



**Special Inspector General  
for Iraq Reconstruction**

**IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION**

**LESSONS IN HUMAN  
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT**

**1**

**[January 2006]**



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## INTRODUCTION

This is the first report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction's (SIGIR) Lessons Learned Initiative (LLI). The LLI is designed to enhance ongoing efforts in Iraq as well as to inform future U.S. reconstruction and stabilization planning and programs. The initiative focuses on three key subject areas:

- Human Capital Management
- Contracting
- Program and Project Management

In each subject area, SIGIR gathers information through research and interviews, collating and distilling the results into a white paper. Each white paper is then reviewed by a panel of experts that evaluates the findings and makes recommendations.

### **About the Human Capital Management Forum**

On September 20, 2005, SIGIR conducted its first Lessons Learned Forum, which focused on human capital management. The forum culminated months of work on the range of personnel issues that have emerged during the Iraq reconstruction enterprise. Much of the data SIGIR developed was derived from interviews with personnel who had first-hand experience in Iraq reconstruction human resource matters.

SIGIR gathered more than 30 experts drawn from government, industry, and academia, including many who served in Iraq, for a full-day forum at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., to evaluate the findings and provide recommendations. This report presents those findings and recommendations.



## **LESSONS LEARNED FINDINGS**


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## **POLICY ALIGNMENT: POLICY AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES FOR STAFFING A TEMPORARY “SURGE” ORGANIZATION**

Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to success. Such a plan should articulate the U.S. interests at stake, define U.S. objectives for reconstruction, and lay out the strategy for achieving these policy objectives, along with a clear division of labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan’s implementation. Perhaps even more important than the plan itself is the strategy development and planning process, which allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles.<sup>1</sup>

*Play to Win,*  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
and the Association of the U.S. Army






History teaches that reconstruction programs in post-conflict environments are neither easy nor expeditious. The most noteworthy of these efforts—the post-World War II reconstruction of Japan and Germany—took many years and a continuing commitment of U.S. forces and funds to reach its goals. Other U.S. reconstruction or relief endeavors—although less costly and protracted—were generally more troublesome or, as in Somalia, ultimately unsuccessful.

This report on the use of human resources within the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq reveals a central if unsurprising point: there was insufficient systematic planning for human capital management in Iraq before and during the U.S.-directed stabilization and reconstruction operations. The practical limitations ensuing from this shortfall adversely affected reconstruction in post-war Iraq. Moreover, the somewhat fitful creation of the initial coalition reconstruction organizations, and the unanticipated post-war collapse of virtually all Iraqi governing structures, substantially hindered coalition efforts to develop and rapidly execute an effective reconstruction program.

A variety of causes led to the problems that burdened human capital management in Iraq. When planning for managing post-war Iraq began in mid-2002, no comprehensive policy or regulatory guidelines existed to staff a temporary “surge” organization for stabilization and reconstruction. One senior Department of Defense (DoD) official told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that the U.S. government was not systematically structured to execute overseas reconstruction and stabilization programs. Further, overall operational planning naturally focused on military requirements.



Shortly after overt hostilities ended, the shortcomings in reconstruction and stabilization human resources became evident:

- There was no existing contingency organization to lead the reconstruction and relief process.
- There was no regulatory template for recruiting personnel to staff a temporary “surge” relief and reconstruction organization.

A senior Department of State (DoS) official noted that:

[the U.S. government was not prepared]...to be an occupying power. We have no contemporary doctrine for occupying another country [and] no basic doctrine on which to base an effective personnel policy...the jobs that we were asking people to do...required constant, consistent judgments; a common understanding of goals and policies; a common discipline; a common sense of accountability; etc. This is what comes from years and decades of an evolving group culture. It cannot happen overnight. And it cannot be achieved by bringing together disparate individuals whose loyalty and accountability is to the company that hired them rather than the USG.<sup>2</sup>

Executing an effective reconstruction and stabilization program in Iraq would have been greatly enhanced if there had been an existing “civilian reserve corps” to deploy in support of relief operations. But no trained and deployable cadre of interagency experts was available for the Iraq relief effort. And the large-scale reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq could not be solved by contracting out those duties.



## Initial Planning Phase


The initial phase of post-conflict planning for Iraq began in mid-2002 when several interagency groups, coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), began developing operational plans for relief and reconstruction. These groups engaged in limited information sharing across agency lines.<sup>3</sup> DoS simultaneously sponsored the “Future of Iraq” project, which created a 1,200-page document that proposed a variety of ambitious concepts for post-Saddam Iraq. The project’s report, however, did not provide a comprehensive plan for the U.S. management of post-war Iraq.

Formal development of a more detailed reconstruction administrative plan began in January 2003 when Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), was appointed to head the newly created Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). According to General Garner, ORHA had no pre-existing guidelines or regulatory templates for acquiring human resources. Thus, after General Garner’s appointment, ORHA rapidly began to develop a staffing plan based on authorizations for “detailing” federal employees, which were provided in a January 2003 Presidential Decision Memorandum. General Garner observed, “We started [our staffing plan] in the first [week] of February... for a March problem.”<sup>4</sup>

## Planning Guidelines

Two DoD documents served as guides to addressing human capital management in post-war Iraq:

- *Civilian Personnel Management Guide for Management Officials During Contingencies and Emergencies*
- *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*



In March 2003, DoD published the *Civilian Personnel Management Guide for Management Officials During Contingencies and Emergencies*, which identified human resource management regulatory provisions that apply during emergency situations. The guide lists a variety of “Hiring Flexibilities” available during contingencies and emergencies, including temporary excepted appointments, emergency appointments to senior level positions, and Senior Executive Service (SES) limited appointments. However, the guide does not provide a framework for establishing a temporary organization like ORHA or the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

The other relevant DoD document was Joint Publication 1-0, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*, which provides guidance for developing personnel requirements during the planning and execution of joint operations. Although the planning document presumes the use of DoD civilians and contractors within joint operations, its primary focus is on the allocation of military and support personnel directly involved in military operations. Moreover, this document does not provide any guidance for managing post-conflict personnel requirements.



There was no contingency organization to lead the reconstruction and relief process.

There was no template for recruiting personnel to staff a temporary “surge” relief and reconstruction organization.



## The 3161 Provision

The primary statutory provision that was used for employing civilians in Iraq was Title 5, Section 3161 of the U.S. Code. The 3161 provision enables temporary organizations to acquire staff through temporary appointments to the excepted service of the Civil Service. ORHA and CPA used 3161 extensively to hire civilian personnel for periods of up to one year (with the possibility of renewal). Depending on the designated tour length, 3161 personnel could receive most federal benefits, but their 3161 service time did not count toward certain federal rehiring privileges, including Civil Service status.

