THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE
SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007
THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION  
ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ  

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007

Public Law 110-28 directed the entity created by §1314 (e) (2) of that Act to make its report to the following committees of Congress:

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate  
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate  
Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives  
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate  
Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives  
Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

As you know, Public Law 110-28, enacted on May 25, 2007, commissioned an independent private entity made up of individuals with credentials and expertise in military and law enforcement matters to conduct an independent assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This report is to be submitted to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations/Affairs within 120 days of enactment. As members of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq we are pleased to submit, within the statutory timeline, our findings and recommendations in the attached report.

As required by the legislation, our report addresses the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, their ability to deny international terrorists safe haven, their ability to bring greater security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and their ability to bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation. In addition, the Commission was tasked with an assessment of ISF capabilities in the areas of training, equipment, command, control, intelligence, and logistics.

Finally, we were asked to consider whether, after several years of training, equipping, and mentoring by Coalition forces, continued support would contribute to the readiness of the ISF to defend its territorial integrity, prevent Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, increase security throughout the nation, and end sectarian violence.

The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq is made up of 20 Commissioners whose cumulative service exceeds 500 years of military and more than 150 years of law enforcement experience. In pursuit of the facts bearing on the legislative mandate contained in Public Law 110-28, the Commission spent three weeks on the ground in Iraq and conducted extensive briefings and research. We visited more than 70 sites and interviewed more than 150 individuals. The Commission put its collective “boots on the ground” and visited troops and experts
in the field. Additionally, the Commission conducted extensive meetings with senior military and civilian leaders from Iraq, the U.S. Mission, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, and Coalition forces. We have been given the highest quality of support by the Defense Department, the State Department, and our national military and civilian representatives in Iraq.

The Commission is confident in its report to Congress and wishes to express its appreciation for having been given the opportunity to make a contribution to this important issue at this critical time. Our report and its conclusions and findings represent the unanimous opinions of the Commissioners. Finally, our report is submitted as an unclassified document. There is no classified annex.

Sincerely,

James L. Jones, General USMC (Ret.)
Chairman
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq

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During our trips to Iraq, we were guests of the many outstanding people within the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I), the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I). We are deeply appreciative of General David Petraeus, USA; Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, USA; and Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, who made themselves and their large staffs available to us prior to, during, and after our trips to Iraq. In the midst of a war, they made possible the access, mobility, billeting, and education that allowed for our assessment. Many people within these organizations were immensely helpful to us as we traveled throughout Iraq. We are especially grateful to Major General Jay Paxton, USMC; Colonel John Martin, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Barry Johnson, USA; and Mr. Walter Redman. The members of the Kentucky National Guard B/1-149th Infantry Joint Visitor’s Bureau who traveled with us as our security detail were an extraordinary group of officers, NCOs, and soldiers of the utmost professionalism, and we extend to them our deepest gratitude and respect. We would also like to thank former MNSTC-I commander and current Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, USA, who has been extremely generous to the Commission with his time and support.

We are grateful to Drs. Jon Alterman, Anthony Cordesman, and Stephen Flanagan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies for their advice and assistance. The Commission also benefited greatly from the collective insights of its Strategic Advisors: Mr. P. T. Henry, Ms. Sarah Farnsworth, the Honorable James Locher, Mr. John Raidt, and Colonel Arthur White, USMC (Ret.). In addition, we thank Dr. Kim Roberts of SAIC for her valuable assistance.

Last but not least, the Commission wishes to thank its staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies—in particular Staff Director Ms. Christine Wormuth and staff members Mr. Samuel Brannen, Ms. Lauren Geetter, Mr. Jake Harrington, and Mr. Jeremy White. The staff helped establish the Commission quickly, traveled with the Commission to Iraq, and worked diligently to help us make this report a reality. The Commission also thanks Ms. Kaley Levitt for valuable research assistance, Alice Falk and Vinca LaFleur for their meticulous editing, and its talented interns, Mr. Nicholas Calluzzo and Midshipman Eric Gardiner, USN.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Statutory Mandate. The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq was chartered by the United States Congress in Public Law 110-28, signed into law by President George W. Bush on May 25, 2007, to assess the readiness of Iraq’s military and police forces to fulfill four major responsibilities: maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, deny safe haven to international terrorists, bring greater security to the country’s 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.

Further, the Commission was tasked to evaluate the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (military and police) in key functional areas, including training, equipping, command and control, intelligence, and logistics, and to consider the likelihood that continued U.S. support would contribute to the ISF’s readiness. Finally, the law directed the Commission to report its full findings to Congress.

At the request of Congress, the Commission is submitting its report in advance of its statutory deadline so that policymakers can consider its findings concurrently with other progress reports on Iraqi security that will soon be submitted to the executive and legislative branches.

Organization. To carry out this important assignment, the Commission, chaired by General James L. Jones, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, assembled a highly qualified team of 20 prominent senior retired military officers, chiefs of police, and a former deputy secretary of defense. This independent team, supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, brought to bear more than 600 cumulative years of military, defense, and law enforcement experience and expertise in the professional disciplines that it was chartered to examine.

To properly address the broad range of topics assigned by Congress, the Commission was organized into 10 syndicates. Each syndicate was led by a senior Commissioner and focused on either a discrete component of the ISF or a crosscutting functional area. Syndicate inputs were subject to review and integration by all Commission members (see Table 1).

Activities. During the course of its study members of the Commission traveled widely throughout Iraq on three separate occasions for a total of 20 days to gather facts and impressions firsthand. Commissioners conducted site visits to Iraqi military and ministerial headquarters and to various command centers, training facilities, and operating bases. They also visited Iraqi police stations, joint security stations, and law enforcement academies; and Commissioners traveled to border, port, and internal security installations, as well as to Coalition facilities designed to assist with Iraqi security training and transition (see Figures 1 and 2). The Commission met with more than 100 Iraqi officials, more than 100 U.S. current and former government officials, and more than a dozen leading nongovernmental experts on the Iraqi Security Forces.

Commissioners met with the Coalition and Iraqi authorities, both military and civilian, who oversee the manning, training, equipping, and operational effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and spoke to the personnel responsible for transitioning security functions from the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) to the Iraqi government. Commissioners spent time with trainers, transition
teams, operational units, and trainees, as well as Iraqi citizens. They consulted with current and former senior U.S. government officials. Finally, the Commission examined key official data and documents with information relevant to the performance and status of the ISF, their rate of progress, and their prospects for fulfilling the responsibilities of a professional and effective security force.

**ISF Defined.** The Iraqi Security Forces are composed of two major components: the Iraqi military (Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force), which MNF-I estimated in a June report to encompass more than 152,000 service members and which operates under the authority of the country’s Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi police (local Iraqi Police Service and National Police), along with the Department of Border Enforcement, which the command estimates to number 194,000 civilian security personnel administered by the Ministry of Interior.¹

This study examines both components. Each is integral to the country’s ability to protect its territorial integrity, deny safe haven to international terrorists, and bring security and stability to Iraq’s 18 provinces. Though not specifically tasked to assess Iraqi ministerial capacity, the Commission addresses this issue because ministries are integral to the development, readiness, and capability of the country’s security forces.

**Context.** The development of the Iraqi military and police into an effective total force capable of providing security and enforcing the rule of law has been a major focus of the Government of Iraq and the multinational Coalition.

The task of building the forces while they simultaneously engage in security operations, both in partnership with the Coalition and independently, presents the Government of Iraq with many difficulties and challenges. Senior Coalition military commanders characterize this process as “building an airplane while you’re flying”—and, in this case, while getting shot at. Similarly, the challenge to Iraq’s leaders of developing a loyal, professional, and cohesive military and police under battle conditions, while working to form a national government able to reconcile bitter historic tribal, ethnic, and religious differences, is a daunting one.

**Security Environment.** Iraq’s security environment is exceedingly diverse and complex. It is characterized by a multitude of threats arising from the struggle for power among sectarian rivals, radical Islamic terrorist groups (including al Qaeda), Sunni insurgents, Shi’a militia, and criminal elements. The various factions possess a diverse range of aims, agendas, and capabilities.

These combatants, and the level of violence and instability they incite, manifest themselves differently throughout the country. Security conditions vary significantly among the provinces and localities, and they are influenced heavily by an area’s geography and demographic composition, the intensity of sectarian tension, the quality of political leadership, and available resources.

In the north, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and other groups vie for control of land and natural resources, particularly in the areas of Kirkuk and Mosul. In the south, where Iranian interference is

acute, Shi’a groups fight one another for political and economic domination. In the west, Sunni insurgents continue to fight the Shi’a-dominated government and the Coalition for the purpose of restoring Sunni political power and prestige. Terrorist groups including al Qaeda are at war to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Iraq. In Baghdad, the political, cultural, and economic epicenter of Iraq, the security situation is characterized by ethno-sectarian struggle and rampant criminal activity. The situation is complicated by the violence incited by terrorists, militias, and religious extremists who seek to inflame sectarian tensions, destabilize the government, and influence public opinion, particularly in the United States.

Overall, the factional tension and violence within Iraq is fed by the slow and disappointing pace of national reconciliation; intensified by the inflow of foreign fighters, terrorists, and weapons; and promoted by neighboring countries, such as Iran and Syria. These two countries and certain non-state entities are generally acknowledged to be pursuing sectarian, political, and security objectives within Iraq and providing manpower, weapons, and support to proxy fighters and militia. Their activities substantially aid and contribute to factional discord, violence, and instability within Iraq.

Particularly in the west, and in key areas surrounding Baghdad, the security environment is being positively influenced by tribal elements who have turned against al Qaeda and are seeking to reduce violence. The most recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq stated: “There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation in rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks.”2 The body of the Commission’s report includes graphics provided by the Coalition depicting the trends in the security environment.

**ISF Overall Assessment.** The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.

While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months.

In the aggregate, the Commission’s assessment ascribes better progress to the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense and less to the Ministry of Interior, whose dysfunction has hampered the police forces’ ability to achieve the level of effectiveness vital to the security and stability of Iraq.

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The Iraqi police are improving at the local level predominantly where the ethnic makeup of the population is relatively homogenous and the police are recruited from the local area. Police forces are hampered by corruption and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior. In some areas, they have been vulnerable to infiltration, and they are often outmatched in leadership, training, tactics, equipment, and weapons by the terrorists, criminals, and the militias they must combat. The rate of improvement must be accelerated if the Iraqi police are to meet their essential security responsibilities.

**Ministry of Defense Assessment.** The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better-functioning agencies of the Iraqi government. It is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission of overseeing and resourcing the Iraqi armed forces. The ministry can plan and budget at a basic level, but budget execution requires significant improvement. It has established basic administrative systems, and operates an adequate training system. However, bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization hamper its capacity. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military.

**Army and Special Forces Assessment.** In general, the Iraqi Army and Special Forces are becoming more proficient in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; they are gaining size and strength, and will increasingly be capable of assuming greater responsibility for Iraq’s security. The Special Forces brigade is highly capable and extremely effective. It is trained in counterterrorism and it is assessed to be the best element of the new Iraqi military.

The Iraqi Army possesses an adequate supply of willing and able manpower, a steadily improving basic training capability, and equipment tailored to counterinsurgency operations. There is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state, with some exceptions remaining along ethnic lines. The Army is making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within its ranks and achieving some progress. The Army’s operational effectiveness is increasing; yet it will continue to rely on help in areas such as command and control, equipment, fire support, logistical support, intelligence, and transportation. Despite continued progress, the Iraqi military will not be ready to independently fulfill its security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved within that period of time.

The challenge for the Army is its limited operational effectiveness, caused primarily by deficiencies in leadership, lack of disciplinary standards, and logistics shortfalls. Some of these shortcomings are typical of unseasoned units and formations being supported by a newly formed government. Many of the problems can be attributed to marginal leadership at senior military and civilian positions both in the Ministry of Defense and in the operational commands. Identifying the next generation of Iraq’s leaders early and placing them in key positions will be one of the major contributors to advancing the effectiveness of the Iraqi military.

**Air Force Assessment.** The Iraqi Air Force’s relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force
size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate in this formative period.

**Navy Assessment.** The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense’s understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by its bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

**Ministry of Interior Assessment.** The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

**Iraqi Police Service Assessment.** The Iraqi Police Service is fragile. It is better trained than in past years and is establishing presence in some areas, but the force is underequipped and compromised by militia and insurgent infiltration. In general, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats they face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

**The National Police Assessment.** The National Police have proven operationally ineffective, and sectarianism in these units may fundamentally undermine their ability to provide security. The force is not viable in its current form.

**Border Security Assessment.** Iraq’s border security forces are generally ineffective and need more equipment, training, and infrastructure before they can play a significant role in securing Iraq’s borders. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor support from the Ministry of Interior. Overall border security is undermined by the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external infiltration of the border security forces are widespread, and the borders are porous.

**Overall Capacity Building.** To maintain progress in the development of the ISF over the next 12 to 18 months, the national government has to establish a competent and reliable administration to provide for the full range of support required to sustain the military and police. Doing so includes establishing functional procurement, storage, and asset management systems and providing the proper weapons, vehicles, spare parts, medical supplies, ammunition, communications assets, and other vital equipment.

Additionally, the ministries of Defense and Interior must focus on meeting the needs of their manpower in terms of benefits, career development, and support. The Iraqi government will also have to assume responsibility for ensuring that adequate services are provided to security forces,
especially when they are operational. Essential services include medical, transportation, maintenance, ordinance disposal, and supply. To overcome current shortfalls and deficiencies, the Iraqi government will need to rely heavily on Coalition support to develop the appropriate practices, procedures, and organizations to accomplish these tasks to an Iraqi standard that will enable the Iraqis to directly take the lead for independent security operations.

**Additional Observations.** The Commission’s work and the main body of this report have focused on the issues assigned by Congress. Nevertheless, the opportunity for Commissioners to immerse themselves in the dynamics of this complex engagement while in Iraq, coupled with the extraordinary access the Commission was afforded, has given rise to associated observations and findings. The Commission believes that sharing them is vital.

The Commission has done so in the concluding chapter so that Congress and the nation at large can take full advantage of the total lessons learned from its work. While the Commission was not assigned to comment on such subjects as Iraqi governance or general trends associated with our ongoing national efforts, this final chapter seeks to share observations and suggest answers to questions regarding the road ahead with respect to Iraqi security and to the larger issues that arise from this study, including the important question: “What does this all mean in terms of the future in Iraq?”

To conclude, the Commission recognizes the leadership, contributions, and sacrifice of the men and women of the United States armed forces and of our allies who have created the conditions for Iraq to emerge as a free and independent nation. The nation’s military and civilian professionals have without question approached a daunting task with the same level of dedicated service to our nation that continues to be the pride of the American people past and present.
CONCLUSIONS, KEY FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall Assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—Military and Police

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability to operate independently. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.

**Finding 1:** Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.

**Finding 2:** The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq’s provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.

**Finding 3:** The “clear, hold, build” strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.

**Finding 4:** The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.

The Ministry of Defense

**Conclusion:** The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.

**Finding 5:** Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.
Finding 6: The ability to contract efficiently is important to the MOD’s mission to sustain the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD currently lacks effective processes to execute contracting requirements.

Finding 7: The MOD consistently compensates the members of the Iraqi military, but it has difficulty accounting for personnel.

Finding 8: The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence organizations.

Finding 9: Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated chain of command, effectively communicating orders directly to field commanders. Such a practice bypasses national command lines, which should flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of Iraqi Armed Forces.

Finding 10: The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition.

The Iraqi Army and Special Forces

Conclusion: The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.

Finding 11: In addition to protecting the nation against external military threats, the Iraqi Army can and should also play a role in preventing unconventional threats migrating from points outside of Iraq. The Army currently does not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.

Recommendation: The Iraqi Army’s size and capability should be developed as part of an Iraqi national security strategy that defines the roles and missions of the ISF to address both internal security and border security needs. The Army as well as the nation’s police forces are currently emphasizing internal security; only ineffective border security forces are focused on controlling the borders. The Iraqi Army must contribute to both border and internal security. A national
commitment to expand the Army’s mission beyond counterinsurgency to include border security must be reflected in Army and MOD plans and policies.

Finding 12: The Iraqi Army has become more effective in supporting Coalition-led counterinsurgency operations from the start of Iraqi and Coalition surge operations in early 2007. The reliability of Iraqi Army units continues to improve, and some units now are an integral part of the Coalition team for counterinsurgency operations. The overall rate of progress of the Army is uneven. Some units perform better than others; but there is rising confidence that progress is being made at a rate that will enable Iraqi Army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations in the next 12 to 18 months. However, they will continue to rely on Coalition support, including logistics, intelligence, fire support, equipment, training, and leadership development for the foreseeable future.

Finding 13: Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable element of the Iraqi armed forces and are well-trained in both individual and collective skills. They are currently capable of leading counterterrorism operations, but they continue to require Coalition support. They remain dependent on the Coalition for many combat enablers, especially airlift, close air support, and targeting intelligence.

Finding 14: The Iraqi Army is short of seasoned leadership at all levels, and a lack of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers hampers its readiness, capability, and effectiveness.

Finding 15: A noncommissioned officer corps is not part of Iraq’s military tradition, but it will be invaluable to making the Army more combat-effective.

Recommendation: Developing leadership in the Iraqi Army will require continued support from Coalition advisors and units. Ongoing employment of a “train the trainers” approach, and continued emphasis on the development of a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, is essential, though developing leaders will take time to achieve.

Finding 16: The Iraqi Army is currently structured for counterinsurgency operations with a goal of manning 13 divisions by the end of 2008. The current divisions are experiencing absenteeism, both authorized and unauthorized. MOD has established a standard of 85 percent “present-for-duty” at all times. To achieve this, units will be manned at 120 percent of authorized strength, and the abundance of volunteers for service in the new Iraqi Army should make the attainment of this goal possible. This higher manning requirement will place additional strain on equipping and combat training programs.

Finding 17: The implementation of an Iraqi code of military discipline, professional development programs, and benefits for members of the armed forces is key to improving readiness. The Commission finds that inadequate implementation of these initiatives adversely affects personnel retention and leadership development. Developing future leaders must be an important objective of personnel programs.

Finding 18: The Iraqi Army is adequately equipped for counterinsurgency. However, equipping the Army with more armor, artillery, and mobility is tactically advantageous and communicates a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemy about the growing strength and capability of the Iraqi Army.

Finding 19: Logistics remains the Achilles’ heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.
Finding 20: The current shortfall in logistics is emblematic of the urgent need to solve a major issue in terms that the Iraqi government and military can adopt. U.S. strategies and solutions rely heavily on outsourcing of logistics, an approach that has met resistance from the Iraqi leaders. In many cases, the “Iraqi way,” though not always optimal, is sufficient. The solutions for the Iraqi armed forces must be developed with the goal of achieving an Iraqi standard that allows for Iraqi culture, traditions, and abilities.

**Recommendation:** To operate independently, the Iraqi Army must develop a functioning logistics and maintenance system. The Coalition should continue working with the MOD to develop a system that meets Iraqi needs.

The Iraqi Air Force

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Air Force’s relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate during this formative period.

Finding 21: The long-term capability of the Iraqi Air Force will depend on its success in recruiting quality personnel, and will require greater emphasis on basic and technical training.

**Recommendation:** Together with its Coalition partners, the Iraqi Air Force must increase the quality of its recruits and the capacity of current and planned training programs, while also increasing the manpower authorizations to compensate for chronic absenteeism. Emphasis on the value of training must be relentless.

Finding 22: Although aircraft procurement has been adequate to date, maintenance and sustainment systems lag well behind the procurement program and thus impede overall Iraqi Air Force capability.

**Recommendation:** Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq must redouble its efforts to inculcate the value of quality maintenance and support into the culture of the MOD in general, and of the Iraqi Air Force in particular.

Finding 23: Although the Iraqi Air Force has had a very late start compared to the Iraqi Army, the present design of the Iraqi Air Force is appropriate for its current mission and it is making significant progress.

**Recommendation:** Given its good progress to date, the new Iraqi Air Force should stay its present course of developing a counterinsurgency air force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, reliance on Coalition support can diminish.
The Iraqi Navy

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense’s understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

**Finding 24:** The low profile of the Iraqi Navy within the MOD, as well as the ministry’s inadequate budget allocation and execution, significantly impede Iraqi naval operations and development.

**Recommendation:** Coalition advisors must assist the Iraqi Navy leadership in advocating budget priorities within the MOD. The strategic importance of the Iraqi Navy must be better articulated to the Government of Iraq, in terms both of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and of providing the security needed to ensure the efficient flow of exports. Larger issues of poor ministerial capacity and poor budget execution must also be addressed with Coalition support, as detailed more extensively in the discussion on MOD capacity (Chapter 4).

**Finding 25:** The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is small, complicated, and of vital strategic importance. Relations among the nations bordering the area of responsibility and their respective navies and coast guards are fragile at best. Furthermore, the international maritime borders with Iran and Kuwait are contested and not clearly demarcated. These issues warrant greater attention from both the MOD and the Coalition.

**Recommendation:** Absent clearly defined territorial seas, the Iraqi Navy’s battle space will be further complicated. Although the Commission realizes that resolving this issue is made more difficult by long-standing animosities between these nations and may not be feasible in the near term, it is important that the profile of this issue be raised within the Government of Iraq and the country team.

**Finding 26:** The Iraqi Navy does not have a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi Coast Guard, though the two services operate in close proximity and have complementary missions. This lack of coordination has the potential to create vulnerable seams in a critical strategic environment.

**Recommendation:** The Coalition should work with the MOD, Iraqi Navy, and Coast Guard to examine the feasibility and potential advantages of merging the Navy and Coast Guard into a single service with responsibility for coastal maritime security. If unity of command cannot be attained by combining both forces under the MOD, then better cooperation and coordination has to be developed to prevent a serious gap in security.

**Finding 27:** The new Iraqi Navy has made significant progress over a very short time period, particularly in planning, but it remains heavily reliant on the Coalition for training, logistics, and maintenance support.

**Recommendation:** An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.
The Ministry of Interior

Conclusion: The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.

Finding 28: Sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MOI and cripple the ministry’s ability to accomplish its mission to provide internal security for Iraqi citizens.

Finding 29: The MOI lacks sufficient administrative and logistics capability to support the civil security forces it controls.

Recommendation: The MOI, with the support of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, must reform its organizational structure, develop a five-year strategic plan, and build sufficient administrative capacity to sustain Iraq’s civil security forces in the field in a manner that is free of real or perceived sectarian favoritism.

Finding 30: The MOI cannot execute its budget, a failure that undermines the effectiveness of the civil security forces in the field.

Finding 31: The Ministry of Interior and provincial authorities share responsibility for management and payment of the Iraqi Police Service. Serious deficiencies in these efforts have led to pay and morale problems and have heightened tensions between the central government and the provinces.

Recommendation: The MOI Transition Team should continue to work with MOI officials to establish workable mechanisms to better manage and resolve pay problems affecting police forces. This should be done in coordination with provincial authorities.

Finding 32: The MOI has little control of the forces that make up the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The allegiance of many Facilities Protection Service personnel has been to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather than to the central government, and such division of loyalties undermines their ability to provide security.

Recommendation: The Coalition should support consolidation of the Facilities Protection Service by encouraging the establishment of national implementing orders. As consolidation proceeds, the Coalition should assist the MOI to ensure that the Facilities Protection Service personnel can be properly vetted, trained, and equipped.
Iraqi Police Service

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.

