A Failed “Transition”: The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War

A Study by the Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus

By Phyllis Bennis
and the IPS Iraq Task Force:
Sarah Anderson, John Cavanagh, Karen Dolan, Erik Leaver, Miriam Pemberton, Amy Quinn, Marc Raskin, Michael Sochynsky, James Suggett, Adam Waxman, Emira Woods

September 30, 2004

A comprehensive accounting of the costs of the war before and after the June 28th “transfer of power.”
The Institute for Policy Studies is a progressive multi-issue think tank that links ideas to action for peace, justice and the environment. Founded in 1963, the Institute serves as a place for creative thinkers and bold activists to study the nation’s and the world’s problems and craft alternatives. Combining research, advocacy, education, and organizing, IPS works across disciplines, bringing together powerful, creative minds from varied of backgrounds to provide information, analysis, and action for social change.

Foreign Policy In Focus, established in 1996, is a “think tank without walls” that functions as an international network of more than 650 policy analysts and advocates. A joint project of the Institute for Policy Studies and the Interhemispheric Resource Center, its mission is to make the U.S. a more responsible global leader and global partner, with a special emphasis on providing resources to ground and inform social movements. Through its extensive publications, media outreach, organizing events and congressional work, the project has since its inception worked to make a wider space for these progressive voices in foreign policy debates on a wide variety of topics, from the war in Iraq, to the spread of economic globalization, to the militarization of Latin American policy to the threats of global environmental degradation.

About the authors

IPS Fellow Phyllis Bennis has written extensively on Middle East and UN issues for many years. In 1999, she accompanied a group of Congressional aides to Iraq to examine the impact of U.S.-led economic sanctions and later joined Denis Halliday, who resigned as the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq to protest the impact of sanctions, on a nationwide speaking tour. Also by Bennis: Before & After: U.S. Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis; Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s UN; and Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader.

Additional IPS Iraq Task Force members include: IPS Director John Cavanagh; IPS Co-founder Marcus Raskin; Foreign Policy In Focus staff Emira Woods, Erik Leaver, and Miriam Pemberton; IPS Fellows Sarah Anderson and Karen Dolan; IPS Peace Movement liaison, Amy Quinn; Cities for Peace organizer, James Suggett, and IPS interns Adam Waxman and Michael Sochynsky.

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for comments and assistance in the production of this report: Julie Ajinkya, Brian Bernhardt, John Gershman, Nalini Gupta, Stefan Heumann, David Maron, Jon Minton, Yasmine Peer, Theo Rose, Monique Sherman, and Scott Williams. Design and layout was done by Erik Leaver.

© September 2004 by the Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus

All rights reserved. This publication is a creative work and fully protected by all applicable laws, as well as by misappropriation, trade secret, unfair competition, and other applicable laws. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise in quantities over one hundred without the prior permission of the authors.

Cost: $10.00
A FAILED “TRANSITION”:
THE MOUNTING COSTS OF THE IRAQ WAR

A Study by the Institute for Policy Studies and
Foreign Policy In Focus

Full report with citations available at:
http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/failedtransition/

Key Findings

“A Failed “Transition”” is the most comprehensive accounting of the mounting costs and consequences of the Iraq war on the United States, Iraq, and the world. Among its major findings are stark figures about the escalation of costs in these most recent three months of “transition” to Iraqi rule, a period that the Bush administration claimed would be characterized by falling human and economic costs.

1. U.S. Military Casualties Highest During the “Transition”: U.S. military casualties (wounded and killed) stand at a monthly average of 747 since the so-called “transition” to Iraqi rule on June 28, 2004. This contrasts with a monthly average of 482 U.S. military casualties during the invasion (March 20-May 1, 2003) and a monthly average of 415 during the occupation (May 2, 2003-June 28, 2004).

2. Non-Iraqi Contractor Deaths Highest During the “Transition”: There has also been a huge increase in the average monthly deaths of U.S. and other non-Iraqi contractors since the “transition.” On average, 17.5 contractors have died each month since the June 28 “transition,” versus 7.6 contractor deaths per month during the previous 14 months of occupation.

3. Estimated Strength of Iraqi Resistance is Skyrocketing During the “Transition”: Because the U.S. military occupation remains in place, the “transition” has failed to win Iraqi support or diminish Iraqi resistance to the occupation. According to Pentagon estimates, the number of Iraqi resistance fighters has quadrupled between November of 2003 and early September 2004, from 5,000 to 20,000. The Deputy Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, British Major General Andrew Graham, indicated to Time magazine in early September that he thinks the 20,000 estimate is too low; he estimates Iraqi resistance strength at 40,000-50,000. This rise is even starker when juxtaposed to Brookings Institution estimates that an additional 24,000 Iraqi resistance fighters have been detained or killed between May 2003 and August 2004.
4. **U.S.-led Coalition is Shrinking Further During the “Transition”:** The number of countries identified as members of the Coalition backing the U.S.-led war started with 30 on March 18, 2003, then grew in the early months of the war. Since then, eight countries have withdrawn their troops and Costa Rica has demanded to be taken off the coalition list. **At the war’s start, coalition countries represented 19.1 percent of the world’s population; today, the remaining countries with troops in Iraq represent only 13.6 percent of the world’s population.**

**Highlights of “A Failed ‘Transition’”**

**I. Costs to the United States**

**A. Human Costs to the U.S. and Allies**

**U.S. Military Deaths:** Between the start of war on March 19, 2003 and September 22, 2004, 1,175 coalition forces were killed, including 1,040 U.S. military. Of the total, 925 were killed after President Bush declared the end of combat operations on May 1, 2003. Over 7,413 U.S. troops have been wounded since the war began, 6,953 (94 percent) since May 1, 2003.

**Contractor Deaths:** As of September 22, 2004, there has been an estimated 154 civilian contractors, missionaries, and civilian worker deaths since May 1, 2004. Of these, 52 have been identified as Americans.

**Journalist Deaths:** Forty-four international media workers have been killed in Iraq as of September 22, 2004, including 33 since President Bush declared the end of combat operations. Eight of the dead worked for U.S. companies.

**B. Security Costs**

**Terrorist Recruitment and Action:** According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, al Qaeda’s membership is now at 18,000, with 1,000 active in Iraq. The State Department’s 2003 “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” documented 625 deaths and 3,646 injuries due to terrorist attacks in 2003. The report acknowledged that “significant incidents,” increased from 60 percent of total attacks in 2002 to 84 percent in 2003.

**Low U.S. Credibility:** Polls reveal that the war has damaged the U.S. government’s standing and credibility in the world. Surveys in eight European and Arab countries demonstrated broad public agreement that the war has hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism. At home, 52 percent of Americans polled by the Annenberg Election Survey disapprove of Bush’s handling of Iraq.
Military Mistakes: A number of former military officials have criticized the war, including retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who has charged that by manufacturing a false rationale for war, abandoning traditional allies, propping up and trusting Iraqi exiles, and failing to plan for post-war Iraq, the Bush Administration made the United States less secure.

Low Troop Morale and Lack of Equipment: A March 2004 army survey found 52 percent of soldiers reporting low morale, and three-fourths reporting they were poorly led by their officers. Lack of equipment has been an ongoing problem. The Army did not fully equip soldiers with bullet-proof vests until June 2004, forcing many families to purchase them out of their own pockets.

Loss of First Responders: National Guard troops make up almost one-third of the U.S. Army troops now in Iraq. Their deployment puts a particularly heavy burden on their home communities because many are “first responders,” including police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. For example, 44 percent of the country’s police forces have lost officers to Iraq. In some states, the absence of so many Guard troops has raised concerns about the ability to handle natural disasters.

Use of Private Contractors: An estimated 20,000 private contractors are carrying out work in Iraq traditionally done by the military, despite the fact that they often lack sufficient training and are not accountable to the same guidelines and reviews as military personnel.

C. Economic Costs

The Bill So Far: Congress has approved of $151.1 billion for Iraq. Congressional leaders anticipate an additional supplemental appropriation of $60 billion after the election.

Long-term Impact on U.S. Economy: Economist Doug Henwood has estimated that the war bill will add up to an average of at least $3,415 for every U.S. household. Another economist, James Galbraith of the University of Texas, predicts that while war spending may boost the economy initially, over the long term it is likely to bring a decade of economic troubles, including an expanded trade deficit and high inflation.

Oil Prices: U.S. crude oil prices spiked at $48 per barrel on August 19, 2004, the highest level since 1983, a development that most analysts attribute at least in part to the deteriorating situation in Iraq. According to a mid-May CBS survey, 85 percent of Americans said they had been affected measurably by higher gas prices. According to one estimate, if crude oil prices stay around $40 a barrel for a year, U.S. gross domestic product will decline by more than $50 billion.
Economic Impact on Military Families: Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 364,000 reserve troops and National Guard soldiers have been called for military service, serving tours of duty that often last 20 months. Studies show that between 30 and 40 percent of reservists and National Guard members earn a lower salary when they leave civilian employment for military deployment. Army Emergency Relief has reported that requests from military families for food stamps and subsidized meals increased “several hundred percent” between 2002 and 2003.

D. Social Costs

U.S. Budget and Social Programs: The Bush administration’s combination of massive spending on the war and tax cuts for the wealthy means less money for social spending. The $151.1 billion expenditure for the war through this year could have paid for: close to 23 million housing vouchers; health care for over 27 million uninsured Americans; salaries for nearly 3 million elementary school teachers; 678,200 new fire engines; over 20 million Head Start slots for children; or health care coverage for 82 million children. A leaked memo from the White House to domestic agencies outlines major cuts following the election, including funding for education, Head Start, home ownership, job training, medical research and homeland security.

Social Costs to the Military: In order to meet troop requirements in Iraq, the Army has extended the tours of duty for soldiers. These extensions have been particularly difficult for reservists, many of whom never expected to face such long separations from their jobs and families. According to military policy, reservists are not supposed to be on assignment for more than 12 months every 5-6 years. To date, the average tour of duty for all soldiers in Iraq has been 320 days. A recent Army survey revealed that more than half of soldiers said they would not re-enlist.

Costs to Veteran Health Care: About 64 percent of the more than 7,000 U.S. soldiers injured in Iraq received wounds that prevented them from returning to duty. One trend has been an increase in amputees, the result of improved body armor that protects vital organs but not extremities. As in previous wars, many soldiers are likely to have received ailments that will not be detected for years to come. The Veterans Administration healthcare system is not prepared for the swelling number of claims. In May, the House of Representatives approved funding for FY 2005 that is $2.6 billion less than needed, according to veterans’ groups.

Mental Health Costs: The New England Journal of Medicine reported in July 2004 that 1 in 6 soldiers returning from war in Iraq showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, or severe anxiety. Only 23 to 40 percent of respondents in the study who showed signs of a mental disorder had sought mental health care.
II. Costs to Iraq

A. Human Costs

Iraqi Deaths and Injuries: As of September 22, 2004, between 12,800 and 14,843 Iraqi civilians have been killed as a result of the U.S. invasion and ensuing occupation, while an estimated 40,000 Iraqis have been injured. During “major combat” operations, between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers and insurgents were killed.

Effects of Depleted Uranium: The health impacts of the use of depleted uranium weaponry in Iraq are yet to be known. The Pentagon estimates that U.S. and British forces used 1,100 to 2,200 tons of weaponry made from the toxic and radioactive metal during the March 2003 bombing campaign. Many scientists blame the far smaller amount of DU weapons used in the Persian Gulf War for illnesses among U.S. soldiers, as well as a sevenfold increase in child birth defects in Basra in southern Iraq.

B. Security Costs

Rise in Crime: Murder, rape, and kidnapping have skyrocketed since March 2003, forcing Iraqi children to stay home from school and women to stay off the streets at night. Violent deaths rose from an average of 14 per month in 2002 to 357 per month in 2003.

Psychological Impact: Living under occupation without the most basic security has devastated the Iraqi population. A poll conducted by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies in June 2004 found that 80 percent of Iraqis believe that coalition forces should leave either immediately or directly after the election.

C. Economic Costs

Unemployment: Iraqi joblessness doubled from 30 percent before the war to 60 percent in the summer of 2003. While the Bush administration now claims that unemployment has dropped, the U.S. is only employing 120,000 Iraqis, of a workforce of 7 million, in reconstruction projects.

Corporate War Profiteering: Most of Iraq’s reconstruction has been contracted out to U.S. companies, rather than experienced Iraqi firms. Top contractor Halliburton is being investigated for charging $160 million for meals that were never served to troops and $61 million in cost overruns on fuel deliveries. Halliburton employees also took $6 million in kickbacks from subcontractors, while other employees have reported extensive waste, including the abandonment of $85,000 trucks because they had flat tires.
A Failed “Transition”

Iraq’s Oil Economy: Anti-occupation violence has prevented Iraq from capitalizing on its oil assets. There have been an estimated 118 attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure since June 2003. By September 2004, oil production still had not reached pre-war levels and major attacks caused oil exports to plummet to a ten-month low in August 2004.

D. Social Costs

Health Infrastructure: After more than a decade of crippling sanctions, Iraq’s health facilities were further damaged during the war and post-invasion looting. Iraq’s hospitals continue to suffer from lack of supplies and an overwhelming number of patients.

Education: UNICEF estimates that more than 200 schools were destroyed in the conflict and thousands more were looted in the chaos following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The State Department reported on September 15 that “Significant obstacles remain in maintaining security for civilian/military reconstruction, logistical support and distribution for donations, equipment, textbooks and supplies.”

Environment: The U.S-led attack damaged water and sewage systems and the country’s fragile desert ecosystem. It also resulted in oil well fires that spewed smoke across the country and left unexploded ordnance that continues to endanger the Iraqi people and environment. Mines and unexploded ordnance cause an estimated 20 casualties per month.

E. Human Rights Costs

Even with Saddam Hussein overthrown, Iraqis continue to face human rights violations from occupying forces. In addition to the widely publicized humiliation and torture of prisoners, abuse has been widespread throughout the post-9-11 military operations, with over 300 allegations of abuse in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantánamo. As of mid-August 2004, only 155 investigations into the existing 300 allegations had been completed.

F. Sovereignty Costs

Despite the proclaimed “transfer of sovereignty” to Iraq, the country continues to be occupied by U.S. and coalition troops and has severely limited political and economic independence. The interim government does not have the authority to reverse the nearly 100 orders by former CPA head Paul Bremer that, among other things, allow for the privatization of Iraq’s state-owned enterprises and prohibit preferences for domestic firms in reconstruction.
III. Costs to the World

A. Human Costs

While Americans make up the vast majority of military and contractor personnel in Iraq, other U.S.-allied “coalition” troops have suffered 135 war casualties in Iraq. In addition, the focus on Iraq has diverted international resources and attention away from humanitarian crises such as in Sudan.

B. Disabling International Law

The unilateral U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq violated the United Nations Charter, setting a dangerous precedent for other countries to seize any opportunity to respond militarily to claimed threats, whether real or contrived, that must be “preempted.” The U.S. military has also violated the Geneva Convention, making it more likely that in the future, other nations will ignore these protections in their treatment of civilian populations and detainees.

C. Undermining the United Nations

At every turn, the Bush Administration has attacked the legitimacy and credibility of the UN, undermining the institution’s capacity to act in the future as the centerpiece of global disarmament and conflict resolution. The efforts of the Bush administration to gain UN acceptance of an Iraqi government that was not elected but rather installed by occupying forces undermines the entire notion of national sovereignty as the basis for the UN Charter. It was on this basis that Secretary General Annan referred specifically to the vantage point of the UN Charter in his September 2004 finding that the war was illegal.

D. Enforcing Coalitions

Faced with opposition in the UN Security Council, the U.S. government attempted to create the illusion of multilateral support for the war by pressuring other governments to join a so-called “Coalition of the Willing.” This not only circumvented UN authority, but also undermined democracy in many coalition countries, where public opposition to the war was as high as 90 percent. As of the middle of September, 2004, only 29 members of the “Coalition of the Willing” had forces in Iraq, in addition to the United States. These countries, combined with United States, make up less than 14 percent of the world’s population.

E. Costs to the Global Economy

The $151.1 billion spent by the U.S. government on the war could have cut world hunger in half and covered HIV/AIDS medicine, childhood immunization and clean water and sanitation needs of the developing world for more than two years. As a fac-
tor in the oil price hike, the war has created concerns of a return to the “stagflation” of the 1970s. Already, the world’s major airlines are expecting an increase in costs of $1 billion or more per month.