According to a former CPA personnel specialist, the 3161 hiring authority had long existed under 5 CFR 213.3199, but it had been typically used to fill boards or commissions. The provision was useful for rapid hiring because it allowed appointments from outside government without the usual competition required under formal job classifications.<sup>5</sup> The use of 3161 to staff the temporary stabilization and reconstruction organizations in Iraq appears to have been unprecedented. But without the authority and agility provided by 3161, it would have been impossible to overcome the shortfall that would have arisen by relying only on interagency detailees. Among employees working for CPA in March 2004, more than 20% had been hired under 5 USC 3161.


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## WORKFORCE PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT: DEALING WITH MISSION FLUX AND INTERAGENCY CULTURE CONFLICTS

Workforce planning is fundamental to establishing a successful government-managed reconstruction organization. To be effective, planning should clearly identify current and future human capital needs, the number of personnel required to accomplish a specific mission, the specific competencies necessary, and the sources from which skilled personnel can be drawn. Appropriate workforce planning should also include elements for evaluating and revising plans.

The Iraq reconstruction experience was affected by special circumstances and requirements that inhibited management's capacity to execute effective workforce planning activities. These circumstances included:

- *The wide-ranging role of CPA:* CPA was the de facto government of Iraq that oversaw the reestablishment of Iraqi ministries, consulted with an advisory "legislature," promulgated laws and regulations, provided diplomatic links with foreign governments, and coordinated with the coalition's military leadership.
- *CPA's temporary status:* CPA had only a few months to define its mission, design an organization to meet that mission, and staff the organization. The lack of sufficient pre-conflict planning and the absence of an existing governmental structure to address such problems made it difficult to arrive rapidly at an adequate human capital solution.
- *The deteriorating security environment:* The security situation affected all plans and operations and was the most inhibiting factor in recruitment.

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- *Inaccurate assumptions about the Iraqi government bureaucracy:* Pre-war reconstruction planning assumed that Iraq’s bureaucracy would go back to work when the fighting stopped. When it became clear that the Iraqi bureaucracy was in widespread disarray, ORHA and CPA had to find coalition personnel to perform these tasks. Forum participants described this as a key factor underlying all of CPA’s organizational and operational difficulties.

Several operational shortcomings exacerbated the extraordinarily challenging circumstances that ORHA and CPA faced in Iraq:


- limited personnel sources
- constantly changing requirements
- inconsistent interagency coordination

## Limited Personnel Sources

The workforce planning and deployment process for Iraq’s reconstruction began before the start of hostilities when ORHA developed a staff to address Iraq’s post-war requirements. ORHA was assigned three major tasks or “pillars” —reconstruction, civil administration, and humanitarian affairs. It built a structure to address these pillars and sought personnel from the appropriate U.S. government agencies to staff the mission.<sup>7</sup> The only apparent systematic manpower plan, however, was the military Joint Manning Document (JMD), which authorized 94 military positions within ORHA.<sup>8</sup> Civilian detailees and direct hires were not included in this initial manning plan.

ORHA sent requests to civilian and military agencies for personnel support but did not prepare detailed job descriptions because of time constraints. For functions that were “not military-unique,” ORHA put out the call to agencies to provide civilian personnel.<sup>9</sup> Personnel began trickling in, and ORHA’s staffing count rose to 150





in mid-March 2003. An ORHA document shows that about half of ORHA's personnel were military detailees (both officer and enlisted). Civilian personnel included contingents from DoD, DoS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and a few from other government agencies.<sup>10</sup>


According to a former ORHA staff member, the number of civilian personnel in ORHA began to increase rapidly after deployment to Kuwait in March 2003. Before moving on to Baghdad in April, ORHA's staff exceeded 500 people, including security and other support personnel. "People just kept coming in... we were running out of billeting space," said one ORHA interviewee. Meanwhile, actual staffing patterns began to deviate sharply from the JMD as individual assignments were shifted to respond to rapidly evolving events on the ground in Iraq.<sup>11</sup>

## **Creation of CPA**

CPA was created in April 2003 and was intended to be a more comprehensive governing entity than ORHA. In May 2003, when Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad as CPA administrator, ORHA's mission and personnel were immediately subsumed by CPA. CPA required a much more ambitious staffing plan than ORHA had, and rapidly expanded its staffing blueprint as a result. Ambassador Bremer and CPA senior advisors recognized that their broader mission required many more people and hired accordingly. Further, as CPA evolved the composition of the organization evolved from primarily military to primarily civilian.

## **Lack of an Adequate Staffing Document**

Except for the JMD passed down from ORHA, CPA had no formal program for manpower planning. A "pull system" evolved in which personnel needs were determined in Baghdad and passed back to



Washington for execution. According to a March 2004 report of the CPA Inspector General (CPA-IG):

At the initial standup of the CPA Baghdad, the CPA Personnel Office (HRM Forward) was manned by one individual who was on a three-month assignment and then replaced. The CPA senior advisors assigned to the various Iraqi Ministries determined their initial manning requirements and forwarded these...to HRM Forward, who...sent them to CPA Washington for action. HRM officials in Washington contacted agencies throughout the government and began the process of recruiting personnel to fill CPA positions ...throughout this process, the CPA manning document changed constantly in terms of the number of required personnel. There was no known ceiling to the number of civilians needed to support the CPA.<sup>12</sup>

Senior CPA officials in Baghdad sometimes recruited personnel directly from various U.S. government agencies without going through CPA Washington. These informal hires were then presented to CPA Washington for processing, which contributed to the haphazard human resources situation.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, because CPA was expected to be a short-term organization, little attempt was made early on to ensure that personnel committed to assignments in Iraq beyond three to six months.

Eventually, CPA Baghdad prepared a more detailed JMD and provided it to CPA Washington. This document contained a civilian segment that constituted the most detailed civilian planning document created for Iraq reconstruction. Military officials in Washington, however, removed the civilian section because their offices were not structured to deal with civilian appointments.<sup>14</sup>



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## **INTRA-CPA COMMUNICATIONS**


One SIGIR interviewee noted that, in the first months of the CPA, some sections were well staffed, with qualified people drawn from cooperative home agencies in Washington, while other offices, without such direct support, often had insufficient personnel or were short on necessary expertise and leadership. CPA's departments in Baghdad had limited communication on personnel issues, especially during this early period, and no CPA Baghdad authority conducted a comprehensive inventory of staff.<sup>15</sup>

## **CREATION OF THE CPA RECRUITING TEAM**

By mid-to-late summer 2003, the changing circumstances facing CPA in post-war Iraq altered original assumptions about length of stay and thus placed new demands on the developing recruiting system in Washington. At the same time, according to one senior U.S. reconstruction official, the ability and willingness of U.S. government agencies to provide detailees to CPA had declined.