**Finding 33:** The emphasis on local recruiting and assignment in the Iraqi Police Service is showing promise in establishing security at the local level; strong personnel vetting processes will remain vital.

**Recommendation:** The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that established vetting procedures are used consistently throughout the country to combat militia, criminal, and terrorist infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service.

**Finding 34:** Police training in Iraq is improving, particularly in areas where training is led by Iraqi instructors partnered with civilian police advisors.

**Recommendation:** The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue transitioning the lead for training to the Iraqis wherever possible and should consider instituting a “train the trainers” program throughout the provinces to facilitate this process.

**Finding 35:** U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.

**Recommendation:** Leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.

**Finding 36:** The number of civilian international police advisors is insufficient to the task of training the Iraqi Police Service.

**Recommendation:** The Coalition—not just the United States—should fund and recruit the requisite number of international police advisors.

**Finding 37:** Training programs to date have emphasized quantity of police trained over quality of training, thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of the force in favor of force generation efforts.

**Recommendation:** Particularly in light of a significantly high number of personnel in the Iraqi Police Service who have not yet undergone Coalition training, the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should seek higher-quality police recruits and vet them more carefully as they continue to address the training backlog.
Finding 38: The Iraqi Police Service lacks a formal police leadership academy, a deficiency that impedes leadership development.

Recommendation: The Iraqi Police Service should work with its Coalition advisors to establish a formal Iraqi Police Academy that is focused on developing civil policing skills in senior officers and includes a separate first-line supervisor training program.

Finding 39: The Iraqi Police Service is underequipped to combat the threats it faces and suffers persistent shortfalls in vital equipment.

Recommendation: Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the Iraqi government to provide adequately armored vehicles and heavier weaponry to the Iraqi Police Service, particularly to police stations in urban areas or other areas where improvised explosive device (IED) and explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks are prevalent.

Finding 40: Quality intelligence is central to the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to take the lead for security, but intelligence supporting police operations is limited and information sharing with other security agencies is weak.

Recommendation: All Iraqi security agencies and the Iraqi Police Service must work together to establish information-sharing systems, practices, and protocols that meet their requirements. The MOI should work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information from the national level down.

Finding 41: The Iraqi Police Service has extremely weak investigative and forensic capabilities that greatly limit its effectiveness.

Recommendation: As the Iraqi Police Service continue to develop, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the MOI to increase the investigative and forensic capabilities of the police service by expanding the Major Crimes Task Force, increasing the number of crime lab facilities in major cities, increasing training courses for criminal investigators, and establishing an investigator rank within the police service.

Finding 42: The Iraqi Police Service is but one element of a broader justice system that is not yet well established in Iraq.

Recommendation: The Government of Iraq, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, should collaborate to create and implement a framework to enable the rule of law in Iraq. The Coalition should continue to strongly support these efforts.

Finding 43: The police are central to the long-term establishment of security and stability in Iraq. Today, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence.

Recommendation: The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to develop a detailed strategic plan to transition primary responsibility for internal security in Iraq from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service.
The National Police

**Conclusion:** The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.

**Finding 44:** In its current form, the National Police is not a viable organization. Its ability to be effective is crippled by significant challenges, including public distrust, sectarianism (both real and perceived), and a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically, whether it is a military or a police force.

**Recommendation:** The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized under the MOI. It should become a much smaller organization under a different name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, special threat action, and other similar functions.

The Department of Border Enforcement

**Conclusion:** Iraq’s borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq’s borders will remain porous and poorly defended.

**Finding 45:** The overall capacity of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate is undermined by weak MOI capacity. Further, border security commanders have little confidence that the MOI will address their needs and concerns.

**Finding 46:** The divided responsibility for land, sea, and air ports of entry between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation, together with the lack of unity of effort between these ministries, undermines the effectiveness of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.

**Recommendation:** The Government of Iraq should establish clear guidelines to facilitate unity of effort between the MOI and MOT for border security and move quickly to consolidate overall responsibility for border security under the MOI.

**Finding 47:** The MOI has not created standardized concepts of operations, operating procedures, or processes for the Ports of Entry Directorate to apply at Iraq’s land ports of entry; each appears to be run according to the initiative—or lack thereof—of the local commander.

**Finding 48:** Many land ports of entry have neither the quantity nor the quality of monitoring and detection systems required for border security operations to function effectively.
**Recommendation:** The Coalition should continue to emphasize to the MOI that the territorial integrity of the country relies heavily on the Department of Border Enforcement’s ability to secure the borders and that funding for detection and monitoring equipment for those forces should be accorded a very high priority to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of ports of entry security forces.

**Finding 49:** The Department of Border Enforcement lacks sufficient logistics, support systems, and infrastructure to sustain many of its forces in the field.

**Recommendation:** Coalition forces should strongly encourage the Department of Border Enforcement to implement its national Headquarters Distribution Plan while continuing to provide logistical and maintenance support in the near term so that Department of Border Enforcement and ports of entry personnel can accomplish their mission.

**Finding 50:** Corruption is a serious problem at many land ports of entry. This fact has not yet been adequately addressed.

**Recommendation:** Eliminating corruption will most likely be a generational undertaking in Iraq, but Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, and civilian agencies should work together to try to increase Border Transition Team oversight of Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate facilities, as well as to develop a standardized training program emphasizing leadership and professional ethics.
Table 1. ISF Independent Assessment Commission Organization

**General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman**

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<tr>
<th>Ministry of Defense Syndicates</th>
<th>Ministry of Interior Syndicates</th>
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<td><strong>Iraqi Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Police Service</strong></td>
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<td>General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.), Syndicate Chair</td>
<td>Chief Charles Ramsey, Syndicate Chair</td>
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<td>General John Abrams, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>The Honorable Terrance Gainer</td>
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<td>General Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)</td>
<td>Colonel Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.)</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland</td>
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<td>Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>Chief John Timoney</td>
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<td>Sergeant Major Alford McMichael, USMC (Ret.)</td>
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<td><strong>Iraqi Special Forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other Ministry of Interior Functions</strong></td>
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<td>Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.), Syndicate Chair*</td>
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<td><strong>Iraqi Air Force</strong></td>
<td>Admiral Gregory Johnson, USN (Ret.)*</td>
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<td>General Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.)*</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Gary McKissock, USMC (Ret.)</td>
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<td><strong>Intelligence/Command and Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General James King, USA (Ret.)</td>
<td>Major General Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.)</td>
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* Denotes dual Commission role
Figure 1: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Iraq)

1. Taif Afar
   3rd Iraqi Army Division HQ

2. Mosul
   Multi-National Division-North HQ
   2nd Iraqi Army Division HQ

3. Kirkuk
   Kirkuk Air Base (Iraqi Air Force)

4. Sulaymaniyah
   Joint Iraqi Police Academy
   Provincial Directorate of Police HQ

5. Habbaniyah
   Habbaniyah Iraqi Police Academy
   Regional Training Center - Habbaniyah
   Multi-National Forces - West (MNF-W) HQ
   MNF-W ISF Training Facilities
   Iraqi National Maintenance Site
   1st Iraqi Motor Transport Regiment

6. Zurbatiyah
   Point of Entry Border Station

7. Taji
   Camp Taji
   Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence
   Iraqi Counterinsurgency Academy
   Iraqi Military Intelligence Academy
   Iraqi Signal School
   Regional Support Unit - Taji
   Iraqi Army Services Support Training Institute
   Taji National Depot
   Regional Training Center - Taji
   1st Brigade Combat Team
   1st Cavalry Division
   Iraqi Army NCO Academy
   CMATT Command
   Taji Air Force Base
   Saba’ Al Bur
   Joint Security Station-West

8. Arab Jabour
   Patrol Base Whiskey One

9. Numaniyah
   Numaniyah Iraqi National Police Academy

10. Basra
    Multi-National Division-Southeast
    10th Iraqi Army Division
    U.S. Regional Embassy Office
    Department of Border Enforcement - J-7
    Iraqi Chief of Police

11. Umm Qasr
    Umm Qasr Naval Base

12. Offshore Oil Terminals
    al-Basa Oil Terminal
    Khor al Amaya Oil Terminal

13. Tallil
    8th Iraqi Army Division
    Provincial Reconstruction Teams
    1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division
    Iraqi Army Commanders for Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces

14. Trebil
    Point of Entry Border Station

15. Al Walid
    Point of Entry Border Station
Figure 2: ISF Independent Assessment Commission Site Visits (Baghdad)

1. International Zone
   - Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
   - Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih
   - Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq HQ
   - Tactical Training Command
   - NATO Training Mission
   - Iraqi National Defense University
   - Iraqi National Command Center
   - Baghdad Operations Center
   - Iraqi Office of the Commander-in-Chief
   - Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement

2. U.S. Embassy Annex

3. Iraqi Ministry of Defense

4. Iraqi Ministry of Interior

5. Baghdad Police College
   - Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police HQ
   - Provincial Directorate of Police
   - Karkh Directorate Police Headquarters

6. Haifa Street Joint Security Station

7. Iraqi National Police Headquarters

8. Rustimiyah
   - Iraqi Military Academy - Rustimiyah
   - Iraqi Joint Staff College

9. Al Mada’in JSS (Al Karradah District)

10. Baghdad International Airport
    - Camp Dublin
        - National Police Emergency Response Unit
        - Iraqi Center for Dignitary Protection Training
    - Al Muthanna Air Base
        - Iraqi Air Force
        - Iraqi Counter Terrorism Command

11. Camp Victory
    - Multi-National Corps - Iraq HQ
    - Multi-National Force - Iraq
    - Iraqi Assistance Group
    - Iraqi Ground Forces Command
    - 6th Iraqi Army Division
    - Command Operations Post Cleary
    - Multi-National Division-Center HQ

12. Command Outpost Attack (West Rashid)
CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN IRAQ

To put the Commission’s assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces in an appropriate context, it is important to understand the internal and external threats facing Iraq and its people, as well as the requirements that those threats impose on the Iraqi Security Forces. The societal forces defining the security environment in Iraq today are enormously diverse, complex, and violent, and they directly affect the stability of the broader Middle East. The conflicts in Iraq today flow from differences over religion, from historical divides, and from disputes in Iraqi society that were unleashed following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They also reflect the broader power dynamics of the region. The Iraqi Security Forces are attempting to develop and operate in the midst of an extraordinarily complex environment—an environment that significantly challenges far more mature international security forces as well.

Iraq’s modern history is the story of different groups and tribes merged into a single nation-state by European powers. After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, the Franco-British plan to unite Mesopotamia was executed through the imposition of rulers and drawing of maps in European capitals—without the censuses of or consultation with the local interested parties. In carving modern Iraq out of the former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, a largely Kurdish north was combined with a largely Sunni Arab center and a largely Shi’a south (See Figure 3). This consolidation papered over existing problems and created new ones.

![Figure 3: Religious / Ethnic Areas in Iraq (as of April 07)](image)

Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Kurds in Iraq number more than 4 million, representing perhaps 20 percent of the total Iraqi population. Significant Kurdish communities in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Iran, and Syria bring the total Kurdish population of the area to more than 25 million. Surrounding states conceive the possibility of Kurdish secession in Iraq as an inspiration to their own Kurdish minority populations, and thus as a threat to their own territorial integrity. The Sunnis also represent another 20 percent of the Iraqi population. Iraq’s Sunnis traditionally have lived in the center of the country, an area without substantial oil or other economic resources. With support from the Ottomans, the British, and the Ba’athists, Sunnis ruled Mesopotamia for more than 400 years—until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Shi’a make up about 60 percent of Iraq’s population, living principally in the south, the area that possesses most of Iraq’s known oil reserves and has access to the Persian Gulf. Many Iraqi Shi’a feel that after years of oppression, the time has come for them to assume a leading role in Iraq, and they profess pride in being the first inhabitants of an Arab state in centuries to be Shi’a led.

Iraq is bordered by Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Syria and Iran have long played a significant role in Iraq’s affairs. Iran, a large Shi’a state governed by an avowedly revolutionary theocracy, is largely Persian, not Arab. In 1980, after a series of border disputes and growing tension between Saddam’s Sunni regime and the Shi’a ruling government in Iran, Iraq invaded Iran, and the two countries battled for eight years and lost more than one million lives between them. So great and widespread was the sacrifice that in many ways, the Iran-Iraq War is as much a defining element of Iran’s political culture as the Islamic Revolution itself. Today, Iran’s cultural and political influence is expanding significantly in Iraq, as pan-Shi’a networks help consolidate Iraqi Shi’a power. Iranians are agreed among their leadership that Iraq should never be allowed to emerge as a powerful and hostile rival. Consolidating Shi’a control with Iranian influence over the central government is one way to achieve their goals. High among Iran’s goals is to undermine U.S. influence in Iraq, since a successful, secure, and pro-U.S. Iraqi government will thwart their regional ambitions.

Syria severed relations with Iraq in 1982 after siding with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the two countries renewed formal diplomatic relations in 2006. Today some 1.5 million Iraqis fleeing their country have crossed the border into Syria, and the growing refugee population is becoming a difficult issue in their bilateral relationship. Syria shelters former Ba’ath Party officials, and many of the foreign Sunni insurgents in Iraq are believed to enter through Syria. Like the Iranian government, the Syrian government believes that a U.S. success in Iraq is adverse to its own interests. But whereas much of the Iranian support appears to go to Shi’a groups and militias, it is Sunni insurgent groups who draw their support from Syria.

Other Arab governments have their own reasons for protecting the interests of Iraq’s Sunnis. Though they may stop short of direct support to Sunni insurgents, they are not as aggressive as they might be in cutting off such aid from private sources. Sunni tribal leaders certainly enjoy overseas support, and some of that money goes toward protecting Sunnis—protection that has sometimes manifested itself as attacks on Shi’a.

Overall, each of Iraq’s neighbors is concerned about developments in that country, and each has invested in some way—often through armed proxies—to protect itself from those developments. The resultant downward spiral in security has meant that each of these countries feels threatened by
the situation in Iraq, but the perils these surrounding countries face are in no way as great as the dangers currently confronting Iraqis themselves.

Against that history and set of regional dynamics, the most significant threats currently facing Iraq are generally agreed to be al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Sunni insurgent groups, Shi‘a militias, and the largely negative involvement of neighboring countries in Iraq’s internal affairs—especially Iranian support of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Badr Brigade.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Al Qaeda in Iraq was credited with only 15 percent of the insurgent attacks in Iraq at the beginning of 2007, but its attacks were typically the most destructive, sensational, and destabilizing.3 According to the Department of Defense, al Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for approximately 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq and the kidnapping of more than 250 foreign workers. Abu

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Hamza al-Muhajir—an Egyptian—has been al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader since the death of the organization’s founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in a Coalition air strike on June 7, 2006. Although al Qaeda in Iraq’s leadership is foreign—a reality that members have tried to hide through information operations—its makeup is likely 90–95 percent Iraqi. Even so, 80 percent of al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bombings are carried out by foreigners. The relationship between al Qaeda in Iraq and the greater al Qaeda leadership in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region remains unclear, but the groups share common goals and openly support one another through the media and sworn loyalty oaths.

Al Qaeda in Iraq has consistently sought to destabilize Iraq and instigate sectarian violence in an effort to oust U.S. forces from the country. Its 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was a turning point that led many in the international community to reconsider support for Coalition operations in Iraq. Similarly, al Qaeda in Iraq’s February 22, 2006, bombing of the Shi’a Askariya Mosque in Samarra was an early accelerant of sectarian violence in Iraq, catalyzing retaliatory attacks against 60 Sunni mosques and the killing of more than 400 Sunnis by Shi’a militias in the bombing’s immediate aftermath.

There are indicators in some parts of Iraq that popular support for, and even tolerance of, al Qaeda in Iraq’s presence may be weakening significantly, in large part because the local population and its leaders resent al Qaeda in Iraq’s coercion and brutality. In Anbar province, which makes up one-third of Iraq’s landmass, Sunni tribal leaders have formed alliances with Coalition and Iraqi forces during the past six months to hunt members of al Qaeda in Iraq operating in the west (For key al Qaeda in Iraq members captured or killed, see Figure 4). Strong Coalition involvement with the local sheikhs has significantly transformed the security environment in that region—once the principal stronghold of Sunni extremist activity manifested in part through al Qaeda in Iraq operations. The ongoing ISF and Coalition presence in Anbar province encourages the population to cooperate with Coalition forces and has markedly spurred police recruiting efforts. Though these new Sunni allies have yet to earn the complete trust of the Government of Iraq—and vice versa—they have dramatically improved the security situation in Anbar province (see Figure 5), providing Coalition forces with valuable intelligence leading to the captures of top al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. There are positive indications that popular support for al Qaeda in Iraq is decreasing dramatically in other provinces as well.

**The Sunni Insurgents**

Hard-line Arab Sunni Ba’athists began the insurgency in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime. They were originally backed by small groups of foreign fighters—mostly secular Arab nationalists—who had crossed into Iraq before the beginning of the war to support the Ba’athist cause. Today Sunni insurgents target Coalition forces, Iraqi forces, and government personnel

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6 Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sunni Insurgents,” p. 3.

7 Cordesman, “Iraq’s Sunni Insurgents,” p. 32.

Figure 5: Anbar Attacks

Density plots are of incidents where attacks occurred

Source: MNF-I: As of 10 Aug / Please Note: * Aug is projection

or those seen as cooperating with them, as well as Shi’a Iraqis and militia members. Their goal is to restore Sunni rule in Iraq. The main Sunni insurgent groups currently operating in the country are the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance, and the Mujahideen Army in Iraq. These groups are believed to be responsible for roughly 70 percent of attacks. Most Sunni insurgent groups are made up of former soldiers and Sunni Arab civilians led by former Iraqi military officers. They have been concentrated in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province, as well as several majority Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, including Amiriya, Adhamiya, Fadhil, Jihad, Amal, and Doura. The recent U.S. and Iraqi troop surge has focused on these violent areas, forcing many insurgents to retreat from their traditional home bases into outlying provinces such as Diyala, which has seen a major spike in insurgent activity since the beginning of the surge. These groups are also increasingly active in the northern, majority-Kurdish provinces and around the multi-ethnic and contested cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.

12 Ibid., p. 37.
Shi’a Militias

There are approximately 80,000 Shi’a militia members in Iraq. Their roots go back to the underground resistance to the Ba’athist regime, but the militias rapidly grew in strength after the Coalition invasion, in part to fill the security vacuum left by the sudden collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and also to ensure that the Ba’athists would not rise again. Shi’a individuals in government and other positions of authority throughout Iraq remain deeply insecure about their place in the new Iraq, despite their majority rule of the country.13

Approximately 60,000 of these militia members belong to Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), 15,000 to the Badr Brigades, and 5,000 to smaller organizations.14 Jaysh al-Mahdi is loyal to the young anti-Western cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The group controls most of Sadr City, a Baghdad slum containing more than 2.5 million Iraqis, and is also increasingly active in southern Iraq. While remaining a fierce critic of the U.S.-led occupation, Muqtada al-Sadr has repeatedly called for Jaysh al-Mahdi to avoid direct confrontation with Coalition and Iraqi forces during the current surge. At the same time, there are increasing signs that Sadr is unable to exercise control over all factions within Jaysh al-Mahdi, and that Iran’s influence over the militant arm of this organization is growing.

The Badr Brigade15 is the Iranian-trained military wing of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, formerly SCIRI), which is currently the largest Shi’a political party. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controls the most seats in Iraq’s parliament and governing coalition.16 The Badr Organization is led by a member of the Iraqi parliament, Hadi al-Amiri, and also operates primarily in southern Iraq.

The Badr Brigade and Jaysh al-Mahdi are both believed to have infiltrated many of Iraq’s ministries and security forces. Various units within the National Police have likely been penetrated by the Badr faction, while Jaysh al-Mahdi is believed to exercise significant influence over Iraq’s Facilities Protection Service, which employs more than 140,000 armed personnel.17 Militia members who join the ISF often remain loyal to their local militia, and may take part in sectarian “extracurricular” activities. The Iraqi government is making efforts to counter the negative influence of these groups. For example, in October 2006, Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani fired 3,000 ministry employees, and seven of nine National Police brigade commanders have been removed in the past six months because of sectarian behavior.18

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14 Ibid., p. 31.
15 The Badr Brigade is also called the “Badr Organization” by some experts, as the militia claims to have de-militarized.
18 Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, p. 32.
Iranian Influence in Iraq

Iraq’s borders with Iran are long, porous, and subject to wide-scale corruption at points of entry. While the exact nature, depth, and breadth of Iranian involvement in Iraq is not fully known, there is general consensus that Iran is a rapidly increasing threat to Iraq’s stability (see Figure 6).

American intelligence and military officials have stated publicly that there is clear evidence of Iran’s providing funding, weapons, ammunition, training, and other forms of support to militia in Iraq, particularly in the southeastern region of the country. For example, U.S. officials have repeatedly asserted that members of the Al Qods Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard have been arming Iraqi Shi’a militias with weapons and explosively forced projectiles (EFPs), which defeat up-armored vehicles.¹⁹ Multi-National Corps–Iraq has stated that EFPs were used to carry out 99 attacks in July 2007, accounting for fully one-third of Coalition combat deaths. EFPs accounted for 18 percent of combat deaths of Americans and allied troops in Iraq in the last quarter of 2006.²⁰

In December 2006 and January 2007, U.S. forces detained seven Iranians suspected of being dispatched agents of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard; five remain in U.S. custody.²¹ Muqtada al-Sadr’s close connections with certain Iranian factions make Jaysh al-Mahdi the most likely recipient of the aid flowing from Iran, but Iran’s assistance may not be limited to Shi’a militia groups. In April 2007, Coalition officials announced that they had also uncovered evidence of Iran’s aiding some Sunni insurgent groups in an apparent attempt to undermine overall Coalition policy in Iraq.²²

Iranian influence has also contributed to increased Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence in the south, as factions vie for power and control of the region’s natural resources and infrastructure. Many leading Shi’a politicians currently in power in Iraq spent decades in exile in Tehran and formed links that are certain to continue to affect the direction of Iraq’s internal politics.

The Role of Iraq’s Other Neighbors

Among Iraq’s neighbors, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey have played the most productive roles in assisting the Government of Iraq. Jordan has hosted ISF training, while Kuwait is an invaluable logistics hub for ISF and Coalition supplies. Jordan has accepted some 750,000 Iraqi refugees, but it recently closed its borders as it no longer feels it can manage the unending flow of refugees.

Although their numbers are relatively small, foreign fighters of different nationalities flow into Iraq mainly through networks in Syria (see Figure 6)—a problem that the Syrian government has not taken effective measures to stop.²³ Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia have also become

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²¹ Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, p. 32.

²² Ibid., p. 34.

increasingly strained, as more than 50 percent of all foreign fighters—and especially would-be suicide bombers—appear to be coming from Saudi Arabia.²⁴

**Means and Methods of Violence**

Thanks to the legacy of the Ba’athist regime, insurgents and militias in Iraq are extremely well-armed. During his rule, Saddam Hussein purchased an enormous arsenal of conventional weapons, including huge stockpiles of artillery, tanks, mines, mortars, explosives, and ammunition of all types.²⁵ As Coalition forces advanced into Iraq in spring 2003, Ba’athist security forces melted away, leaving large, unguarded depots and armories that were quickly looted. Insurgents and militia members may also be buying on a black market weapons originally intended for the Iraqi Security Forces.²⁶

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²⁵ Although a large portion of Iraq’s arsenal was destroyed in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there still remained packed depots throughout Iraq.