F. Undermining Global Security and Disarmament

The U.S.-led war and occupation have galvanized international terrorist organizations, placing people not only in Iraq but around the world at greater risk of attack. The State Department’s annual report on international terrorism reported that in 2003 there was the highest level of terror-related incidents deemed “significant” than at any time since the U.S. began issuing these figures.

G. Global Environmental Costs

U.S.-fired depleted uranium weapons have contributed to pollution of Iraq’s land and water, with inevitable spillover effects in other countries. The heavily polluted Tigris River, for example, flows through Iraq, Iran and Kuwait.

H. Human Rights

The Justice Department memo assuring the White House that torture was legal stands in stark violation of the International Convention Against Torture (of which the United States is a signatory). This, combined with the widely publicized mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military and intelligence officials, gave new license for torture and mistreatment by governments around the world.
# CONTENTS

**Key Findings** ........................................................................................................... i

**Introduction** ............................................................................................................. 1

**I. Costs to the United States** .................................................................................. 5

A. Human Costs to the U.S. and Allies ................................................................. 5

   Chart 1: U.S. Military Casualties ....................................................................... 5

   Chart 2: Foreign (Non-Iraqi) Contractor Deaths per Month ....................... 6

B. Security Costs ........................................................................................................ 8

C. Economic Costs ...................................................................................................... 15

   Box 1: Breakdown of Economic Costs of War ................................................... 15

   Box 2: The Cost of War in One State: Ohio ...................................................... 18

D. Social Costs ............................................................................................................ 21

E. Human Rights Costs .............................................................................................. 26

   Box 3: The Price of War Profiteering ................................................................. 30

**II. Costs to Iraq** ...................................................................................................... 33

A. Human Costs .......................................................................................................... 33

   Chart 3: Estimated Strength of Iraqi Resistance .............................................. 34

B. Security Costs ........................................................................................................ 35

C. Economic Costs ...................................................................................................... 37

D. Social Costs ............................................................................................................ 39

E. Human Rights Costs .............................................................................................. 41

   Box 4: Women’s Human Rights ......................................................................... 41

F. Sovereignty Costs ................................................................................................... 42

**III. Costs to the World** ........................................................................................... 47

A. Human Costs .......................................................................................................... 47

   Box 5: Non-U.S. Coalition Casualties ................................................................. 47

B. Undermining International Law ........................................................................ 47

C. Undermining the United Nations ...................................................................... 49

D. Enforcing Coalitions ............................................................................................ 52

   Chart 4: Percentage of World Population Represented by Coalition ........... 53

E. Costs to the Global Economy ............................................................................... 54
A Failed “Transition”

F. Undermining Global Security and Disarmament ..................55
G. Global Environmental Costs ........................................57
H. Undermining Human Rights .........................................58

Appendix ........................................................................61
Endnotes ......................................................................63
Introduction

A national and global debate rages over the rising costs and dubious benefits of eighteen months of war and occupation in Iraq. For many people, especially in the United States, informed debate has been difficult since so much of what we have been told by the Bush administration has turned out to be false. The majority of people now recognize that the administration’s central premises in launching this war were lies: Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, Baghdad had nothing to do with September 11, and Saddam Hussein did not have operational ties to al Qaeda.

The authors of this report at the Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus believe that an informed debate over next steps in Iraq requires a full and comprehensive accounting of the costs of this war—the invasion, the occupation, and the so-called “transition”—for the United States, for Iraq, and for the world.

The last three months, the period that the Bush administration labeled a “transition” of power from U.S. to Iraqi authorities, has seen a dramatic escalation in the war’s costs—especially the human costs. The U.S. and the global public were told on the eve of the “transition” in late June that these costs of war were about to diminish. Instead, those costs skyrocketed. For example:

- For the United States, total war casualties have been highest during the “transition” period. The total number of U.S. killed and wounded during the three transition months stands at 747 per month, exceeding the 482 per month during the six-week war, and the 415 per month during the 14-month official occupation. This is worth repeating: U.S. casualty levels are higher now during what the White House calls the “transition to Iraqi sovereignty” than they were during the periods of invasion and acknowledged occupation.

- The average number of foreign contractors killed per month since the “transition” is 17.5. This is more than double the 7.6 per month during the occupation period.

The Bush administration declared on June 28, 2004 that the United States was “transferring sovereignty” to Iraq. We were told that this was a great victory for democracy. And yet, after 18 months of war and occupation in Iraq, and even as public support for the war plummets, there is still little understanding in the United States about the real costs of the war. This report offers evidence that we have paid a very high price for the war and have become less secure at home and in the world. The destabilization of Iraq since the U.S. invasion has created a terrorist haven that did not
previously exist in Iraq, while anti-American sentiment world-wide has sharply increased.

Costs of this war and occupation continue to accrue for the people of the United States, Iraq, and the world. Most Americans are somewhat aware of the body count for the United States and its allies, now amounting to 1,039 dead and 7,413 wounded as of September 22, 2004. Yet, most are not aware that the number of Iraqis killed is more than 10 times the number of Americans who have lost their lives. Most don't know or haven't thought about how many children could have obtained health insurance or how many elementary school teachers could have been hired with the $151 billion spent on the war so far. Most don't know the enormous financial burden shouldered by the majority of U.S. military families. Most don't consider how the billions spent on the war have expanded an already huge budget deficit that will greatly burden the next generation. Most are barely aware of the legion of other costs—economic, human, environmental and more—born by millions of people in Iraq and around the world.

Conversely, most Iraqis, the people in whose name the Bush administration fought the war on false pretenses, understand too well the costs of war and occupation for their society. In recent polls, conducted by U.S. occupation authorities themselves, Iraqis overwhelmingly oppose the continuing occupation. Indeed, the majority of Iraqis now state that the occupation has made them less secure.

This report attempts to look comprehensively at the human, economic, social, security, environmental, and human rights costs of this war and the ensuing occupation. The Iraq Task Force of the Institute for Policy Studies spent several months scouring sources as diverse as professional engineers, economists, humanitarian organizations with expertise in Iraq, the United Nations, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, and the most accurate journalistic accounts we could find. The accounting of costs for the United States (Chapter 1) was the easiest to gather, although there are conflicting assessments on some aspects, such as the short- and long-term impacts of the war on the U.S. economy. By contrast, in looking at the war's consequences for Iraq (Chapter 2), even such basic facts as how many people have been killed since the fighting began are only partially available, and we try to help the reader by carefully explaining the sources and limitations of the data. Yet, as difficult as it is to get accurate statistics on a country in the midst of war and occupation, a good overall assessment has been possible. The costs to the rest of the world (Chapter 3) was perhaps the most difficult to quantify, as some of the broader consequences are just now emerging. Yet, we think we offer some useful and provocative categories to begin to understand such longer-term costs.
A Failed “Transition”

At IPS and FPIF, we were deeply moved on February 15, 2003, when millions of people in over 600 cities around the world demonstrated against the impending war. On that day, from diverse corners of the globe, the majority of the world’s people spoke with one voice, only to be dismissed on March 20, 2003, when the Bush administration launched its war against Iraq. In that sense, democracy at home and around the world suffered a severe blow with the launching of this war.

It is our conviction that democracy is strengthened through informed debate. If this report helps stimulate broader debate and discourse in this country and around the world about the costs and legitimacy of the war and occupation in Iraq, then we will consider this report a success.

The authors

September 30, 2004
A Failed “Transition”
I. Costs to the United States

A. Human Costs to the U.S. and Allies

U.S. Military Deaths and Injuries

Between the start of war on March 19, 2003 and September 22, 2004, 1,175 coalition forces have been killed, including 1,040 U.S. military personnel.¹ The average rate of military casualties (dead and wounded) incurred by U.S. forces in Iraq has been higher during the transition period than in either the invasion or occupation periods. Since the June 28, 2004 “transition” there have been 747 casualties per month compared to 482 during the invasion and 415 during occupation.² U.S. deaths are steadily climbing in 2004 from 48 in June to 55 in July and 66 in August.

Over 7,413 U.S. troops have been wounded, 6,953 (94 percent) since May 1, 2003.³ August 2004 was marked by the second-highest monthly toll since the war began, as 863 soldiers and Marines were wounded, most in the urban cities of Najaf, Baghdad, and the Sunni Triangle.⁴

The high injury rate is due to relentless attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. The monthly average of insurgent attacks more than doubled from 1,005 in the eight months prior to the June 28 2004 “transition” to 2,150 in the months since.⁵ Attacks are not expected to subside, as insurgents likely have vast supplies of weapons obtained during the widespread looting of ammunition dumps and bases following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Randolph Gangle, the head of the Marine Corps’ Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, predicts that “If [the U.S.] has the political will and stamina to stay, I could see this thing going on for 10 years.”⁶

![Chart 1: U.S. Military Casualties](chart.png)
Other security indicators are worse than at any time since the U.S. invasion in March 2003, as casualty rates among coalition partners, Iraqi deaths from truck bombings, and kidnapping and killing of foreign nationals are all at their highest rates since the U.S. invasion.\textsuperscript{7}

**Contractor Deaths**

The casualty numbers in Iraq are likely undercounted since the U.S. government does not track deaths among private contractors, even when the individuals are killed while carrying out missions traditionally reserved for the military.\textsuperscript{8} Independent groups, however, have tried to track such deaths, and estimate that there have been 154 civilian contractor deaths since the “end of major combat” on May 1, 2003, including 52 identified as Americans.\textsuperscript{9} By contrast, only 7 private contractors were killed in the 1991 Gulf War.\textsuperscript{10}

The June 28 “transition” has done nothing to slow down the death toll. Of the 154 total contractor deaths, 49 occurred after that date, and the monthly average has more than doubled, from 7.6 contractors killed per month during the occupation to 17.5 people per month after the “transfer.”\textsuperscript{11}

**Kidnapping**

The steady rate of abductions of foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens, is impeding the U.S. goals of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. Kidnapping and the gruesome killings that have often followed have driven untold numbers of foreign corporations out of Iraq as well as Philippine troops.\textsuperscript{12}

Between April 2004, when the pattern of insurgent kidnapping of foreign nationals began, and the June 28 “transition”, 49 foreign nationals were abducted. Since then, at least 52 more have been kidnapped and the total has climbed to 138 (the
exact dates of 13 abductions are unknown). As of September 22, 2004, 17 of the 138 foreign nationals kidnapped were still being held, and the status of 20 foreign nationals was unknown. The number of those kidnapped and then murdered rose to 28 on September 22 when militants beheaded a ninth person, Jack Hensley, an American contractor. In addition, an unknown number of Iraqi businessmen, journalists, children and women have also been taken hostage.

In a *New York Times* article, Michael P. Nonan, National Security Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said, “It’s being used as an easy, strategic level tool to put a lot of pressure on governments. Even when they know their demands aren’t going to be met, it builds support for their movement.”

**Journalist Deaths**

Iraq is currently the most dangerous place in the world to work as a journalist. The total number of international media workers killed in Iraq, as of September 22, 2004 is 44, including eight who worked for U.S. companies. Of the total, 33 have been killed since President Bush formally declared the end of the major combat in May 2003. U.S. forces are responsible for at least nine deaths, including employees from the BBC, Reuters, ITN, U.S. ABC network, Arab TV stations al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera and Spanish station Telecinco. In addition, the United States has put journalists in danger by conducting strikes against known media locations. Another source of threat to journalists has come from insurgents who appear to be systematically targeting foreigners, including journalists, and Iraqis who work for them.

The deliberate or inadvertent killing of media workers and/or the destruction of media infrastructure by parties of a conflict are in direct violation of international law. Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits parties to an armed conflict from attacking civilian objects, and parties are required to take precautionary measures to prevent and limit civilian casualties in the course of any attack, including the provision of effective advance warning. The mistreatment and/or killing of media agents erodes internationally accepted standards for the treatment of journalists in war zones and jeopardizes the future safety of U.S. and international media workers, as well as their capacity to deliver information to the world effectively.
B. Security Costs

*The U.S. action in Iraq has failed to stabilize the country, and moreover, has severely damaged America's reputation in the region and around the world.*

Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, former commander of the U.S. Central Command

Terrorist Recruitment

The war against Iraq has left U.S. citizens more vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home and abroad. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the best known and most authoritative source of information on global defense capabilities and trends, the war in Iraq has accelerated recruitment to al Qaeda and made the world less safe. It estimates worldwide al Qaeda membership now at 18,000 with 1,000 active in Iraq. It concludes that the occupation has become the organization's “potent global recruitment pretext,” has divided the United States and UK from their allies, and has weakened the war on terrorism. In remarks to a Philadelphia audience, President Bush's former anti-terrorism czar Richard Clarke said, “the Iraq war took resources away from the fight against al Qaeda, which was able to survive and morph into a hydra-headed monster.”

As both the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee found, there were no operational ties between al Qaeda agents and Saddam Hussein prior to the U.S. invasion. A year and a half since the invasion, hundreds of jihadists have infiltrated Iraq to fight U.S. forces, creating a stronger base for radical Islam in Iraq. While many terrorist-affiliated groups operate independently from the indigenous Iraqi resistance, the estimated combined force of 20,000 has proven an untamable menace for the United States. According to W. Andrew Terrill, professor of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, “the anti-U.S. insurgency is expanding and becoming more capable as a consequence of U.S. policy.”

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an al Qaeda operative, is alleged to have masterminded some of the deadliest attacks against occupying forces and Iraqis, aimed at creating social and religious discord in the country. While some of the most radical Islamist sects have been ideologically and tactically influenced by al Qaeda, most operate independently. A September 2004 report written by Chatham House predicts that the Iraq war will intensify anger and frustration across the Muslim world, leading to further radicalization of Islamist political groups and a continuation of attacks on Western targets.

As Iraqis and Arabs around the world are continually exposed to daily satellite TV images of chaos, bloody civilian casualties, and suffering in Iraq, and shots of similar Israeli military incursions into Gaza, frustrations are predicted to rise.
harsh conditions of Iraqi lives has inspired hundreds of young Muslim men from Europe and around the world to answer the call of militant groups affiliated with al Qaeda, “dramatically strengthening their recruitment efforts.”

Fueled by controversy over the underreporting of terrorist incidents in 2003, the State Department re-released their report “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” The corrected June 23, 2004 version documented 625 terrorism-related deaths (the largest number of terror-related incidents deemed “significant” at any time since the U.S. began issuing these figures); 3,646 people injured from terrorist-related bombings and shootings; and a dramatic climb in terror-related incidents reported in the Middle East.

The State Department report acknowledged that “significant incidents,” meaning incidents where victims were killed, injured, or kidnapped, increased from 60 percent of total attacks in 2002 to 84 percent in 2003. It also stated that anti-U.S. attacks around the world increased from 77 in 2002 to 84 in 2003, not including attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. There were 98 suicide attacks around the world, more than any year in contemporary history. The weight of the evidence strongly suggests that the war on terror has fueled anger against the United States and its perceived allies and endangered the lives of innocent American citizens around the world.

Low U.S. Credibility Threatens Security

**Credibility in the International Community:** Discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished at home and around the world, while perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations. Surveys in eight European and Arab countries demonstrate broad public agreement that the war in Iraq has hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism. This view was held by wide margins—more than 20 percentage points—in every country surveyed (France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco) except in Great Britain, where the margin was 14 percentage points. The war in Iraq has alienated the United States from many traditional allies just at a time when allies are crucial to U.S. security. The international sympathy for the United States after the September 11 attacks has largely disappeared, while anti-American sentiment has sharply increased and U.S. credibility as a free and fair country has diminished.

**Credibility in Iraq:** A poll conducted by the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority released on June 15, 2004 found that 92 percent of Iraqis surveyed thought of the Coalition Forces as occupiers. Only 2 percent saw them as “liberators.” Most Iraqis also said they would feel safer if Coalition forces left immediately. An overwhelming majority of about 80 percent said they had “no confidence” in either the U.S. civilian forces or the Coalition forces. Sixty-seven percent of Iraqis surveyed believed that
violent attacks had increased in Iraq because “people have lost faith in the Coalition forces.”

A more recent poll, conducted August 10-20, 2004 by the International Republican Institute and the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies, reported that less than half (46 percent) of Iraqis felt their lives have gotten better since the fall of Saddam Hussein, while 31 percent said they had gotten worse and 20 percent said their lives stayed the same. The same poll showed that 76 percent of Iraqis think violence is very likely or somewhat likely leading up to the elections in January 2005.