To resolve this situation, a new CPA recruiting team was set up within the Pentagon's White House Liaison Office (WHLO), based in part on the "transition team" model used to staff new Presidential administrations. This team immediately began a strong recruitment drive for temporary, direct-hire 3161s to staff CPA and to cover the shortfall in detailee contributions from federal agencies.<sup>16</sup>

The WHLO CPA recruiting team was successful in quickly hiring hundreds of new temporary employees, but some possessed what proved to be inconsistent skill sets. Furthermore, no long-term human resource strategic plan was developed. CPA senior staff and ministry advisors in Baghdad continued to determine manpower



needs, and the recruiting team matched their requests to an applicant pool.\*

## Constantly Changing Requirements


Major changes in circumstances on the ground in Iraq substantially altered personnel requirements within CPA. This began in May 2003 when the newly created CPA subsumed ORHA. The swift and complete collapse of virtually all of Iraq's governing structures required CPA to expand its role to the complete management of the Iraqi government as well as reconstruction. The lack of a functioning indigenous security force and the dissolution of the Iraqi ministries generated unanticipated demands on the coalition, requiring the deployment of a larger number of military and civilian personnel than originally envisioned.

In November 2003, President Bush announced that CPA would terminate by the end of June 2004 and would transfer all governing authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. The President also announced that, with this transition, DoS would assume (from DoD) the lead role in managing Iraq's relief and reconstruction. These important decisions immediately changed the CPA's mission plan and put the future of many pending CPA positions on hold. Since the middle of 2003, CPA had expected to be in operation for at least two more years. The President's announcement changed these expectations and thus fundamentally altered CPA's human capital management. By the spring of 2004, many job offers and deployment actions remained frozen while CPA and DoS decided whether these positions would continue after the June 2004 turnover.<sup>17</sup>

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\*There were some reports that certain employment decisions were politically influenced, especially for mid-level hires. SIGIR Interview, June 2004. The DoD WHLO vigorously disputed such reports.







## Inconsistent Interagency Coordination


Relatively few agencies responded effectively to the call for volunteer detailees for CPA. One ORHA official pointed to DoD's initial "go it alone" attitude as a factor. The agencies that did provide personnel may have acted through requests from senior officials in Baghdad who had influence in their agencies—not through any formal coordination or tasking process. Interagency coordination was generally weak on human resource management within the U.S. government. One of the causes of this coordinative weakness was the lack of any systemic process within the U.S. government to manage reconstruction and stabilization programs. In August 2004, the DoS addressed this issue by creating the new office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This office will:

lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. S/CRS is building civilian capacity to plan and coordinate stabilization and reconstruction efforts. S/CRS and its interagency partners also draw on expertise from nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, private firms, and universities. The U.S. government will use these resources to encourage and coordinate activities with other governments and international organizations.<sup>6</sup>

One forum participant expressed surprise at the degree to which many federal agencies gave only "lip service" to taskings from the White House and the NSC for Iraq detailees. This participant suggested that the White House should insist that Cabinet secretaries support detailee initiatives and be held accountable.

Another forum participant emphasized that most civilian agencies are not structured for surge events. Some senior government officials stressed that domestic agencies do not have the required





numbers or types of personnel available for overseas reconstruction duty. One agency representative stated that his agency met CPA demands by reprioritizing work, which caused lower-priority, non-Iraq initiatives to be delayed.

Although temporary, direct-hire 3161s were able to fill many of the billets for which government detailees were unavailable, they often had no military or government experience and thus were unfamiliar with the management environment. Moreover, most U.S. government detailees to CPA had not worked with the military or in a post-conflict environment. Better workforce planning by CPA might have helped to alleviate this problem. One senior CPA official noted:

The civilians in the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military organization, and thus no idea of which parts of the military might either assist them or need to know what they were planning. The civilians didn't know whom to call.<sup>18</sup>

It should be noted that this situation was not true of ORHA, which had a high proportion of military detailees and civilian personnel with military experience, according to a senior ORHA official. DoD officials indicate that this mix was deliberate, to allow ORHA to function, it was hoped, as an intermediary between the U.S. Military Central Command and civilian reconstruction specialists.

## **The Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC)**

In an ambitious effort to tap the expertise of Iraqi exiles and expatriates for the reconstruction program, DoD created the Iraq



Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) in 2003. IRDC was tasked with helping to rebuild Iraqi government structures by embedding Iraqi exiles and expatriates as technical advisors in 23 Iraqi ministries and provincial centers. Under a \$33 million U.S. government contract for IRDC recruiting, a U.S.-based firm hired Iraqi expatriates to support CPA efforts to bring relief to Iraq.

The program's main goal was to leverage the expatriates' professional knowledge and cultural understanding to help rebuild the government infrastructure. There are mixed reports about this program's effectiveness and the qualifications of IRDC personnel. Problems arose in a variety of areas. For example, IRDC members had an ambiguous status that differentiated them from mainstream CPA colleagues and from their native Iraqi counterparts. Additionally, the chain of command established for IRDC was unclear to CPA management because their personnel were deployed on a broad range of projects, with no central CPA point of contact for guidance and management.

While many IRDC members claimed that they were underemployed and not given the responsibilities that they expected, others had clear records of individual achievement. Perhaps the best example was provided by a DoS official who noted that IRDC set up a shadow council of economic advisors led by Sinan al-Shabbibi, who is now the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq.

One forum participant said that IRDC's "major shortcoming was [that] the goals and commitments set forth through the Office of the Secretary of Defense were not communicated to ORHA/CPA personnel in Baghdad. As a result, IRDC and ORHA/CPA expectations never completely meshed." DoD officials involved in organizing IRDC, however, assert that CPA "was repeatedly informed of IRDC's availability, but declined to make use of this resource."<sup>19</sup> A former CPA official recalled that some IRDC personnel had limited skills,

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unrealistic expectations about their status, and were reluctant to accept the authority of senior CPA officials, thus making it difficult to use them effectively.


The Iraq experience has shown the critical need for in-depth understanding among relief and reconstruction specialists of the cultural, political, and socioeconomic underpinnings of the post-conflict country or region. A cadre of experts drawn from that country's expatriate population could provide a unique resource to meet this need. One lesson learned from Iraq in this area is that using an expatriate corps requires clear lines of authority and careful matching of skills and jobs.