The war in Iraq features the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on a sweeping scale. Throughout the conflict, IEDs have been responsible for the majority of casualties. Their main components are explosive material, an ignition device, and a trigger. Explosive materials are abundant, and ignitions and triggers can be made from almost any small electronic device or collection of spare parts. Derivatives of the common “package-size” IEDs are vehicle-borne (VBIEDs), suicide vests, or even entire blocks of houses wired together (house-borne or HBIEDs).

VBIEDs have been the most effective weapon of insurgents in Iraq. VBIED attacks include the truck bomb that hit the United Nations headquarters on August 19, 2003, and killed Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Most IEDs are planted with a wire or pressure trigger or are remotely activated. This method is a force multiplier for the enemy, and it allows placement by unskilled foot soldiers while bomb makers and leaders remain undetected and out of danger. The tactical impact of IEDs is very similar to that of antipersonnel or antivehicle land mines; however, because of Iraq’s urban terrain and the ease of IED construction, IEDs are more difficult to detect.

Levels of Violence and Their Impact on Iraqi Society

Violence remains a fact of life in Iraq. Those insurgents who perpetrate this violence are elusive, operate covertly, and seek to avoid direct engagement with Coalition and Iraqi forces. While violence has recently declined sharply in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province—the former stronghold of the insurgency—attacks have risen in Diyaia, Balad, Basra, and Amarah. Violence remains endemic in Baghdad, despite measurable gains made since the implementation of Fardh al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan) in February 2007 by Coalition and Iraqi forces.

Since the beginning of Fardh al-Qanoon, the average number of sectarian killings in Baghdad has decreased. The average number of daily attacks has similarly fallen 27 (see Figure 7). While these numbers may simply reflect the decision of many of the Shi’ite militias to maintain a low profile during the Coalition-led surge, there are signs of improvements in the security situation in Baghdad.

Iraq’s violent environment has placed its population under extreme duress. Iraq’s population at the time of the 2003 invasion was about 26.5 million. Currently, more than 40,000 Iraqis leave Iraq each month. There are at least 2 million Iraqi refugees throughout the Middle East, whose presence places increasing pressure on Iraq’s neighbors, and an additional 2.2 million displaced persons within Iraq. 28 Seventy percent of Iraqi residents lack adequate water supplies, compared with 50 percent in 2003. 29 Twenty-eight percent of children are malnourished, compared to 19 percent before the 2003 invasion. Ninety-two percent of Iraqi children suffer learning problems due to the stress of the war. Sadly, international funding for humanitarian assistance in Iraq has plummeted, from $453 million in 2005 to $95 million in 2006. 30

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30 Oxfam, “Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq.”
Figure 7: Ethno-Sectarian Violence: Baghdad Security Districts

Density plots are of incidents where deaths occurred

Source: MNF-I

Iraqi society is being convulsed by sectarianism that if not swiftly and significantly curtailed could contribute to a rapid deterioration of Iraq, with “grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences.”\(^{31}\) Iraq’s overall security environment is very complex. Elements of terror, ethnic violence, insurgency, meddling by external actors, and criminal activity all combine to define, in varying degrees, the nature of the threats. The Commission assesses that despite all that remain to be done, the single most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq’s direction and security is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence and hatred. Sustained progress within the Iraqi Security Forces depends on such a political agreement.

CHAPTER 2: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

This report assesses each element of the Iraqi Security Forces in terms of its military readiness to contribute to the security of Iraq. Though many of the challenges facing the ISF are common across the military and police forces, each force has unique characteristics, potential strengths, and evident weaknesses. This chapter provides the Commission’s perspective on the overall ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to conduct four critical missions: maintaining the territorial sovereignty of Iraq, denying safe haven to terrorists, providing greater security in the provinces, and ending sectarianism to promote national reconciliation.

Although the ISF have made significant progress in many areas, the Commission finds that they are not yet able to execute these missions independently. Without continued combat support, combat service support, and assistance from Coalition Military Transition Teams, it is unlikely that the ISF will achieve, in the near term, the proficiency and readiness needed to provide security for Iraq.

Figure 8: Glide Path: Iraqi Security Forces

* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% owing to Operation Fardh al-Qanoon lessons learned (FMS funded).

Source: MNF-I
Overview of Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces are composed of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces. The Iraqi Army and Special Forces, Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy report to the Ministry of Defense. Under the Ministry of Interior are the National Police, the Iraqi Police Service, the Department of Border Enforcement, the Facilities Protection Service, and the Coast Guard (for current and projected ISF end strengths, see Figure 8).

In 2004, the Coalition established the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq to focus exclusively on helping to establish and develop the Iraqi Security Forces so that the Government of Iraq would be able to provide for its own security. The command is responsible for working with the Government of Iraq to generate and train Iraqi Security Forces, and to develop administrative capacity within the ministries of Defense and Interior to support the ISF. The Multi-National Corps–Iraq (the tactical unit responsible for command and control in Iraq) has joined in helping to develop the ISF, with an emphasis on providing Military Transition Teams and Police Transition Teams that partner with Iraqi military units at the division, brigade, and battalion levels and with police forces at the provincial, district, and police station levels.

Since 2003, United States has spent $19.2 billion on the development of the ISF. Iraq has spent approximately $16.6 billion for the same purpose, but in 2007 its expenditures for the first time exceeded those of the United States. In 2008, the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq anticipates that Iraq will spend about $11.6 billion on the ISF, and has recommended that the United States contribute $5.5 billion.

Although this chapter examines each of the four missions in turn, it is clear that the missions themselves are interrelated: many of the capabilities needed to accomplish one specific mission are needed to accomplish the others as well. In order to deny terrorists safe haven in Iraq, the ISF must ultimately be able to secure Iraq’s borders, an objective that is central to maintaining Iraq’s territorial security. Denying terrorists a safe haven will contribute to bringing security to the provinces. In a similar vein, to accomplish any of these four missions, the ISF and the ministries that organize, train, and equip them must have functioning administrative and budgeting systems; logistics and supply chain management systems; and combat support such as aviation support, intelligence, and communications.

Maintain Territorial Integrity

To maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity, the Iraqi Security Forces need to be able to protect the country from external threats, secure the nation’s borders and maritime approaches, and control its air space. To fulfill these missions, the Iraqi Security Forces must be able to recruit, train, equip, and retain sufficient officers and soldiers who are loyal to the nation. They also must be able to project and sustain forces around the country, collect and act on military intelligence, command and control forces effectively, and conduct military operations successfully.

Today, the ISF is not able to secure Iraq’s borders. The Iraqi Navy and Air Force do not control Iraq’s maritime approaches or airspace, and the Ministry of Defense does not have the systems in place to project and sustain its military forces independently.

Iraq has 2,268 miles of land border—compared to 1,951 miles of the U.S.-Mexican border—as well as 36 miles of coastline. The nation’s borders are porous, and at least two of Iraq’s neighbors are actively contributing to instability within the country. Arms, munitions, and foreign fighters regularly come across the Iranian and Syrian borders. Not only is Iran providing matériel to militia groups but there are also distinct signs of Iranian influence at the political level in Iraq. Saudi Arabia has not taken effective steps to stem the flow of Saudi foreign fighters and suicide bombers into the country. However, discussions with Coalition commanders and intelligence officials in Iraq made it clear to the Commission that Iran’s activities raise the greatest concern for future stability, and are making it more difficult for the Coalition to achieve its goals in Iraq.

The Iraqi armed forces are not yet a major factor in Iraq’s border security effort. Iraq’s 37,000 Department of Border Enforcement personnel are just over one-third the numbers that monitored Iraq’s border during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Border forts and land crossings lack equipment to inspect and monitor people and cargoes coming into the country. Many border facilities are crumbling, and corruption is a serious problem at many points of entry into Iraq.

Although Iraq’s armed forces are not yet able to independently defend Iraq from external threats, they are increasingly capable of managing counterinsurgency operations. More than 75 percent of the battalions in the Iraqi Army can plan, conduct, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support, though the degree of that support—particularly in logistics—can be substantial at times. The improvement in the Iraqi Army was aptly captured by the comment of a senior American general who noted that “a year ago we just wanted the Army to stand and fight with us and not run away—today we don’t even have to think about that.”

As part of Fardh al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan), the Iraqi Army has participated in a large number of high-intensity operations and demonstrated an effectiveness and level of determination far greater than what Coalition forces observed during joint operations in 2005 and 2006 (this is illustrated by casualty figures, see Figure 9). The Iraqi Minister of Defense seemed to recognize both the progress the Iraqi Army has made and the remaining challenges when he

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predicted to Commissioners that the Army would be 60 percent capable of independently protecting Iraq from external threats by 2012 and entirely independent in this regard by 2018. He also insisted that the Iraqi Army will be able to accept more responsibility for direct combat against internal threats in 2008.

![Figure 9: Casualties in Iraq by Month and Year](image)

The Iraqi Special Forces are a success story. The most capable units within the Iraqi military, they have trained extensively with U.S. Special Forces and developed a strong set of junior officers and a noncommissioned officer corps. Special operations involving both Coalition and Iraqi Special Forces are led by Iraqi commanders; their brigade provides 70 percent of the forces for these operations. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces still rely extensively on Coalition forces for fire and counterfire, close air support, fixed-wing and rotary wing mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The Iraqi Air Force and Navy are still too underdeveloped to contribute significantly to maintaining Iraq’s territorial sovereignty. The Iraqi Air Force is organized for counterinsurgency operations and is flying operational missions over Baghdad and key critical infrastructure sites to provide Iraqi and Coalition forces with actionable intelligence, but these contributions represent a fraction of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability needed to combat the threats facing Iraq. Despite plans to triple its personnel by the end of 2007, the Air Force remains very small and is unlikely to be able to control Iraqi air space without outside assistance before 2010. Its ability to conduct aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions is improving, however, and with the planned acquisition of additional C-130 cargo aircraft for transport, UH-II helicopters for mobility and medical evacuation, and Russian Mi-17 helicopters for counterinsurgency operations, the Iraqi Air Force will grow more capable over time.
Like the Air Force, the Iraqi Navy is very small and faces significant challenges. Most of Iraq’s oil for export is pumped through two offshore oil terminals located just off Iraq’s very small coastline in Basra province, a region of Iraq plagued by Jaysh al-Mahdi presence. While the Iraqi Navy’s area of responsibility is of strategic importance given the volume of oil for export that is pumped from these oil terminals, the “fleet” is extremely small; some of its vessels are not seaworthy and are useful only as a source of spare parts. The Navy is in the process of acquiring a range of newer vessels that will provide it some capability to patrol continuously, protect the offshore terminals, and sustain maritime operations, but these capabilities will not be fully operational for at least another two to three years.37

Deny Terrorists Safe Haven

To deny international terrorists a safe haven in Iraq, Iraqi Security Forces need to be able to project force on behalf of the central government throughout the country and must have access to sufficient and actionable intelligence to ensure strategic situational awareness, secure the nation’s borders, and conduct significant counterterrorism operations. Cooperation between Iraq’s armed forces and its civil security forces—that is, the National Police, Iraqi Police Service, and the Department of Border Enforcement—is critical to achieving these missions.

Finding: Although the Iraqi Army and Special Forces have demonstrated significant progress in counterterrorism capabilities at the operational level, the Iraqi Police Service and National Police have many challenges to overcome and cannot yet effectively contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Iraq. The border security forces are assessed as being ineffective.38

Iraq’s central government in Baghdad does not have national reach in terms of security, nor does it have a monopoly on the use of force—a defining characteristic of a functioning nation-state. Militias continue to play a prominent role and are seen by American and Iraqi officials alike as posing almost as significant a threat to Iraqi stability and security as al Qaeda in Iraq. Despite the heavy concentration of forces brought to the capital as part of Fardh al-Qanoon, the central government does not yet fully control security in Baghdad or its surrounding “ring cities.”

The central government also lacks a clear view of activities in the provinces, although this absence of information does not necessarily mean that terrorists are establishing safe havens within them. Seven of Iraq’s 18 provinces are now under “provincial Iraqi control” (PIC), meaning that in theory the Iraqi central government and provincial authorities are largely responsible for security in those areas (see Figure 10). Three of these seven provinces are in the Kurdish region of Iraq, which

37 The Commission surveyed the Coalition’s senior field commanders to obtain their on-the-ground assessment of the status and progress of the Iraqi Security Forces. Asked to rate the progress that has been made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, 6 of the 8 rated the progress “satisfactory,” and 2 “unsatisfactory.” None rated progress as “excellent.” With regard to MOI forces, 2 rated progress as satisfactory, 2 unsatisfactory, and none excellent.

38 The Commission’s survey of the Coalition’s senior field commanders regarding the ISF asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to deny international terrorists safe haven, 7 rated the progress as satisfactory, 1 as unsatisfactory, and 1 as excellent; with regard to MOI forces, 4 rated progress as satisfactory, none unsatisfactory, and none excellent.
essentially has a separate regional government and its own security forces. The remaining four provinces under provincial Iraqi control are in the southern part of Iraq. Despite the transition to this status, security in the four southern provinces is deteriorating because of a rise in intra-Shi’a violence. Increasing violence is particularly notable in Basra, Diyala, and Dhi Qar. Unlike Diyala and Dhi Qar, Basra has not yet been transferred to provincial Iraqi control, but this transfer is expected to occur in the near future.

Figure 10: Governor and MNC-I Assessments and Projections for Provinces (1-31 Jul 2007)

As of 9 AUG 2007

Source: MNF-I

Although the central government cannot yet control security inside the country, Iraq’s ground forces, particularly its Special Forces, have demonstrated strong counterterrorism capability. Iraqi Special Forces, which have conducted many counterterrorism operations with and without Coalition forces, have achieved significant operational success in 2007.

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Concurrent with improvements to the counterterrorism capabilities of the Iraqi Army and Special Forces has been the somewhat unexpected alliance of local tribes in Anbar province with Coalition and Iraqi forces. After meeting with American and Iraqi leaders in Anbar, the Commission assesses that progress in Anbar against al Qaeda in Iraq is both real and encouraging. “Provincial security forces”—local police, vetted by the tribal sheikhs, who will eventually go through formal police training—are helping to drive terrorists out of western Iraq and ensure that it is no longer a safe haven for al Qaeda in Iraq. It is not yet clear whether these new security arrangements can be exported successfully to other parts of Iraq, though there are promising signs that other provinces are experiencing a similar rejection of al Qaeda. Whether confined to Anbar province or more widely established, these alliances will have to be managed very carefully in order for them to contribute to Iraq’s long-term security.

In areas where local tribes have allied themselves with Coalition and Iraqi security forces, tips against al Qaeda in Iraq and apprehensions of suspected al Qaeda in Iraq members or militiamen have increased dramatically. Coalition and ISF personnel are finding caches of weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) more frequently, and the number of murders and other violent attacks is going down. Local populations and leaders in Anbar province will no longer tolerate al Qaeda in Iraq’s violent attacks or attempts to inflict religious law on their more secular societies, and this rejection of the group has been a boon to Coalition forces. It is not clear whether these tribal alliances can always be trusted or will persist once al Qaeda in Iraq is largely driven from the province.\(^\text{40}\)

To effectively eliminate terrorist activity inside Iraq, strong cooperation between the military forces and the police forces in Iraq will need to be institutionalized. Thus far the police are at a lower level of development. Most National Police units are not yet sufficiently operationally effective, and the organization as a whole is viewed as highly sectarian, given its almost exclusively Shi’a composition and its history of involvement in sectarian activities. Although Iraqi police working closely with Coalition forces have been able to establish a degree of presence in their respective communities, in many areas of Iraq, members of the Iraqi Police Service rarely venture outside their stations. The very limited existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Iraqi Police Service police leave them unable to contribute substantially to counterterrorism operations. Perhaps of greatest concern is that in many areas the Iraqi Police Service has been infiltrated by insurgents and militias.

Many of the shortcomings that prevent the Iraqi armed forces and civil security forces from independently maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq are also weaknesses that prevent them from independently ensuring that Iraq does not become a safe haven for international terrorists. Although the Iraqi armed forces have made progress in developing greater combat proficiency, they lack the combat support and combat support services outlined previously.\(^\text{41}\)


Across the entire ISF, Iraqi supply chain management, maintenance, and logistics systems are substandard. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is working closely with the Ministry of Defense to develop support and sustainment systems at the strategic and operational levels, and the Military Transition Teams reporting to Multi-National Corps–Iraq are working with tactical Iraqi units in the field to improve these capabilities, but the Commission foresees that the Iraqi military will rely on Coalition forces for at least another two to three years.

In a similar vein, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is working closely with the Ministry of Interior to develop support and sustainment systems for Iraq’s police and border forces; but because the MOI is not as well developed as the MOD, this process will likely take more time.

Bring Security to the Provinces

In order to bring better security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, the Iraqi Security Forces will need to be able to better protect Iraqi citizens from ethnic, religious, terrorist, and insurgent-based violence; protect vital public and private infrastructure and transportation arteries; and project credible, effective, and sustainable military and police power throughout the entire country.

Finding: The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring greater security to Iraq’s provinces varies by region and by organization within the ISF owing to many factors, including political leadership, security environment, sectarianism, and available resources.

While security in some parts of Iraq appears to be increasing, the country continues to be plagued by internal violence. Security gains overall have different attributes depending on the threat in the region. Relatively homogenous areas such as Anbar and the Kurdish provinces seem to be moving rapidly toward establishing provincial security by bringing together tribal leaders, Coalition forces, and Iraqi Security Forces. These developments are encouraging, but their durability is unknown and they are viewed with extreme skepticism by the predominantly Shi’a central government.

The three Kurdish provinces under Iraqi control are relatively secure, and the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces are quite capable. There are three Iraqi Army brigades in the Kurdish region and a range of police and civil security forces, including the Asayesh, the Peshmerga, the Zeravani, and the Iraqi Police Service. The Kurdish police were by far the most capable police the Commission observed during its visits to Iraq.

While some areas in Iraq seem to be stabilizing, ethnically or religiously mixed areas such as Baghdad and its ring cities continue to experience violence and intense sectarian activity. As noted above, even some of Iraq’s most homogeneous Shi’a areas in the southern part of the country are seeing rising levels of intra-Shi’a militia violence.

The shift in the past year toward a greater focus on local recruiting for the Iraqi Security Forces has contributed to the ability of some ISF organizations to provide heightened security in the provinces. The Army and the Iraqi Police Service are most effective in areas where they reflect the ethnic and sectarian composition of the public they are responsible for protecting. Though it is important for the Iraqi Security Forces at the national level to be ethnically and religiously diverse and broadly representative of Iraq’s national composition, there is value in using forces that resemble local populations. In areas like western Iraq, the police force is largely Sunni, reflecting the local makeup. The “neighborhood watches” or “provincial security forces” that local sheikhs have organized in partnership with Coalition forces are representative of this kind of successful localized provision of security. In the Kurdish provinces, security forces are largely composed of Kurds. In the Shi’a south, the Iraqi Army and police are almost exclusively Shi’a.\(^{43}\) Over time, if security and stability can be more broadly established in Iraq, the goal should be to field more ethnically and religiously mixed security forces—particularly in the Iraqi Army, which is intended to deploy nationally.

The Iraqi National Police, a force that reports to the Ministry of Interior, illustrates the peril of attempting to provide security with forces that are not representative of the population. There are nine brigades of National Police, and more than 85 percent of the force is Shi’a. Its members have been implicated in sectarian activities, including death squads and covert prisoner torture. When deployed to exclusively Shi’a areas, the National Police has been accepted by local communities, and its units have helped provide security under Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. At the same time, the National Police is widely rejected by Sunni communities, and efforts to recruit more Sunnis into the force have failed. Despite efforts to transform and retrain the National Police by October 2007, the organization is mistrusted by much of Iraqi society and some fear it could become a new Republican Guard.

**Finding:** The “clear, hold, build” strategy being implemented by Iraqi Security Forces is on the right track and shows potential, but neither the Iraqi armed forces nor the police forces can execute these types of operations independently.

Reflecting the Coalition’s much stronger grasp of counterinsurgency operations, the “clear, hold, build” strategy launched in March 2006 appears to be generating results in enhancing security in the provinces. The Iraqi Army’s ability to conduct “clearing” operations has improved significantly; units such as the 2nd Iraqi Army Division based in Ninewa province are conducting effective intelligence and counterinsurgency operations that seem to be noticeably reducing violence levels. New cooperative relationships with local forces in Anbar and Diyala provinces exemplify how local Iraqi forces are able to “hold” Iraqi territory after it has been cleared by Coalition and Iraqi Army troops.

The “surge” of Coalition forces has made the presence of the Coalition and ISF much more visible in cities and neighborhoods all over Iraq. The morale of ISF units paired with Coalition forces appears relatively high, and trainers all over Iraq report that the ISF, particularly the Iraqi Army, seem to have the will to fight. An ISF casualty rate three times that of Coalition forces would seem to

\(^{43}\) The Iraqi Army as a whole is 75–80 percent Shi’a. Shi’a predominate in 6 of the existing 11 battalions, but Iraqi Army units in the northern regions are 50 percent Kurdish, and a small number of battalions are almost 90 percent Sunni.
reflect this determination, albeit also the reality that neither the Iraqi Army nor the Iraqi Police Service are adequately armed or protected against the threats that they face.\textsuperscript{44} The Joint Security Stations established in Baghdad partner Coalition forces with the Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police Service, and they appear to be reducing levels of violence in their immediate areas.\textsuperscript{45} The Joint Security Stations also are increasing the level of cooperation between local Iraqis, the ISF, and Coalition forces, as well as providing opportunities for in-depth mentoring and advising by Coalition forces.\textsuperscript{46}

**End Sectarian Violence**

The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to end sectarian violence in Iraq and contribute to setting the conditions for national reconciliation is limited in the absence of a strong central government and an active political reconciliation process. From a military perspective, to help end sectarian violence, the Iraqi Security Forces should represent the diversity of Iraq’s population at the national level and not be a participant—actual or perceived—in sectarian violence.

**Finding:** The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they are drawn. Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq.

Sectarian militias are a fact of life in Iraq. They may pose as much danger as al Qaeda in Iraq and may be an even greater threat to Iraq’s long-term stability. Particularly in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq, militias terrorize the population and continue to drive Iraqis out of the country.

At the ministerial level, while the Ministry of Defense has made considerable strides in developing its ability to plan, program, and budget for the Iraqi armed forces and to recruit and retain high-quality, vetted forces, the Ministry of Interior is not administratively effective and may be fueling sectarian tensions. It leans heavily toward protecting Shi’a interests, as evidenced by its recent decision to reject a religiously balanced list of new police for the city of Tal Afar in Ninewa province in favor of assigning 300 Shi’a policemen.\textsuperscript{47} Sectarian tensions are so high that a number of MOI officials having been assassinated on their way to and from their offices, and as a result many MOI officials live permanently in the ministry.

\textsuperscript{44} In most meetings with Americans working with the ISF and Iraqi leaders of the ISF, the Commission heard that the ISF is not adequately armed against the threat, nor do they have sufficient armor protection. See also “In-Stride Assessment,” p. 11.

\textsuperscript{45} For example, there was a 26 percent decline in the number of murders and executions in Baghdad between the month of February and March, and a 60 percent reduction during the last week of March and the first week of April. See Melinda L. Larson, “Baghdad Security Plan Seeing Many Successes,” American Forces Press Service, April 8, 2007.