---

**76 percent of Iraqis think violence is very likely or somewhat likely leading up to the elections in January 2005.**

---

**Credibility in the U.S.:** A poll conducted in August 2004 by the Annenberg Election Survey showed 52 percent of Americans disapprove of Bush’s handling of Iraq, while 45 percent approve. A Harris poll conducted that same month indicated that 54 percent of the general public believes the invasion of Iraq has not helped protect the United States from another terrorist attack and an equal number favor bringing most of our troops home in the next year. Support is even lower among African-Americans. According to Gallup, 76 percent of African-Americans say the war was a mistake, while only 20 percent say it was not a mistake.

**Security Costs Due to Military and CPA Mistakes**

_We made a “miscalculation of what the conditions would be.”_

President George Bush, interviewed August 26, 2004 by the New York Times on the aftermath of Iraq regime change.

The President’s admission of a miscalculation came after several former U.S. military leaders had voiced criticism of the Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq. For example, in remarks to a Washington, DC audience in May 2004, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, former commander of the U.S. Central Command, outlined Bush administration mistakes that have left the United States at greater security risk than before the war. These included abandoning the existing policy of containment, manufacturing a false rationale for war, abandoning our traditional allies, propping up and trusting the Iraqi exiles, and failing to plan for post-war Iraq.

The latter has proven the gravest mistake in the post-June 28 “transition” period. Despite overwhelming intelligence warning that chaos could erupt after Saddam’s overthrow, the Administration moved into Iraq without sufficient plans in place. In
A Failed “Transition”

remarks about the period immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein, Army Secretary Thomas White said, “we immediately found ourselves shorthanded in the aftermath. We sat there and watched people dismantle and run off with the country basically.” Now almost three months after the June 28 “political transition,” public security in Iraq continues to steadily deteriorate.

The U.S. move to disband the Iraqi army and police forces and to dismiss tens of thousands of Iraq civil servants after the regime collapsed bred thousands of unemployed and disaffected Iraqis. Sanctions against tens of thousands of former low-level Ba’ath Party members also fed flames of resentment. Meanwhile, the Coalition Provisional Authority brought Iraqi expatriates, whose support on the ground was shallow, into the governing council process while ignoring many indigenous leaders with popular political bases. The result is a handpicked “Interim Government of Iraq” (IGI) that is not representative of most Iraqi people and is perceived as the puppet of the United States, and therefore illegitimate in the eyes of most Iraqis.

The former marine commandant and head of U.S. Central Command, Retired General Joseph Hoare, told a Guardian newspaper reporter, “The idea that this is going to go the way these guys planned is ludicrous. There are no good options. We’re conducting a campaign as though it were being conducted in Iowa, no sense of the realities on the ground. It’s so unrealistic for anyone who knows that part of the world. The priorities are just all wrong.”

Yet U.S. authorities continue to insist that Iraq will be ready for elections in four months. Lt. General Thomas F. Metz, operations chief for more than 150,000 troops, said that the uncontainable violence may lead authorities to exclude certain “hot spots” like Falluja from voting in the proposed January elections to choose a transitional government in Iraq. Metz and UN agents have raised questions about the viability of countrywide elections and have conceded that the likelihood of pacifying the most perilous resistance strongholds in time for the elections is slim. The contingency plan of relying on widespread disenfranchisement in order to move forward with the elections will put in place an illegitimate government, while further inflaming Iraqi resentment of the United States.

Elections experts question how a free and fair election can be held in a country where abductions, assassinations, ambushes, and bombings are a daily reality. Just four months before the proposed elections no Iraqis have announced their candidacy, nor have voter registration systems been put in place.
Security and Reconstruction Shortfalls

U.S. intentions to transform the Iraq economy through control of reconstruction dollars has also fed unrest. Reconstruction is severely behind schedule due to the derailment of projects by insurgent-led violence and sabotage. As sabotaged pipelines and water, sewer, and electricity projects remain on hold for months at a time, frustration on the streets builds and support for anti-American sentiment grows.

As of September 9, only $1.138 billion, or six percent, of the $18.4 billion authorized by Congress for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) had been spent. As of July 2004, fewer than 140 of the 2,300 projects that these funds were intended to pay for were underway.

U.S. officials blame the delays in awarding contracts on the volatile situation in Iraq and bureaucratic infighting between the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House. Dozens of projects stalled when the risk of kidnapping and other attacks on foreign workers spiked in April 2004. Meanwhile, only 30,000 Iraqis have been hired for projects to rebuild their country, far short of the U.S. goal of 250,000, and national unemployment remains at 28 percent.

In an interview with the BBC, Dr. Safa Ahmad, Iraqi Professor of Economy, stated, “Unemployment is a big burden on the Iraqi economy. The collapsed economy has led many Iraqis to engage in criminal activity. The rise in the rate of unemployment is proportionally consistent with the rise in the crime rate.”

Yet while the bulk of U.S. tax-payer funds for Iraq has not been spent, the now defunct Coalition Provisional Authority managed to spend or commit more than $19 billion in Iraqi funds to pay U.S. contractors. This money came from the $20 billion Development Fund for Iraq financed through Iraqi oil revenues. The 12 U.S. members of the Fund’s Program Review Board were able to quickly award contracts to companies like Halliburton because they were not constrained by the same rules, such as competitive bidding requirements, that are now being applied to U.S. taxpayer funds. Reports indicate that billions of dollars from the oil fund were hastily allocated to improperly planned projects in the countdown to the June 28 handover.

The UN-mandated international independent oversight committee for the oil revenue fund was stalled for months, and an auditor was only appointed weeks before the dissolution of the CPA. There are allegations that the CPA prevented the auditor from reviewing documents that contained vital information on billion dollar contracts. Christian Aid, which investigated the spending of Iraq oil revenues, concludes that the failures to follow procedures outlined by UN mandates are a “flagrant breach of the UN resolution” by the former CPA.
In addition, criminal investigations are underway by the Coalition Provisional Authority's inspector general over $600 million in cash from the Iraqi oil money fund that was spent without sufficient controls. Twenty-six other criminal investigations are underway into fraud, waste, and abuse involving millions of dollars by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Allegations over U.S. impropriety is feeding Iraq's already waning distrust of the United States.

Of the $18.4 billion that Congress has approved to rebuild Iraq's shattered infrastructure, $3.5 billion is being shifted away from water, sewerage, and electricity, to spending for security and law enforcement, oil capacity enhancement, and economic development. Funds allocated for water and sewage are decreasing from more than $4.4 billion to $1.9 billion, while funds to support electricity infrastructure will go from $5.5 billion down to $1.1 billion.

The shift in policy underscores that, despite the United States' best efforts to contain the insurgency, the resistance has strengthened and become an increasing threat to the future stability of Iraq.

Use of Private Contractors

An estimated 20,000 private contractors are working in Iraq, a number equivalent to three army divisions. To put this in perspective, at the end of the Persian Gulf War, the ratio of soldiers to contractors was 100:1. According to Peter Singer, author of a book on the privatization of military jobs in the Iraq War, this ratio has now become 10:1. Aside from the U.S. military, private companies supply more trainers and security forces to Iraq than all remaining members of the “Coalition of the Willing.”

The expanded use of private contractors in Iraq poses a variety of potential costs for the United States. Almost a third of the Army's budget for Iraq and Afghanistan, $20 billion, goes to contractors. It means that work that has been traditionally carried out by the military, from training the Iraqi army to guarding installations and convoys, is now contracted out to private companies that often lack sufficient training and are not accountable to the same policy guidelines and review systems as military personnel.

Both the General Accounting Office and the Pentagon’s Inspector General have found that there is little or no government oversight over contracts and contracts being granted, renewed, and increased, and that there has been virtually no inspection of written documents or work performed.
The lack of contractor oversight and training not only increases the likelihood that taxpayer money will be misused, it also increases the chances that unaccountable contractors will violate international laws and standards, abuse Iraqis with impunity and further damage the United States’ reputation and credibility. Of the 44 incidents of abuse that have been documented at Abu Ghraib prison, 16 have been tied to private contractors. 64 An Army Inspector General Report, issued on July 21, 2004, found that 11 of the 31 interrogators employed by the firm CACI International who were involved in the abuse lacked proper training in military policies and techniques, and that there was no evidence of any formal training programs for contract interrogators in Iraq. 65 Nevertheless, the U.S. Army awarded another $23 million contract in August to the company to continue providing interrogators for Iraq prisoners. When questioned about the decision, the Army simply stated that coalition forces were “satisfied” with CACI’s performance and they needed the company’s help to relieve “a huge backlog of work.” 66

The U.S. government is now requiring security contractors to have a copy of the U.S. government’s guidebook “Rules on the Use of Force.” 67 There is no evidence, however, that the U.S. military can verify or enforce that contractors read, understand, and comply with the rules.

**Security Costs Due to Loss of First Responders**

Spending for homeland security in 2005 is expected to be appropriated at $47.5 billion. Yet many of the “homeland security” priorities are under-funded, including port security, community policy programs, airline cargo screening, and U.S. diplomacy. 68

Further strain on homeland security is being felt by the loss of community first responders. More than 47,600 members of the National Guard and Reserve are currently serving in Iraq—making up nearly one-third of the total U.S. forces there. 69 From Texas alone, 3,000 more National Guard troops were deployed to Iraq in August 2004 for a period of up to two years, marking the largest combat mobilization for Texas since World War II. 70

The deployment of these Guard troops puts a particularly heavy burden on their home communities because many of them serve as so-called “first responders,” a category including police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. A poll conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum found that 44 percent of police forces across the nation have lost officers as a result of deployment to Iraq. Eighty percent of U.S. law enforcement agencies are staffed with 20 or fewer officers. 71 Hence, a few officers deployed at the same time can dramatically disrupt a municipality’s ability to respond to emergencies.
There are also strong fears about how the absence of so many Guard troops may affect states’ ability to handle natural disasters. The problem is not just the shortage of personnel, but also equipment. For example, in Montana, the Guard is seeking commercial helicopters to handle the job of fighting small forest fires. Normally, it would use the Guard’s Black Hawk helicopters, which can carry more than twice as much water as commercial helicopters, but these have been withdrawn from use due to a deployment alert. In Mississippi, the unit designated to handle hurricane damage has sent 21 helicopters to Iraq, leaving just five for post-storm rescues and transport of cargo and troops.72

C. Economic Costs

In 2002, White House Economic Advisor Lawrence Lindsey was fired after predicting that an Iraq war would cost between $100 billion and $200 billion. Later that year, budget director Mitchell Daniels called Lindsey’s prediction a “historical benchmark” rather than a “budget estimate” in an attempt to distance the Administration from Lindsey’s forecast. Mitchell then predicted the war would cost between $50 and $60 billion.73

As it turned out, Lindsey was right on target. Congress has already approved three wartime emergency spending bills totaling $151.1 billion for Iraq.74 The combination of unanticipated resistance and higher-than-expected troop deployments led the Administration to secure an additional $25 billion in July 2004 for the Iraqi Freedom Fund Contingent Emergency Reserve (included in the $151 billion figure). This interim installment of funds virtually guaranteed the continued presence of 138,000 troops throughout 2005. Another supplemental $60 billion appropriation request is expected after the election.

The General Accounting Office estimated in June 2004 that costs for the larger “war on terror,” including Iraq, would exceed supplemental funding by about $12.3 billion for the current fiscal year.75 The largest shortfalls were documented in Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts that provide support services for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown of Economic Costs of War: (in $billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2003 Emergency Supplemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003 Emergency Supplemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004 Emergency Supplemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
soldiers, such as food and housing, and increased spare parts needed for equipment associated with a higher than expected level of troop movements due to sustained combat. The GAO noted that these expenses have grown as private contractors have replaced soldiers in these delivery functions and 31,000 more troops than expected remain in Iraq.

While the $25 billion supplemental was applied retroactively to make up for some of the accounts, the Department of Defense is putting plans in place to cover expected year-end shortfalls in 2004 war-related funding. Steps include asking Congress for authority to transfer an additional $1.1 billion from other DOD appropriations accounts, deferring some planned spending, and reducing costs in certain areas. Concerns have been raised that deferring spending for programs planned for FY2004 will front-load spending needs for FY2005 and shortchange future accounts.

Concerns have been raised over the accounting of Global War on Terror (GWOT) funds. Reporting for 2004 GWOT funds show large sums reported as “obligated in miscellaneous categories,” obscuring how those funds have been spent. The GAO reported a similar problem in 2003, as 35 percent of funds reported in the operation and maintenance account were identified only as “other supplies and equipment” and “other services and miscellaneous contracts.” GAO warns that these practices threaten to “reduce transparency and accountability to the Congress and the American people” and reduce Congress’ capacity to budget for future years.

To put Iraq war spending figures in perspective, the monthly cost of the Iraq and Afghan wars now rivals the average monthly cost of the Vietnam War. Operations costs in Iraq are estimated at $5 billion per month while the average cost of U.S. operations in Vietnam over the eight-year war was $5.2 billion per month, adjusting for inflation. While fewer troops are in Iraq, the weapons they use are more expensive and they are paid more than their counterparts who served in Vietnam.

**Long-term Impact on U.S. Economy**

As the occupying power, the United States is obligated under international law to provide for the human needs of the Iraqi people and to pay the immense costs of reconstruction, including the bulk of future U.N. peacekeeping expenses. On the basis of the U.S. military’s prediction of a three-year military occupation at $50 billion per year plus reconstruction costs, author Doug Henwood projects the bill will add up to a low-end average of $3,415 for every U.S. household.

University of Texas economist James Galbraith predicts that in the long term, the Iraq war will be “a dagger at the heart of [the] U.S. economy.” While war initially tends to boost an economy, he says that the characteristics of this one—go-it-alone,
underestimated in terms of costs, losses and challenges and without the requisite tax increases to pay for it—is likely to worsen national external debt and inflation, possibly triggering worldwide commodity shocks. Import consumption, he predicts, will rise, and U.S. trade deficits, which are already staggering, will grow. The war, in short, is likely to contribute to international monetary disorder and a decade of economic troubles.82

Oil Prices

Oil prices have shot up by more than one-third since the end of 2003. U.S. crude oil prices spiked at $48.66 a barrel on August 19, 2004 the highest level since 1983.83 According to Mark Zandi of Economy.com, if crude oil prices were to stay around $40 a barrel for a year, U.S. gross domestic product would fall by 0.5 percent, or in excess of $50 billion a year.84

Analysts cite four reasons for the price hike: higher demand around the world, global dependence on fossil fuels, lack of alternative energy options, and the deteriorating situation in Iraq. The increasing attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq are striking fear that the supply chain will be limited in a period when global oil demand is growing at the fastest pace in more than two decades.85 Saboteur bombing of oil pipelines and refineries was up threefold over the summer period and shrunk oil exports to their lowest levels in 2004.86 Oil pipelines that supply Iraq’s main refinery and feed the major northern export line and a key pipeline in the south that feeds the main oil terminal in Basra were targeted throughout the summer.87

According to a mid-May 2004 CBS survey, 85 percent of respondents said they had been affected measurably by higher gas prices, and 56 percent said they had been affected a great deal. The direct effects fall hardest on low-income Americans, who spend a larger share of their paychecks filling their tanks. Everyone feels the indirect effects, as they work their way through the economy as a whole.

Economic Impact on Military Families

Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 364,000 reserve troops and National Guard soldiers have been called for military service.88 The Pentagon is becoming increasingly dependent on these support soldiers to supplement full-time troops, placing reservists in jobs of both frontline combat and military policing. Thus, reservists are serving long, successive tours in Iraq—each tour often lasting 20 months. For many families remaining back home, this has meant struggling to survive on military salaries that are significantly lower than civilian salaries. Studies show that between 30 and 40 percent of reservists and National Guard members earn a lower salary when they leave civilian employment for military deployment.89 Facing
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act prohibits discrimination against part-time soldiers, requiring that employers guarantee jobs for their employees once they return from deployment. Yet the U.S. Labor Department is receiving a large number of complaints that these laws have been only loosely followed by small companies that are struggling financially. For example, Jerry Chambers of Oberlin, Kansas returned home to find that budget cuts had eliminated his job as a substance abuse prevention consultant.92

The Labor Department says it has helped reduce the number of returning soldiers who lose their jobs due to illegal employer actions from 1 in 54 during the first Gulf
War to 1 in 69 today by informing more employers of the law. On the other hand, there are signs that many military personnel are facing job insecurity. An Arlington, VA-based job assistance hotline set up for returning National Guard and Reservists is fielding an average of 400 calls per week from returning soldiers, up from 125 before September 11. In addition, a survey by the National Military Family Association of service members and their families found that programs to assist military families with job training, communication, and health care are “inconsistent in meeting families’ needs.”