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## **RECRUITMENT: MATCHING SKILLS WITH NEEDS**

The Coalition nations have millions of the most talented individuals in the world. We needed, and did not have, several thousand of them. Our partners sent some of their best and brightest. The United States did not proportionally provide. There were all sorts of reasons that sending enough good people to Iraq was difficult, from simply the lack of places to sleep, to the difficulty in getting people to put their lives on hold to do a demonstrably dangerous job. Those involved in staffing the Coalition found every one of these obstacles. We simply did not have sufficient people for the task. There was no time to maintain a record of what was occurring—it was difficult enough in my Directorate to maintain even the semblance of a correspondence chronological file.<sup>20</sup>

“Restarting the Economy in Iraq,”  
Rear Admiral David Oliver, USN (Ret.),  
former CPA Director for Management and Budget



As with any large and diverse organization, CPA's ability to accomplish its mission was directly linked to the quality and skill of the people who staffed it. Therefore, the personnel recruiting process was a fundamental component of CPA's operational success. Recruiters needed to determine the necessary skills and experience, identify candidates who possessed these traits, and hire and retain these candidates. They also had to ensure that managers properly matched their skills to CPA positions. These circumstances and requirements combined to create challenges to planning and executing personnel recruitment for Iraq reconstruction.

CPA's experiences yielded lessons that could improve ongoing recruiting processes in Iraq. Among these lessons were:

- lack of matching talent to mission requirements
- inappropriate or inconsistent tour lengths
- the overtime disincentive
- lack of interagency support

### **Lack of Matching Talent to Mission Requirements**

The process of hiring reconstruction personnel must be aligned with the expected mission's goals and requirements so that skills critical to mission success are clearly defined and the correct personnel are hired. The essential elements of a competitive staffing plan must be developed in advance and a cadre of relief and reconstruction experts must be ready to deploy. The new S/CRS office has now been empowered by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 to coordinate personnel and other post-conflict requirements for all agencies, which should help in this process.



## **SKILL ALIGNMENT**

One of CPA's critical personnel shortcomings was the inadequate link between position requirements and necessary skills. The process for identifying qualified personnel and hiring them for specific positions was never systematically coordinated. Gaps existed not only in the type of experience among those hired, but also in the quality and depth of their experience relative to their assigned job. Although most of the dedicated personnel deployed to CPA proved to be flexible, adaptable, and resilient in facing the rigors and dangers of post-war Iraq, they could not, in some cases, overcome shortfalls in skills or experience. This problem was especially apparent among mid-level appointees.<sup>21</sup>

Iraq reconstruction veterans interviewed by SIGIR noted that there were personnel in CPA without the appropriate skills for the position to which they were assigned. Similarly, a SIGIR audit on the administration of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) contracts found that personnel and resource shortfalls contributed to the ineffective monitoring of DFI contracts, poor document execution, and inaccurate collection of data. SIGIR found that the general shortage of personnel (and the widespread lack of required skill and experience among those available) affected all facets of reconstruction assistance.<sup>22</sup>

The management of talent in contingency operations must include the correct alignment of skills and experience to do the job. To handle the hiring surge, CPA personnel management should have been streamlined and adequately resourced once it became clear that the more broad-based CPA would subsume ORHA's limited role.




## The Need for a Standing Reconstruction Reserve Corps

The CPA experience demonstrated the U.S. government's critical need for a reserve civilian corps of talented professionals, with the proper expertise, willing to work in a hostile environment during post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction periods. Such a contingency organization ideally would be identified, recruited, trained in advance, exercised regularly, and be ready—like a military reserve unit—to deploy and meet the needs of conflict/post-conflict relief and reconstruction.<sup>23</sup> One forum participant suggested that such a group should include a “human resources management SWAT team” available on short notice to provide planning for an emerging reconstruction event. Such an organization, however, would be expensive. One former CPA official suggested that we aim more modestly for “procedures in hiring, a good Rolodex, and a single line of authority.”<sup>22</sup>

### THE CPA HIRING CYCLE

Another impediment to securing qualified people for Iraq was the unpredictable length of the CPA hiring cycle, especially for personnel from outside the federal government. SIGIR surveys suggested that the hiring process was often long and unresponsive to job candidates. Some CPA personnel were hired and deployed in 3–15 weeks; others experienced delays of up to 10 months. Many personnel, recruited months earlier for CPA, were not deployed until after the June 2004 transfer of governance authority. They became employees of the DoS Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), which took over CPA's reconstruction function.<sup>25</sup>

Once a job was identified in Iraq, recruiting staff reviewed resumes and interviewed candidates in Washington until a suitable person was hired for that position. However, by the time that




person was approved, in-processed, and deployed, circumstances on the ground in Iraq had frequently changed. The position might no longer be required, or it might have been filled by someone else in Iraq.<sup>26</sup> The bottom line is that delays in the recruiting pipeline in Washington often required those on the ground in Iraq to develop alternative recruitment strategies.

Some forum participants were concerned that appropriate pools of qualified people were not fully used. One participant stated that it should have been possible to take greater advantage of the expertise within the Civil Service to fill Iraq reconstruction positions, despite existing hurdles. Another noted that over the last decade at least 1,000,000 Americans have had experience in post-conflict reconstruction environments, and they should have been more effectively tapped as a personnel resource. This participant called for the development of a “more agile” recruiting approach that could do more than “just finding people in the U.S. government.”

Forum participants from the CPA recruiting team disagreed with these observations, stating that CPA recruited outstanding people with the proper skills. These divergent comments reflect the differing perceptions of those who hired and those who managed CPA personnel, thereby underscoring the need for a fully developed pre-conflict staffing plan that clearly lays out what level of expertise and skills are required.

## **Inappropriate/Inconsistent Tour Length**

Of all the personnel problems that affected the Iraq reconstruction program, the continual turnover of key personnel was perhaps the most burdensome. Organizations need to plan and implement employment strategies that ensure that personnel, especially those with critical skills, serve out their expected tours of duty. In Iraq, inconsistent deployment cycles significantly impeded reconstruction



efforts. The causes for this are varied, but they include the failure to focus on implementing reliable mechanisms for recruiting and retaining individuals well-suited for the mission and the systemic lack of established pools of follow-on personnel ready to deploy as existing tour cycles expired.

### **STANDARD DEPLOYMENT CYCLE**


Developing standard practices for temporary deployments is essential to a successful personnel system in stabilization and reconstruction environments. Thus, a system should be developed early on that provides for standard tour lengths, the identification of personnel with necessary skills, and the development of a cadre of follow-on personnel.