\textsuperscript{46} In the Commission’s survey of the Coalition’s senior field commanders regarding the ISF, among those asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward attaining the capabilities required to bring greater security to the provinces in the respondent’s area of operations 7 rated the progress as satisfactory, none as unsatisfactory, and none as excellent. With regard to MOI forces, four rated progress as satisfactory, none as unsatisfactory and none as excellent.

\textsuperscript{47} Meeting with Multinational Division–North officials, July 2007.
The Iraqi Army, while not free of sectarianism, is in fact increasingly representative of the makeup of Iraqi society. About 75–80 percent of Iraqi Army soldiers are Shi’a, and 2 of the 11 divisions are 50 percent Kurdish. Sunnis are the least represented group within the Iraqi Army. Encouragingly, the Iraqi Army’s leadership is relatively balanced: of the 11 divisions currently in operation, 3 are led by Kurdish commanders, 4 by Shi’a commanders, and 4 by Sunni commanders. After extensive interaction with Iraqi Army units, Coalition forces assess the majority of Iraqi Army units as operationally reliable and free from blatant sectarianism.

As noted above, the members of the National Police—in contrast to the Iraqi Army—are widely seen as sectarian and are not trusted by most Iraqis. Despite Coalition efforts to retrain the National Police and emphasize human rights and the rule of law, it is not clear that this element of the Iraqi Security Forces, in its current form, can contribute to Iraqi security and stability in a meaningful way.

Local recruiting for the ISF, at least in the short term, is critical in many parts of Iraq where, as already mentioned, developing security forces that reflect local populations will help reduce sectarianism and bring greater security to Iraq’s provinces. Ethnically and religiously mixed areas such as Baghdad, the central provinces in Iraq, and areas around Kirkuk and Mosul are more challenging, because they do not lend themselves to this relatively simple model. Coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces are already working together, neighborhood by neighborhood, to establish security in mixed areas. As a result of the robust and intense partnerships established under the leadership of General David Petraeus, Coalition forces today are already functioning as brakes on sectarian activity by the ISF. In mixed locations, Coalition forces may be the guarantors of security until sufficient stability can be achieved, but the Coalition cannot serve indefinitely in this capacity.

If recruited in a balanced fashion, vetted appropriately, and properly trained, the Iraqi Security Forces have the potential to reduce sectarian violence. At the same time, because they are drawn from the Iraqi population, the ISF will represent the society from which they come. If Iraq’s national government exhibits sectarian behavior and if sectarianism is rampant in Iraqi society at large, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Security Forces will be immune to the same dynamics, regardless of their military readiness.

Since the beginning of Fardh al-Qanoon in February 2007, the Coalition and the Iraqi Security Forces have managed to create some level of security and some breathing space for Iraqi politicians. If the Coalition continues to provide key enabling support and training to the ISF over the next few years, with the expected increases in security that such support will likely bring, a more durable security environment will continue to develop and perhaps broaden. The reverse is certainly true should the government be unable to find the required political solution.\footnote{In the Commission’s survey of the Coalition’s senior field commanders regarding the ISF, among those asked to rate the progress made by the MOD forces toward ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation, 6 rated the progress as satisfactory, 2 as unsatisfactory, and none as excellent. With regard to MOI forces, four rated progress as unsatisfactory, none as satisfactory, and none as excellent.}
Conclusion: The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military and external threats.
CHAPTER 3: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) is a relatively new organization, coping with the challenges of managing its own development while supporting the current combat operations of the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD is strengthening its administrative capacity in several areas—notably in budget development, strategic and operational planning, and personnel management. It has a vision and strategic plan for Iraq’s armed forces and is beginning to implement that vision. It has put functioning systems in place to recruit soldiers, sailors, and airmen; has developed an adequate training base in cooperation with the Coalition; and is working to improve its ability to acquire the systems its armed forces need to accomplish their missions effectively. At the same time, the ministry still struggles to ensure that its armed forces are combat ready. Iraqi commanders today rely on sometimes substantial Coalition assistance to overcome the deficiencies caused by shortfalls in budget execution, contracting, intelligence, and logistics within the MOD.

Overview of the Ministry of Defense

Under Saddam Hussein, the Ministry of Defense was controlled directly by the regime and staffed only by trusted military commanders. The Ba’athist MOD’s primary mission was to protect Saddam and his immediate circle—not the Iraqi people. At the outset of the 2003 invasion, the Coalition planned to de-Ba’athify and then reform the MOD. After discovering firsthand the MOD’s deep roots in the previous regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority chose to dismantle the MOD entirely at the same time that it disbanded the Iraqi Army and other military institutions, under CPA Order Number 2.49

Today, the MOD is led by Minister of Defense Lieutenant General (Ret.) Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jassim Obeidi, a Sunni career military officer and political independent.50 The ministry comprises a Joint Headquarters, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (which commands the Army), the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and the Iraqi Army, Navy (including Marines), and Air Force.51 The ministry’s core mission and functions are organizing, training, equipping, sustaining, and employing the Iraqi Joint Forces in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, government direction, and the law.52

Coalition assistance to the Ministry of Defense is provided largely through the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the two national-level transition teams assigned to the MOD. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team advises both the MOD and the Joint Headquarters on manning, training, equipping, basing, and sustainment for ISF units throughout Iraq as they work toward operational readiness. The Ministry of Defense Transition Team (MOD-TT) advises civilian leadership at the MOD and is composed of a team of about 50 U.S. civilian

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49 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, May 23, 2003.
50 Most senior staff in the MOD are retired military officers, some of whom still wear their uniforms. The large numbers of retired military officers may be fueling resistance to greater civilian control within the MOD.
52 All background information comes from MOD-TT/JHQ-TT/CMATT overview briefings received by the Commission in Iraq in July 2007.
advisors, 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries, and six U.S. military personnel, led by a Senior Executive Service-level U.K. civil servant. Most of the U.S. civilian advisors are contractors from private companies; as of July 2007, only two were U.S. civil servants. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team is led by an Australian general officer and a staff of 50 Coalition military personnel and contractors. All three organizations—the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, the MOD Transition Team, and the Joint Headquarters Transition Team—report to Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq.

The Coalition transition teams working with the Iraqi MOD have separate but related missions, each with specific challenges. The MOD Transition Team is charged both with mentoring the Iraqi MOD civilian leadership as it carries out the ministry’s mission and functions and with helping the ministry build its institutional capacity. The MOD Transition Team is also working to build a professional core of civil servants within the MOD. The Joint Headquarters Transition Team supports the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in its efforts to build and implement a command and control capability to train, sustain, and develop the Iraqi Joint Force’s ability to address threats as directed by the Government of Iraq. The Joint Headquarters is based on a NATO standard staffing model.

During its assessment, the Commission held numerous meetings with Coalition advisors and Iraqi MOD officials, including two with the Iraqi Minister of Defense. The Commission found that the MOD has made significant strides since 2004 and is one of the more effective ministries in the Government of Iraq. As mentioned, the MOD still faces challenges in budgeting functions, contracting, personnel, intelligence, command and control, and logistics.53

| Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq |
| Definition of Success |
| Success is: |
| If they can recruit themselves, train themselves, sustain themselves, equip themselves, pay themselves, trust each other and acquire their future force requirements, then they are truly mission ready. |

**Budgeting**

*Finding: Inefficiencies and overcentralization within the Ministry of Defense and its inability to fully execute its budget impede the combat readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces.*

The MOD has a functioning financial management system, complete with budgets that are tied to a requirements process at broad levels. MOD officials characterized their budget as having three primary dimensions: activating the armed forces and deepening their capabilities,

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53 In a survey conducted of senior Coalition commanders in Iraq, the majority told the Commission that progress being made by the MOD in the essential combat functions of command and control, intelligence, mobility, logistics, and fire support is unsatisfactory. Logistics is the greatest near term priority.
modernizing the ground forces, and continuing expansion in manning levels. The Joint Headquarters commander drives the process to determine budgetary priorities by soliciting inputs from the four services—Iraqi Army and Special Forces, Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy—as well as from functional commanders such as those directing logistics and communications.

The ability to build a budget is an important first step, but it may be the least complex element of a financial management system; it is not the same as the ability to execute the budget, a task that the MOD finds far more problematic. As of November 2006, MOD had spent 76 percent of its calendar year budget for salaries, 25 percent of its budget for goods and services, 1 percent of its budget for capital goods and projects, but only 32 percent of its overall budget of $3.4 billion. The MOD’s ability to execute its budget may be improving; when the Commission met with ministry officials in July 2007, they stated that they had already expended 46 percent of their calendar year budget for 2007.

The Iraqis have a complex internal control system that divides the entire budgeting process between multiple ministries. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) controls all funds and there are serious bureaucratic difficulties in securing the release of moneys. MOD officials shared their frustrations over this situation with the Commission, noting that Ministry of Finance control over their funding makes it difficult, if not impossible, to increase their budget.

Even when the MOD builds a budget and secures the release of funds from the Ministry of Finance, its ability to execute that budget is hindered by insufficient delegation of authority in the MOD to disburse money. The Minister of Defense is allowed to give partial expenditure authority to some staff, but overall the Commission found that budget execution remains burdensome. The specter of corruption has added another layer of internal controls to an already cumbersome budgeting and expenditure process (and as discussed in the next section, MOD’s use of the Foreign Military Sales system to thwart corruption has often compounded its difficulties).

The MOD Transition Team should remain engaged and work closely with MOD officials on the crucial issue of budget execution. Continued mentoring is of particular importance, as many of the financial and administrative systems being put in place by Coalition advisors are new to their Iraqi MOD counterparts, grasping them will require significant time and training. The new financial systems may also be an example of the Coalition tendency to focus on solutions that mirror Western methods rather than on developing approaches that are more consistent with Iraqi norms, standards, and experience. Addressing the larger issue of cultural resistance to delegation of authority is more difficult but may be more critical to ensuring that the MOD can execute its budgets consistently. Changing this aspect of the MOD’s corporate culture will require institutional changes at the highest levels of ministerial leadership, together with a commitment to prioritize budget execution at the same level as budget development.

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54 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., *Stand Up and be Counted*, July 2007, p. 105.
Contracting

Finding: The ability to contract efficiently is important to the MOD’s mission to sustain the Iraqi armed forces. The MOD currently lacks effective processes to execute contracting requirements.

In order to recruit, retain, train, operate, and sustain an authorized military force of more than 195,000, the MOD must be able to contract for a wide range of goods and services. This vital capability continues to be a major problem for both organizational and cultural reasons. During the 30 years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, Iraqi bureaucrats learned that mistakes were punished with a severity that curbed any impulse toward initiative. This ingrained fear, coupled with a cultural bias toward centralized control at senior levels, led to an onerous process for awarding MOD contracts. For example, a minimum of three bids are required for any contract above 25 million dinars (about $20,000). MOD officials told the Commission that if fewer than three bids are received, the MOD must reissue the request for proposal. In a similar vein, the Minister of Finance apparently insists on personally reviewing all contracts over $50,000.

Because of these extensive controls and limitations, the Iraqi procurement process was accomplishing little. It also was seriously distorted by corruption. To correct both problems, U.S. advisors persuaded the Iraqi government to utilize the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, an elaborate arrangement developed over the past 40 years to coordinate the sales of military hardware and services to foreign governments. The United States government acts as the integrating office for a relatively small commission.

The Foreign Military Sales system is free of corruption, but it is not speedy under even the best of circumstances—and in this specific instance, its functioning has been weak and frankly embarrassing. The Commission was told by Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq that of $1.7 billion in sales in 2006, only $300 million of the services and equipment had been received by the Iraqis as of July 2007. They have deposited another $600 million for the Ministry of Defense in 2007, but no orders have been placed pending delivery of 2006 orders. Moreover, it appears that the New Equipment Training (NET) bought and paid for through Foreign Military Sales did not enable the Iraqis to actually learn to maintain the equipment they had received. When confronted with this record, senior U.S. commanders in Iraq lamented that the performance of the Foreign Military Sales system is “a national embarrassment.” The Coalition talked the Iraqi government into using the system to avoid corruption and ensure delivery of critical goods and services, yet the United States is not delivering on the commitments it made. This failure is hurting the United States as sorely as the Iraqis. The Coalition depends on the improved capabilities of Iraqi forces to replace Coalition troops. U.S. failure to make the foreign military system function is directly hindering plans to transfer warfighting responsibilities to the Iraqis. The U.S. Secretary of Defense should appoint a single senior official responsible for ensuring timely and efficient processing of Iraqi material and support contracts through the Foreign Military Sales system on an expedited basis.

MOD officials expressed frustrations about contracting processes at the MOD and also acknowledged that although the Foreign Military Sales system is the best option at present, the

55 Figure from MNSTC-I overview briefing received in Baghdad, July 2007.
Iraqis must develop their own system.\textsuperscript{56} The contracting issue is a long-term problem that requires more than a near-term work-around. Coalition personnel consistently noted to the Commission that Iraqis are more likely to address important issues when they are spending Iraqi government money. If this is true, the current practice of financially supplementing Iraqi operations may be enabling the Iraqis to avoid making needed changes to their administrative systems and processes: in this case, to their contracting system.

There also are indications that the Iraqi MOD may be improving its ability to contract effectively. In June 2007, the MOD Joint Contracting Command awarded $64.2 million in contracts, of which more than 70 percent—for items such as batteries, uniforms, undergarments, boots, and armored buses—were awarded to Iraqi-owned companies. This contracting effort is extremely important, as it demonstrates that there is an emerging capability within Iraq to provide material in support of ISF requirements.

**Personnel**

**Finding:** The MOD consistently compensates the members of the Iraqi military, but it has difficulty accounting for personnel.

In general, the MOD is able to make payroll for its growing forces—despite relying on methods that are out of date by U.S. standards. Currently, unit commanders must certify who is on the rolls, and then compare those rolls to a master list. At that point, designated fiduciary agents in the units distribute moneys to the commanders, who pay military personnel in cash. Though highly cumbersome, this administrative system appears to work effectively.

The MOD also continues to develop a new banking facility that is already providing roughly 2,800 employees with direct deposit services. The MOD is working to add another 1,500 personnel to the bank’s rolls. The new MOD bank will facilitate payment while also reducing the risks of corruption in the payroll system.\textsuperscript{57} Although at present only a fraction of MOD personnel are part of the new direct deposit system, it is an important step in the right direction.

Another positive development in the MOD’s administrative capacity is the rolling implementation of the Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS),\textsuperscript{58} which links personnel and pay functions into a single automated system and database. The purpose of HRIMS is to provide its customers, in a single format, a clear snapshot of information, tracking pay and personnel from initial recruitment to separation. The system should also be able to facilitate accurate reporting and analysis, enabling reliable auditing functions and minimizing opportunities for corruption. At present, the Commission was informed that HRIMS is in use at the MOD and division levels, and should be available for use at the brigade level by September 2007.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} Commissioner interviews at Camp Phoenix, Baghdad, July 10, 2007.

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with senior Iraqi MOD officials, Baghdad, July 10, 2007.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview with MOD Logistics and Personnel Transition Team, Baghdad, July 10, 2007

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
Intelligence

**Finding:** The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory—a problem exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence organizations.

There are four significant, known intelligence organizations that support the Iraqi Security Forces. The Directorate General of Intelligence and Security (DGIS) is within the MOD; the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA), is under the Ministry of the Interior; and the Iraqi National Intelligence System (INIS) is considered Iraq’s primary intelligence agency. An independent intelligence organization has been established by the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA).

Most Iraqi officials that met with the Commission noted that there is relatively little information sharing between these organizations—or, in some cases, even between operational units of the same organization in the field. The reluctance to share information seems particularly apparent at the intersection point of the military and police forces. There is very little understanding in the Iraqi armed forces or in the Ministry of Interior—where many senior officials are former military officers—of how to use intelligence effectively to support operations. The Commission was concerned by the apparent lack of access by the Iraqi Army and police to the Iraqi National Intelligence System.

Information-sharing challenges between intelligence organizations and security forces are not unique to Iraq, but the active competition among Iraq’s intelligence organizations is making the typical problems much more difficult. For example, the MSNSA is organized along the lines of the former regime state security apparatus and is operating in direct competition with INIS, the more established national-level intelligence agency. Commissioners believe that MSNSA was created in part as a reaction to perceptions that INIS was too closely linked to the Coalition. These internal turf battles detract from the critical task of building greater intelligence capacity. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has a new intelligence transition team function that is working closely with members of the Iraqi intelligence community to facilitate coordination among these agencies.

Iraq is principally a human intelligence (HUMINT) theater of operations and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The challenge for all of Iraq’s security forces is how to share information gathered at the local level without compromising sources, and how to convince information holders to trust and communicate with one another. From a fusion center would come “actionable intelligence”—which then would have to be converted into “immediate-use” intelligence for operations. At that point, certain technologies and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) would be applied to continually monitor the target.

The Commission believes that the U.S. military intelligence model, which is heavily based on technology, is unlikely to work well in the Iraqi environment. Iraqi officials stressed repeatedly that what they need is mentoring and time to develop and adjust their own approaches rather than to adopt the complicated doctrine, structures, and technological solutions that are the hallmark of the U.S. system. Examples of low-technology techniques described to the Commission that have worked well in Iraq include the “National Tips Hotline,” which enables the public to provide information to
the police and military via cellular telephone, and the working relationships that are being developed through partnership arrangements such as the Joint Security Stations and brigade-level Military Transition Teams.

**Command and Control**

**Finding:** Parallel lines of direct communication to military units have been established under the control of the Prime Minister. He is perceived by many as having created a second, and politically motivated chain of command, effectively communicating orders directly to field commanders. Such a practice bypasses national command lines, which should flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of Iraqi Armed Forces.

In creating the Office of the Commander in Chief, the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, and in claiming command and control over Iraq’s highly capable Special Forces, the Prime Minister is perceived to have established a separate chain of command. At the very least, there now exists the appearance that a senior elected official can bypass existing military command structures for sectarian reasons. In Iraq’s developing military culture, this has a potentially divisive effect reminiscent of the previous era. The two organizations most associated with this perception are the Office of the Commander in Chief and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, both of which report directly to the Prime Minister. Any perception that elements of the ISF are influenced along sectarian and political lines is not in the best interest of Iraq’s newly formed Armed Forces. The Commission believes that the Office of the Commander in Chief should be abolished and that the Prime Minister should immediately emphasize that command and control of Iraqi Special forces is to be executed through the national chain of command. The existence of any other parallel or additional structures fosters mistrust, creates confusion, impedes military effectiveness, and perpetuates sectarian tension in the Armed Forces.

**Logistics**

**Finding:** The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this condition.

The Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq 2007 Campaign Action Plan for the “Year of Leaders and Logistics” called for the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to assume responsibility for providing logistical support to the Iraqi Army by November 2007. Although steps have been made in contracting and procurement strategies, information technology systems rollout, infrastructure improvement, logistics force structure design, and leadership development, the progress to date has been slow by Coalition standards, and Iraqi logistics is unlikely to be ready for this transition by the end of 2007.

The MOD has a plan to roll out an information system designed to support the command and control of the logistics enterprise. This is a vital requirement, as the MOD currently relies on an unresponsive, paper-driven process. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq advisors to
the MOD informed Commissioners that they are planning to field a new software system within the next 6 to 10 months, but before that can happen the software needs to be translated into Arabic, soldiers will need to gain the skills to operate it, and solutions are needed to the problems of connectivity that the regular electricity shortages will inevitably cause. In light of these challenges, fielding a workable logistics information technology system in support of the Iraqi Armed Forces is very unlikely in the near term.

There has been progress in providing the infrastructure required to logistically support the Iraqi armed forces. The comprehensive plan is centered around the Taji National Depot, which, when completed, will provide the national hub for training, supply support, and intermediate maintenance. Construction of warehouses, small arms and ammunition storage, and generator facilities are under way. Much work remains before this plan will be realized, however. The Commission was informed that the end point of the phased timeline is early 2008, but funding and construction delays will most likely push actual completion to between 2010 and 2012. Only $55 million has been funded, just one-tenth of the total required.

Another challenge for the MOD is logistics force structure design. The Iraqi Army remains heavily dependent on contracted support to satisfy day-to-day requirements, and it appears that contracted logistics support (CLS) in some form will be necessary for two to three years. The MOD has developed a detailed plan that will, when in place, adequately provide all required support. This plan is well understood by all key stakeholders, and the structure will provide not only ministerial oversight but also operating components down to the tactical level. Manning the logistics force structure will be a major undertaking, as the Iraqi Army has concentrated on its combat units and has only recently begun the process of manning and training logistics organizations. The Commission was informed that arriving at the final force structure design will likely take two to four years.

The final element needed for logistics development at the MOD level is critical: leadership. At present, there is little logistics expertise at the national level, and both uniformed and civilian leaders require one-on-one mentoring. At the operational and tactical level, transition teams are embedded with operational units. These teams provide technical support and mentoring to the battalion, brigade, and division headquarters and appear to be working very well.

**Conclusion:** The Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for policy development and implementation as well as resource allocation for the Iraqi military, is building the necessary institutions and processes to fulfill its mission. However, its capacity is hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization. These flaws reduce the operational readiness, capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military. As the MOD continues to mature, it should assume the ministerial-level functions that currently fall to the Coalition.
CHAPTER 4: THE IRAQI ARMY AND IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The Iraqi Army (IA) is a newly forming light infantry army already fighting a difficult counterinsurgency as it comes into being. Though the Iraqi Army is enjoying increasing success at the tactical level, significant challenges remain. Most units can muster only 60–75 percent of their assigned strength on any given day, owing to the need for soldiers to travel home to give their families their pay, the lack of enforcement of the Iraqi Code of Military Discipline, the counting of wounded soldiers who remain on the personnel rolls but cannot fight, and the number of soldiers on scheduled leave.\(^6\) Although many units in the Iraqi Army can now fight well at the small unit level and appear to have a greater will to fight than was present in 2005 and 2006, Iraqi Army units are often outgunned because they lack crew-served and indirect fire weapons, possess limited capacity to handle medical evacuation and combat casualty, and have few “soldier support” systems. Reflecting these capability gaps, the Iraqi Army is at present highly dependent on the Coalition for combat enablers such as fires and counterfires, close air support, fixed wing and rotary wing mobility, C\(^4\)ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), reinforcing capability, partnered presence with Multi-National Corps–Iraq units on the battlefield, supplemental logistics, and maintenance support.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) is a small, elite group that has trained very closely with Coalition Special Forces and has developed into one of the most capable special forces in the Middle East. Like the Iraqi Army, however, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces remain dependent on Coalition combat enablers. The fact that the chain of command to the Special Forces is outside the established Ministry of Defense chain of command, reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s office, raises concerns about the politicization of these units.

Overview of the Iraqi Army and Special Forces

From 1980 to 1988, the Iraqi Army fought a corps-level war against Iran over a terrain larger than the entire Western front of World War II. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iraq’s army was the world’s fourth-largest, composed of seven corps and five armored divisions and having mobilized 1.7 million Iraqis.\(^6\) During the Gulf War in 1991, the Coalition destroyed this force—significantly weakening the armed forces of Iraq.

