
<td>UN-Iraq talks in NY on renewing weapons inspections</td>
<td>Iraq orders 5 UN Oil-for-Food workers to leave Baghdad without consulting UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Feb 2002</td>
<td>UN Special Rapporteur visits Baghdad</td>
<td>Iraq suspends oil production</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 May 2002</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1409, revised 300-page Goods Review List</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Sep 2002</td>
<td>UNSC begins discussion on Iraq non-compliance with UN resolutions</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Sep 2002</td>
<td>UNSC adopts RES 1441 outlawing provisions for enhanced weapons inspections</td>
<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Nov 2002</td>
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<td>Iraq temporarily halts oil exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Nov 2002</td>
<td>UNMOVIC and IAEA chairman in Baghdad for technical talks</td>
<td>Iraq accepts RES 1441</td>
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PICTURE CREDITS


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