In Iraq, CPA did not establish a standard deployment cycle for personnel detailed from supporting agencies. In addition, non-government, direct-hire personnel (3161s), were on deployment cycles that differed from federal detailees. Moreover, the 3161s were under no legal obligation to remain in Iraq for a full tour, and some ended their deployments early. As a general rule, the 3161s had steeper learning curves in Iraq than their federal counterparts. It was thus a daunting task to maintain continuity of effort within this diverse pool of personnel with varying tour lengths and skill sets.

### **VARYING TOUR LENGTHS**

Military tour lengths for those supporting Iraq reconstruction were also inconsistent. Iraq tour lengths stabilized at one year for Army personnel, six months for Navy, and four months for Air Force. The Marine Corps used a more complex system: its personnel served multiple, relatively short tours in country, with breaks between tours. Detailees from federal agencies other than DoD and DoS were recruited for six-month tours.<sup>27</sup> DoS detailees were originally asked





to serve three-month temporary duty (TDY) assignments, which were extended to six-month TDYs in January 2004. In the post-CPA period, DoS tours were extended to one year.<sup>28</sup>

The tours for 3161 employees were initially six months but were later extended to one year. In practice, the tours for CPA-assigned 3161 hires and federal detailees varied widely and were often curtailed early, making accurate deployment cycle planning difficult, if not impossible. One DoS CPA detailee described CPA recruiters as being “willing to take people for as long as people were willing to stay.”<sup>29</sup> Forum participants noted that short-term stays were almost the rule rather than the exception during the early days of CPA.


## **Audit of Personnel Management**

On June 25, 2004, CPA-IG issued an audit of CPA personnel management<sup>30</sup> that cited a number of factors causing high turnover of personnel in CPA, including:

- uncertain length of rotations
- high work volume
- intense operational tempo
- limited incentives
- high-risk environment
- shortfalls in qualified personnel

No substantial effort was made to deter the recruitment of government employees by contractors in Iraq. Some SIGIR interviewees claimed that private sector organizations’ pirating of personnel from government agencies increased U.S. government labor costs. Private sector organizations were typically able to offer higher pay and other incentives.

Aggressive incentives, such as retention rewards for completion of deployment, might have helped keep individuals in their rotation



and deterred contractors from recruiting government personnel. In the future, positive and negative incentives should be provided within the personnel management process so that the leadership and the human resources managers have the appropriate tools to encourage or require personnel to fulfill their assigned tours.

## **The Overtime Disincentive**


Forum participants noted that many 3161 direct hires claimed large amounts of overtime pay, which caused them to reach federal annual pay caps months before their scheduled tour completion dates. This created a disincentive toward tour completion and caused early departures.

The problem manifested itself most strongly among the senior staff, whose base salary was already at annual pay cap levels (\$135,000). Because of large overtime payments, these people often reached the pay cap after only six to eight months of what was to be a one-year assignment. One forum participant suggested that, to maintain the integrity of the senior leadership cadre, overtime pay should not be authorized or be very limited for such personnel.

## **Lack of Interagency Support**

A U.S. Institute of Peace report discussing the CPA experience stated that:

even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing stability and governance in post-war Iraq, there is simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to mobilize large numbers of the right people quickly. One source of tension (and there were many) between the military and the CPA stemmed from the utter mismatch in capabilities. The CPA was the ultimate authority in the land and charged with rebuilding the country, but it was composed of a pickup team, and it underwent enormous turnover; it was not unusual for CPA employees to stay in Iraq for only a month.<sup>31</sup>



Early in the planning process, CPA made assumptions about the availability of personnel. To accomplish its mission, CPA expected to be able to draw people from agencies throughout the U.S. government; however, support from U.S. government agencies fell well short of expectations. Forum attendees agreed that involuntary assignment of civilian detailees—though perhaps legal—would not work in practice.

Many sources corroborate the finding that CPA was understaffed, largely because the expected interagency support did not materialize. A CPA report explained concerns at the time:

U.S. government departments are reluctant to send the requested number of people or their best people because they see CPA as a DoD project. DoD was also slow to deploy their best people to Baghdad.<sup>32</sup>

CPA-IG data from March 2004 illustrate the low level of response from U.S. government agencies. At that time, CPA was estimated to have filled 1,196 billets of the 2,117 authorized. Other than DoS and DoD, federal cabinet-level agencies filled just 64 of these positions (about 5.4%). Of the remainder, DoS and USAID filled 91 positions (about 7.5%). The remaining 1,041 positions were filled by coalition members, 3161s, smaller federal and local government agency detailees, and military detailees.

In addition, to compensate for the lack of available candidates, agencies hired personnel from outside the government to deploy to Iraq. This aggravated the human capital management problem because newly hired civilians proved to be more difficult to deploy than federal workers, whose clearance status, among other things, was already established. Non-government personnel had to be in-processed, cleared, and trained, which added substantial time to the recruiting and deployment cycles. In some cases, hiring delays caused qualified outside applicants to terminate their candidacies.<sup>33</sup>


A DoD HR specialist interviewed by SIGIR noted that these March 2004 figures probably constitute the high point in CPA staffing. From May 2003 to March 2004, the total numbers and the specific contributions of individual agencies were lower than these numbers, although rising slowly.<sup>34</sup> The following table illustrates the contributions of selected Cabinet departments.

**NUMBER OF CPA DETAILEES FROM SELECTED U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**


DEPARTMENT	DETAILEES
Dept. of Agriculture	3
Dept. of Commerce	6
Dept. of Energy	10
Dept. of Health and Human Services	4
Dept. of the Interior	1
Dept. of Justice	9
Dept. of Transportation	5

Source: CPA-IG Working Paper #3; *Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Iraq*; June 25, 2004

One success story in terms of detailee and civilian staffing, however, was the Ministry of Health. Shortly after CPA began operations, the highly experienced former head of the Michigan Department of Community Health was appointed as advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Health. Working closely with CPA recruiting at the Pentagon, he took personal responsibility for putting together a 25-person team before going to Iraq. The team comprised U.S. government detailees, military personnel, IRDC personnel, and civilians.



U.S. government workforce planning for Iraq's reconstruction suffered from a poorly structured, ad hoc personnel management process.



Upon arrival in Baghdad, this group began working with the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which had 120,000 employees, 240 hospitals, and 1,200 clinics. The original Iraqi budget of \$16 million grew to \$1 billion a year later when the Ministry of Health became the first ministry to be transferred to full Iraqi control. A key lesson learned from this situation was the value of organizing a coherent and cohesive team before deployment.<sup>35</sup>

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## **CONTINUITY: DEALING WITH STAFF TURNOVER AND INFORMATION HAND-OFF**

U.S. government workforce planning for Iraq's reconstruction suffered from a poorly structured, ad hoc personnel management process. Problems caused by this process were aggravated by the mounting insurgency that substantially hindered progress on all fronts in Iraq.