Prewar planning for the invasion of Iraq in the 2002–2003 time frame “called for the dismantlement of the Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, and paramilitary structures and for the creation of a core of a new force, consisting of three to five divisions and geared to self-defense.”\(^6\) As the United States advanced into the country, the Iraqi forces put up very little

\(^6\) This figure is derived from conversations with current and former MiTT team members and MNSTC-I officials throughout Iraq and in Washington. It accords with estimates of outside sources such as Dr. Anthony Cordesman and the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.


resistance—but instead of surrendering, they shed their uniforms and melted back into the civilian population.\textsuperscript{63} Along with other top Ba’athist leadership, the 400,000 regular troops and 10,000 generals of the Iraqi Army simply went home. The rampant looting that followed destroyed what was left of the Iraqi Army facilities, including many hardware and ammunition depots.

On May 23, 2003, Order 2 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally disbanded the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State for Military Affairs, National Security Bureau, Iraqi Army, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Directorate of Military Intelligence, and Saddam’s many irregular units.\textsuperscript{64} CPA Order 1 concerning de-Ba’athification had already essentially liquidated and sent into hiding or resistance the top cadre of military leadership.\textsuperscript{65} CPA Order 2 also initiated the extensive task of reconstructing Iraq’s security forces and establishing the New Iraqi Corps, which became the New Iraqi Army (NIA) in August 2003. Under civilian control, the army’s mission was to provide “defense of the nation, including defense of the national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, infrastructure, lines of communication and supply, and population.”\textsuperscript{66} The objective was to create a force that could deter regional aggressors and unwanted foreign factions without threatening the regional balance of power. This force was to be 44,000-strong, “oriented toward external threats . . . with a clear focus on border security . . . [to] fill the growing need for a national military force, but with a measured equipping program and without any true logistical capacity.”\textsuperscript{67}

In September 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority increased end strength and added force structures: an air component, coastal defense, and an Iraqi counterterrorism force that became the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.\textsuperscript{68} Also that month, CPA Order 28 recognized a need for more Iraqi forces to deal with the continued degradation of the security situation in the country, creating the internally oriented Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, later renamed the Iraqi National Guard.\textsuperscript{69} The Iraqi National Guard worked alongside Coalition forces to address Iraq’s internal security challenges, but it quickly developed a poor reputation and became a prime target of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{70} In March 2004, the CPA redesignated the New Iraqi Army as a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the control of a newly constructed Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{71} In April 2004, it transferred control of the Iraqi National Guard from the Ministry of Interior to the MOD.

In June 2004, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi of the Interim Iraqi Government announced the formation of another military service—the Iraqi Intervention Force, a branch of the Iraqi Army specializing in counterinsurgency warfare.\textsuperscript{72} This was a force designed to surge to urban hot spots within the country. Because the missions of the Iraqi Intervention Force and the Iraqi Army were

\textsuperscript{63} Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{64} Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, May 23, 2003.
\textsuperscript{65} Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, April 16, 2003.
\textsuperscript{66} Coalition Provisional Authority Order 22, August 7, 2003.
\textsuperscript{68} Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{69} Coalition Provisional Authority Order 28, September 3, 2003.
\textsuperscript{70} “Iraq to Dissolve National Guard,” BBC, December 29, 2004; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4133039.stm.
\textsuperscript{71} Coalition Provisional Authority Order 67, March 21, 2004.
becoming difficult to distinguish, the CPA and MOD decided to merge the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi Intervention Force into the Iraqi Army.

The Iraqi Army, in all its various forms, has been an all-volunteer force since the fall of the Ba’athist regime and is the core of Prime Minister Maliki’s “Objective Counterinsurgency Force” (for its growth since 2004, see Figure 11). It is composed of:

- Nine light infantry divisions (with one more division in development and two more planned)
- One mechanized infantry division
- Associated support/combat support units
- Nine motorized transportation regiments
- Four logistics battalions
- Two support battalions
- Five regional support units
- Eighty garrison support units

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Figure 11: Iraqi Army Size and Capability Growth

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The Iraqis also formed the Strategic Infrastructure Brigade, dedicated to protecting key energy and other infrastructure. It comprises three brigade headquarters commanding 17 battalions. The Prime Minister has directed that the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions go through a retraining and equipping process to bring them to Iraqi Army battalion standards, but with additional training in infrastructure protection and consequence management.\footnote{Several other battalions with this specialty skill set may be developed in the 3rd Iraqi Army Division.}

The Iraqi Army’s training base is still developing. Currently there are three dedicated training battalions and six Regional Training Centers under the direction of the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command. Also under Training and Doctrine Command are the Defense Language Institute, the Tactical Doctrine Center, and the Lessons Learned Center. Within the training base are the nascent National Defense University, the Joint Staff College, and the Defense Strategic Studies Institute. Finally, the Iraqi Army has established a noncommissioned officer school, a counterinsurgency center, and the Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces is the operational component of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Command. Iraqi Special Operations Forces is a brigade-size force composed of approximately 1,500 soldiers: a counterterrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit. A key component in developing an Iraqi counterterrorism capability is the ongoing effort to double the number of soldiers in the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.\footnote{9010 Report, June 2007, pp. 41–42.} This expansion will include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando companies in Basra, Mosul, and Al Asad.

Like the other elements of the Iraqi military, the Iraqi Army today receives training and mentoring from both Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq. As Iraqi Army units become capable of operating in combination with Coalition forces, their tactical control is transferred to the appropriate Multi-National Corps–Iraq unit, which embeds advisors and partners Coalition forces with Iraqi units. The Iraqi Assistance Group, which reports to the Multi-National Corps–Iraq commander, provides advisors in the form of Military Transition Teams. The Military Transition Teams are composed of 10–15 Coalition soldiers—along with marines, airmen, and sailors—ranking from staff sergeant to colonel (or equivalent service rank). There are currently 5,000 Coalition personnel serving in more than 500 Military Transition Teams throughout the country. Military Transition Teams advise, coach, teach, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces in infantry tactics, intelligence, communications, fire support, and logistics.\footnote{U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, \textit{Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces}. 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 2007, pp. 127–41.} They seek to develop and improve Iraqi leaders, support Iraqi units’ continued training, and assist with logistics and battlefield enablers such as medical evacuation and close air and artillery support. Military Transition Teams are linked to brigade combat teams deployed throughout Iraq. As Iraqi Army units sustain themselves more effectively, the goal is ultimately for them to operate without the Military Transition Teams. To gauge unit progress, the Military Transition Team leader and counterpart Iraqi Army commander prepare monthly classified Operational Readiness Assessments\footnote{These reports were formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments.} (for the readiness level definitions and the Iraqi Army’s progression to ORA levels 1
and 2, see Figures 12 and 13 below; for the disposition of Iraqi Army divisions and their respective ORA levels, see Figure 14).

**Figure 12: Iraqi Army Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level Definitions**

- A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.
- A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support.
- A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.
- A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Source: MNSTC-I

**Figure 13: Iraqi Army Progression to ORA Levels 1 and 2**

Source: MNF-I
Challenges for the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces

During its assessment, the Commission held discussions with more than 50 American officials and 50 Iraqi officials directly involved in the development of the Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces, including meetings with a large number of Military Transition Teams and partnered Multi-National Corps–Iraq forces. The Commission also visited more than 30 Iraqi Army and Special Operations Forces facilities throughout Iraq, including Army bases, training centers, logistics and maintenance centers, and units at the division, brigade, and battalion levels.

The Commission believes that the Iraqi ground forces have made considerable progress, particularly in the past two years. However, the Iraqi Army and Special Forces face significant challenges in several mission and functional areas, including border protection, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, leadership, personnel, equipment, and logistics and maintenance.
Border Protection

**Finding:** In addition to protecting the nation against external military threats, the Iraqi Army can and should also play a role in preventing unconventional threats migrating from points outside of Iraq. The Army currently does not have sufficient forces to enhance border security and conduct counterinsurgency operations simultaneously.

Iraqi and American officials noted to the Commission that the Iraqi insurgency is a “vehicle-borne insurgency.” Controlling main routes to and from border areas and in other key regions is necessary to stop the inflow of foreign fighters and to control the spread of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and other deadly technologies that defeat up-armored vehicles and kill or injure Coalition and Iraqi forces in large numbers. More than 80 percent of suicide bombers in Iraq—including the drivers who deliver vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to their targets—are foreigners.78

Senior officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense made clear to the Commission that they are aware of a serious problem with Iraq’s border security. The MOI’s Department of Border Enforcement forces, as the first line of defense, are failing to control the borders adequately (as discussed in Chapter 11). Coalition and Iraqi commanders who use Iraqi Army units to reinforce less capable border forces are finding success—apprehending foreign fighters and intercepting significant amounts of weapons.79 Despite the Iraqi Army’s achievements in assisting with border security in some areas, it relies deeply on the Coalition for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In addition, although the Army needs to play a role in thickening Iraq’s border defenses, given its demanding internal security responsibilities, it does not yet have adequate forces to fill the gap.

**Recommendation:** The Iraqi Army’s size and capability should be developed as part of an Iraqi national security strategy that defines the roles and missions of the ISF to address both internal security and border security needs. The Army as well as the nation’s police forces are currently emphasizing internal security; only ineffective border security forces are focused on controlling the borders. The Iraqi Army must contribute to both border and internal security. A national commitment to expand the Army’s mission beyond counterinsurgency to include border security must be reflected in Army and MOD plans and policies.

Given Iraq’s evident border security challenges, the Iraqi Army should assist in “thickening” or “reinforcing” border enforcement as part of its broader mission to protect the country from external threats. In the near term, the Government of Iraq may need to consider expanding the size of the Iraqi Army to backstop less reliable border enforcement police without compromising the Iraqi Army’s ability to combat internal threats. To be effective in this role in the near term, the Iraqi

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79 Iraqi Army and Coalition commanders in the areas of responsibility of Multi-National Forces Command–West and Multi-National Division–North noted the utility of this approach.
Army will require key enabling support from the Coalition, particularly in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

**Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations**

**The Iraqi Army**

*Finding:* The Iraqi Army has become more effective in supporting Coalition-led counterinsurgency operations from the start of Iraqi and Coalition surge operations in early 2007. The reliability of Iraqi Army units continues to improve, and some units now are an integral part of the Coalition team for counterinsurgency operations. The overall rate of progress of the Army is uneven. Some units perform better than others; but there is rising confidence that progress is being made at a rate that will enable Iraqi Army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations in the next 12 to 18 months. However, they will continue to rely on Coalition support, including logistics, intelligence, fire support, equipment, training, and leadership development for the foreseeable future.

Changes to U.S. counterinsurgency strategy since 2006 have significantly altered the dynamic between U.S. and Iraqi forces, and have led to noticeable improvements in the Iraqi Army’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (internal defense). The lessons learned and best practices resulting from the new approach to counterinsurgency operations are spreading to Iraqi Army units, in part because those units are working hand-in-glove with the Americans. The Iraqi Security Forces have developed their own counterinsurgency doctrine, and unit commanders are cycled through the Iraqi Counterinsurgency School at Taji.

The Commission observed Iraqi Army units operating alongside U.S. troops in joint security stations, patrol bases, and command outposts. The American and Iraqi field-grade officers indicated to the Commission that they trust one another unconditionally. Even when American units are absent, the Commission observed indications that Iraqis are taking the fight to the enemy. High-intensity operations such as Fardh al-Qanoon in Baghdad plainly demonstrate that the Iraqi units are willing to combat urban counterinsurgency with far more determination and efficacy than during the generally disorganized joint operations of 2004 to 2006.

At the same time, it is clear that the relatively large numbers of Coalition advisors and partner units are a key enabler of this improved performance, as they continually provide strong leadership and mentoring, as well as combat support during actual operations. Where American and Iraqi Army units have worked closely with local communities, established patrol bases and other forward sites, and operated extensively together, there are increasing signs that local populations enjoy a credible security alternative to the lawlessness of the past few years. These closer Coalition–Iraqi community partnerships are leading to the development of stronger human intelligence networks, which in turn lead to more combat successes.

Coalition forces advise and mentor Iraqi Army units learning to conduct operations that win hearts and minds, respect human rights, separate enemies from the civilian population, and facilitate
political solutions. These are complex operations for any military force, and Coalition support for the Iraqi Army has been critical to the progress made to date. Without continued training, mentoring, and key combat enablers from the Coalition, it would be difficult for the Iraqi Army to progress to a point where it can conduct effective, independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Further, it is likely that the hard-won progress made to date would atrophy.

**Iraqi Special Operations Forces**

**Finding:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable element of the Iraqi armed forces and are well-trained in both individual and collective skills. They are currently capable of leading counterterrorism operations, but they continue to require Coalition support. They remain dependent on the Coalition for many combat enablers, especially airlift, close air support, and targeting intelligence.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces are a strong direct action and “snatch” force—specializing in operations to place high-value targets in custody in “nonpermissive” environments. Joint special operations involving the Iraqi Special Forces are led by Iraqi commanders; their brigade provides 70 percent of the forces. Coalition Special Operations Forces have been training their Iraqi counterparts since 2003, and many Coalition operators are in Iraq on repeated tours, bringing depth, continuity, and experience to the training effort. Coalition forces have helped develop a strong noncommissioned officer corps in the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, as well as a junior officer corps. Both display considerable promise for and confidence in the future of the Iraqi armed forces.

Despite their strong and consistent performance, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces rely heavily on Coalition combat enablers. A particularly important capability gap is the lack of independent rotary air support. Consequently, there are a variety of special operations missions and roles that the Iraqi Special Operations Forces cannot yet perform.

The Iraqi Special Operations Forces are the most capable force in the Iraqi Security Forces, but the diverse and challenging nature of the threats in Iraq leads to an extraordinarily difficult mission set. To ensure that the requirements of this mission set can be met, Special Operations in Iraq must remain a three-legged stool—Iraqi Special Forces and MOI special tactics units, Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force units, and other U.S. Special Operations task forces.

**Army Leadership**

**Finding:** The Iraqi Army is short of seasoned leadership at all levels, and a lack of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers hampers its readiness, capability, and effectiveness.

De-Ba‘athification initially banned almost all experienced Iraqi Army leadership from continued service. Over time, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq adjusted their policies and about 20,000 officers and noncommissioned officers have returned to the Army. The most severe leadership shortage is the lack of company-grade and junior field-grade officers. According to
Coalition estimates, the Iraqi Army needs at least an additional 30,000–40,000 leaders (officers and NCOs) to command units in the field. The demand for officers and NCOs in Iraq competes with the need for competent leaders throughout government bureaucracies and in the other security forces. The virtual shutdown of many Iraqi colleges and universities, and the interruption of primary and secondary schools by the events of the past few years, will likely make recruiting educated officers and noncommissioned officers a greater challenge, as has the continued emigration of many educated Iraqis.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has many programs under way to develop an officer corps, with an emphasis on “train the trainers” approaches. The Coalition is attempting to increase the number of one-year military academies in the country, using a standardized curriculum based on that of the Royal British Military Academy at Sandhurst. The first military academy was opened in 2004 as the Iraqi Military Academy in Rustamiyah and is run by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Training Mission–Iraq. The first class of 73 cadets graduated in June 2006. More than 2,500 Iraqi officers and civilians have received training in Iraq through NATO-led courses, and close to 1,000 Iraqi personnel have been trained outside the country through additional NATO Training Mission courses. NATO also has provided the Iraqi Army with much-needed equipment and has provided additional training and educational activities outside of Iraq. The Commission wishes to underscore the immense potential that the efforts of NATO nations are unleashing in Iraq.

**Finding:** A noncommissioned officer corps is not part of Iraq’s military tradition, but it will be invaluable to making the Army more combat-effective.

The Iraqi Army needs a noncommissioned officer corps in order to become a truly cohesive fighting force capable of the type of small unit operations essential to success in combating an insurgency. However, the American concept of NCOs seems to present difficulties for many Iraqi officers, particularly when newly minted NCOs are seen to perform at levels approaching NATO standards. In addition, during the Saddam era, Iraqi officers operated in an environment that emphasized centralized power over delegation to subordinates. Coalition advisors should support and encourage NCO development and should foster in Iraqi officers an appreciation for their role. However, it may take time for the Iraqis to embrace this concept.

It appears the American concept of a noncommissioned officer is fundamentally threatening to many current Iraqi officers, particularly when newly minted noncommissioned officers are seen to perform at levels approaching NATO standards. As the Iraqi Army and Coalition forces continue to develop the noncommissioned officer corps, care should be taken at the same time to develop Iraqi officers’ appreciation for their role.

**Recommendation:** Developing leadership in the Iraqi Army will require continued support from Coalition advisors and units. Ongoing employment of a “train the trainers” approach, and continued

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80 The MNSTC-I commander is dual-hatted as the commander of NTM-I.
emphasis on the development of a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, is essential, though developing leaders will take time to achieve.

Developing Iraqi Army leadership will be the work of a generation and will require long-term Coalition or NATO involvement—at least in an advisory capacity. Although it will take more than 12 to 18 months to develop a functioning noncommissioned officer corps, the strong and effective Iraqi Special Operations Forces noncommissioned officer corps is an encouraging example. The NATO experience in former Eastern bloc countries further demonstrates that long-term engagement can build a world-class noncommissioned officer corps in places it never existed before.

**Personnel**

**Finding:** The Iraqi Army is currently structured for counterinsurgency operations with a goal of manning 13 divisions by the end of 2008. The current divisions are experiencing absenteeism, both authorized and unauthorized. MOD has established a standard of 85 percent “present-for-duty” at all times. To achieve this, units will be manned at 120 percent of authorized strength, and the abundance of volunteers for service in the new Iraqi Army should make the attainment of this goal possible. This higher manning requirement will place additional strain on equipping and combat training programs.

In its most recent report to Congress, the Department of Defense estimated the Iraqi Army’s strength to be around 135,000. Outside analysts put the figure at closer to 100,000. The Government of Iraq would like an end strength of 190,000, and it plans to add 24 battalions in 2007 for an increase of approximately 45,000 soldiers. The force structure is planned to be 13 divisions.

At any given time, Iraqi units are at 60–75 percent of their manning strength, and annual attrition is 15–18 percent in the Iraqi Army. Iraqi soldiers return home to bring their pay to their families and check on their safety, contributing to a lack of accountability. In addition, assassinations of Iraqi soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers further compound manning problems.

Not only does the Iraqi Army suffer from manning shortages, but many of the soldiers that do report for duty are at different standards of training, owing to the many different training programs in place since 2003. Standardization of the forces and of training is only a recent development. As a result, Iraqi Army divisions are uneven in ability.

The Commission visited a camp of fresh recruits going through five weeks of basic training. Beginning in spring 2007, the earlier thirteen-week basic training course was compressed into five weeks, largely to accelerate force generation efforts. The average Iraqi jundi (private or soldier) has a fourth-grade education. He has been familiar with “guns” his whole life but has probably not fought in the military. The minimum age for enlistment in this volunteer force is 18. In basic training,

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83 E.g., see Anthony Cordesman, July 24, 2007, p. vii.
soldiers are taught everything from hand washing before meals to proficiency with an M-16 or AK-47 rifle. Discipline is maintained by corporal punishment.

Further complicating basic training efforts is the need to identify those recruits with links to militias, who must either be converted or dismissed from the Iraqi Security Forces. Despite the risks associated with service in the ISF, military pay is high enough to make enlistment attractive, and recruiters are often simply overwhelmed by the sheer numbers in need of vetting. Following basic training, Iraqi soldiers’ collective skills and basic unit skills are frequently developed under combat conditions.

**Finding:** The implementation of an Iraqi code of military discipline, professional development programs, and benefits for members of the armed forces is key to improving readiness. The Commission finds that inadequate implementation of these initiatives adversely affects personnel retention and leadership development. Developing future leaders must be an important objective of personnel programs.

Currently, mechanisms to prevent Iraqi soldiers from being absent without leave are not enforced. The Commission was repeatedly informed that no penalty is applied for desertion or being absent without leave in the Iraqi Army. Present-for-duty numbers are verified once a month by the Coalition Military Transition Team. Despite Coalition confidence in these numbers, the military is still plagued by high rates of absenteeism, particularly in Iraqi Army units deployed for combat operations outside their usual area of operation. Such units have leave rates as high as 50 percent.

Although the Iraqi Army is aware of the need to establish a personnel and professional development system that could create positive incentives for soldiers to remain in the military, problems remain. For example, there are currently few rewards for obedience and performance: promotions are slow, time-in-grade pay does not exist, and combat pay for deployments is just coming into being. Battlefield promotions do not occur. The number of captains in the Iraqi Army is very large, reflecting a preliminary rank inflation—captain is the de facto entry grade for officers on the promotion track. Lieutenants are often left without opportunity for promotion and perform the function of noncommissioned officers.

The Commission was struck by one outstanding young Iraqi captain who had been fighting in the Army for the past three years. His American counterparts at a forward operating base were a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major. The Iraqi remained a captain and was frustrated by the slow promotion process. In another case, the Commission discovered that the Sergeant Major of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command is still salaried as a private, despite decades of service to his country and his important position.

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86 Commissioner interviews at Camp Taji, Iraq, July 10, 2007.


Finally, there is no evidence in Iraq that any social compact has been established with the military. Formal support for wounded veterans and for the families of soldiers killed in action is almost nonexistent. As stated above, in Iraq’s economy, the military’s high pay is very attractive and likely remains the primary motivator for service in the all-volunteer force. Soldiers earn around $460 a month—an enormous sum compared with the $2 per month they were paid during the Saddam era as conscripts. But the risks are significant, and there is no system in place to mitigate them. When injured, soldiers must endure Iraq’s overcrowded, underequipped, and corrupt public hospitals. They receive no compensation for long-term disabilities, though in a practice that skews unit strength numbers they are often kept on payrolls by commanders, who understand the importance of loyalty to their troops.

To develop a durable and combat-effective Army, the Government of Iraq and Ministry of Defense need to develop the legal framework to support the human capital of the military—the backbone of any armed force. Current deficiencies are presenting obstacles to the development, loyalty, and effectiveness of the military. The Coalition and Government of Iraq are investing far too much in the training and equipping of Iraqi soldiers to allow them to simply walk away. The application of the Iraqi Code of Military Discipline would address this problem, as would establishing a promotion process that recognized time-in-grade and rewards combat performance as incentives for personnel to remain in service.

To address these challenges, the MOD is considering and implementing a number of new policies and requirements. For example, it is weighing the benefits of waiving time-in-grade requirements to accelerate promotions for junior noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains. The MOD is also working to overcome problems in manpower accountability.

Equipment

**Finding:** The Iraqi Army is adequately equipped for counterinsurgency. However, equipping the Army with more armor, artillery, and mobility is tactically advantageous and communicates a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemy about the growing strength and capability of the Iraqi Army.

Each Iraqi Army soldier is equipped with the standard Iraqi Army uniform, Kevlar helmet, interceptor bulletproof vest, boots, and an M-16 rifle or M-4 rifle for officers. Until May 2007, Iraqi soldiers were issued AK-47 rifles; a program now under way to replace those weapons with M-16 or M-4 rifles, tracked by serial number and biometric data recorded when they are issued, will have beneficial effects when completed.

The Iraqi Army’s inventory of assets is limited in comparison to its neighbors’. In Iraq’s existing forces are 77 T-72s, 250 Soviet-built BMP-1s, 6 Brazilian EE-9 Cascavels, 61 MT-LB Russian-

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90 Coalition forces must follow strict guidelines in offering medical support to Iraqis to ensure that their own capabilities are not overwhelmed.
built tracked vehicles, 69 BTR-80 Russian-built six-wheel vehicles, 353 Polish DZIK four-wheel-drive vehicles, 291 Textron T-6 Badgers, 2,647 AM General Humvees, 600 Land Rover armored jeeps, and 60 small armored vehicles. Shortages of equipment include modern armor, heavy firepower, tactical mobility, air support, and proper medical capabilities. Orders have been placed for delivery by the end of 2007 of 110 BMPs and 29 Cascavels, 29 BTR-80s, 247 DZIKs, 149 Badgers, and 952 Humvees (for a July 2007 snapshot of Iraqi Army unit equipment levels, see Figure 15).