To help part-time soldiers facing immediate financial strains, the House of Representatives passed legislation in April 2004 allowing them to prematurely withdraw money from retirement savings without paying the usual 10 percent penalty. However, according to Rep. Tom Lantos, this legislation is insufficient as it does not compensate for the huge gap between military and civilian salaries. Lantos has unsuccessfully pushed for laws requiring federal agencies to pay reservists the difference between their military and civilian pay and offering incentives for state and local governments and private employers to provide the same relief service to reservists.

As a result of their decreased salaries, more military families have been forced to rely on emergency food support programs. Retired Colonel Dennis Spiegel of the Army Emergency Relief reported a “several hundred percent” increase in requests for access to food stamps and subsidized meals between 2002 and 2003. Just in Thurston County, Washington—site of the Fort Lewis military base—more than 250 military families depend on the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) nutrition program for food stamps. In response to the growing demand, hunger associations nationwide have collaborated with the National Guard to provide emergency relief to military families that have never before experienced prolonged periods of low income.

Sometimes soldiers don’t even receive the low wages that they are due. The General Accounting Office has documented at least one pay problem in 95 percent of audited case studies of units that were mobilized, deployed, and demobilized some time during the 18-month period from August 2002 through January 2004. Both over- and underpayments were documented, and mistakes sometimes persisted for over a year. Pay problems, like receiving late tax exemption benefits, have profound adverse impact on soldiers and their families. Soldiers often have to navigate the system to inquire about pay and benefits errors while deployed in hostile Iraq territories. In the 824th Quartermaster Company, for example, 49 soldiers did not receive the hardship duty pay they were entitled to until three months after arriving at their overseas deployment. Such problems have taken a toll on soldiers’ morale, caused considerable hardship on families, heaped unnecessary burdens on soldiers in already stressful situations in Iraq, and contributed to some soldiers’ reluctance to re-enlist.
Military families are also grappling with problems of inadequate housing. More than 60 percent of the military housing units on and off military bases in the United States may be in need of renovation, at an estimated cost of $30 billion over 30 years.\textsuperscript{101} Given the budget problems faced by the Bush administration, military housing renovation programs are not a priority. Thus, families of soldiers who are risking their lives in Iraq continue to live in substandard living conditions.

Economic Impact on Contractor Families

Although private military contractors tend to be far better paid than military personnel, they and their families face significant problems of their own. In the case of the death of contractors, families have faced challenges transporting their loved ones’ bodies back to the United States, as the military only transports them as far as Kuwait.\textsuperscript{102}

In addition, many contractors have difficulties in obtaining insurance. Almost half of all injury and death claims filed by U.S. government contractors this year were for incidents that occurred in Iraq.\textsuperscript{103} The Defense Base Act requires all U.S. government contractors and subcontractors to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for civilian employees working overseas, but insurance companies are not required to provide coverage. To provide an incentive for insurers to offer coverage, the War Hazards Compensation Act requires the federal government to reimburse private insurance carriers for death or injury workers compensation payouts of $250-$1,000 per week for “war-risk hazards.” The funds can be withheld if the contractor dies or is injured in Iraq through means other than the contracted job. While Labor Department officials say they do not have a cost estimate for reimbursement of Iraq-related claims this year, they say they expect payouts to cost the United States “multimillions.”\textsuperscript{104} Yet even with the guaranteed reimbursement for a war-related injury or death, the spike in claims is leading many insurers to deny coverage, due to the many months it takes the federal government to investigate and reimburse claims paid out by insurance companies.\textsuperscript{105}

Companies are not mandated by the Defense Base Act, which outlines private contractor insurance coverage, to provide a life insurance policy. By contrast, most soldiers carry $250,000 in life insurance, and their spouses are eligible for nearly $1,000 a month in additional benefits.
D. Social Costs

War Spending Impact on U.S. Budget and Social Programs

The Bush administration’s combination of massive spending on the war and tax cuts for the wealthy means less money for social spending. The Administration’s FY 2005 budget request proposes deep cuts in critical domestic programs. It also virtually freezes funding for domestic discretionary programs other than homeland security. Among the programs the Bush administration seeks to eliminate: grants for low-income schools and family literacy; Community Development Block Grants; Rural Housing and Economic Development; and Arts in Education grants. In addition, if the request is passed as written, across-the-board cuts to domestic discretionary programs would remain in place through FY 2009.

While some in Congress are moving to block some of these cuts, officials who oversee federal education, veterans, healthcare, and other programs have been warned by the Bush White House to prepare for cuts in FY 2006 if the Administration remains in office. According to preliminary White House plans for 2006, defense and foreign aid spending, due in part to the war in Iraq and the “war on terrorism,” will grow while remaining discretionary funds for domestic programs would drop by 0.7 percent from $368.7 billion in 2005 to $366.3 billion in 2006. Indeed, a leaked memo from the White House to domestic agencies outlines major cuts following the election, including funding for education, Head Start, home ownership, job training, medical research and homeland security—all programs the President has been touting during the campaign.

The Administration’s budget priorities have privileged a war of choice over essential human needs at home. More than half of all U.S. jobs pay below the level necessary for self sufficiency. While job growth has improved somewhat in recent months, U.S. workers are still suffering from the loss of millions of high-paying manufacturing jobs. Today, a worker making minimum wage cannot afford housing at fair market rent anywhere in the United States. The jobless situation has depressed wage growth, caused real wages to fall for some, thus eroding living standards for many working families. Every 46 seconds a child in the United States is born into poverty. Every minute a child in the United States is born without health insurance. The Bush vow to “leave no child behind” in education remains underfunded by at least $14.1 billion, with the new budget threatening to reduce funding by an additional $9.4 billion.
The $151 billion appropriated thus far for the war in Iraq could have purchased any of the following desperately needed services in our country:

- Close to 23 million housing vouchers;
- Health care for over 27 million uninsured Americans;
- Nearly 3 million new elementary school teachers;
- 678,200 new fire engines;
- Over 20 million Head Start slots for children;
- Health care coverage for 82 million children.\textsuperscript{117}

The National Priorities Project, a non-partisan research institution, has compared the approximately $150 billion appropriated for Iraq for FY 2003-2005 to expenditure levels of important domestic programs over the same time period. For example, the war expenditures dwarf the $8.8 billion allotted for Environmental Protection Agency programs for state and local governments, the $21.7 billion for federal job training and employment, and the $13 billion for Community Development Block Grants, which fund affordable housing and economic opportunity programs for low income and poor people.\textsuperscript{118}

Further, state governments are saddled with costs and lost revenues totaling $175 billion over fiscal years 2002 through 2005, and are trying to cope with the federal budget cuts to necessary programs.\textsuperscript{119} The more than $150 billion in war costs could provide desperately needed relief to citizens teetering on the edge of survival at home. Under the Bush administration's FY 2005 budget proposal states will be hit with a $6 billion shortfall in federal grants to all state and local programs other than Medicaid.\textsuperscript{120}

Another long-term cost for the United States will result from the diversion of research support away from social needs to the military. According to the House Committee on Science, Democratic Caucus, nearly all of the 4.7 percent increase in R&D spending contained in the Administration's FY 2005 budget request would go to only two departments: Defense and Homeland Security. The rest of the R&D budget, funding advances in such fields as health care and new clean energy sources to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, would actually shrink.\textsuperscript{121}

\textbf{Social Costs to the Military/Troop Morale}

The overwhelming power of the U.S. military toppled the Saddam Hussein regime in record time. The ensuing insurgency and prolonged occupation has, on the other hand, put severe strains on the force.
With troops stretched in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the world, U.S. military personnel have had to spend far more time enduring the highly dangerous and rigorous conditions of Iraq than expected. To date, the average tour of duty in Iraq has been 320 days, compared, for example, to 156 days during the Persian Gulf War. According to military policy, reservists are not supposed to be on assignment for more than 12 months every 5-6 years. Instead, the Army has made frequent use of “stop-loss” orders, which allow them to extend without consent the stay of all soldiers after their formal contracts expire. Thus far, the tours of over 20,000 troops have been extended and in early June 2004, the Army announced the possibility of extended tours to all soldiers who are deployed in the future.

An unidentified U.S. Army Sergeant from California is suing the U.S., claiming that subjecting reservists to involuntary extended tours of duty is unlawful. The National Guardsman and supporters claim that “stop-loss” policy is serving as a “back-door draft” for the U.S. Army.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in September 2004 that the United States risks running out of National Guard and Reserve troops for the war on terrorism because of existing limits on involuntary mobilizations. Unless time limit restrictions for deployment are changed, the GAO warns, the United States could face a shortage of Guard and Reserve troops to meet its global military commitments.

Yet concerns are now surfacing at the Pentagon that the dangerous conditions on the ground in Iraq, coupled with more frequent and longer combat tours, will drive more soldiers to leave the Army rather than re-enlist, especially if the possibility of being sent back to Iraq is high. The Army National Guard, for example, has failed to meet recruitment goals in 14 of the 20 months from October 2002 through May 2004. And an Army survey in March 2004 indicated that over 50 percent of Army troops surveyed said they would not re-enlist.

Facing potential troop losses, the U.S. Army and National Guard have responded with aggressive recruitment efforts, warning inactive reservists that they will be sent back to Iraq unless they re-enlist in the active reserves or join local guard units. These intimidation efforts, which have been used in much of the country, have been criticized by soldiers who recently returned from Iraq. “It’s devious, it’s deceptive, it’s dishonest, it’s valueless,” said MariAnn Curta, who recently completed a nine-month tour in Iraq. “I can’t believe they’d pull this kind of fast trick on kids who already served.”

---

The Army National Guard has failed to meet recruitment goals in 14 of the 20 months from October 2002 through May 2004.
Cost to Veteran Health Care

*Veteran healthcare is a continuing cost of war.*

Paralyzed Veterans’ of America Legislative Director Richard Fuller

Though there are many issues and costs for soldiers who return from duty, healthcare is at the top of the list. As of September 22, 2004, 7,413 soldiers have been injured during the course of the war, with 54 percent unable to return to duty and in need of immediate assistance from the Veterans’ Affairs (VA) healthcare system. Up to 86 percent of soldiers and Marines have engaged in a firefight in Iraq, explaining the high injury rate. But as was the case in the Persian Gulf War, many others are likely suffering from undetectable injuries or ailments that will only surface years from now.

By the end of July 2004, 27,571, or 16 percent, of Iraq veterans had sought healthcare in the VA system. Disability rulings average 171 days and more than 3,000 vets are waiting for their first visit to the doctor. The department lacks a modern computer system, one that can track a new applicant’s service record.

Currently, VA healthcare is not prepared for the swelling number of claims from soldiers returning from Iraq. Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington needed an extra $42 million to treat casualties for 2003 and 2004.

The Congressional budget resolution passed in the House of Representatives in May boosted President Bush’s veterans benefits proposal by $1.2 billion, to a total of $31 billion, but a $2.6 billion funding gap remains. With 235,000 troops rotating through Iraq, healthcare for these massive numbers will be a growing expense.

Another major cost is the care for amputees. The lives of many U.S. soldiers have been saved by improvements in body armor covering the chest and abdomen, but these protections do not cover a soldier’s extremities. Increases in numbers of amputees are the result. Arriving home, these disabled veterans require extensive rehabilitation. Walter Reed Medical Center alone has treated over 70 amputees, including roughly 15 with multiple-limb amputation. The Administration took one proactive step in allotting $13 million to a recuperation center at Walter Reed Medical Center. Yet the VA Technology Assessment Program notes that a lower limb prosthesis can cost up to $60,000; given the lack of funding, the high cost of this basic requirement of care is likely to drain resources from the larger task of comprehensive research and rehabilitation for our nation’s disabled veterans. Those whose injuries from war qualify them for disability compensation must wait an average of six months to two years to receive compensation.
When injured soldiers attempt to transition back to civilian life with their new physical disability, they are met with a multitude of obstacles. Testifying before the House Total Force Subcommittee, Corporal Victor Thibeault was particularly concerned about the lack of aides who specialize in easing the transition.\textsuperscript{137} Transitional support, and the lack of it, is a major issue for these veterans.

In addition to direct care, funds are needed to improve the effectiveness of current health screenings. In the fall of 2003, the General Accounting Office reported on the Army and Air Force’s compliance with the Defense Department’s pre-screening regulations. They found that 38 to 98 percent of personnel records reviewed were missing one or both of the pre- and post-deployment health assessments. The review also found that as many as 36 percent were missing two or more required immunizations.\textsuperscript{138} Without proper health screening, soldiers may be sent into a war zone with undetected health problems. Further, lapses in health record maintenance virtually guarantee that returning soldiers will face challenges in obtaining swift and effective health care.

**Mental Health Costs**

The *New England Journal of Medicine* reported in July 2004 that one in six soldiers returning from war in Iraq showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, or severe anxiety. The authors attributed the high level of psychological problems to the normal stresses of war, but also to the fact that soldiers in Iraq are experiencing more contact with “the enemy” and exposure to “terrorist attacks” than the troops during Gulf War I.\textsuperscript{139} Only 23 to 40 percent of respondents in the study who showed signs of a mental disorder had sought mental health care.\textsuperscript{140}

This study corroborates the findings of a December 2003 Army report, the first ever to assess mental health during combat, which identified the following problems:

- **Extensive Mental Health Problems:** Soldiers screened positive for traumatic stress (15.2 percent), anxiety (7.3 percent), and depression (6.9 percent).

- **Greater Need for Services:** Almost half of soldiers surveyed reported not knowing how to obtain services. Of those soldiers wanting help, only one-third had received any assistance.

- **Need to Monitor Soldiers for Suicide:** There were 23 confirmed suicides among Army troops in Iraq in 2003, a rate of 15.6 per 100,000 soldiers. This number represents an increase from the Army 8-year average of 11.9 per 100,000 soldiers but still less than the U.S. national average of 17.6 for all U.S. males in 2001.\textsuperscript{141}
E. Human Rights Costs

The human rights costs to the United States of the Iraq war are inextricably linked to the structural and legal changes following the September 11 attacks. President Bush’s declared “war on terror” led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, and expansion of the powers of law enforcement.

Since September 11, government officials, including local police, have used an array of tactics to limit dissent including censorship, surveillance, detention, denial of due process and use of excessive force. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, “Police have beaten and maced protesters in Missouri, spied on law-abiding activists in Colorado and fired on demonstrators in California, and campus police have helped FBI agents to spy on professors and students in Massachusetts.”\(^{142}\) Attorney General John Ashcroft’s Justice Department has further asserted the right to seize protesters’ assets and detain and deport immigrants under anti-terrorism statutes rushed through Congress after the attacks.\(^{143}\)

**Government Surveillance of Anti-War Activity**

Just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the “USA PATRIOT Act,” an overnight revision of the nation’s surveillance laws that vastly expanded the government’s authority to spy on its own citizens, while simultaneously reducing checks and balances on those powers like judicial oversight, public accountability, and the ability to challenge government searches in court.

The federal government has extended the reach of its surveillance goals to the local level. In an October 15, 2002 classified memorandum to local law enforcement officials, the FBI instructed local law enforcement to loosen local rules prohibiting the collection of information about anti-war protesters and to report suspicious activity to local counter-terrorism squads.\(^{144}\) The memo warned local officials of possible violence at upcoming antiwar demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco but admitted that the FBI had “no information indicating that violent or terrorist activities are planned.”\(^{145}\) The FBI asked police to watch out for protest tactics, including Internet use, fund-raising activities, and “peaceful techniques (that) can create a climate of disorder.”\(^{146}\)

The Los Angeles, New York, Atlanta, Washington, DC and other city police departments have been authorized to use a variety of tactics, including keeping files on anti-war protesters, videotape demonstrations, and infiltrate rallies with plainclothes officers.\(^{147}\)
In February 2003, Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. of New York’s Federal District Court modified a 1971 court order called the Handschu agreement that had restricted the New York Police Department’s ability to conduct surveillance of political groups. Police officials had said they needed greater flexibility in investigating terrorism, and the judge agreed to ease the rules, citing “fundamental changes in the threats to public security.”