As Iraq's reconstruction became increasingly difficult, the need for more U.S. reconstruction personnel to stay longer—or at least for more predictable periods of time—became essential. Moreover, the stresses associated with living in Iraq and the increase in the security threat demanded the development of a clearly structured deployment cycle with well-defined tour lengths and sufficient overlap with successors.

### **The Need for Continuity**

An ideal tour cycle should include sufficient time to develop necessary job knowledge, to apply that expertise, and to transfer that knowledge to a successor. A face-to-face transition is



...the stresses associated with living in Iraq and the increase in the security threat demanded the development of a clearly structured deployment cycle with well-defined tour lengths and sufficient overlap with successors.



essential for mission continuity because, particularly for Iraq, pre-deployment briefing information is limited. Thus, successors should be chosen and prepared to deploy well in advance of their predecessors' departure.

Many sources stated that CPA never developed a formal deployment cycle for detailees or 3161s. These were the key shortcomings regarding the continuity of personnel:


- temporary mindset
- lack of synchronized deployment
- uncertain tour length, personnel turnover, and control

## Temporary Mindset

CPA was a temporary organization. The definition of “temporary” for CPA, however, changed over time. Originally, the United States was expected to use ORHA to supervise a three-month transition of most governing functions to a new Iraqi government staffed largely by Iraqi expatriates who would move ahead with a democratic vision for Iraq. But in the spring of 2003, as it became apparent that the recovery of Iraq would require a more extensive presence, the U.S. government created CPA, which subsumed ORHA and assumed the role of interim governing authority for Iraq.

This development immediately made continuity of in-country staff a key issue. Except for U.S. Army personnel, however, most personnel assigned to Iraq were requested to serve for no more than six months; in practice, their tours were often shorter. According to forum participants, the “temporary mindset” among CPA staff continued for several months after CPA’s establishment, despite its ever-expanding role. Most CPA personnel at that time expected to complete the mission and turn the government over to the Iraqis within a few months after the organization’s inception.






By the autumn of 2003, this mindset had changed, and a general sense of a long-term role for CPA prevailed. Moreover, in September 2003, Ambassador Bremer had stated that CPA would probably operate for at least two years. In November 2003, however, the President announced that CPA would turn over sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004. Seven months later, on June 28, 2004, CPA transitioned governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. At that time, the U.S. Mission Iraq and other U.S. government agencies assumed responsibility for the reconstruction program. Thus, as this chronology shows, CPA spent half of its 14-month life span preparing for its own expiration.

This situation did not promote long-term commitment among staff and did not allow for the orderly execution of a strategic plan. A RAND study of U.S. post-conflict reconstruction efforts since the end of World War II concluded that one key factor in successful reconstruction, or nation-building, was long-term commitment: “Five years seems the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to nation-building.”<sup>36</sup> It is important to note that the U.S. commitment to reconstruction remains strong, even though the organization that launched the reconstruction effort, the CPA, was subsumed by the U.S. Embassy.

## **Lack of Synchronized Deployment**

A lack of cooperation among U.S. government agencies hampered the early management of Iraq reconstruction. Numerous accounts detail the frustration that tour lengths were too short and not coordinated among agencies. High-level DoD field assessment teams and SIGIR interviews of CPA personnel suggest that the varying deployment lengths within diverse federal agencies contributed to the overall human resources problem and that interagency coordination was needed. Because of disparate deployment lengths, an ad hoc



rotation schedule, weak personnel tracking, and a lack of retention incentives, government agencies could not ensure that personnel actually completed their rotations.


Moreover, USAID and other organizations were already critically short of personnel worldwide and did not have a surge capacity from which to rapidly deploy personnel to Iraq. This forced these organizations to obtain many personnel through direct contracting or by reducing commitments to existing programs.<sup>37</sup>

SIGIR interviews and various reports confirm that no agency developed, or was able to enforce, a deployment cycle that included a standard overlap period to ensure transmission of critical information from predecessors to successors. New personnel arrived in Iraq facing steep learning curves and lengthy orientation periods, which complicated the development and execution of the reconstruction program.

In a SIGIR interview, a former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official who served as a CPA and IRMO senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior agreed that there were serious problems with the personnel process. He observed:

this revolving door that they had over here [and] the weaknesses on the staffing...you had all these 90-day wonders getting their tickets punched that [said], “I’ve been in Baghdad.”<sup>38</sup>

He was one of many SIGIR interviewees who expressed concern about the frequency of turnover and the lack of information exchange among reconstruction personnel in Iraq. Several senior CPA human resources personnel also told SIGIR that the lack of interagency deployment coordination was a serious obstacle to proper staffing. The deployment cycle should have included a requirement to stay the requisite amount of time, required a significant



transition period with successors, and stipulated that tour length be tied to contract performance milestones.

## **Uncertain Tour Length, Personnel Turnover, and Control**


The volunteers that did come to Iraq performed heroically, but people frequently rotated through every four to eight weeks, and, when they departed, too often took their invaluable knowledge with them.<sup>39</sup>

This comment by the former Director of the CPA Office of Management and Budget typifies what SIGIR learned from many CPA officials about deployment difficulties in Iraq. Neither CPA nor supporting government agencies developed an integrated framework from which to source and deploy people to Iraq.

In a SIGIR interview, a Department of the Army Human Resource Regional Director, who was detailed to CPA as a human resources and staffing specialist, said:

We really didn't have a grasp because the Coalition Provisional Authority was such a different experiment...you had coalition partners that were here, you had 3161 direct hire employees, you had people...who became detailed here, you had soldiers, and Marines, and people from all the services, and you had contractors. So, we really had five sources of individuals... and some here for three months, some for six months, some for a year, some for two weeks.<sup>40</sup>

This interviewee stated that the CPA policies for hiring personnel did not meet the needs of the personnel on the ground and did not anticipate the evolving needs of the organization. The interviewee (and others) noted that there was no way to enforce deployment




lengths—especially for civilian 3161s. Therefore, personnel were held to a “moral commitment” to stay for an agreed-upon period. This commitment, however, was frequently breached by personnel who terminated their deployments early. Adding a provision to 3161 hiring contracts that required a mandatory tour length would have been useful in alleviating this problem.

A forum participant noted that the stress endured by deployed personnel negatively affected tour lengths: there was nowhere to go for rest and recreation. The result was a high burnout rate; many personnel returned to the United States “when they got worn out.” Departures were often sudden and unplanned, and the long processing pipeline for hiring meant that replacements were not readily available. No overlap or hand-off was possible.