Iraqi units are regularly subjected to direct and indirect fire throughout the country. In almost all cases, Coalition forces must supply the counterfire, close air and artillery support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needed to target the enemy. The Iraqi Army is also significantly supported by Coalition airlift to quickly transport and surge forces to the fight.

As the Commission has stated, the Iraqi Army should continue to focus on its mission of internal defense while beginning to transform itself into a force capable of dealing with the longer-term challenge of external threats. Tactically advantageous to both missions are armor, artillery, and mobility (especially rotary airlift and aircraft capable of providing close air support). Acquiring and implementing these platforms, however, should not distract from the current counterinsurgency mission.

As a first step, existing platforms such as the T-72 tanks donated by NATO to the 9th Mechanized Division should be strategically arrayed around the country to leverage their psychological effect. Entering these platforms into the fight would send a powerful message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of the Iraqi people, including neighboring states supporting terrorism and insurgents. Outward, visible indications of strength in the form of heavy armor—displayed in the capital and elsewhere—would demonstrate that the Iraqi Army has been reborn with the strength necessary to protect the nation and its people.

**Figure 15: Iraqi Army Equipment by Unit**

![Graph showing Iraqi Army Equipment by Unit](image)

Source: MNF-I

DIV = Iraqi Army Division

MTR = Iraqi Army Motor Transport Regiment

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Logistics

**Finding:** Logistics remains the Achilles’ heel of the Iraqi ground forces. Although progress is being made, achieving an adequate forcewide logistics capability is at least 24 months away.

Although the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq’s 2007 goal is to “transition equipment, sustainment and infrastructure expenditures to Iraqi responsibility,” completing this transition poses a great challenge to the independent operation of the Iraqi Army. Iraqi commanders and officials are assigning priority to getting soldiers into the fight; sustaining combat power remains a secondary goal.

As many U.S. commanders and trainers noted, the Coalition’s desire to keep Iraqi forces from failing sometimes has the effect of rewarding bad behavior. For example, although Iraqis ostensibly took over responsibility for fuel distribution months ago through the Ministry of Oil, the Coalition often has to intervene to ensure that Iraqis have enough diesel and benzene to operate generators and continue their daily operations. This is only one symptom of “phantom” Coalition logistics support—provision of off-the-books Coalition logistics—to prevent Iraqis from failing. Phantom logistics mask the true depths of the problems not only in fuel distribution but also in maintenance and repair, ammunition, and other basic support.

Even when Iraqi Army units have the necessary equipment, faulty maintenance of that equipment can be a critical weakness. U.S. commanders and soldiers in the field repeatedly informed the Commission that the Iraqis in general fail to maintain equipment. Iraqis are unfamiliar with many of the new systems and platforms they have purchased in the past few years. When a vehicle becomes non-operational, there are no backup or reserve vehicles to replace it. Preventive maintenance is an alien concept to Iraqis, an attitude that exacerbates the lack of spare or backup vehicles. Where maintenance teams do exist and Iraqi commanders do make upkeep of equipment a priority, they face the further hurdle of acquiring spare parts from Taji National Depot, which appears unable to keep up with requirements.

As discussed in the previous chapter on the Ministry of Defense, the Commission found that the national logistics system cannot yet address the needs of Iraqi units fighting the war. The Taji National Depot is full of new vehicles, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, boots, uniforms, and many other end items that should be made available quickly to Iraqi soldiers fighting the war. According to the Department of Defense, 100 percent of individual authorized items were distributed to the Iraqi Army by the end of 2006, though there were some admitted problems of “cross-leveling between and within units that . . . [led] to shortages in some subordinate units.”

Despite reported distribution of all individual equipment, the Commission heard repeatedly of deployed Iraqi units encountering fundamental difficulties when trying to obtain needed war materials to remain combat-ready.

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91 The Iraqi Army has, for instance, dozens of different types of light-transport trucks and lacks part and maintenance know-how for the different systems.

**Finding:** The current shortfall in logistics is emblematic of the urgent need to solve a major issue in terms that the Iraqi government and military can adopt. U.S. strategies and solutions rely heavily on outsourcing of logistics, an approach that has met resistance from the Iraqi leaders. In many cases, the “Iraqi way,” though not always optimal, is sufficient. The solutions for the Iraqi armed forces must be developed with the goal of achieving an Iraqi standard that allows for Iraqi culture, traditions, and abilities.

Logistics are a problem in large part because the MOD bureaucracy can be complex and cumbersome, and has very little expertise in logistics. Its weaknesses have an adverse trickle-down effect to the Iraqi armed forces. At lower levels of the logistics chain, it is also clear that the Iraqi Army’s Headquarters and Service Companies are undermanned and not independently capable.

The absence of support from the MOD bureaucracy frequently leaves commanders to rely on their creativity, on their thrift, and on whatever resources are available. An Iraqi commander told the Commission of using confiscated weapons caches to make repairs and provide additional ammunition for ongoing operations. To acquire the ammunition through the existing Iraqi logistics system, this commander would have had to send an officer in person to the MOD in Baghdad with a requisition request. Upon receipt of this personally delivered request, the MOD might then take months to fill and distribute the requested ammunition—all this despite the ready availability of ammunition in the MOD system.

The Iraqi Army is not enthusiastic about a contractor-based logistics and maintenance system, which might be at least part of the solution to existing capability shortfalls. The Iraqi Army staff is unimpressed with the contracts they have seen executed, and they seek to foster independence in their operations across the board. While this is a laudable goal, it is not producing results. Every command post and headquarters the Commission visited had vehicles and equipment that were inoperable—and more often than not, the Commission found that Iraqis were waiting for the Coalition to take care of the problem for them. Coalition forces recognize this dependency but find it difficult to lessen while simultaneously maintaining the pace of current operations.

As critical as the development of a functioning logistics capability is for the Iraqi military, Coalition experts may be imposing on them a more complex and elaborate logistics system than is necessary. The logistics force structure plan developed by the Coalition for the Iraq Army appears to reflect the Coalition’s preferences rather than the Iraqis’ needs. Over time it is likely that the current plan will be modified and an “Iraqi solution” will emerge. The Iraqi solution is one that gets the job done to an adequate level, even if not with optimal efficiency and speed. Those innovations will come in time.

**Recommendation:** To operate independently, the Iraqi Army must develop a functioning logistics and maintenance system. The Coalition should continue working with the MOD to develop a system that meets Iraqi needs.

Although the lack of an adequate logistics and maintenance system is a critical shortfall, it is clear that solutions that are imposed on an unwilling organization will not work. A sustainable solution will require patient and consistent efforts to work with MOD officials and Iraqi Army commanders to develop systems that are consistent with the realities of Iraqi culture and
bureaucratic incentives. The Coalition should work with the MOD and Iraqi Army to simplify processes wherever possible and adjust them to an Iraqi standard, which may be more effective in the near term if not necessarily as efficient as we would like.

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Army and Special Forces possess an adequate supply of willing and able manpower and a steadily improving basic training capability. The Army has a baseline supply of equipment for counterinsurgency, but much of this equipment is unavailable for operations owing to maintenance and supply chain management problems. They are making efforts to reduce sectarian influence within their ranks and are achieving some progress. Their operational effectiveness, particularly that of the Special Forces, is increasing, yet they will continue to rely on Coalition forces for key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. Despite progress, they will not be ready to independently fulfill their security role within the next 12 to 18 months. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that substantial progress can be achieved to that end.
CHAPTER 5: THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

In 2004, the Iraqi Air Force had 35 people and possessed no aircraft. This meager beginning and late start as compared to the new Iraqi Army help put in context the progress the Air Force has made since then. Its personnel now number approximately 1,100 airmen equipped with 45 aircraft that are capable of 130 to 150 sorties a week. They are engaged in supporting the domestic counterinsurgency fight, and as the Iraqi Air Force’s capacity improves, so too will its ability to be a force multiplier for Iraqi ground forces. However, the delayed start-up of the new Iraqi Air Force resulted in a considerable lag behind the Iraqi Army’s current level of maturity. Moreover, the creation of effective operational, maintenance, and support systems for an air force, with its advanced technical requirements, demands a longer period of development. The net effect of this asymmetry is that Coalition support will likely be required for a longer period for the Iraqi Air Force than for the Army. Despite steady progress and its strong future potential, today’s Iraqi Air Force is heavily reliant on Coalition forces for support and training; and though its capabilities are improving, it remains far from operational independence.

Overview of the Iraqi Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force was established in the early 1930s and originally consisted of five pilots and a supporting crew of less than three dozen. From 1931 until the arrival of Coalition forces in 2003, the Air Force took part in a number of armed conflicts, including the May 1941 war against British occupation and the 1948 and June 1967 wars against Israel. The Air Force contributed significantly at the end of the protracted Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s by quashing Iran’s final offensive; during that war, it grew to roughly 950 aircraft. By the time of the first Gulf War, the Iraqi Air Force was the largest in the Middle East, though it suffered from uneven quality in both aircraft and aircrew.4

In general, Saddam Hussein preferred not to use his air force for combat, saving it instead as a reserve force to defend Baghdad. It proved most effective against fixed economic targets such as oil facilities, and Hussein structured his air defenses along the Soviet model. During the Gulf War, U.S.-led coalition forces devastated the Iraqi Air Force, greatly degrading its overall capacity. Most of the aircraft that did survive the war are now in Iran, where they were moved before the Gulf War to save them from being destroyed. Although the Commander of the Iraqi Air Force has expressed a desire to retrieve some of those aircraft, this retrieval has not yet occurred.

Lieutenant General Kamal al-Barzanji, who leads the new Iraqi Air Force, reports to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The main objectives of the new Iraqi Air Force are to organize, train, and equip air operations; to conduct day/night/all-weather counterinsurgency operations; and to provide homeland capabilities to the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is focused mainly on

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93 Briefing from Iraqi Air Force officials, July 2007.
95 Ibid.
counterinsurgency missions, particularly aerial observation and surveillance and air transportation, and units perform daily operational missions that collect intelligence for Iraqi and Coalition forces.

The Iraqi Air Force operates with a small mix of platforms: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; fixed wing transport; and rotary wing capabilities. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms are now eight SAMA CH-2000s, two Sea Bird Seekers, and three Cessna Caravans used by two squadrons.99 By December 2007, this capability will include one more advanced platform, the King Air 350ER. In addition, a training squadron will receive its first intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms of four Cessna 172s and two Cessna 208Bs. The fixed wing transport capability is currently supported by three C-130 transport planes, and the Ministry of Defense has requested three more to bring the squadron size to six.100 The three rotary wing platforms, used mostly for battlefield mobility and casualty evacuation by three Iraqi Air Force squadrons, are 10 Bell Huey II helicopters, 14 Mi-17 battlefield mobility helicopters, and 5 Jet Ranger training helicopters. By December 2007, the number of Huey IIs should reach 16 and the number of Mi-17s should be 28. The 5 Jet Rangers will provide the initial capability to another training squadron, which will also receive its own 8 Huey IIs.101

In short, if procurement proceeds as intended, the Iraqi Air Force platforms will increase in number from the current 45 to 80 by December 2007. By 2010, the Iraqi Air Force also has plans to bring on line a counterterrorism capability with both greater numbers of existing platforms and more sophisticated platforms. These would include 18 King Air 350s, 6 Caravans, and 8 CH2000s for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component; 6 C-130s and 4 King Air 350s for greater fixed wing airlift capacity; 41 Mi-17s and 40 Huey IIs for increased rotary wing capability; and 32 T6/Super Tucano/L-39 class aircraft for a new light attack capability.102

The Iraqi Air Force currently operates out of four air bases throughout Iraq. New Al Muthana Air Base handles the Iraqi Air Force’s fixed wing transport functions. Because the 23 Squadron there features all-Iraqi flight crews with Iraqi Air Force maintenance technicians performing all basic maintenance, U.S. Air Force Military Training Team personnel have been able to reduce their presence. The Taji Air Base houses an interim Air Force Academy as well as most of the Iraqi Air Force’s rotary wing platforms. The Basra and Kirkuk Air Bases are focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support of the counterinsurgency mission.103 To that end, units from these air bases run daily missions throughout Iraq to provide actionable intelligence back to Coalition and Iraqi ground forces.

The current capacity of the Iraqi Air Force includes a growing number of personnel. The force totals more than 1,100 at present, and aggressive recruitment efforts are seeking to raise the number of airmen above 3,000 by the end of 2007.104 Most early manning has derived from the pre-

99 Ibid.
100 Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, June 2007, p. 43 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).
103 Briefing from Coalition Air Force Transition Team, July 2007.
104 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.
2003 Iraqi Air Force, consisting mainly of older men who have done little flying since 1991. The current pilots are considered sufficient for the low-end counterinsurgency fight until younger, more highly trained pilots can be fielded. All current leadership is also drawn from the pre-2003 Air Force, and in general their survival skills exceed their capacity for leadership. Over time, they will need to be replaced so that the development of true quality can be fostered in the new service.

Training the growing numbers of Iraqi Air Force personnel is an ongoing challenge. The training, generally conducted in conjunction with Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, has been run largely by Coalition Air Force Transition Teams. Basic Iraqi Air Force training consists of pilot sustainment and conversion training and maintenance training. C-130 training has taken place in United States, while language training and flight training have been conducted in Iraq, currently at Al Muthana Air Base. Some additional crews previously received training in Jordan on UH-1Hs and Seekers.105 Advisory Support Teams provide U.S.-based training for reconnaissance missions, including courses for pilots, navigators, maintenance officers, flight engineers, and loadmasters, and courses in Iraq for maintenance and aircrew personnel.106 The Iraqi Air Force also has two training squadrons located at Kirkuk Air Base, where a flight school is scheduled to open in the fall of 2007.107

Challenges Facing the Air Force

During the course of this assessment, the Commission met with virtually all of the Iraqi Air Force general officers (including the Commander and Deputy Commander), numerous field and company grade officers, officer trainees, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel. The Commission visited all the Iraqi Air Force installations save one, plus numerous training and operational facilities. One member of the Commission flew four separate missions with Iraqi Air Force crews and aircraft. On the basis of these numerous meetings and site visits, the Commission developed a number of key findings that are outlined in the sections to follow.

Woven throughout these findings, the Commission notes three particular challenges:

- Identifying, recruiting, and training personnel who are technically capable and motivated to pursue a demanding military profession.

- Molding a leadership and management approach in the emerging officer corps that is consistent with Iraqi culture yet rejects the risk aversion and obsequiousness of the Saddam era.

- Inculcating the need for and developing the skills to synchronize air capabilities with joint (special operations and army) missions.

Recruiting and Training

**Finding:** The long-term capability of the Iraqi Air Force will depend on its success in recruiting quality personnel, and will require greater emphasis on basic and technical training.

The Commission found that although Air Force recruitment is proceeding at a numerically satisfactory rate, the quality of the available recruiting pool leaves much to be desired. Much of Iraq’s middle class, from which technically inclined recruits are normally drawn, has left the country. For those Iraqis remaining in the country, military service, regardless of its personal appeal, carries with it significant risk of insurgent retaliation. The future of an effective Iraqi Air Force depends on recruiting quality candidates who can absorb high standards of training and also adapt to a new culture of responsibility and choice unknown during the Saddam era. Improved screening methods and recruiting tools that reach deeper into the available recruiting pool are required.

Filling the requirement for pilots is a twofold problem: near-term requirements can be filled only by Saddam-era pilots, most of whom had questionable original training and have not flown seriously since 1991. These men generally require significant retraining even at elementary levels, and often seem more interested in enjoying the status of being pilots than in undertaking the hard work of improving their skills. To their credit, they do seem willing, even eager, to engage in the counterinsurgency fight.

The Iraqi Air Force has developed an expansive training plan that, as mentioned, is now being implemented. Basic enlisted and officer training began in spring 2007, and technical training is scheduled to grow incrementally to adequate capacity by the summer of 2008, when the output of undergraduate pilots should be 30 per year. According to Iraqi Air Force officials, going forward the training plan will have three main facets. First, they will run Air Force Officer training at the Iraqi Military Academy in Rustamiyah. Second, they will use an interim Air Force Academy in Taji for technical training in areas such as maintenance, intelligence, and fuels, as well as for basic enlisted and warrant officer training. Third, the air base in Kirkuk will host air wing training, with a focus on rotary wing training on Jet Rangers and Huey IIs, and fixed wing training on Cessna 172 and Cessna Caravan platforms. At present, absenteeism, particularly among enlisted and warrant officers, is very high (35–40 percent), effectively lengthening the training time for new technicians.

The Iraqi Air Force has shown more enthusiasm for updating its platforms than for training qualified technicians and airmen and building the necessary infrastructure to support them. The latter are more difficult tasks, but they are critical to any successful air force.

**Recommendation:** Together with its Coalition partners, the Iraqi Air Force must increase the quality of its recruits and the capacity of current and planned training programs, while also increasing the manpower authorizations to compensate for chronic absenteeism. Emphasis on the value of training must be relentless.

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Maintenance

Finding: Although aircraft procurement has been adequate to date, maintenance and sustainment systems lag well behind the procurement program and thus impede overall Iraqi Air Force capability.

At present, the Iraqi Air Force does not have an air force-wide maintenance or supply system, in part because of the low training output mentioned above, and in part because of its resourcing priorities. In general, the enthusiasm to buy more and better platforms far exceeds the desire to purchase spare parts or perform maintenance on existing platforms and equipment. Moreover, using contractor support as a stepping-stone to developing an organic maintenance capability is often viewed with suspicion by the Iraqi Air Force leadership, who see it as a ruse to get Iraqis to give their money to U.S. firms. In the absence of a sufficient capability within the Iraqi Air Force, much of the responsibility for maintenance currently rests with Coalition advisors.

The inherently technical nature of air force equipment makes the lack of a functioning maintenance and supply system a significant problem, in terms both of establishing operational independence for the Iraqi Air Force and of supporting its growth over time.

Recommendation: Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq must redouble its efforts to inculcate the value of quality maintenance and support into the culture of the MOD in general, and of the Iraqi Air Force in particular.

Training in proper maintenance, including preventive maintenance and the timely purchase of appropriate levels of spare parts, must become the very foundation on which a capable new Iraqi Air Force is built. Until the Iraqi Air Force can take responsibility for its own maintenance, it will continue to require significant Coalition assistance. The key, then, is determining at what point the Iraqi Air Force is ready to assume this critical responsibility. It is important to wait long enough to ensure that the capability to perform the tasks adequately is present, but not so long that the motivation to take responsibility never develops. Once the transition of responsibility for maintenance occurs and a sufficient emphasis on maintenance is embedded in the culture of the Iraqi Air Force, greater numbers of more sophisticated aircraft can be absorbed and managed effectively. However, the Commission believes that even with success in this area, the Iraqi Air Force will likely require Coalition assistance for the next two to three years.

Overall Air Force Direction and Progress

Finding: Although the Iraqi Air Force has had a very late start compared to the Iraqi Army, the present design of the Iraqi Air Force is appropriate for its current mission and it is making significant progress.

The current design of the new Iraqi Air Focus is focused on supporting the domestic counterinsurgency operations while using mainly low-tech aircraft. This design appears appropriate for its present stage of development, given its relatively limited lift capacity; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability; and rotary wing insert and retraction capabilities. The Iraqi Air Force’s overall capacity is still very small compared with the size of the ground forces that
it is designed to support, and it has almost no lethal capability. The procurement process has begun to acquire low-tech, fixed wing close air support aircraft. When that capability is added to those above, a balanced air force will emerge capable of fully supporting the military’s counterinsurgency mission. At that point, Coalition air forces may begin a prudent drawdown.

Current deficiencies in the Iraqi Air Force include the lack of fixed wing close air coverage to fully support the counterinsurgency capability of ground forces, a command and control program that is still largely in its infancy, and the lack of a demonstrable ability to operate jointly with other services. The Iraqi Air Force must develop operating techniques compatible with those of the ground forces that it is intended to support. Traditional independence and cultural habits among its personnel of thinking primarily of their own family or tribe may contribute to the challenge of fostering its seamless integration into joint operations. The Commission discerned some faint progress in this area, but a considerable distance remains to be traveled.

**Recommendation:** Given its good progress to date, the new Iraqi Air Force should stay its present course of developing a counterinsurgency air force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, reliance on Coalition support can diminish.

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Air Force’s relatively late establishment hampers its ability to provide much-needed air support to ground operations. It is well designed as the air component to the existing counterinsurgency effort, but not for the future needs of a fully capable air force. Though limited by the availability of properly skilled personnel, and by an inclination to value force size and acquisition over operational effectiveness, it is nonetheless progressing at a promising rate during this formative period.
CHAPTER 6: THE IRAQI NAVY

The Iraqi Navy operates in an area of responsibility with significant strategic value, bordered by countries with which Iraq has difficult political relationships. The Navy is responsible for supporting ongoing counterinsurgency operations and for the security of the key Iraqi infrastructure that enables the shipping of nearly all Iraq’s oil, which constitutes the majority of national revenue. In just a few years, the Iraqi Navy has made significant progress, has embarked on an ambitious training and acquisition program, and has implemented a sophisticated planning process. It continues to develop solid leadership as it works with its Coalition partners toward independent operation in its area of responsibility. This progress notwithstanding, the Iraqi Navy remains dependent on Coalition assistance and faces significant challenges in a number of areas.

Overview of the Iraqi Navy

Founded in 1937 with just four ships, the Iraqi Navy has generally remained a small part of Iraq’s overall military capacity. The Iraqi Navy played almost no part in the Iran-Iraq War, but it did pose a threat to U.S. forces during the Gulf War, primarily through its large arsenal of naval mines. By the conclusion of Operations Desert Shield and Storm, more than 100 Iraqi naval vessels had been destroyed and the Navy was largely devastated. By 2002 the Iraqi Navy was in a meager state of readiness, with remaining units barely operational and crews largely untrained.109

The Coalition began working with Iraqis to rebuild the Navy in 2004. Challenges at that early stage included lack of personnel and appropriate vessels, the need to establish working relationships between the Iraqi Navy and Joint Headquarters, a legacy of no central planning or budgetary continuity, and poor relations with the Coast Guard.110 In January 2004 the Coalition established the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force, whose volunteers attended eight weeks of basic training alongside Army trainees. They then pursued special maritime training in Umm Qasr, concentrating on more advanced seamanship, sea rescue, maritime law, first aid, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training.111 The Iraqi Coastal Defense Force was later renamed the Iraqi Navy, and the new Iraqi Navy training pipeline began in January 2005.112

The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is very small but strategically important, as it includes the al Basra and Khor al Amaya oil terminals and Iraq’s only deep water port (Umm Qasr), all of which are vital to Iraq’s economy. Thus despite the Iraqi Navy’s small size, its mission is significant—protection of these crucial assets, Iraq’s territorial seas, and its economic exclusion zone; protection of the shoreline and inland waterways from insurgent and criminal infiltration; force protection; surface surveillance; point defense of offshore oil loading facilities; and visit, board,

110 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy official, July 2007.
search, and seizure interdiction operations. However, the Navy’s development has lagged behind that of the other services, perhaps two to three years behind that of the Iraqi Army.