Beginning with the February 15, 2003 anti-war rally, NYPD started interviewing activists on their group membership, views on the Middle East and the war, and whereabouts on September 11, 2001.

After hearing evidence of the way the NYPD was exercising their expanded power in August 2003, Judge Haight criticized police officials for the way demonstrators were interrogated, citing what he called a “display of operational ignorance on the part of the NYPD’s highest officials.” However, the Judge did not impose new restrictions on the police in the wake of the interrogations but said that lawyers could return to court and seek to hold the city in contempt if they believed that a violation of the rules also violated an individual’s constitutional rights.

In response to the Atlanta Police Department’s surveillance of anti-war protesters in 2003, Georgia State House Majority Whip Nan Orrock (D-Atlanta) said, “This use of police resources is highly questionable and can very much have a chilling effect on people’s sense that they can exercise their constitutional rights without appearing in somebody’s database ... this harkens back to some very dark times in our nation’s history.”

The surge of public outcry against federal and local changes to surveillance practices has led to local calls for tighter restrictions of police surveillance powers. As of August 22, 2004, 352 cities and four states had passed resolutions against provision of the USA PATRIOT ACT that violate constitutional rights such as free speech and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Colorado on April 17, 2003 announced the settlement of a landmark lawsuit challenging the Denver Police Department’s practice of monitoring and recording the peaceful protest activities of local residents. The Denver police, who for decades had kept files on peaceful critics of government policy with no connection to criminal activity, agreed to end the political spying in what the ACLU called “a First Amendment and civil liberties victory for people in Denver.”
Under this agreement, the collection of intelligence on activists is forbidden without specific evidence of serious criminal activity and it limits dissemination of information from intelligence files and provides for internal safeguards and review.  

Constitutional Right to Assembly and Free Speech
While political protest surged in the lead-up to military action in Iraq, many protest activities were met with increased limits on freedom of speech and assembly in violation of the First Amendment. In the name of terrorism-prevention and public safety, authorities have denied anti-war groups permits to march, positioned permitted demonstrators far from the target of the protest, and denied access to permitted demonstrations through strategically placed barricades and personnel.

The capacity of local, state or federal officials to call upon terrorism-prevention to alter the time, place, and manner of political activity opens the gates for unhindered curtailment of First Amendment protections and the human right to free speech.

In February 2003, the city of New York denied United for Peace and Justice, a coalition of local and national organizations, a permit to march in front of the United Nations, a site with symbolic meaning because of its evolving role in the debate about the looming war. Despite a legal challenge, public outcry, and the routine approval of similarly-sized parades, the city, citing security concerns, denied the group’s request to march anywhere in Manhattan, only issuing a permit for a stationary rally several blocks from the UN.

After the February 2003 rally, the New York Civil Liberties Union filed suit, claiming the New York City Police Department infringed upon protesters’ civil liberties by setting up metal barricades to contain protesters and using excessive force, including charging horses, pepper spray, and unprovoked searches and arrests. Police also denied protesters access to First Avenue, preventing them from reaching the site of the protest.

Organizers planning demonstrations in New York to coincide with the August 30 to September 2, 2004 Republican National Convention (RNC) faced similar challenges. To explain the denial of a permit to United for Peace and Justice to use New York City’s Central Park for a 250,000 person demonstration, police and city officials cited everything from terrorism to “lawn care”. Deputy Police Commissioner Paul Browne said police were concerned “that al-Qaeda may want to use a large political event as a target as they did in Madrid ... as a way of infiltrating a political climate and the outcome of the election.”
Donna Lieberman, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, said the city is obligated to ensure protesters can demonstrate. “Of course, there is an overlay of national security concern whenever the president comes to town, and that is always a factor, but national security cannot glibly be invoked to stifle protest,” said Lieberman. 

Although 71 percent of the city’s registered voters thought protesters should be allowed to demonstrate in Central Park during the Republican National Convention, city officials persuaded a federal and state judge to keep the park off limits to rallies. In a last minute agreement, demonstrators were permitted to march in mid-town Manhattan.

Police arrested 1,821 people in NYC for alleged protest activities associated with the RNC, the largest number of arrests at any major party convention in history. Most of those arrested were detained for more than two days without being arraigned, which a state Supreme Court judged ruled a violation of legal guidelines. While the NY Police Department claims there was a backlog in getting the large number of people fingerprinted and processed, state officials released figures showing that the police had processed 94 percent of all fingerprints within one hour and many judges waited in empty court rooms as people sat in jails and waited. Many lawsuits are expected charging the NY Police Department with constitutional rights violations.

The pattern of restricting protesters’ First Amendment rights when the President visits a city extends beyond New York. One class action lawsuit filed claims that the Secret Service set up “free speech zones” in 12 cities when the President came to town. At protests, critics of Bush’s policies have been routinely quarantined out of range of the President and the media, while the general public and even those who are demonstrating in support of the President have been allowed to gather at the site of the President’s appearance, a clear violation of equal protection rights and freedom of speech.

On September 14, 2004 Sue Niederer, whose son, Second Lt. Seth Dvorin, was killed in Iraq, was arrested at a Laura Bush appearance in Hamilton, NJ. Niederer followed procedures and obtained a ticket for the event along with hundreds of Bush supporters. When she stood up at the event, wearing a T-shirt with a photo of Seth that read “President Bush killed my son” and asked Mrs. Bush why her children aren’t serving in Iraq, she was surrounded by “men in dark suits” and escorted out from the hall. Moments later, as she spoke with reporters outside the hall, she was arrested and charged with “trespassing.” In an interview with the New York Times, Niederer said, “My goal is to bring the troops home as quickly as possible. This was Seth’s wish. I can’t save my son, but I can save someone else’s son. Seth’s mission is mine.”
The Price of War Profiteering

The U.S. government’s Iraq reconstruction process has cost both Iraqis and Americans. Instead of boosting Iraqi self-determination by granting contracts to experienced Iraqi businesses, the U.S. government has favored U.S. firms with strong political ties. Major contracts worth billions of dollars have been awarded with limited or no competition. Employees of the U.S. contractors have been lightning rods for terrorist attacks. As a result, USAID reports that 20-25 percent of funding for Iraq redevelopment projects is now being siphoned off to pay for the costs of security.1

Meanwhile, U.S. auditors and the media have documented numerous cases of fraud, waste, and incompetence. The most egregious problems are attributed to Halliburton, Vice President Richard Cheney’s former firm and the largest recipient of Iraq-related contracts.

Halliburton Chronology

Based on research by the Center for Corporate Policy (http://www.corporatepolicy.org)

2002: Halliburton 2002 Annual Report: “We expect growth opportunities to exist for additional security and defense support to government agencies in the United States and other countries. Demand for these services is expected to grow as a result of the armed conflict in the Middle East.”

11/15/2002: Long before the start of the war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense awarded a classified $1.8 million task order to Halliburton for Iraqi oil field planning.2

3/24/2003: The Pentagon announced that a contract had been awarded on March 8 to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) to extinguish oil fires and evaluate and repair Iraq’s petroleum infrastructure. The no-bid, “cost-plus” contract was estimated to cost up to $7 billion over 2 years, with profits of up to 7 percent.3 The administration argued that only KBR could begin implementing the plan on extremely short notice, but CBS News later reported that other qualified companies had attempted to bid on the contract but were shut out of the process.4

4/22/2003: Reports reveal that KBR did not actually extinguish Iraqi oil well fires during the war, per the March 8 Defense Department contract, but instead subcontracted the work to two other U.S. firms, Boots & Coots International Well Control and Wild Well Control.5

10/2003: A Pentagon inspection report documents unsanitary conditions at mess halls and kitchens run by Halliburton in Iraq. The report complains that Halliburton had been ordered to fix these conditions but had failed to do so.6

12/10/2003: Army Corps documents show that Halliburton charged $2.64 a gallon for fuel it imported from Kuwait—more than twice the cost of fuel imported from Kuwait by the Iraqi state oil company and the Pentagon’s Defense Energy Support Center. The over-charge by Halliburton’s Kuwaiti subcontractor, Altanmia, amounted to approximately $61 million.7

9 Ibid.
12/19/2003: Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, Commander of the Army Corps of Engineers, cleared KBR of wrongdoing in the Kuwait fuel delivery contract in a ruling known as a “waiver” because it lifted a requirement that Halliburton provide data justifying its pricing. Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) called the Flowers ruling “incomprehensible” and said “it appears the administration is deliberately sabotaging the government’s ability to audit Halliburton.”

1/13/2004: A Defense Contract Audit Agency memo to the Army Corps of Engineers labeled as “inadequate” KBR’s system for estimating the cost of ongoing work in order to justify payments.

1/15/2004: The Defense Department’s top auditor asked the Pentagon to open a formal investigation into whether Halliburton overcharged for fuel deliveries into Iraq.

1/19/2004: Despite the widening probe into Halliburton by Defense Department auditors, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded the company a competitively bid contract valued at $1.2 billion to continue to rebuild damaged oil infrastructure in Southern Iraq (this replaced Halliburton’s previous oil infrastructure contract).

1/23/04: Halliburton revealed to the Pentagon that two of its employees took kickbacks valued at $6 million in return for awarding a Kuwait company lucrative work supplying U.S. troops in Iraq.

2/2/2004: It was revealed that KBR overcharged $16 million for meals served to troops in Iraq at Camp Arifjjan, a large U.S. military base in Kuwait. KBR’s Saudi sub-contractor, Tamimi Global, billed for 42,000 meals per day in July but served only 14,000 meals per day.

2/4/2004: Halliburton notified the Department of Defense that it had over-billed by an additional $11.4 million in 2003 at four other dining sites in the region, for a total of nearly $28 million.

2/13/04: The General Accounting Office, briefing investigators of the House Government Reform Committee, said that Halliburton claimed it would cost $2.7 billion to provide food and logistics services to U.S. troops, but lopped $700 million off the estimate, without explanation, after questioning by the Defense Department.

5/16/04: Pentagon auditors announced that they were recommending the withholding of nearly $160 million in reimbursements for meals that Halliburton had charged the government but never served.

6/14/04: The General Accounting Office issued a report charging that the Pentagon had violated procurement laws by issuing the Nov. 2002 task order to Halliburton to develop plans for Iraqi oil. This task order had paved the way for Halliburton to receive the $7 billion, no-bid contract to extinguish oil fires and rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure.

6/14/04: Four former Halliburton employees issued statements charging that the company had routinely wasted money. They claimed, for example, that the company had paid $45 each for cases of Coke and $100 per bag of laundry, while instructing personnel to abandon nearly new $85,000 trucks in the desert when they got flat tires and to overstate hours worked in company timecards.

8/11/04: Pentagon auditors found that Halliburton failed to account adequately for $1.8 billion in charges for feeding and housing troops.

9/7/04: The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. military had recommended the termination of Halliburton’s Iraq contract.

A Failed “Transition”
II. Costs to Iraq

Iraq and Iraqis have paid by far the highest price for the U.S. war and occupation. With the collapse of earlier justifications regarding non-existent weapons of mass destruction and non-existent operational ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, the Bush administration turned to the rationale of “democracy for Iraq” to justify the war. But more than three months after the June 28 “transfer” of power to the Iraqi Interim Government, democracy remains a distant fantasy as more than 160,000 foreign troops continue to occupy the country, more than 100 executive orders issued by former CPA head Paul Bremer remain in effect, and hundreds of U.S. “advisors” operate within Iraqi ministries.

Like all of the Administration’s previous claims for this war, the portrayal of Iraqi democracy also rings hollow. While the removal of the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein was no doubt a welcome development for many Iraqis, the costs of the war have been extremely high and there is no end in sight. Tens of thousands of Iraqis are dead or grievously injured. The streets of Baghdad and other cities remain dangerous war zones. Clean water, electricity, and even gasoline in this oil-rich country are all in even shorter supply than during the dark years of economic sanctions. Women face new restrictions and new dangers. Thousands of Iraqis remain imprisoned in U.S.-controlled jails that are now infamous worldwide for mistreatment and torture of detainees. Democracy, freedom, and human rights appear out of reach. And Iraq remains mired in all of the indignity that military occupation brings. Iraqis are indeed paying a high price.

A. Human Costs

Iraqi Civilian Deaths

The U.S. military refuses to monitor or even estimate the number of Iraqi civilian casualties. As Gen. Tommy Franks described the Pentagon’s approach earlier in Afghanistan, “we don’t do body counts.”169 Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the U.S. military’s deputy director of operations, said U.S. forces do not have the capacity to track Iraqi civilian casualties.170 The failure of the United States to count Iraqi civilians dehumanizes the very people the Administration claims they are liberating. “Americans think that only their dead count, but what is happening to the Iraqis is a disaster,” said a senior Health Ministry official.171

Iraq Body Count, a group of academics and researchers, has compiled a comprehensive account of civilian casualties during the war. IBC researchers have determined that as of September 22, 2004, between 12,800 and 14,843 civilians have been killed
as a direct result of the U.S. invasion and ensuing occupation of Iraq. But Iraq Body Count’s numbers may be low. The Iraqi Health Ministry recently reported that 2,956 Iraqis died from military strife between April 5, 2004 and August 31, 2004—two and a half times the number reported by Iraq Body Count in the same period. The U.S. public is largely uninformed about the high toll Iraqis are paying. A recent poll found that only 30 percent of respondents thought the death toll was more than 5,000 Iraqi civilians.

**Iraqi Civilians Wounded**

Historically, the number of wounded in war is about three times as many as those killed, suggesting that roughly 35,000 Iraqis have been wounded as of September 2004. But for U.S. troops in Iraq, seven have been wounded for every one killed, so this estimate of Iraqi wounded is likely low. Furthermore, Iraq’s hospitals and health system have been understaffed and overwhelmed throughout the war and occupation, meaning that many injured Iraqis did not seek or receive medical care. Medact, an organization dedicated to alleviating the health effects of war, estimates that at least 40,000 Iraqis have been injured.

**Iraqi Insurgents Killed**

During “major combat” operations, between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers and insurgents were killed. The nature of the fighting has made it difficult to distinguish civilians from fighters. The Pentagon provides day-to-day estimates of insurgent deaths, but Iraqis on the ground claim that occupying forces unfairly categorize civilians as insurgents. For example, during the spring 2004 siege of Fallujah, over 600 Iraqis were killed. Rahul Mahajan, a journalist reporting from Fallujah during that period, estimated that the dead included 100 children and 200 women. However,

**Chart 3: Estimated Strength of Iraqi Resistance**

Note: These Pentagon estimates may be low. The Deputy Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, British Major General Andrew Graham, estimates that there are 40,000 to 50,000 active insurgent fighters in Iraq. See endnote 180.
the U.S. commander of the operation, without visiting any hospitals or cemeteries, insisted that of the 600 killed, “95 percent of those were military-age males.”

Ostensibly to give the impression that the U.S. forces are “winning” despite the more than 1,000 American deaths, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has emphasized that U.S. troops killed an estimated 1,500 and 2,500 enemies in the month of August 2004 alone. But instead of reducing the insurgents’ ranks, U.S. attacks have resulted in greater recruitment and growth of the insurgency. By the Pentagon’s own estimates, the number of insurgents in Iraq increased from 5,000 in November 2003 to more than 20,000 in August 2004. This growth is astounding when one considers that a Brookings study based on government data estimates that 24,000 suspected insurgents have been detained or killed as of August 2004. The insurgent forces have also grown in composition to encompass not only former regime loyalists and foreign terrorists, but also Sunni Islamic extremists, and most recently, Shi’a radicals.

**Effects of Depleted Uranium**

For over a decade, the U.S. military has coated its armor-piercing missiles in depleted uranium (DU), a toxic and radioactive metal. Many scientists and observers attribute the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome among U.S. soldiers and the rapid increase of cancer in southern Iraq to the use of DU. For example, the number of serious child birth defects in Basra has increased sevenfold since 1991. The Pentagon estimates that U.S. and British forces used 1,100 to 2,200 tons of weaponry made from DU during the March 2003 bombing campaign, far more than the roughly 375 tons dropped during the 1991 Gulf War. Most governments, including NATO and U.S. allies such as Germany, Canada, the Czech Republic, Norway and the Netherlands have foresworn the use of DU weapons.