The continuous personnel turnover was a major reason why the U.S. reconstruction effort never reached its authorized working staff level during CPA’s tenure. Despite this ongoing operational limitation and regular interagency meetings, no interagency coordination was ever established to monitor and manage the plethora of personnel challenges that CPA and other U.S. government agencies faced in Iraq.

Several sources noted that a Washington, D.C.-based interagency control office that was fully integrated into Iraq operations could have provided coordination, leadership, and credibility to the recruiting effort in Baghdad. Such an entity could have controlled the flow of personnel in and out of Iraq, ensured coordination among agencies, and managed personnel demands to provide the needed experience in Baghdad.

An article on outsourcing in post-conflict operations in the *Journal of Public and International Affairs* recommended the establishment of:




a head office in Washington, D.C., and a main office in each area of operation (i.e., Baghdad and Kabul) staffed with specialists in contract management (either contracted out or hired from U.S. government offices with contracting experience, such as Defense Contract Management Agency and the USACE) and subject experts (knowledgeable in areas such as construction, engineering, electricity, etc.).<sup>41</sup>


This idea of a centralized and professionally staffed operations center in Washington, D.C., was echoed in the “Personnel Assessment Team Report” to the Secretary of Defense on CPA operations in Iraq.<sup>42</sup> The report noted that there was no personnel transition control and that turnover was resulting in a loss of continuity that created a severe burden for reconstruction efforts. The study further recommended that an oversight office be established to improve coordination of personnel and limit duplication of effort. The report underscored the need for a 24-hour reach-back center for coordination by relating a story of how DoD and DoS deployed six people to relieve one person and how, in other instances, personnel were sent to regions that had no use for them.<sup>43</sup>

### **ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONNEL**

The U.S. government also experienced shortcomings in accounting for personnel deployed to Iraq—especially civilians and contractors. There was, and still is, a lack of effective control procedures at many entry and exit points for Iraq, and there is no interagency personnel tracking system. Official and contract personnel often arrived and departed with no systematic tracking of their whereabouts or activities, or in some cases, with no knowledge of their presence in country. Shortly before its dissolution in June 2004, CPA was still unable to account for 10% of its staff in Iraq. A CPA-IG report in June 2004



The report noted that there was no personnel transition control and that turnover was resulting in a loss of continuity that created a severe burden for reconstruction efforts.



noted that this situation adversely affected both contingency planning and CPA's general ability to forecast life-support requirements.

Forum participants said that while this issue has been more or less resolved for official personnel, it remains an acute problem for contractor personnel. Mechanisms to track contractors supporting CPA have been left largely to the contractors' individual firms and have not been enforced. The SIGIR Human Capital Management Forum developed a variety of recommendations to remedy contractor accountability problems. These recommendations were echoed in a recent proposed interagency policy change to cover U.S. government contractors in Iraq.





# **LESSONS LEARNED RECOMMENDATIONS**




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## RECOMMENDATIONS

The President recently empowered the Secretary of State via a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) to coordinate all overseas reconstruction and stabilization activities. SIGIR expects that the following recommendations will help advance the policies undergirding the new DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

The recommendations are:

- Congress should fund, expand, and empower the S/CRS, pursuant to NSPD-44. This organization should serve as the primary point of authority within the U.S. government for planning and programming for future relief and reconstruction efforts. In coordination with other agencies, S/CRS should develop standardized HR practices.
- DoD should develop complementary plans and programs, pursuant to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 that coordinate military responses with S/CRS and that integrate S/CRS personnel and initiatives into exercises.
- The Administration and Congress should develop a “civilian reserve corps” that would serve as reconstruction and stabilization first responders, and would include a quick-reaction human resources team that pre-identifies human resources requirements for potential relief and reconstruction contingency operations.
- The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should manage the development and implementation of a uniform set of human resources rules that would apply to all federal personnel deployed for contingency operations. OPM should coordinate these new human resources rules with the new DoD National Security Personnel System and other new federal personnel systems to




ensure that hiring flexibilities and benefits will not be adversely affected. These rules should provide guidance that addresses the tour length and personnel turnover problems that have burdened Iraq reconstruction.



## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> *Play to Win*, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, January 2003, p. 11.
- <sup>2</sup> Comments to SIGIR from former CPA and DoS official, November 2005.
- <sup>3</sup> “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace,” by Mark Fineman, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus, *Los Angeles Times*, July 18, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), April 22, 2004.
- <sup>4</sup> SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), former ORHA Director, April 22, 2004, p. 1.
- <sup>5</sup> SIGIR interview with Anthony W. Whitehouse, Army Civilian Human Resources Regional Director for the western United States and former CPA HR Specialist, July 1, 2004.
- <sup>6</sup> Presentation at a Joint Center for Strategic and International Studies/ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars event, October 20, 2004, by Ambassador Carlos Pascual, S/CRS.
- <sup>7</sup> SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), April 22, 2004.
- <sup>8</sup> SIGIR interview (name withheld), June 2003.
- <sup>9</sup> Garner interview, op. cit.
- <sup>10</sup> ORHA, “Current Manning and Personnel Gaps,” PowerPoint Presentation, March 23, 2003.
- <sup>11</sup> SIGIR interview (name withheld), June 2003.
- <sup>12</sup> “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” CPA-IG Audit Report No. 04-002, June 25, 2004.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup> SIGIR conversation with CPA HR personnel, April 2004.
- <sup>18</sup> “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” unpublished manuscript by Rear Admiral David Oliver, USN (Ret.), former Director of CPA Office of Management and Budget.

- <sup>19</sup> SIGIR interview with officials from DoD/Under Secretary of Defense, Policy, October 2005.
- <sup>20</sup> David Oliver, op. cit.
- <sup>21</sup> *U.S. Policy in Iraq: A “Realist” Approach to its Challenges and Opportunities*, Anthony H. Cordesman, August 6, 2004; DoD Personnel Assessment Team, Report to the Secretary of Defense, CPA Baghdad, February 11, 2004; and SIGIR discussions with former CPA officials.
- <sup>22</sup> “Administration of Contracts Funded by DFI,” SIGIR Audit No. 05-008, April 30, 2005.
- <sup>23</sup> Ambassador Carlos Pascual presentation, op. cit.
- <sup>24</sup> Comments to SIGIR from former CPA and DoS official, November 2005.
- <sup>25</sup> SIGIR interviews, surveys, and discussions with CPA and IRMO personnel (various).
- <sup>26</sup> SIGIR discussion with ORHA/CPA and IRMO personnel specialists.
- <sup>27</sup> Anthony W. Whitehouse interview, op. cit.
- <sup>28</sup> SIGIR discussion with DoS CPA detailees.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> CPA-IG Audit Report No. 04-002, op. cit.
- <sup>31</sup> *The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq*, Celeste J. Ward, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., May 2005.
- <sup>32</sup> *Personnel Assessment Team Report to the Secretary of Defense*, CPA Baghdad, February 11, 2004.
- <sup>33</sup> SIGIR discussion with CPA and IRMO personnel.
- <sup>34</sup> Anthony W. Whitehouse interview, op. cit.
- <sup>35</sup> E-mail to SIGIR from James Haveman, former CPA official, December 2005.
- <sup>36</sup> *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, James Dobbins et al., RAND Corporation, 2003.
- <sup>37</sup> *Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve its Workforce Planning and Operating Expense Accounting*, GAO, September 2003.