The new Iraqi Navy is commanded by Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhim at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Baghdad and by an operational commander, Commander Ahmed Maarij, in Umm Qasr; its leadership reports to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. Today the Iraqi Navy consists of almost 1,300 personnel, with plans to expand to 2,500. It is organized into an operational headquarters, a patrol squadron, an assault squadron, and four marine battalions. As the Iraqi Navy’s area of responsibility is in the country’s south, the Navy’s personnel are predominantly Shi’a; but most other ethnic and religious groups, including Kurds, Christians, and Sunnis, are represented. Furthermore, one of the Iraqi Navy’s major successes has been in remaining nonsectarian; it has put significant emphasis on instilling a sense of overarching loyalty to the Navy and the central government—not to tribal and religious affiliations.

The current naval fleet is not adequate to execute the Navy’s mission. It consists of Predator class patrol boats, Italian river boats, Al Faw patrol boats, and fast assault boats. Some of these assets are of such poor quality that they can at best be cannibalized for spare parts, or perhaps used for basic ship handling and navigation training. In addition, the fleet as a whole is plagued by poor maintenance practices. Accordingly, a large part of current planning is an extensive and ambitious acquisition program to build the fleet to contain 15 patrol boats, 4 patrol ships, 2 offshore vessels, and up to 50 fast assault boats. These vessels will provide security for the oil terminals; patrol the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Iraqi territorial waters and economic exclusion zone; and provide command and control and forward support. The contracts for the offshore support vessels, patrol ships, and three of the patrol boats are completed—though they have been delayed over negotiations regarding exchange rates and taxes—and the purchases were made with Iraqi money.

At present the Iraqi Navy is using a road map formulated in conjunction with Coalition forces. The Maritime Services Transition Team encompasses many different Coalition components, including U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Multi-National Forces–Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, the Joint Headquarters Transition Team, Combined Task Force 158 and Combined Task Group 158.1, the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, and the Naval Transition Team. The Maritime Services Transition Team works closely with the Iraqi MOD, Joint

113 Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, February 2006, p. 44 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).
114 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.
115 Briefing with Maritime Services Transition Team official, July 2007.
116 Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007.
118 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.
119 Combined Task Force (CTF) 158 operates in the northern Persian Gulf, also known as the northern Arabian Gulf (NAG), under a separate chain of command from that of the Naval Transition Team. Task Force 158 is the maritime contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and is executed by Coalition forces of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom working alongside elements of the Iraqi Navy and the Iraqi Marines. Task Force 158’s mission is to protect Iraq’s vital oil infrastructure in the NAG, to conduct maritime security operations (MSO) in the NAG, and to contribute to the development of the operational capability of the Iraqi Navy and Marines so that Coalition forces may withdraw in due course.
Headquarters, the Iraqi Navy, and operational elements at Umm Qasr as it provides advice and training. It should be noted that a primary player in this process is the Royal Navy, which provides the bulk of personnel and the senior liaison officers, including the principal advisor to Rear Admiral Jawad. The commander of the Naval Transition Team in Umm Qasr, who also serves as the principal advisor to Commander Ahmed, the Iraqi operational commander, is a member of the Royal Navy as well.

Although this structure is complex, in general it functions as follows: Multi-National Force–Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq advise the MOD and Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The representative of the naval component of the Joint Headquarters Transition Team in turn advises the head of the Iraqi Navy. The commander of the Naval Transition Team at Umm Qasr provides force training and mentoring to the Iraqi operational commander at Umm Qasr, who also receives training feedback from the Combined Task Group 158.1. At the same time, the operational commander is the Iraqi force provider to the Combined Task Group 158.1. Combined Task Group 158.1 and Combined Task Force 158 also provide operational assistance and on-scene training to the Iraqi Navy in protecting the oil terminals and in conducting visit, board, search, and seizure operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

**Challenges Facing the Iraqi Navy**

As a part of its assessment, the Commission interviewed five senior Coalition officials from the Maritime Services Transition Team structure, the Naval Transition Team, Combined Task Force 158, and the Combined Task Group 158.1, as well as two senior officials from the Iraqi Navy. The Commission also traveled to the Umm Qasr Naval Base and, via Iraqi patrol boat, to the al Basra and Khor al Amaya oil terminals in the Iraqi Navy’s area of responsibility. These meetings and site visits made clear that although the new Iraqi Navy is making progress, it faces challenges raised by its low profile within the MOD, the complexity of its mission, the highly restricted maritime battle space in its area of responsibility, poor logistics and maintenance, and poor relations with the Coast Guard.

**Ministry of Defense**

*Finding: The low profile of the Iraqi Navy within the MOD, as well as the ministry’s inadequate budget allocation and execution, significantly impede Iraqi naval operations and development.*

The Iraqi Navy has never enjoyed a high profile within the Ministry of Defense, although this situation is changing somewhat with increased recognition of the Navy’s strategic importance, not only in the role it plays in Iraq’s economic well-being but also in maintaining the country’s territorial integrity by protecting Iraq’s economic exclusion zone. Iraqi naval officers told the Commission that they confront two main types of challenges: external threats to the nation and a weak internal relationship with the Ministry of Defense. The Iraqi Navy frequently has problems

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120 Iraqi Navy Information Brief, July 2007.

121 The Commission also spoke informally with many more Iraqi Navy and Coalition officers during extensive site visits.
working with the MOD on issues related to budget execution, contracting, and planning.\footnote{122} For example, because of the long lead time required to procure naval assets, the head of the Iraqi Navy recommended budgeting on a five-year cycle, but the MOD has not embraced this idea of planning further into the out years.

Like many other components of the Iraqi Security Forces, the Iraqi Navy fails to spend much of what has been appropriated for it (and what it greatly needs) because the MOD refuses to delegate budget execution authority and insists on complex bureaucratic procedures requiring multiple signatures. Senior Iraqi Navy officers also told the Commission that the Iraqi Navy does not receive sufficient funding to conduct daily operations. At present, the Iraqi Navy operational commander in Umm Qasr has a monthly operations and management budget of only $2,000. Although this figure does not include wages and fuel costs, it is insufficient to cover priorities such as routine maintenance and the purchase of spare parts, let alone such basics as buying office supplies and running the sick bay.\footnote{123} Maintenance remains drastically underfunded, largely because of budget execution problems.\footnote{124} This lack of delegation authority extends even to basic equipment and training. For example, MOD M-7 (the Training Directorate), rather than Navy operational commanders, determines how much training ammunition to allocate. Currently MOD M-7 allocates only 10 training rounds per year, per person—an amount considered wholly inadequate by both Iraqi Navy operational commanders and Naval Transition Team advisors.\footnote{125}

Some senior Iraqi Navy leaders believe that these challenges are due in part to what they see as the MOD’s inability to fully understand or value the Navy’s role. The MOD, which is focused more on ground forces given the current security environment, may not understand the nature of naval operations, the maintenance they involve, or their need for spare parts. Iraqi naval leaders feel that the MOD will always prioritize other components of the ISF over the Navy when facing budgetary pressures. Absent a reasonable operations and management budget, as well as sufficient access to spare parts, ammunition, and other necessities, no amount of Coalition training or support will enable the Iraqi Navy to operate independently.

***Recommendation:** Coalition advisors must assist the Iraqi Navy leadership in advocating budget priorities within the MOD. The strategic importance of the Iraqi Navy must be better articulated to the Government of Iraq, in terms both of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and of providing the security needed to ensure the efficient flow of exports. Larger issues of poor ministerial capacity and poor budget execution must also be addressed with Coalition support, as detailed more extensively in the discussion on MOD capacity (Chapter 4).

**Iraqi Navy Area of Responsibility**

***Finding:** The Iraqi Navy area of responsibility is small, complicated, and of vital strategic importance. Relations among the nations bordering the area of responsibility and their respective navies and coast guards are fragile at best. Furthermore, the international maritime borders with Iran and Kuwait are

\footnote{122 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.}
\footnote{123 Ibid.}
\footnote{124 Ibid.}
\footnote{125 Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007}
contested and not clearly demarcated. These issues warrant greater attention from both the MOD and the Coalition.

The Iraqi Navy and its Coalition partners operate in an extraordinarily small and confined maritime battle space that is bordered by both Iranian and Kuwaiti waters and that includes two oil terminals. These terminals are among the most important infrastructure assets in Iraq. The al Basra oil terminal (ABOT) alone accounts for roughly 85 percent of the Government of Iraq’s revenue, with more than $12,000 worth of oil running through it for export every second. This terminal can handle four tankers at a time and pump 1.2 million barrels per day, with the potential of pumping 2.2 million barrels daily. The Khor al Amaya oil terminal (KAANOT), which sits very close to the Iranian border, has only recently returned to limited operations after a serious explosion and fire; it is in a state of serious disrepair and has a much smaller capacity. It can handle about one tanker a week, pumps about 200,000 barrels per day, and brings in about 5 percent of Iraq’s revenue. Since it has no metering capability, many suspect that much of the oil shipped from this terminal ends up on the black market, with revenues going to local criminal elements. Together these two terminals not only are vital to Iraq’s economy but are of strategic importance to the international oil market.

Although the Iraqi Navy has completed some small-scale exercises with Coalition navies, including the Kuwaiti Navy, there are several challenges to overcome in Iraqi-Kuwaiti naval relations, mostly stemming from the lack of clear demarcation of international borders and territorial waters. For example, the Kuwaiti government sometimes objects to dredging and maintenance work done on the channel near Umm Qasr that is critical to maintaining oceangoing access. It also stops fishing vessels, and when it judges them to be violating Kuwaiti waters it asks them to change their flags or detains the fishermen, often confiscating their boats and fishing gear. The Iraqi naval operational commander expressed a desire to meet with the Kuwaiti side to discuss and resolve political issues, but to date such a meeting has not occurred. Combined Task Force 158 is also trying to encourage engagement with Kuwait on issues of mutual interest, including dredging, normalizing water space, infrastructure investments, and consequence management. Consequence management in the face of a major oil spill or other such maritime disaster is a major concern, as neither the al Basra nor Khor al Amaya oil terminals have sufficient plans or assets in place for such an eventuality. For example, because of the currents, any oil spill would quickly reach the intakes of Kuwaiti and Saudi water desalination plants. It would also threaten their oil platforms and likely cause a significant boost in maritime insurance rates.

Even more is at stake in the relationship between the Iraqi Navy and its Iranian counterpart, yet apparently no strategic policy exists with respect to their maritime interactions. The Iraqi-Iranian

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126 Naval Transition Team Briefing, July 2007.
127 ABOT has been repaired with Coalition funding and is now a world-class facility. However, some Coalition officials told the Commission that they believe Iraq’s Southern Oil Company would like to turn off ABOT’s metering device to obscure from the Iraqi central government the amount of output from the platform. In theory, doing so would give Southern Oil Company the opportunity to take additional profits. KAAOT remains unmetered; it also lacks a surge damper, and that absence increases operational risk.
128 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
129 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
130 Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.
131 Ibid.
demarcation lines remain contested, and there is a significant Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy presence in the area. Further complicating the battle space is an old sunken Iraqi barge crane, now claimed and occupied by Iran, that rests in the disputed waters about one nautical mile from the Khor al Amaya oil terminal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy uses it for surveillance. From the vantage point of the crane, it is possible to closely observe Iraqi Navy and Coalition naval activities as well as Combined Task Group 158.1 Headquarters, which is located on a barge attached to the Khor al Amaya oil terminal. No action has been taken to remove the Iranians from their new perch.

**Recommendation:** Absent clearly defined territorial seas, the Iraqi Navy’s battle space will be further complicated. Although the Commission realizes that resolving this issue is made more difficult by long-standing animosities between these nations and may not be feasible in the near term, it is important that the profile of this issue be raised within the Government of Iraq and the country team.

**Coast Guard**

**Finding:** The Iraqi Navy does not have a collaborative relationship with the Iraqi Coast Guard, though the two services operate in close proximity and have complementary missions. This lack of coordination has the potential to create vulnerable seams in a critical strategic environment.

The Iraqi Coast Guard patrols the river waterways along the Iraqi coast and focuses on smuggling interdiction. The Coast Guard operates in a region heavily infiltrated with largely pro-Iranian Shi’a militia. For example, the port of Umm Qasr itself has fallen under strong Jaysh al-Mahdi influence. The Coast Guard has been trained to tactical proficiency by the Royal Navy, and is capable of taking on smugglers during encounters. Coast guardsmen tend to focus on commercial smuggling, particularly large-scale oil smuggling, though they have taken casualties.

Iraqi Naval officers appear wary of Coast Guard operations. Coalition advisors told the Commission that the coast guardsmen appeared rarely to capture smugglers they pursued or to confiscate seized weapons. It is not clear whether the Coast Guard would engage smugglers more effectively if its personnel were better armed or if its alleged poor performance indicates infiltration or cooperation with militias in the area.

Because the Iraqi Navy and Coast Guard operate in such close proximity, they need to work well together. Today the relationship between the Iraqi Navy and the Iraqi Coast Guard is problematic. The Iraqi Navy and Coast Guard operate under separate chains of command, with the Coast Guard reporting to the Ministry of Interior and the Navy reporting to the Ministry of Defense. To date, there has been little formal contact between the two forces, though some Coalition advisors are pushing for more such interchanges. A further complication in the relationship is that many Coast Guard personnel are former Navy officers and petty officers who failed to pass through the

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132 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
133 Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.
134 Interview with CTF 158 official, July 2007.
vetting process as the new Iraqi Navy was being formed, and old resentments obviously could create tensions between the two forces.  

**Recommendation:** The Coalition should work with the MOD, Iraqi Navy, and Coast Guard to examine the feasibility and potential advantages of merging the Navy and Coast Guard into a single service with responsibility for coastal maritime security. If unity of command cannot be attained by combining both forces under the MOD, then better cooperation and coordination has to be developed to prevent a serious gap in security.

**Overview of Current Status**

**Finding:** The new Iraqi Navy has made significant progress over a very short time period, particularly in planning, but it remains heavily reliant on the Coalition for training, logistics, and maintenance support.

Planning is one area of real progress in the Iraqi Navy. Not only does the Navy have a multiyear transition road map, but Rear Admiral Jawad has started inviting officers to semiannual naval planning days at which the road map is explained and discussed. There is also a semiannual Navy board that convenes in August and December; the December 2007 board will likely approve the Navy plan for 2008. In addition, every four to five months—most recently in May 2007—U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Coalition meet to take stock of the Iraqi Navy’s progress. Rear Admiral Jawad himself is taking additional small but important steps, such as codifying, printing, and distributing standardized rules of engagement.

The Iraqi Navy’s road map includes an ambitious acquisition plan that necessitates an equally ambitious and effective technical and leadership training program. Such efforts are well under way, under the auspices of the Coalition advisory structure outlined above. The Naval Transition Team works closely with the Iraqi Navy operational commander in Umm Qasr, and in general its representatives characterized the Iraqi Navy’s progress toward identified milestones, its recruitment levels, and its attitude as very good. The basic Naval Transition Team mission is to mentor the Iraqi Navy in order to make possible a successful transition, and it focuses on operational capability and sustainability. The Naval Transition Team in Umm Qasr consists of 55 people from the United Kingdom and the United States. They are divided into six functional areas: operations, logistics, training, military training, engineering, and naval base construction. The Naval Transition Team, headed by a Royal Navy captain, is taking a “leading from behind” approach so that Iraqis gain a sense of ownership of their responsibilities, decision making, and progress. This captain also stressed that because of the high level of turnover (Royal Navy tours last only six months), establishing the personal relationships necessary to move forward can be challenging—particularly since building rapport before tackling daily operational issues is critical to success.

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136 Ibid.
137 Rear Admiral Jawad is set to attend the International Sea Power Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, in October 2007. The event is hosted by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.
138 Interview with senior Iraqi Navy officer, July 2007.
139 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 42.
140 Meeting with Naval Transition Team official, July 2007.
The Naval Transition Team commander identified several problem areas for the Iraqis undertaking the transition. For example, the Iraqis are having trouble with the command and control portion of the road map, which eventually calls for strategic command from the Joint Headquarters in Baghdad, operational control from the naval headquarters at Umm Qasr, and tactical command from commanders on vessels in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Naval Transition Team officials characterized leadership as variable, though they consider the operational commander in Umm Qasr to be highly competent. Training is progressing well (including a good program in visit, board, search, and seizure operations), and in general the Iraqi Navy is making progress in acquiring new ships. At the tactical level, the Naval Transition Team commander cited good spirit and morale and improved base security.

The issues of poor maintenance and a weak supply chain surfaced repeatedly as major impediments to the Iraqi Navy’s development. In particular, a tendency toward fixing breakdowns rather than performing preventive maintenance is a significant problem, as is the difficulty of getting funding released that can be devoted expressly to maintenance and other support operations. In fact, the Naval Transition Team Commander informed the Commission that maintenance is one of the Iraqi Navy’s pressing problems. In addition, lack of access to sufficient fuel stocks and reliance on generators are problematic. These issues also strongly indicate the need for continued Coalition assistance.

**Recommendation:** An ongoing Naval Transition Team presence in Umm Qasr is essential and should be continued.

It is vital that the Iraqi Navy retain the support of its Coalition partners, both to sustain current progress and to address new priorities. Among the Naval Transition Team’s future priorities are creating an Umm Qasr naval base action plan with an operational focus (building command and control, improving communications, formalizing a planning process), developing consistent and competent leadership, and, ultimately, effecting the transition. The most difficult choice will likely be regarding the extent to which Naval Transition Team should step back and allow the Iraqis to take on greater responsibility, balancing their need to learn to take risks against the need to complete the transition. The central tension may be between attempting to achieve Coalition standards and encouraging the Iraqi Navy to find Iraqi solutions to its problems. In the very near term, the focus may have to be placed more on the integration of Coalition forces with Iraqi naval forces than on transition.

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Navy is small and its current fleet is insufficient to execute its mission. However, it is making substantive progress in this early stage of development: it has a well-thought-out growth plan, which it is successfully executing. Its maturation is hampered by the Ministry of Defense’s understandable focus on ground forces and counterinsurgency operations, as well as by bureaucratic inefficiency. The Iraqi Navy will continue to rely on Coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the foreseeable future.

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141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Briefing with CTF 158, July 2007.
CHAPTER 7: THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

A central challenge confronting the development of effective civil security forces in Iraq is the dysfunctional and sectarian Ministry of Interior (MOI) itself. In contrast to the Ministry of Defense, the MOI is rife with political and sectarian intrigues and is struggling to be even partially effective as a government institution. In most areas of administrative function, the MOI has some nascent capability, but progress is extremely slow. There is very little sense of momentum in transitioning greater responsibilities to the MOI. The ministry’s physical presence—its multiple floors reportedly controlled by different factions, its location near Sadr City, and its multiple security checks and heavily armed occupants—is in itself a symbol of its dysfunction, sectarian character, and ineffectiveness. Whether the Iraq Police Service—which over time will be critical to Iraq’s ability to maintain internal stability and deny terrorists safe haven—can ultimately become effective is heavily dependent on whether the MOI can become a far more functional ministry.

Overview of the Ministry of Interior

Under Saddam Hussein, the Ministry of Interior essentially was the intelligence arm of the Ba’ath Party, acting as the country’s secret police. Despite the MOI’s ignominious roots, the Coalition Provisional Authority did not dissolve it as it did the Ministry of Defense; instead, it sought to retain the MOI so that it could quickly transfer responsibility for policing and internal security to an Iraqi institution.144 The Coalition Provisional Authority invested considerable effort into restructuring the MOI, but focused largely on the physical reconstruction of the ministry building itself. Although some attempts were also made at this time to develop the MOI’s administrative capabilities, progress was slow because advisory staff and their Iraqi colleagues spent most of their time managing short-term crises and could devote little energy to longer-term developmental efforts.

The current Minister of Interior is Jawad al-Bolani, a Shi’a who served in the Iraqi Air Force for more than 15 years. The ministry has five deputy ministers who are responsible for running its five primary departments, eight independent directorates reporting directly to the Minister, and several senior supporting advisors. A plan has been developed to consolidate ministry functions into a more streamlined organization, but it is not clear when that restructuring process will be complete.

Coalition assistance to the Ministry of Interior and its civil security forces is provided largely by the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), which was established in 2004. Recognizing the MOI’s administrative weaknesses, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team established a 90-person Ministry Transition Team to work in various offices within the MOI to mentor senior officials, build internal capacity, and advise on policy and technical issues. A brigadier general from the United Kingdom leads this transition team and personally visits MOI offices several times each week. The transition team’s overall goal is to develop the MOI’s administrative capacity so that it can sustain Iraq’s civil security forces, which number more than

300,000 as of July 2007 and are composed primarily of the Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and border enforcement forces (see Figure 16).

![Figure 16: MOI Force Growth](image)

**Ministry of Interior**

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Data includes all MOI Forces (IPS, National Police, FPS and DBE)

**Challenges for the Ministry of Interior**

During its assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Commission met with officials at the departments of Defense and State involved in efforts to further develop the Ministry of Interior. The Commission also met with the Honorable Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida’ie, Iraq’s Ambassador to the United States, who had served in 2004 as Minister of Interior. While in Iraq, the Commission held discussions with numerous Iraqi and American officials working for and with the MOI. In addition to meeting with senior officials working at the MOI level, the Commission also visited many Iraqi Police Service, National Police, and Department of Border Enforcement sites to gain a field-level perspective on the ministry.

It is clear from the Commission’s extensive interviews and site visits that despite painstaking work, especially during the past year, the Ministry of Interior remains a highly sectarian organization that is partially effective at best and is in danger of losing ground in some administrative areas. If it is to continue to make progress, the MOI must deal more successfully with
sectarianism and corruption, administration, logistics, and budgeting, as well as the status of the Facilities Protection Service.

Sectarianism and Corruption

Finding: Sectarianism and corruption are pervasive in the MOI and cripple the ministry’s ability to accomplish its mission to provide internal security for Iraqi citizens.

Under the previous Interior Minister, Bayan Jabr, who is now the powerful Minister of Finance, the Ministry of Interior became politicized. Jabr was a member of the Badr Organization and a member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest Shi’a political party. He gave key ministry posts to members of the Badr Brigade, and Badr Brigade militia infiltrated Iraqi police units in many areas of the country. Although current Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani wants to reform and professionalize the ministry, this is his first senior government position; he reportedly has no political affiliation or natural political constituency, and he lacks personal experience in managing police units.

Many experts outside the U.S. government have decried the present state of the Ministry of Interior. It has been described as an “11-story powder keg of factions” that is plagued by battles for influence among political parties, religious groups, the existing government, and tribes and families. The security environment at the MOI is so dangerous that when Western officials visit the ministry they frequently wear body armor and move only under heavily armed escort.

Although Minister al-Bolani has attempted to address the sectarianism and corruption in the MOI—steps taken include removing the commanders of 7 of the 9 National Police brigades and 17 of the 27 National Police battalions—the fundamentally sectarian nature of the ministry endures. For example, a former National Police general continues to work at the MOI, despite his having been implicated in a covert detention center operation in 2006; the Interior Minister blocked his arrest warrant. MOI employees have been arrested for smuggling explosives into the ministry, and according to some reports may have been Sunni insurgents or followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. In the past year, three of the ministry’s longest-serving Sunni generals have been killed. The Commission surveyed the Coalition’s senior field commanders to obtain their on-the-ground assessment of the status and progress of the Iraqi Security Forces. Asked to rate the progress made by MOI forces toward ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation, all four respondents rated progress as unsatisfactory.