Whereas during the first Gulf War much of the DU was dropped on desert battlefields, in 2003 the vast majority of the toxic weapons were deployed in heavily populated urban areas such as Baghdad. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is poised to start cleaning up toxic pollution in Iraq, including DU, in October 2004. While Great Britain has provided UNEP with maps pointing out the locations for the DU they fired, the U.S. military has not disclosed the location of their munitions, exposing the Iraqi people to possible contamination.

**B. Security Costs**

**The Rise in Violence and Crime**

Occupying forces are obligated under international law to provide for the basic needs, including security, of the civilian population under occupation. However, U.S.
troops have either neglected or failed to meet this responsibility. U.S. troops have failed to protect Iraqis from the escalation of violent crime that has plagued Iraq since the U.S. invasion. Criminal acts such as murder, rape, and kidnapping skyrocketed after March 2003, forcing children to stay home from school and women to stay off the streets at night.188 Although comprehensive crime statistics are not available, Baghdad's central morgue documented a dramatic increase in gunshot deaths from 10 in July 2002 to 470 in July 2003, an indicator of Iraq's new lawlessness.189 During the first year of occupation, there were over 4,279 violent deaths in Baghdad, averaging 357 violent deaths each month, not counting victims of car bombs or military action. By contrast, the 2002 average was only 14 each month.190

Failure to Train Iraqi Police and Army

Iraqi police and National Guard have largely failed to provide security for the Iraqi people. With the formal end of occupation, the situation appears to be only worsening. One indicator is that these Iraqi security forces are being killed at an even higher rate than before. At least 127 were killed in June and July 2004, with a total body count of more than 700 since April 2003.191 In part, the problems are due to the lack of training and equipment. U.S. Major General Paul D. Eaton, formerly in charge of training Iraqi police and military forces, admitted to the Associated Press that efforts to develop effective leadership within Iraqi security forces “hasn't gone well. We've had almost one year of no progress.”192 While the U.S. Congress has appropriated $2.9 billion for training and equipment, only $562 million has been spent and less than half of the U.S. military personnel required to train Iraqis have been hired.193 Despite this failure to spend what has already been appropriated, President Bush forwarded a request to Congress in September for an additional $3.5 billion for security to be diverted from reconstruction funds.

A major flaw with the training of Iraqi security forces is that U.S. training programs have few standards. The GAO reported just after the “transition” that “Commanders had wide latitude in terms of training police and did not uniformly adopt the Transition Integration Program. They were free to establish their own curriculum and requirements for policies, which varied in depth and scope. Training could last between three days and three weeks.”194 Since the “transition,” the Department of State reports that while they have 154,000 security forces “on hand,” only 96,000 have met even the minimal training standards.195

In addition to the lack of training, the Department of Defense has failed to develop effective coordination with Iraqi forces. Security expert Anthony Cordesman notes, “The U.S. failed to treat the Iraqis as partners in the counterinsurgency effort for nearly a year.”196 These problems were seen as one factor in the fiasco of the April
2004 uprising, during which some sectors of the Iraqi forces had up to 80 percent desertion rates.\textsuperscript{197}

**Smuggling**

In addition to an increase in violent crime, the UN Office on Crime and Drugs has documented an increase in smuggling. According to the UN agency’s report, pre-war networks that the government of Saddam Hussein used to profit from and circumvent the UN-imposed oil embargo are now being used to steal and smuggle oil and copper throughout the country.\textsuperscript{198} The report also noted that given Iraq’s “porous borders, geographical location—situated near one of the major drug routes for the smuggling of opiates from Afghanistan—and an established tradition of smuggling, a strong possibility of an increase in drug trafficking [throughout Iraq] exists.”\textsuperscript{199}

**Psychological Impact**

Living under an occupation force that employs indiscriminate tactics against insurgents but fails to provide the most basic security has devastated the Iraqi population. The slow pace of reconstruction combined with the denial of democracy has created an environment conducive to extremism.\textsuperscript{200} While most Iraqis rejoiced in the ouster of the repressive regime, the celebration quickly turned to anger at the U.S. occupation. A poll conducted by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies in June 2004 found that 80 percent of Iraqis believe that coalition forces should leave either immediately or directly after the election.\textsuperscript{201}

**C. Economic Costs**

**Unemployment**

By the summer of 2003, the unemployment rate in Iraq had doubled, from 30 percent before the war to 60 percent.\textsuperscript{202} This rapid increase in unemployment was largely the result of the CPA’s decision to disband Iraq’s military and dismantle much of Iraq’s state bureaucracy in the guise of a “de-Ba’athification” campaign. The CPA’s own Labor Ministry estimated that the Ba’athist purge combined with the army demobilization put 750,000 people out of work.\textsuperscript{203}

The latest Iraqi Ministry of Labor report estimates national unemployment rates at 28 percent; a recent poll notes the depth of unemployment, reporting that 85 percent of those unemployed had been seeking work for more than four months.\textsuperscript{204} By

---

Only $1.1 billion out of $18.4 billion slated for reconstruction has been spent by mid-September 2004 and few guidelines exist to give preference to Iraqis for reconstruction projects.
comparison, during the Great Depression, U.S. unemployment peaked at 25 percent. The U.S. government has tried to respond by involving more Iraqis in reconstruction, but acknowledges that it is only employing 120,000 Iraqis in the civilian sector. Furthermore, only $1.1 billion out of $18.4 billion slated for reconstruction has been spent by mid-September 2004 and few guidelines exist to give preference to Iraqis for reconstruction projects.

It is clear that high levels of unemployment are fueling the insurgency by putting, in the words of one U.S. Army officer, “too many angry young men, with no hope for the future, on the street.” The International Crisis Group notes that “Unemployment is the main problem and main source of resentment. It’s a vicious circle: Lack of security leads to lack of reconstruction, which leads to lack of jobs, which leads back to lack of security.”

**Corporate War Profiteering**

Most of Iraq’s reconstruction has been contracted out to American companies, rather than Iraqi or regional companies. Several of these companies, such as Halliburton and Bechtel, have close ties to officials within the Bush administration. More importantly, the work that has been done has been substandard, extremely expensive, and has proceeded far too slowly. For example, Bechtel’s work on schools in Iraq was described in a leaked Army report as, “Lousy paint job. Major clean-up work required. Bathrooms in poor condition.” Inspections of facilities found that school bathrooms in supposedly “repaired” schools were overflowing with sewage.

The recipient of the largest U.S. contracts, Halliburton, has provided particularly sluggish, uncoordinated, and over-priced services in Iraq. (see Box 3, pp. 30-31.) Congressional committees such as the House Government Reform Committee have discovered that many of the companies responsible for oversight of Iraqi reconstruction contracts had direct business ties and conflicts of interest with the companies they were meant to be overseeing. Besides wasting U.S. taxpayer funds, such practices have had a deleterious impact on Iraq’s economy, preventing local involvement in reconstruction and keeping unemployment high.

**Iraq’s Oil Economy**

Testifying before Congress in March 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that “Oil revenues of Iraq could bring between $50-100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.” This prediction has proved to be wildly optimistic. Iraq’s export revenues totaled only $8 billion in 2003 and are not expected to exceed $15 billion in 2004. Although Iraq possesses the second-largest oil
reserves in the world, the ongoing anti-occupation violence has prevented Iraq from capitalizing on its oil assets. Even with more than 14,000 security guards deployed along pipelines, attacks have been frequent.\textsuperscript{214} Since June 2003, there have been at least 118 attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure\textsuperscript{215} Oil production levels are not only lower than Wolfowitz predicted, they are even lower than before the U.S. invasion. In 2003, Iraq’s oil production dropped to 1.33 million barrels per day, down from 2.04 million one year earlier.\textsuperscript{216} By September 2004, oil production still had not reached pre-war levels and major attacks caused oil exports to plummet to a 10-month low in August 2004.\textsuperscript{217}

D. Social Costs

Electricity

While U.S. officials knew that restoring electricity would be key to starting reconstruction, planners underestimated the time, money, and security needed to rebuild the electric system after war and a decade of sanctions. Since reconstruction began, the leadership of the electricity project has changed seven times. Widespread looting further slowed the process. Without adequate protection from U.S. troops, saboteurs knocked down 600 towers and stole more than 50 miles of high tension wire.\textsuperscript{218} Problems with electricity have affected public health and the Iraqi oil sector, and delayed the revival of Iraq’s economy and essential infrastructure.

By late July 2004, Iraq reached a major milestone in exceeding its pre-war electricity levels, providing 5,000 megawatts of electricity across the country. Yet, production is far below the demand of the 7,000-8,000 megawatts needed.\textsuperscript{219} The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that “Most Iraqis equate the coalition’s inability to develop an adequately functioning electrical system with the slow pace of reconstruction more generally ... Iraqis who are sweltering in 120-degree heat with many hours of blackouts a day do not feel that Iraq is being reconstructed.”\textsuperscript{220}

Health Infrastructure

Thirty years ago the Iraqi health system was considered the finest in the Middle East. Wars and over a decade of sanctions put the health sector in shambles. Making matters worse, many hospitals lost critical equipment during 2003 post-invasion looting.\textsuperscript{221} Although the war led to the lifting of the sanctions which permitted imports of medical equipment and medicines, Iraq’s hospitals continue to suffer from lack of supplies and an overwhelming number of patients.\textsuperscript{222} There are shortages in basic items like cough syrup and also in critical items such as diabetes medications, anti-cancer drugs, intravenous lines, tuberculosis test kits and ventilators.\textsuperscript{223} Dr. Shakir Al-Ainachi, the Health Ministry’s director general said, “The drug shortage is our number one problem.”\textsuperscript{224}
After the U.S. invasion in the summer of 2003, some 60 percent of Iraqis were reliant on government handouts for food. Soon after the United States declared an end to combat operations on May 1, 2003, a nutritional assessment carried out by UNICEF in Baghdad found that acute malnutrition or wasting, measured by a child’s weight for height, had nearly doubled from four percent a year ago before the war, to almost eight percent.

Education

Similar to other sectors of Iraq, the Iraqi education system has languished over the past 20 years. According to statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of Education, 64 percent of school buildings required maintenance and rehabilitation before the war even began. During and after the latest war, more than 3,000 schools were looted, destroyed or burned in southern and central Iraq and 60 in Baghdad suffered bomb damage. The Ministry estimates that it will take about 4,500 new schools to meet the needs of the current student population. Out of more than 15,000 existing school buildings, 80 percent now require significant reconstruction. More than 1,000 schools need to be demolished and completely rebuilt. Another 4,600 require major repair. The war caused varying degrees of damage and post-war looting resulted in widespread loss of ceiling fans, lighting, furniture, school desks, fences, doors, glass, blackboards, cabinets, electric cables, school radio stations, telephones, refrigerators, air coolers and conditioners.

Before the war, attendance in primary schools was mandatory. UNICEF estimates that close to 90 percent of primary school-age children attended school. In May 2003, primary school attendance was less than half what it was before the U.S. invasion. The upswing in violence in mid-April 2004 forced many schools to close in Baghdad and Fallujah, and parents have been forced to keep their children away from school for fear that they will be killed or kidnapped. The new school term was slated to begin on September 1, 2004 but has been postponed until October 1 due to recent fighting. The State Department reported on September 15th that “Significant obstacles remain in maintaining security for civilian/military reconstruction, logistical support and distribution for donations, equipment, textbooks and supplies.” A recent Ministry of Education survey found that with the ravished economy, many school-age children are being forced to work instead of attend school.

Environment

During the war and occupation, water and sewage systems were destroyed, thousands of bombs were dropped leaving unexploded ordnance (UXO) strewn across the country, the fragile desert ecosystem was damaged by tanks and U.S. temporary military outposts, well fires spewed smoke across the country, and ocean ports were clogged from bombed ships.
Since the U.S. occupation began, significant quantities of mines and unexploded ordnance have been encountered, especially in and around heavily targeted areas such as Baghdad and Basra. In March 2004, the Mines Advisory Group, one of the world's leading humanitarian mine clearance organizations, announced that it had cleared more than one million mines and items of UXO in Iraq since the beginning of the war. Even with these efforts, the Mines Advisory Group estimates that there are still 20 casualties per month due to mines and UXO.\textsuperscript{234}

As previously mentioned, the environment in Iraq has also been severely damaged through exposure to depleted uranium, whose residue remains behind when DU-filled weapons are fired, and which has been linked to a range of serious diseases including leukemia and other cancers, birth defects and other problems among Iraqi civilians and soldiers during the first Gulf War.\textsuperscript{235}

E. Human Rights Costs

While President Bush claimed that “Iraq is free of rape rooms and torture chambers,” the photos of Abu Ghraib Prison told the world a different story.\textsuperscript{236} The International Committee of the Red Cross documented the U.S. military engaging in harsh prisoner interrogation techniques such as “hooding, beating with hard objects...stripp[ing] [prisoners] naked for several days while being held in solitary confinement ... [and] threats ... of reprisals against family members ... and imminent execution.”\textsuperscript{237} Such actions fall within the

Box 4

Women’s Human Rights

A July 2003 report from Human Rights Watch states that “women face grave dangers in Baghdad.” With rising instability, women and girls in Baghdad told Human Rights Watch that the insecurity and fear of sexual violence or abduction is keeping them in their homes, out of schools, and away from work and looking for employment. According to HRW, “many of the problems in addressing sexual violence and abduction against women and girls derive from the U.S.-led coalition forces and civilian administration’s failure to provide public security in Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{1}

According to Houzan Mahmoud, the UK representative of the Organisation of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, “from the start of the occupation, rape, abduction, ‘honour’ killings and domestic violence have become daily occurrences. A lack of security and proper policing have led to chaos and to growing rates of crime against women. Women can no longer go out alone to work, or attend schools or universities. An armed male relative has to guard a woman if she wants to leave the house.”\textsuperscript{2} The International Federation of Journalists has documented that “credible threats have been made against Yanaar Mohammed, head of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq who publishes the Al Nisa magazine and runs the www.equalityiniraq.com website. She has been a leading campaigner through the magazine and website for equality for women. “This colleague has come under attack because she is fighting for basic human rights,” said Aidan White, IFJ General Secretary.\textsuperscript{3}

The inquiry into the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal, launched by the U.S. military in January 2004, headed by Major General Antonio Taguba, documented mistreatment of women held at the prison. Among other references, the report confirmed that a letter describing the abuse of women held there, smuggled out of Abu Ghraib by a woman known only as “Noor,” was accurate. The Taguba investigation also found that guards have videotaped and photographed naked female detainees.\textsuperscript{4} The Bush administration has refused to release photographs of Iraqi women forced at gunpoint to bare their breasts but according to The Guardian newspaper, “among the 1,800 digital photographs taken by U.S. guards inside Abu Ghraib there are images of a U.S. military policeman ‘having sex’ with an Iraqi woman.”\textsuperscript{5}


definition of torture established by the international Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the United States is a signatory. Torture is defined in the Convention as “an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person,” for a purpose such as obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion.

The Red Cross also reported that between 70 percent and 90 percent of inmates at Abu Ghraib had been arrested by mistake. Torture is the only thing you can call this,” says one senior military official. Other reports suggest that the abuse extends beyond Abu Ghraib, revealing overall flaws in the new Iraqi justice system.

While the Bush administration has tried to blame the torture on a “few bad apples,” abuse has been widespread throughout the post-9-11 military operations, with over 300 allegations of abuse in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantánamo. As of mid-August 2004, only 155 investigations into the allegations had been completed. According to Human Rights Watch, “The pattern of abuse ... resulted from decisions made by the Bush administration to bend, ignore, or cast rules aside.”

Many more instances of abuse may come to light. In early September 2004, Army investigators revealed at a Congressional hearing that as many as 100 detainees were hidden from the International Committee of the Red Cross at the request of the CIA.

F. Sovereignty Costs

Despite the claim that on June 28, 2004 the United States “transferred sovereignty” to Iraq, post-transfer Iraq remains an occupied country. Neither the existence of the interim government nor Security Council Resolution 1546 changes the reality of 138,000 U.S. troops and another 24,000 coalition troops occupying the country, or the reality of U.S. economic and political control of Iraq’s political and economic life.