<sup>38</sup> SIGIR interview of Steve Casteel, former CPA Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, July 3, 2004.

<sup>39</sup> David Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>40</sup> Anthony Whitehouse interview, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> “Outsourcing in Post-conflict Operations: Designing a System for Contract Management and Oversight,” Blake W. Mobley, *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, Princeton, NJ, spring 2004, p. 34.

<sup>42</sup> DoD Personnel Assessment Team, Report to the Secretary of Defense, *op. cit.*


<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 11-12







## **FORUM PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES**




**MR. STUART W. BOWEN, JR.**, serves as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. He was appointed as Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG) on January 20, 2004, by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. With the enactment of the Defense Authorization Act for 2005, CPA-IG was re-designated as SIGIR.

Before his appointment as CPA-IG, Mr. Bowen was a partner at the law firm of Patton Boggs. Prior to that, Mr. Bowen served as Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel, and later as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Staff Secretary at the White House under President George W. Bush.

**MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM L. NASH, USA (RET.)**, was appointed Director of the Council on Foreign Relations's Center for Preventive Action in April 2001. He leads the Council's efforts to work with governments, international organizations, the business community, and non-governmental organizations to anticipate international crises and to provide analysis and specific recommendations for preventive action.

**DR. FREDERICK BARTON** currently serves as a Senior Adviser in the International Security Program and Co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Concurrently, Mr. Barton teaches as a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was previously the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy.

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**MS. KATJA BULLOCK** serves as a Special Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel. She held the same position and duties under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In 2003, Ms. Bullock was detailed to Iraq as Director of Civilian Personnel to help set up the CPA government in Iraq, later returning to prepare for the transfer of governance authority to the Iraqi people.

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**MR. GREG GARDNER** is Vice President, Government and Homeland Security Solutions, at Oracle Corporation. From April to November 2003, Mr. Gardner served with CPA in Iraq as Chief of Staff for the Senior Advisor, Ministry of National Security and Defense. He then returned to Washington to coordinate personnel activities for CPA before leaving government service in March 2004.




**MR. PATRICK GARVEY** is a member of the professional staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar. His portfolio includes oversight for Iraq stabilization and reconstruction efforts, counter-terrorism, and broader Middle-East policy. He had a direct role in producing 23 Iraq oversight hearings.

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**MR. DAYTON MAXWELL** is Special Advisor to the Administrator of USAID, where he is assisting in the establishment of a new USAID office of military affairs. Previously, he worked on a detail from USAID to JFCOM, serving as a senior advisor in the new DoS Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. In 2003, he deployed on detail to Iraq where he worked in the Office of Policy Planning and Analysis for CPA until the end of 2003.

**MR. JOSEPH T. (MICKEY) McDERMOTT** is the Assistant IG for Audit at SIGIR. He serves as the principal advisor to the Inspector General and the Deputy Inspector General for all audit matters, including audit policy and planning. He spends most of his time in Baghdad with his audit staff.




**MR. CHRIS MIHM** is the Managing Director of the GAO Strategic Issues Team, leading work on government-wide, long-term issues that support transition to a more accountable federal government, including federal agency transformations, budgeting and the nation's long-term fiscal outlook, strategic human capital management, Civil Service reform, the decennial census, and federal tax policy and administration.

**MR. JAMES O'BEIRNE** is Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison. He provides program advice and support in identifying placement opportunities for political appointees within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments. Mr. O'Beirne has served as Deputy Special Assistant and as Special Assistant, during the launch of ORHA and CPA.

**REAR ADMIRAL DAVID R. OLIVER, JR., USN (RET.)**, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of EADS North America. He has a diverse career, including extensive experience in government, industry, and the military. Immediately before joining EADS North America, Mr. Oliver served in Iraq as the Director of CPA Office of Management and Budget. Mr. Oliver completed a distinguished career in the U.S. Navy in 1995, retiring as a Rear Admiral.

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. OSTER, USMC (RET.)**, is Chairman of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation and the Military Ministry of the Campus Crusade for Christ. During 2004, he served as the CPA Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer.




**DR. R. NICHOLAS PALARINO** is the Senior Policy Analyst for the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform. This subcommittee has held several hearings regarding Iraq reconstruction issues and challenges.

**MR. JOHN M. PALGUTA** is Vice President for Policy and Research at the Partnership for Public Service, responsible for the implementation of a comprehensive program of research and analyses on human capital issues in the federal government. The results of these efforts assist federal government policy makers, managers, and other interested individuals and organizations in developing viable solutions to recruit, motivate, and retain a highly talented and diverse workforce.

**MS. HANNAH SISTARE** is Director of the Human Resources Management Consortium at the National Academy of Public Administration. She is also Executive Director of the National Commission on the Public Service (Volcker Commission) Implementation Initiative at the Academy.

**MR. STAN Z. SOLOWAY** is president of the Professional Services Council, the principal national trade association representing the government professional and technical services industry. PSC is known for its leadership on the full range of government acquisition/procurement and outsourcing and privatization issues. Mr. Soloway assumed the presidency in January 2001.



**MS. TONI B. WAINWRIGHT** was reappointed to the Senior Executive Service (SES) as Deputy Director of Civilian Personnel, Department of the Army, in February 2005. She assists in overseeing the largest civilian workforce in the federal government. She is also responsible for supervision and oversight of all staff and line HR functions for the U.S. Army's civilian personnel management program. In June 2004, Ms. Wainwright served as Director of Personnel Policy with the Office of National Security Affairs in Baghdad, Iraq.

**DR. RUTH WHITESIDE** is a career member of the Senior Executive Service at the Department of State, and she served in the Foreign Service from 1978 to 1984. In June 2001, she began serving as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of the Director General, Bureau of Human Resources.