Political Sovereignty

The new interim government reflects the continuation of U.S. control over Iraq. It was created through negotiations between the U.S. occupation forces and the Iraq Governing Council, which was selected and put in power by the United States. UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, charged with selecting the members of the Interim Government, acknowledged that the U.S. pressures on him made his job impossible and stated that “Mr. Bremer is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature. Nothing happens without his agreement in this country.”
UN Resolution 1546 outlines the limited powers of the interim government in Article 1, stating that the government will “refrain from taking any actions affecting Iraq’s destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of Iraq assumes office.” This, according to Article 4(a), will only happen “by 31 December 2005.” Thus, the interim government does not have the authority to reverse or undo the major decisions imposed on Iraq by former CPA head Paul Bremer, including laws privatizing Iraqi resources, restricting press freedom, or allowing foreign corporations to control the reconstruction process.

Resolution 1546 endorses the interim government and turns the U.S. and “coalition” forces into a UN-mandated “multinational force.” But it does not change the nature of the occupying forces, nor does it grant the Iraqi interim government the right to veto U.S. military operations. The changes Washington and London negotiated with other Security Council members were aimed at pacifying European opposition, not providing real sovereignty for Iraq.

While the UN Resolution mirrors the Bush administration’s assertions that the transfer of power on June 28 handed Iraqi sovereignty over to the Iraqi people, the continued U.S. presence in Iraq proves otherwise. The U.S. now maintains one of the largest U.S. embassies in the world in Iraq, with nearly 1,000 American staffers supervising the $18.4 billion reconstruction fund appropriated by Congress. The embassy is supplemented by U.S. diplomatic offices in four additional regions of Iraq. A perhaps even more blatant obstacle to Iraq’s political sovereignty is the fact that 200 U.S. and international advisors remain as “embedded consultants” with various Iraqi ministries. Militarily, the United States is planning for the long term as they focus on constructing 14 “enduring bases.” These are being designed as encampments for the thousands of American troops expected to serve in Iraq for at least the next two years.

With control over much of the funds for Iraq and effective control over the military situation, these U.S. advisors, while not directly in charge, will continue to exert strong influence over the decisions of Iraqi officials.

Economic Sovereignty

Over the past year and a half, the Bush administration has broken its obligations as an occupying power under The Hague and Geneva Conventions to provide for basic life necessities without fundamentally altering Iraq’s economic laws. The head of the now defunct CPA, Paul Bremer, passed nearly 100 orders that, among other things, give U.S. corporations virtual free reign over the Iraqi economy while largely excluding Iraqis from a reconstruction effort which has failed to provide for their basic needs.
The Bremer Orders give preference to U.S. corporations over the development of the Iraqi economy in a variety of ways, including:

- Denying Iraq the ability to give preference to Iraqi companies or employees in the reconstruction effort. On a more basic level, state-owned Iraqi companies are actually prohibited from bidding;
- Permitting the full privatization of Iraq’s state-owned enterprises and 100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi companies;
- Allowing foreign products to flood the Iraqi market which has, in turn, forced local producers out of business;
- Preventing restrictions on capital flows; and,
- Failing to require that contractors provide services first and receive payment second.\textsuperscript{249}

UN Resolution 1483 further reinforced U.S. influence over the Iraqi economy by creating the “Development Fund for Iraq” (DFI) to administer proceeds from the export sales of Iraq’s oil, as well as funds remaining from the UN Oil-for-Food Program and other assets seized from the defunct regime. While the Bush administration was very vocal in the media saying that Iraqi oil belongs to the Iraqi people, the $20 billion in the DFI was initially placed under the control of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

To promote transparency and financial accountability of the DFI, the UN created an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). Though billed as “the eyes and ears of the international community,” the CPA left it blind and deaf for nearly six months before appointing members and dragged its feet another four months before appointing an auditor. The first audit reports were not released to the public until July 15, 2004, two weeks after the CPA was dissolved. The audit noted that the metering of oil extracted from Iraq was not functioning, so it was impossible to tell if it had all been accounted for. It also noted that only one of the IAMB members was an Iraqi and that he had attended only two of the 43 meetings.\textsuperscript{250} The CPA’s own Inspector General found that at least $8.8 billion in Iraqi funds could not be accounted for.\textsuperscript{251}

Iraqi sovereignty over its oil industry was also undermined by UN Resolution 1546, which keeps in place protections from prosecution granted to oil companies under Resolution 1483. It does exclude from immunity those companies that sign contracts after June 28, but this simply means that U.S.-chosen companies will enjoy protection but those chosen by the Iraqi people will not.
Further weakening Iraqi sovereignty over the oil, President Bush signed Executive Order 13303 in May 2003 and reaffirmed it in May 2004, thus revoking international environmental protections for oil spills or other ecological disasters, and granting blanket immunity to U.S. corporations that gain possession or control of Iraqi oil or products through any means. There is no cutoff date for the immunity, which renders “the judicial process ... null and void.” Hence, if any damages occur from oil companies, Iraqi citizens have no legal recourse.\textsuperscript{252}
A Failed “Transition”
III. Costs to the World

A. Human Costs

Coalition Deaths

While Americans make up the vast majority of military and contractor personnel in Iraq, other U.S.-allied “coalition” troops continue to suffer war casualties in Iraq. As of September 22, 2004, the total non-U.S. coalition casualties numbered 135.253 The Pentagon does not track non-U.S. citizen military or civilian contractors killed or wounded in Iraq, but independent accounts show at least 106 non-U.S. contractors killed as of September 22, 2004.254

Diversion of Resources

In addition to the direct human costs, the Iraq war continues to drain attention and resources away from other international problems. One result is the world community’s continuing inability to respond effectively to emergencies, including the humanitarian crises in Sudan, Chechnya, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations attention, peacekeepers, diplomatic talent, political support, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development monies all are scarce as the world focuses its attention on Iraq.

B. Undermining International Law

The U.S. war in Iraq violates major tenets of international law. In a September 15, 2004, interview regarding the Iraq war, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that “from the [UN] Charter point of view, it was illegal.”255 The UN Charter’s otherwise absolute prohibition against war allows only two exceptions: if the Security Council itself calls for armed action (Chapter VII, Article 42), or in self-defense (Article 51) “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (and then only “until” such time that “the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”). Neither the terms of Article 42 nor of Article 51 were met in the case of Iraq. The violation is particularly egregious since no evidence has emerged to prove the extensive pre-war claims made by the Bush administration and by Prime Minister Tony Blair in Britain, regarding the “imminent” threat osten-
sibly posed by Iraq’s alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. To the contrary, Charles Duelfer, the chief of the U.S. Iraq Survey Group overseeing 1,500 analysts searching for WMDs in Iraq, determined that “Iraq had no WMD, only intentions” to create them.256

Pre-Emptive War

In waging war in Iraq, the Administration has sought to legitimate the notion of pre-emptive or preventive war as the basis for its international relations. In addition to undermining the restrictions on war imposed by the United Nations Charter, however, the war has set a dangerous precedent for other countries to act as military aggressors, seizing any opportunity to respond militarily to claimed threats, whether real or contrived, that must be “pre-empted.”

Unilateralism

Just two weeks before the war, President Bush stated that “when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission.”257 The unilateral U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq thus led to what must be termed an aggressive or preventive war. Aggressive war is outlawed both by the Nuremberg Charter, which prohibits the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,” and the United Nations Charter, which is the primary international treaty proscribing war. Iraq was not in fact a preemptive war—because that would require an imminent threat, which we know did not exist in Iraq. In fact, years before the war in Iraq began, contesting views were already common that challenged the “imminent threat” claim. Those views existed within U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as among academic experts, outside analysts, other countries’ intelligence resources and many more arenas. The reports of David Kay, head of the UN arms inspection team, and of Charles Duelfer of the U.S. arms search team, provide additional proof that the “imminent threat” claim was false.

The Rules of War

The tactics of the war also violate major tenets of international law, primarily those of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions regarding protection of civilian populations in time of war, treatment of populations under military occupation, and the laws of war themselves regarding proportionality and illegal weapons and tactics. The bombing of civilian population centers and religious sites violates Geneva’s requirements. Use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons violates the Convention’s prohibitions against disproportionate use of force since it is known that the effects of DU extend far beyond the targeted sites and military personnel to harm water systems, agricultural and residential land, and civilian populations for many years.
During the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. military continues to violate the Geneva Convention prohibitions regarding collective punishment. Those violations include the use of imposed curfews, closures of whole towns and neighborhoods, the demolition of houses, and the arrest or kidnapping of family members of wanted militants to use as hostages to force the wanted men to turn themselves in. Extrajudicial killing of Iraqi opposition political leaders remains a violation of the Geneva Convention’s prohibition against such assassination by an occupying power.

C. Undermining the United Nations

Many in the Bush administration believed that their war in Iraq would weaken the United Nations. While the Administration had systematically attacked the legitimacy and credibility of the UN from the moment it took office in January 2001, those attacks escalated in the run-up to the Iraq war even as the UN, from the Security Council to the General Assembly to the Secretary General and the Secretariat, continued to defy the U.S. call to war.

Attempting to operate in Iraq during the U.S. war and occupation further undermined the credibility and independence of the United Nations because many perceived it to be a sign of UN approval of U.S. government actions. On August 19, 2003 the UN paid a grim human price for the decision to remain in Iraq under U.S. occupation when a truck bomb destroyed the UN’s Baghdad headquarters, killing 22 staff members, including the Secretary General’s Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Attempting to Make the UN “Irrelevant”

In his September 12, 2002 speech at the General Assembly, Bush continued his claim that the UN would be “irrelevant” if it did not join the war. “Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?” A month later he followed that up with a warning that the UN must act to join his war, or risk becoming a “debating society.”

As the war came closer and the global organization still refused to back the U.S.-UK assault, the attacks on the United Nations grew sharper. On February 9, 2003, President Bush told a Republican audience that “it’s a moment of truth for the United Nations. The United Nations gets to decide, shortly, whether or not it is going to be relevant, in terms of keeping the peace, whether or not its words mean anything.” A month later, on March 6, 2003, Bush taunted the UN, saying “The fundamental question facing the Security Council is, will its words mean anything? When the Security Council speaks, will the words have merit and weight? If we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so.”
Bush’s aides waged even sharper attacks on the United Nations. Three days after the United States launched its war on Iraq, then-Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, Richard Perle, celebrated what he saw as a key accomplishment of the war in an article titled “Thank God for the Death of the UN.” He cheered at the prospect that the war would expose what he called “the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions.”

**Undercutting Democracy and Diplomacy**

In the U.S. effort to win Security Council support for the war, the Bush administration undermined always-tenuous UN democracy and diplomacy by threatening member states to cease their opposition to a UN endorsement of the war. In a move that was reportedly used against many other countries as well, the U.S. ambassador to South Africa sent a March 18, 2003 letter to that country’s deputy foreign minister explicitly demanding that South Africa not participate in or support any effort even to convene an emergency General Assembly meeting on the Iraq war. The language was harshly threatening: “Given the current highly charged atmosphere, the United States would regard a General Assembly session on Iraq as unhelpful and as directed against the United States. Please know that this question as well as your position on it is important to the U.S.”

**Rejection of Inspections**

Before the war, the United States refused to accept the reports of the UN arms inspectors as legitimate. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Bush administration has refused to allow UN inspectors back into the country, despite the fact that the United States signed on to UN resolutions continuing the mandate of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and despite the fact that UNMOVIC, working outside of Iraq, has continued to find new information regarding Iraq’s destroyed weapons programs. In its rejection of UNMOVIC, the United States continues to undermine the legitimacy of the UN as a centerpiece of global disarmament.

**The Illusion of UN Independence**

UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi was mandated by the United Nations to select an interim government in Iraq. But Bush administration pressure on Brahimi led to the selection of a government ultimately chosen and vetted not by the representative of the international community, but rather by the occupying power and its own cho-
sen minions. Although Brahimi was essentially invited by the White House to take the UN position (the official UN request came thereafter), he described “terrible pressure” from the U.S. occupation forces that kept him from selecting the candidates he and the UN favored for the interim government in Iraq. Although the idea of an outside force selecting a “sovereign government” already stands outside any understanding of democratic or international legitimacy, the refusal of the United States to allow even Brahimi, whom the White House itself had approved, to function, further undermined the already stretched credibility and legitimacy of the UN.

Unilateral “Multilateralism”

Washington’s decision to go back to the United Nations at all, after dismissing the global organization as “irrelevant” when it stood defiant of war, reflected a thoroughly tactical, rather than law-based, approach to the UN. However, in the eyes of the world community, the relevance and centrality of the United Nations had remained not only intact but strengthened. Unfortunately, the increased recognition of the UN’s value in global diplomacy was undercut once again in May 2003, when the Security Council accepted, albeit reluctantly, the U.S.-UK resolution endorsing the existing U.S. occupation of Iraq.

In the June 2004 “transfer of sovereignty,” the Bush administration again needed the UN’s imprimatur, this time to legitimize the new interim government. While Washington acted on tactical rather than international law grounds, the grudging return to the UN still reflected the world’s insistence on multilateral approaches.

In fact, however, the resolution further insisted that the UN accept as “sovereign” a government possessing only a fictional version of sovereignty. The Iraqi interim government was not elected, and was put in place by and remains dependent on the occupying forces controlling its country. Such a decision undermines not only the UN as a whole but the entire notion of national sovereignty which serves as the basis for the United Nations Charter. It was on this basis that Secretary General Annan referred specifically to the vantage point of the UN Charter in his September 2004 finding that the war was illegal.

Cutting Deals

The Security Council’s acceptance of the U.S.-UK resolution endorsing the U.S.-imposed “interim government” in Iraq and changing the name (but not the reality) of the U.S.-dominated occupation force to a “multi-national force” reflects new pressures, including bribes as well as threats, on the UN as a whole. There are also specific bribes and threats being brought to bear on individual Council members. While more details will likely emerge later, it is already clear that Germany plans to leverage...
its support for the U.S.-UK position on the Iraqi interim government to win U.S. backing for their longstanding goal of a permanent Security Council seat.

In early June the German Chancellor’s foreign policy advisor told journalists that they already “have four of the five permanent members” as well as the necessary two-thirds support of the General Assembly, and therefore in the fall 2004 session Germany will “push through” a resolution for a seat. Berlin is unlikely to have made such a public announcement unless it had received some level of assurance from Washington regarding support for its campaign for a permanent seat.266 (By September 2004 Germany had joined with Japan, Brazil and India in a high-profile joint campaign for new permanent seats for all four countries.)

D. Enforcing Coalitions

The U.S. effort to create what the Bush administration called a “coalition of the willing” to endorse the Iraq war, despite massive popular as well as overwhelming UN opposition, led to a further undermining of the UN’s authority over issues of global peace and security. Individual countries were pressured to join the coalition, turning it into a “coalition of the coerced.”

Coalition of the Coerced

On March 18, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell released a list of 30 countries that he claimed had agreed to be publicly identified as members of the U.S.-led coalition. However, according to the Washington Post, officials of at least one of these countries, Colombia, were apparently unaware that they had been designated as a coalition partner. It is not known how many other governments first learned of their membership in the coalition through the media. At the same time the State Department claimed that an additional 15 countries had joined the “coalition,” but were unwilling to be publicly identified.267 It is clear that in putting together their “coalition,” the U.S. frequently substituted coercion and subterfuge for actual diplomacy.

Superficial Support

Other nations, including Hungary and the Netherlands, allowed their names to be placed on the coalition list, while at the same time reassuring their citizens that they would not actually support the military action in any substantive way. In this way U.S. pressure on governments to join the coalition undermined democracy in many of those countries, since public opposition to the war ranged as high as 90 percent, thus forcing “willing” governments to go to war against the wishes of their own populations. One indicator of the artificial character of the so-called “coalition” is the number of allies who have left the coalition, or refused to renew their tiny troop commitments. Another indication of “coalition” weakness is evident in examining the lack
of global representation among the allied countries. Despite the Administration’s claims that this alliance represented a strong global mandate for the war, the 30 countries on the State Department’s original coalition list, even when combined with the United States, made up less than 20 percent of the world’s population. Moreover, since polls showed strong majorities opposed to the war in virtually all countries except the United States and Israel, the Administration was highly disingenuous when it suggested that more than a billion people supported the war.

Since that time, a few additional countries have joined the coalition, but eight countries have withdrawn their forces, and another, Costa Rica, has demanded to be taken off the coalition list even though it had no troops in Iraq. As of the middle of September 2004, only 29 countries had forces in Iraq, in addition to the United States. These countries, combined with United States, make up less than 14 percent of the world’s population (see Appendix for details).

The unraveling began with the withdrawal of Spain’s 1,300 troops after the spring 2004 defeat of the pro-war Aznar government. Spain’s pull-out led Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic to recall their small contingents soon after. Then the entire Philippines contingent was withdrawn after kidnappers threatened to execute a captured Filipino contract worker. By the end of September 2004, Norway, New Zealand, and Thailand had all pulled out.268 The Netherlands and Poland reportedly plan to withdraw before the middle of next year.269 While Eastern European and former Soviet countries remain the most committed to the U.S. war, even Estonia has announced pull-out plans for June 2005.270 Other countries have reduced their already tiny symbolic contingents; by July 2004 Singapore had only 33 soldiers left in Iraq out of 191, and Moldova, already the smallest group with 42 soldiers, was now down to 12.271
E. Costs to the Global Economy

The war in Iraq was sold to the American public as quick and inexpensive, requiring little U.S. investment and soon effectively paying for itself through Iraqi oil revenues. In fact, the war has been anything but cheap, and the economic costs to the world are perhaps the gravest.

Wasting Billions

While the U.S. has used Iraqi funds (oil revenues and frozen assets from around the world) to pay the billions of dollars to U.S. and other western contractors in Iraq, the U.S. has paid for the vast majority of the Pentagon’s direct dollar costs of the war itself. But the consequences of those expenditures are global. By pouring $151.1 billion into the war and occupation in Iraq, the U.S. government diminished the resources available for real economic, humanitarian and reconstruction aid around the world.

To put the U.S. war costs in perspective, consider that:

- The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that it would only need $24 billion annually to cut world hunger in half. That would translate to 400 million people currently malnourished gaining access to sufficient food, many for the first time in their lives.\textsuperscript{272}

- The director of UNAIDS needs only $10 billion annually to launch a truly global, comprehensive program to respond to HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{273}

- The UN Children’s Organization UNICEF estimates that it would take a mere $2.8 billion annually to provide immunization for every child in the developing world.\textsuperscript{274}

- To provide clean water and functioning sewage systems to the world’s population, the World Water Council estimates an annual cost of $37 billion.\textsuperscript{275}

Combined, these efforts to provide basic food, HIV/AIDS medicine, childhood immunization and clean water and sanitation, would cost $74 billion dollars a year. That means that the $151 billion the United States is spending for war in Iraq could provide those basic necessities to impoverished people around the world for more than two years.

Rising Oil Prices

As mentioned in Chapter I, the war is also at least one causal factor in the increase in oil prices. This development has already shaken world stock markets and consumer confidence. If oil prices remain high for a prolonged period, the strain on nearly every
sector of the global economy could be severe. According to the British magazine *The Economist*, “If oil is only $10 a barrel higher than it would otherwise have been, and stays there a while, prices in general will rise, output and incomes will be reduced, and unemployment, at least for a while, will be raised. That vicious combination of higher inflation and lower growth—stagflation, to recall a term from the 1970s—is about the worst scenario an economic policy-maker can contemplate.”

The airline industry is already feeling the pinch. The International Air Transport Association announced that if oil prices remain $36 per barrel or higher, world airlines will face increased costs of $1 billion or more per month, further damaging an industry still struggling to recover after September 11. Meanwhile, the Bush administration has failed to pursue an energy strategy that would reduce the nation’s oil dependence through development of more fuel-efficient automobiles and renewable energy resources.

F. Undermining Global Security and Disarmament

Rise in Global Terrorism

While the Bush administration has claimed that the war in Iraq has “made Americans safer,” people around the world (including Americans) are more insecure than ever. Bush administration officials have acknowledged that terrorism is a greater threat today than it was before the Iraq war. The State Department’s annual report on international terrorism, released in April 2004, falsely claimed that terrorist attacks declined in 2003. In fact, Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted two months later that the data in the report was wrong, and that the actual number of terrorist attacks had increased, not decreased, in 2003. California Rep. Henry Waxman, the ranking Democrat on the House Government Reform Committee, said the 2003 State Department report did not include attacks that happened after the report’s November 11 printing deadline. Those left out included the bombings of two synagogues, the British consulate, and a bank in Istanbul later that month. In a letter to Powell, Waxman accused the Bush administration of manipulating figures to show a decline in terrorist attacks ahead of the elections in November. Indeed the State Department, forced to print a correction, released corrected numbers on June 23, 2004 that showed dramatically higher terrorism-related casualties.

A New Haven for Terrorists

While the Ba’athist regime in Iraq was brutal and repressive at home, international terrorism was not its hallmark. The U.S. State Department’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports have not held Iraq responsible for an international terrorist attack at least since 1993 when some officials blamed Baghdad for a disputed (and
failed) attack on ex-President George H.W. Bush. Now Iraq has apparently become what the country never was before: a focal point of international terrorist organizations that have been galvanized by the U.S. occupation. As a result, people around the world are at greater risk. In particular, citizens of countries whose governments are supporting Washington's war (as well as Americans) face even higher levels of risk.

**Setting a Dangerous Precedent**

Global security is also threatened by other nations mimicking U.S. unilateralism and claiming their own versions of the legitimacy of preventive or preemptive war. The United States thus provides a model for other unstable countries and regions to turn towards preventive or preemptive war as a legitimate option. The U.S. war in Iraq could provide a legitimating example for a possible Indian decision to attack Pakistan, for Rwanda to go to war against Congo, for Armenia to attack Azerbaijan, or for any other potential aggressor interested in escalating a local conflict. More immediately, the proliferation of this threat is evident in the position asserted by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who claimed the right of preemptive strikes anywhere in the world in response to the deadly September 2004 school hostage crisis in Beslan in southern Russia.\(^{280}\)

**Global Increase in Military Spending**

While it is difficult to isolate costs of the Iraq war from the broader U.S. “war on terrorism,” it is still useful to document the global increases in military spending since the start of the Iraq war and occupation. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2002 world military spending was $795 billion. With the skyrocketing costs of the war in Iraq, worldwide military spending has soared to an estimated $956 billion in 2003. The United States accounts for nearly three-fourths of the worldwide growth in military spending, due largely to Iraq war expenditures and other efforts to cement U.S. global military dominance. According to SIPRI, most countries in the Middle East have also increased military spending due to heightened tension in the region over Iraq and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.\(^{281}\) Beyond the U.S. and the Middle East, major military spenders such as China, Japan and Russia have also increased their expenditures between 1999 and 2003, and are projected to continue to do so through 2008.\(^{282}\)

**Missing Illicit Materials**

The United States justified its preventive strike on Iraq under the guise of non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). But the Iraq war has actually increased the challenges facing global efforts at non-proliferation and disarmament. The UN’s UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors reported in June 2004 that a number of sites in Iraq known to have contained equip-
ment and material that could have been used to produce banned WMDs and long-range missiles were either cleaned out or destroyed. The material, some of it discovered in a scrapyard in the Dutch port of Rotterdam, had been earlier identified and tagged by UN arms inspectors when they were still working in Iraq.283

**Nuclear Proliferation**

The looted sites included the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, where the IAEA had catalogued and placed under seal tons of partially enriched and natural uranium. In the post-invasion looting, the Center was stripped of computers and much equipment; it is unclear whether potential nuclear materials were also taken. According to the *Washington Post*, “the war has dispersed the country’s most dangerous technologies beyond anyone’s knowledge or control.”284

The Tuwaitha Center had been sealed off by the IAEA, but an expert familiar with UN nuclear inspections said the Marines apparently broke the IAEA seals designed to ensure the materials would not be diverted for weapons use or end up in the wrong hands.285 The UN arms inspectors had been forced to withdraw from Iraq on the eve of the U.S. invasion; once the Marines left Tuwaitha, the Center was vulnerable to looting because of the broken seals.

**G. Global Environmental Costs**

**Poisoning the Region’s Water**

While environmental damage from the war is concentrated within Iraq, devastating Iraq’s land, water and people, spill-over is inevitable as water, sand and air move across Iraq’s borders. The Tigris River, for example, flows down to the Shaat al-Arab entry point where Iraq, Iran and Kuwait all empty into the Persian Gulf. Hence, contamination of the Tigris threatens not only Iraq but neighboring countries and those further away as well.

According to a June 2004 report by Dr. Husni Mohammed, an Iraqi who holds a PhD in Environmental and Biological Science and has researched the condition of the Tigris River, “the Tigris River water is a concentrated cocktail of pesticides, fertilizers, oil, gasoline and heavy metals, reports. Raw sewage mixes with particles from antiquated piping and U.S.-fired depleted uranium munitions, plus remnants from untold amounts of other chemicals released by American and Iraqi weaponry used since the 1991 Gulf War.”286
H. Undermining Human Rights

On a global scale, war in Iraq has undermined human rights. The dismissive attitude towards the Geneva Conventions—reflected both in White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales’ statement that the Conventions are “quaint” and the more fully articulated rejection of the Conventions concluding that they do not apply to prisoners held in the Guantanamo prison facility—begun during the immediate post-September 11 period and particularly in the Afghanistan war—continued during the Iraq War. The global implications of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal are serious, providing a dangerous example to other nations that it is somehow acceptable to hold only low-ranking individual soldiers accountable while granting functional impunity to all higher-ranking officers and military policymakers.

Neglecting Economic Rights

According to Amnesty International, “the poor and the marginalized are most commonly denied justice and would benefit most from the fair application of the rule of law and human rights. Yet despite the increasing discourse on the indivisibility of human rights, in reality economic, social and cultural rights are neglected, reducing human rights to a theoretical construct for the vast majority of the world’s population. It is no mere coincidence that, in the Iraq War, the protection of oil wells appears to have been given greater priority than the protection of hospitals.”

Torturing Prisoners

On the first anniversary of his “mission accomplished” announcement, Bush stated that “life for the Iraqi people is a world away from the cruelty and corruption of Saddam’s regime. At the most basic level of justice, people are no longer disappearing into political prisons, torture chambers....” That statement came in the middle of the widening torture scandal involving U.S. interrogators and guards at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Setting an Abysmal Example

The widely publicized humiliation, torture, and brutalization of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. intelligence officials and guards gave new license for torture and mistreatment by governments around the world, particularly U.S. allies, who found a new reply to whatever small-scale U.S. pressure might be brought to bear regarding human rights violations. Those governments would simply reply that what they were doing wasn’t nearly as bad as what the Americans were doing in Iraq, so who were Americans to tell them anything?

The refusal of the U.S. investigators to examine responsibility for the torture above the level of the prison commander, including top generals as well as the top leadership
of the Pentagon and the White House, legitimizes any other nation's refusal to hold its own top officials accountable for human rights violations carried out by underlings.

**Ignoring International Human Rights Law**

The refusal to investigate further up the Administration hierarchy was particularly damaging to international human rights norms because of specific statements in the legal memorandum requested by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that “President Bush was not bound by either an international treaty prohibiting torture or by a federal anti-torture law because he had the authority as commander in chief to approve any technique needed to protect the nation’s security.” While that memo was drafted in reference to the “war on terrorism,” specifically regarding prisoners from Afghanistan held at Guantanamo, the consistent Administration claim that the Iraq War is “ground zero” of the war on terrorism makes it inevitable that such findings would be viewed by U.S. troops and others as applicable in Iraq as well.

The Justice Department memo assuring the White House that torture was legal stands in stark violation of the international Convention Against Torture, of which the United States is a signatory. While the U.S. press has focused on the divergent definitions of torture between the White House and the Pentagon, both U.S. versions violate the only internationally recognized definition: that contained in the Convention Against Torture. That convention defines torture much more broadly as “an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.” All of the competing U.S. definitions stand in violation of that Convention.

The fact that the Bush administration ignored existing treaty obligations and created its own public legitimation for the use of torture outlawed under international law, gives every government in the world the right to similarly embrace its own use of torture against its own citizens or the populations of countries or territories it occupies, as “exceptions” to the global prohibition.

**Weakening the International Criminal Court**

The scandal demonstrated the weakness, as well as the potential, of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Made irrelevant to the Abu Ghraib scandal by virtue of the Bush administration having “unsigned” the Rome Treaty, the ICC still provided a useful, if unused, example of how international jurisdiction might have been brought to bear to hold U.S. and “coalition” troops accountable to the international community as a whole for their violations of the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions. This accountability would apply as well to political leaders in the U.S.
and “coalition” countries, and to the currently unaccountable private military contractors.

The public U.S. refusal to abide by the recommendations of the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding violations of the Geneva Conventions in the Pentagon’s detention facilities in Iraq undermines the authority of the world’s leading humanitarian organization and sets a dangerous precedent for other recalcitrant governments. Because the ICRC is charged with implementing the Geneva Conventions, such weakening of its authority seriously damages the rule of law on a global scale.
## COALITION OF THE WILLING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Member of original (3/03) coalition list</th>
<th>Joined and sent troops after 3/03</th>
<th>Had withdrawn from coalition or pulled forces from Iraq as of 9/16/04</th>
<th>Had forces in Iraq as of 9/16/04</th>
<th>Total population of countries with forces in Iraq as of 9/16/04 (mil)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>127.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>284.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>833.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AS % OF WORLD TOTAL**: 13.6

### Sources


Countries with forces in Iraq: Department of State, Sept. 8, 2004 (data as of August 26, 2004).

Note: Norway, New Zealand and Thailand were included on this list, but have since brought their forces home.

Countries that have withdrawn from the coalition: *Washington Post,* July 15, 2004.
A Failed “Transition”
ENDNOTES


2 “U.S. Wounded and Dead Charts” at: <http://www.icasualties.org>, Calculation is based on a 2.79 month transition period.


4 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 Committee to Protect Journalists database, September 22, 2004.


20 Geneva Convention, Protocol I.


24 Ibid.
32 “A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” survey of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco, and Jordan by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, March 16, 2004.
37 The Gallup Organization Poll, September 14, 2004 (results compiled from polls over the prior year).
42 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
A Failed “Transition”

57 Ibid.
71 National Institute of Justice Funded Study to Examine Recruitment and Hiring, Fall 2002-Summer 2003.
74 Congressional Research Service, “Supplemental Appropriations FY 2003: Iraq Conflict, Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security,” updated April 18, 2003. While the law specifies $62.4 billion for defense expenditures, it does not provide specific amounts for military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The House Budget Committee’s Democratic staff estimates that $9.1 billion of the amount was for activities in or around Afghanistan. See House Budget Committee Democratic Caucus, “The Cost of War and Reconstruction in Iraq: An Update,” September 23, 2003; Committee on the Budget, Appropriations Update, “Fiscal Year 2004 Defense and Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Conference Report,” November 5, 2003. While the law specifies $66.1 billion for defense expenditures it does not provide a breakdown of specific amounts for military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. However, the administration’s original supplemental request stated the estimated division of the funding to be $51 billion for Operation Iraqi Freedom, $11 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom and $4 billion for Operation Noble Eagle; See Office of Management and Budget, “Estimate #17, FY 2004 Supplemental: Iraq and Afghanistan Ongoing Operations/Reconstruction,” September 17, 2003; Although the $25 billion, like previous supplementals, does not specify funding a particular mission, it can be assumed that the full amount will be applied to Operation Iraqi Freedom given that the Iraq costs are running far higher than expected.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

A Failed “Transition”

111 National Priorities Project Database, Data on income and poverty. Available at: <http://database.nationalpriorities.org/>.
112 Errata.
118 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 “U.S. May Run Out of Guard and Reserve Troops for War on Terrorism,” Agence France Presse, September 15, 2004.
A Failed “Transition”

140 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 “Mr. Ashcroft’s Snooping,” St. Louis Post Dispatch editorial, November 26, 2003.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
A Failed “Transition”

160 Christopher Mumma and Josh P. Hamilton, UFPJ Goes to Court for Central Park, Bloomberg, August 24, 2004.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
175 Mike Dorninig, “We are Losing our People,” Chicago Tribune, September 14, 2004.
A Failed “Transition”

183 Campaign Against Depleted Uranium. Available at: <http://www.cadu.org.uk>.
186 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
A Failed "Transition"

210 Ibid.
214 Ibid.

230 Ibid.


235 Campaign Against Depleted Uranium. Available at: <http://www.cadu.org.uk>.


238 Ibid.


240 Ibid.


254 Ibid.
266 Andreas Zumach, UN/Geneva correspondent, die Tageszeitung (Berlin).
271 Ibid.
A Failed "Transition"


286 Dahr Jamail, “Pollution Chokes the Tigris, a Main Source of Baghdad’s Drinking Water,” The New Standard, June 6, 2004. Available at: <http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show_item&itemid=481>.