The Commission was struck by the refrain of negative statements it heard about the MOI when it visited civil security force facilities in the provinces. Iraqi Police Service officials in particular complained bitterly about the sectarian behavior of the ministry, noting instances when the MOI simply does not pay police because they are Sunni or Kurdish, as well as cases when the MOI...

145 Robert M. Perito of the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Olga Oliker of RAND Corporation, and Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies have all written in numerous publications about capacity problems and sectarianism within the Ministry of Interior.


147 Ibid.
allegedly rejected lists of police recruits because they were perceived as being from “the wrong sect.”

The MOI Transition Team is also working closely with oversight directorates in the MOI, particularly the Internal Affairs Division, to combat the pervasive climate of corruption within the ministry; but in these areas, as in combating sectarianism more broadly, there are real limits to the progress the Coalition can make, especially in the short term.\textsuperscript{148}

Administration and Logistics

Finding: The MOI lacks sufficient administrative and logistics capability to support the civil security forces it controls.

Put simply, the Ministry of Interior lacks administrative capability and capacity in most areas. As is true of other government ministries in Iraq, this deficiency stems in part from the de-Ba’athification process, which prevented many of Iraq’s experienced bureaucrats from working in the government. The MOI is highly centralized and resistant to the delegation of authority, and it has very little ability to conduct long-term planning. The planning staff in the MOI is very small. The ministry also lacks systems—particularly those for tracking equipment and personnel—to enforce accountability in its administration.

The MOI has plans to streamline its organizational structure from five deputy ministers to three, though many “direct reports” to the Minister will remain even under the proposed new structure. While this restructuring may help Minister al-Bolani manage the MOI more strictly and oversee reforms, his effectiveness is limited by his physical distance from the ministry building. Because the MOI is located in the Red Zone near Sadr City, a dangerous neighborhood in Baghdad, Minister al-Bolani for the most part runs the ministry from a palace in the Green Zone.

Like the Ministry of Defense, the MOI lacks a layered bureaucracy with systems in place to get resources (e.g., uniforms, ammunition, and fuel) to the field in a timely fashion, but the logistics challenge in the MOI is much more pronounced. Without functioning systems to sustain Iraq’s civil security forces in the provinces and major cities, the Iraqi Police Service, much less the National Police and other MOI civil security forces, cannot be effective.

Recommendation: The MOI, with the support of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, must reform its organizational structure, develop a five-year strategic plan, and build sufficient administrative capacity to sustain Iraq’s civil security forces in the field in a manner that is free of real or perceived sectarian favoritism.

\textsuperscript{148} Interviews with senior international police advisers in Iraq, July 2007. See also the prepared statement of Robert M. Perito before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007. Perito specifically notes that the transition team provided the head of the Internal Affairs Division with a fingerprinting system that the division chief used to identify and remove police with criminal records.
There is no substitute for the slow and often frustrating work of reforming the MOI, and the MOI Transition Team is an important source of advice to guide this process. As part of the planned MOI restructuring, one of the deputy ministers should have a robust strategic planning capacity and take the lead in developing a five-year strategic plan for the ministry and its civil security forces. This plan needs to be tied to budgetary requirements and should be developed in partnership with the 18 provincial police chiefs and other provincial civil security force officials. Although the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team can play a critical role in advising the strategic planning effort, Iraqi officials in the MOI must lead the effort so that the ministry’s leadership will have a vested interest in implementing the plan when it is complete.

It will be critical for the Deputy Minister for Administration and Finance to establish functioning systems for logistics and maintenance of the civil security forces and to facilitate effective, centralized tracking and accountability of the equipment that is issued to Iraqi forces. The Government Accountability Office recently published its finding that the United States did not begin to employ a centralized distribution system for the provision of Coalition-issued ISF equipment until December 2005.\(^{149}\) Given the level of sectarian infiltration within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service, the concerted efforts of ministry officials and Coalition advisors will be required not only to develop and implement a system that is able to accurately account for issued equipment but also to foster a culture of accountability within the MOI.

**Budget**

Finding: The MOI cannot execute its budget, a failure that undermines the effectiveness of the civil security forces in the field.

The ministry suffers from several problems in the area of budget and finance. The MOI cannot execute its annual budget because of rigid constraints in budget categories and requirements to approve all expenditures at multiple layers of the bureaucracy and because there are rigid constraints on budget categories. The MOI’s budget in 2007, which exceeded $3 billion, was underspent by $1 billion.\(^{150}\) In some cases this underspending is an expression of the power struggle between the central government in Baghdad and the provincial authorities. For example, a senior budget official in the MOI withheld 50 percent of the overall police budget in 2007 because of her concern about corruption in the police force and the MOI’s lack of insight into how police funds are spent in the provinces.\(^{151}\) A major component of the MOI Transition Team’s capacity-building program is working with MOI officials to develop sufficient funding mechanisms to support the MOI’s forces in the field.

Finding: The Ministry of Interior and provincial authorities share responsibility for management and payment of the Iraqi Police Service. Serious deficiencies in these efforts have led to pay and morale problems and have heightened tensions between the central government and the provinces.


\(^{150}\) Briefing from MNSTC-I CPATT in Iraq, July 2007.

\(^{151}\) Interviews with CPATT officials, July 2007.
The MOI’s bifurcated system for administration and compensation of police creates particular problems in the budgeting and finance arena. Authority to hire police personnel is vested in the provincial police departments, but the payroll for the police is centralized with the MOI. The MOI also sets overall authorizations for the number of police each provincial government can hire, but provincial authorities feel they have a better understanding of local needs and in several cases have exceeded their authorized level of hires. Serious payroll problems and delays have resulted; police in some provinces claimed they have not been paid in months.152

MOI’s inability to directly pay *shurtas* (new police recruits) and police officers is a major part of this problem. Under the existing system in Iraq, the Ministry of Finance (not the MOI) disburses funds to the provincial police chiefs, who in turn distribute salaries to line police. This indirect pay system provides little transparency for MOI officials attempting to monitor how funds are actually spent, and it creates many opportunities for corruption and the misuse of funds. Provincial police payrolls often include “shadow police”—individuals who are just names on the payroll but who do not report for duty, or former police who have been killed or who have deserted. It is not uncommon for police leadership at the provincial, district, and local level to use the “salaries” of shadow police for other purposes or to simply pocket the funds. These practices heighten budgetary tensions with the MOI in Baghdad.

**Recommendation:** The MOI Transition Team should continue to work with MOI officials to establish workable mechanisms to better manage and resolve pay problems affecting police forces. This should be done in coordination with provincial authorities.

As part of the MOI reform effort, the ministry should establish a process to determine provincial police requirements in coordination with provincial authorities, effectively enforce the requirements that are set, and pay police directly. Direct pay for police would give the MOI greater insight into management of the police forces at the provincial level, reduce corruption, and strengthen the identification of police throughout Iraq with the national government.

**Facilities Protection Service**

**Finding:** The MOI has little control of the forces that make up the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The allegiance of many Facilities Protection Service personnel has been to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather than to the central government, and such division of loyalties undermines their ability to provide security.

The Facilities Protection Service is designed to provide protection for the personnel and facilities of the various ministries. Many of the individuals hired into this service are associated in one way or another with their respective minister and demonstrate loyalty to that minister, a political party, a tribe, or a clan. There has been no vetting or formal training of these forces at the national level. In response to this lack of control over the hiring or training of the approximately

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152 The relatively recent creation of provincial security forces in provinces like Anbar has complicated the issue: in many cases, Iraqis are forming neighborhood watches filled with individuals who view themselves as police and expect to be paid accordingly, even though they are not actually on the provincial police payroll.
140,000 people serving in the Facilities Protection Service, in December 2006 the Prime Minister directed that all FPS personnel be consolidated and come under the supervision of the MOI. Despite this new policy mandating consolidation, most ministries are resisting the change. Some ministries are reluctant to relinquish control of their FPS forces, and the Ministry of Finance has not transferred funding to the MOI to administer oversight of the Facilities Protection Service.

Until FPS personnel can be vetted, trained, and equipped under a central, national set of standards, the threat of sectarian violence delivered at the hands of FPS personnel will remain.

**Recommendation:** The Coalition should support consolidation of the Facilities Protection Service by encouraging the establishment of national implementing orders. As consolidation proceeds, the Coalition should assist the MOI to ensure that the Facilities Protection Service personnel can be properly vetted, trained, and equipped.

**Conclusion:** The Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability in Iraq.
CHAPTER 8: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Iraq’s local and provincial police force, is fragile throughout Iraq. On the one hand, training for the Iraqi Police Service is improving, and in some areas the police are patrolling neighborhoods more regularly, manning security checkpoints, and working with the Iraqi Army and Coalition forces to combat insurgent groups. On the other hand, the Iraqi Police Service faces many challenges. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), which supports the Iraqi Police Service, is highly dysfunctional. Infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service by militia members, insurgents, and criminals is widespread in some parts of Iraq. The police are not sufficiently equipped to combat their enemies, nor do they have the support and sustainment systems to function effectively. The Iraqi Police Service lacks investigative capabilities and sufficient intelligence and information systems, and it operates in an environment without a strong foundation in the rule of law. The Iraqi Police Service is an important part of the long-term solution for stability in Iraq, but it will be at least a few more years before the police can contribute significantly to bringing real security to the provinces. In the interim, they will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Overview of the Iraqi Police Service

During the years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, Iraqi police were at the bottom of the hierarchy of security forces. Although there were more than 60,000 police in the force, they were poorly trained and equipped. In addition, they were often brutal and corrupt, and as a result they were widely feared by the Iraqi public. Reflecting that public distrust, looters targeted and destroyed many police stations, vehicles, and pieces of equipment in the wake of the 2003 invasion. In an effort to begin reestablishing security in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority called the Iraqi police back into service; and in May 2003, the Department of Justice determined that the Iraqi Police Service needed to be significantly reorganized, retrained, and reequipped in order to be effective.

Six months later the United States began a recruiting and training program for the police, relying on 500 police advisors reporting to the Department of State. By early 2004, however, it was clear that the State Department–led police training program was not sufficiently effective, primarily because of the challenging security situation. In March 2004, President Bush assigned responsibility for the police training effort to the Department of Defense. This was unprecedented; historically, the departments of Justice and State have taken the lead in training indigenous police forces. Placing the military in charge does ensure that police trainers are more secure, but it also has resulted in greater emphasis on counterinsurgency operations than on civil policing and more traditional law enforcement activities.

153 The most solid example of civil policing the Commission saw in Iraq was in the Kurdish province of Sulaymaniya, but it must be noted the Kurdish provinces have benefited from years of being a virtually autonomous area in Iraq.

Today there are more than 230,000 police in the Iraqi police force. The U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), the military-led organization within the Coalition with responsibility for mentoring and advising the Iraqi Police Service, has trained approximately 164,000 police, but the Department of Defense estimates that only 40 to 70 percent of these Coalition-trained recruits are still serving in the police force. However, the existence of ghost payrolls makes it difficult to generate reliable estimates of the precise number of personnel available for duty. It now is clear that tens of thousands of Iraqi police have entered the force without going through the Coalition training program; rather, they have been directly hired by provincial authorities, often at the urging of local sheikhs or other tribal elders.

The Iraqi Police Service falls under the Ministry of Interior, led by Minister Jawad al-Bolani. The police force is organized into provincial police departments with district chiefs, as well as into police departments in the major cities. The provincial directors of police (PDoPs) report to the provincial governors and are typically selected at the provincial government level from a pool of candidates validated by the Ministry of Interior, a process that is more art than science. Most provincial, district, and major city police forces include patrol police, station police, traffic police, and highway patrol police. There are some specialized units for forensics and criminal evidence, but in general the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Iraqi Police Service range from quite weak to nonexistent. The provinces also have Emergency Response Units (ERUs) that are similar to SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams in the United States.

Training and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service have improved markedly in the past few years, but significant challenges remain in both areas. Today there are three police academies that train police officers (mainly front-line supervisors such as sergeants and lieutenants) and six regional training centers throughout Iraq that offer a 10-week training course for new police recruits, known as shurtas. This basic training for Iraqi shurtas includes courses on defensive tactics, patrolling, democratic policing, and firearms, as well as other subjects. Many classes are conducted by Iraqi instructors. Police who have not gone through the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team training pipeline do typically receive at least 80 hours of very basic training. Recognizing the need to standardize training, the Coalition has a long-term plan to put all police on the MOI payroll through the 10-week course as soon as possible. In addition to the 10-week basic training for shurtas, newly recruited police officers attend a 9-month training course at one of Iraq’s training academies. The police colleges also offer a three-year advanced course for police officers. Training for the more specialized Emergency Response Units takes place at the Camp Dublin Specialized Training Center in Baghdad.

Although on average the Iraqi Police Service has received more than 80 percent of the basic equipment deemed essential for its mission, many police stations still lack uniforms, weapons, and

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155 Coalition forces have trained just over 164,000 police as of August 2007, according to information from CPATT officials in MNSTC-I. See also Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March 2007, p. 31 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).

156 There is also a national-level Emergency Response Unit in the National Police, containing about 600 personnel.
vehicles, as well as spare parts and ammunition.\textsuperscript{157} Iraqi police are authorized to be equipped with two uniforms, a pistol, an AK-47, sets of flexible handcuffs, and individual body armor. Police use high-frequency radios and typically patrol in unarmored Nissan pickup trucks or midsize sport utility vehicles.

Led by a two-star U.S. general, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team oversees about 900 senior police advisors and works closely with Coalition Police Transition Teams (PTTs). The Coalition began using Police Transition Teams in 2006 to develop closer partnerships with the Iraqi Police Service and to provide day-to-day advising and mentoring of the Iraqi Police Service. Today more than 220 Police Transition Teams throughout Iraq are working side by side with Iraqi police at the provincial, district, and police station levels.\textsuperscript{158} Like the Military Transition Teams, the Police Transition Teams report to Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), led by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno. Police Transition Teams are typically composed of 11 to 15 individuals and are led by military personnel who range in rank from staff sergeants to lieutenant colonels, depending on the level of the station that the team mentors. The deputy leaders are senior international police advisors, and the rest of the team is made up of a mix of military police and civilian police advisors. There are about 1,200 police stations in Iraq, and because the number of Police Transition Teams is not large enough to partner or monitor every station, the Coalition generally has insight into about 25–30 percent of them (for the Operational Readiness Assessment level definitions for the Iraqi Police Service, see Figure 17).\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{figure}
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\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent law enforcement operations.} \\
\textbf{A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent law enforcement operations with ISF or coalition support.} \\
\textbf{A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting independent law enforcement operations in conjunction with coalition units.} \\
\textbf{A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting independent law enforcement operations.} \\
\hline
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\caption{Irish Police Operational Readiness Assessment Level Definitions}
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Source: MNSTC-I
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\textsuperscript{157} 9010 Report, March 2007, p. 31. See also CPATT, “Iraqi Police Service,” briefing provided in July 2007. While the national average for basic equipment is 80 percent, some provinces in Iraq are still experiencing shortfalls in particular categories of equipment. These shortfalls vary from province to province in size and type.

\textsuperscript{158} CPATT briefing, July 2007. Currently there are 10 provincial PTTs, 65 District PTTs and 148 station PTTs; see 9010 Report, March 2007, p.32.

\textsuperscript{159} CPATT briefing, July 2007. Four hundred of the almost 1,200 police stations are in areas under Provincial Iraqi Control. Of the remaining 800 stations, 200 are too dangerous for PTTs to visit. There are sufficient PTTs to visit just over half of the remaining 600 stations in the country.
Challenges for the Iraqi Police Service

Though 2006 was to be “the Year of the Police,” it is widely viewed as having been less than successful. At the same time, it is clear that in the past year, the Iraqi Police Service has made some progress. The police in the Kurdish region are relatively solid and are providing basic security in the three Kurdish provinces. Not only are they policing their own neighborhoods, they also have opened the police training center in Sulaymaniyah to police recruits from across the country, and the region has accepted internally displaced persons from other parts of Iraq with relatively few ensuing security problems. In Habbaniyah in Anbar province, efforts to recruit police locally are thriving, and the training being conducted at the Habbaniyah regional training center is encouraging. Finally, while the sectarian influences on the police are far greater in ethnic and religiously mixed areas like Baghdad, even there the joint security stations have demonstrated that the police can begin to establish a more meaningful neighborhood presence if Coalition forces provide mentoring and oversight (for a snapshot of the transition plan for Joint Security Stations, see Figure 18).

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160 Perito, “Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police and Facilities Protection Service.”
During its assessment, the Commission met with officials at the departments of Defense and State involved in efforts to develop the Iraqi Police Service. While in Iraq, the Commission held discussions with more than 20 American officials and 25 Iraqi officials directly involved with the Iraqi Police Service. Commissioners visited 15 police-related facilities throughout Iraq, including police stations, joint security stations, and a number of police training centers and colleges.

It is clear from the Commission’s extensive interviews and site visits that the Coalition and the Government of Iraq (GOI) have invested significant effort and resources into the development of the Iraqi Police Service, but considerable challenges remain in a number of areas—notably, in recruiting, training, equipment, information sharing, investigations and forensics, and the creation of a justice system.

**Recruiting**

*Finding:* The emphasis on local recruiting and assignment in the Iraqi Police Service is showing promise in establishing security at the local level; strong personnel vetting processes will remain vital.

The Commission was struck by the fact that there is no shortage of Iraqis who wish to volunteer for service.\(^{161}\) Despite many bombings of police recruit queues, and a suicide bombing at the Baghdad Police College in 2005 that killed more than 27 recruits, Iraqis continue to sign up for the Iraqi Police Service. Their actions, in part, are undoubtedly driven by economic necessity, but it also seems to suggest that these Iraqis perceive a stake in bringing security to their communities.

Local recruiting for the police has emerged as a focal point in the overall development of the Iraqi Police Service, reflecting the professional law enforcement view that policing is most effective when performed at the neighborhood level by people with ties to the local community. The most visible example of this emphasis on local recruiting has been the “Anbar Awakening” movement in the western Sunni stronghold of Anbar province, but it was widespread in each province the Commission visited.

One benefit of local recruiting is that recruits know their communities and are known themselves in turn, but the need for robust vetting efforts to ensure that local police forces are not infiltrated by militia, terrorists, or criminals remains strong.\(^{162}\) Though the vetting of police recruits is improving, it is still a challenge.\(^{163}\) When an Iraqi seeks to join the Iraqi Police Service, as either a shurta or an officer, he now is required to provide a retinal scan and set of fingerprints. The biometric results are then provided to the MOI for a criminal history check. Candidates who have a previous criminal history are reviewed by the MOI Internal Affairs Division. Criminal history checks are more complicated in Iraq than in many other places because of the sizable number of Iraqis who were unfairly charged with crimes by Saddam’s regime. If a criminal record appears to be largely a result of political activity or perceived crimes against the state, candidates are given the

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\(^{161}\) The large numbers of willing recruits are encouraging, but the Commission also notes that this abundance can contribute to problems in quality if recruits are not sufficiently vetted and trained, as discussed in more detail later this chapter.

\(^{162}\) Vetting is also critical to ensure that local recruits meet physical fitness and literacy standards.

\(^{163}\) Interviews with CPATT officials, July 2007.
opportunity to explain their backgrounds rather than being automatically barred from the police service. In addition to providing the biometric information, police recruits also fill out a questionnaire similar to that used for a basic background check in the United States. If recruits do not have a known criminal record and if they pass the literacy and physical fitness requirements, they must pass a vetting interview before entering the training center or police academy.

**Recommendation:** The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with provincial authorities to ensure that established vetting procedures are used consistently throughout the country to combat militia, criminal, and terrorist infiltration of the Iraqi Police Service.

The MOI now has a process in place to vet police recruits, but many perceive this vetting process as selecting and rejecting candidates along sectarian lines. Infiltration of the police service by militia and other criminal elements is widespread in some areas, particularly in the south. Some but not all of this infiltration can be attributed to the relative immaturity of the Iraqi databases used for background checks and to police departments’ having begun only recently to collect biometric data. Efforts by local tribal authorities to generate recruits for the police service are encouraging, but to ensure that this cooperation is beneficial for Iraqi security it is crucial that provincial police chiefs and local commanders be required to emphasize universal and consistent application of established vetting procedures.

Establishing provincial police selection boards with appropriate representation among ethnic and sectarian groups, as well as various aspects of the Iraqi Police Service community, could help formalize this localized vetting process. In particularly difficult cases, it may be appropriate to require candidates to submit to a polygraph test. Even if rarely used, the possibility of having to take such a test may prove a powerful incentive for recruits to be more transparent about their associations and allegiances.

**Training**

**Finding:** Police training in Iraq is improving, particularly in areas where training is led by Iraqi instructors partnered with civilian police advisors.

Training for police in Iraq has improved considerably in the past two years, but the progress is fragile. The regional police training center in Habbaniyah appears to be a model for police training in Iraq, as was the training center the Commission visited in Sulaymaniyah. At the Habbaniyah center, the 10-week training class for Iraqi shurtas covered a wide range of basic policing subjects as well as specific challenges, such as the threat of suicide bombers. Iraqi instructors lead most of the training, and the students appear very eager to learn. Progress was less evident at the Baghdad Police College, where most if not all of the training courses are led by American instructors. Not surprisingly, Iraqi recruits appear more receptive and attentive in courses taught by fellow Iraqis, but it is not clear there are sufficient numbers of qualified Iraqi personnel to staff all six regional police training centers and three police academies.
The continuing instability of the security environment in many parts of Iraq creates problems for military and civilian Coalition trainers as they try to do their jobs. In some areas, trainers have difficulty getting to training sites safely, and in a few cases, they have actually come under attack while conducting training. Finally, though the basic training program for shurtas and police officers is now in place, there also is a need for police command staff training, including first-line and mid-level manager training, to develop the leadership cadre of the Iraqi Police Service over the long term.

**Recommendation:** The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue transitioning the lead for training to the Iraqis wherever possible and should consider instituting a “train the trainers” program throughout the provinces to facilitate this process.

Having Iraqi instructors direct police training courses is clearly the most effective and desirable way to train incoming recruits. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should accelerate its efforts to put Iraqi instructors in the lead at all training centers throughout the country. Establishing a robust “train the trainers” program would facilitate this effort and potentially free up civilian police advisors—who are already in scarce supply—to serve in larger numbers on Police Transition Teams.

**Finding:** U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.

Because security conditions in Iraq were becoming difficult by 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36 placed the Department of Defense in charge of the Coalition effort to train the Iraqi police. While it was clear to the Commission that the military has not intentionally sought to minimize the role of civilian police advisors in Iraq, in practice the Coalition’s efforts to help develop the Iraqi Police Service have not been fully effective. Military leaders in the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team do not have backgrounds in civilian law enforcement. In addition, the military leadership of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team changes about once a year; five different generals have commanded the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team since it was established, and none of them have been military policemen by military occupational specialty. Although the Coalition program to train the Iraqi police has been ongoing for four years, one advisor noted to the Commission that “we have not had four years to implement a training plan; we have implemented a one-year training plan four times in a row.”

Civil policing is fundamentally different from military policing. In civil policing, the police depend on the “consent” of those they police; it therefore requires spending considerable time building relationships with the communities being served. Civil police are trained to use defensive techniques, and to use deadly physical force only as a last resort. In contrast, military police are focused on force protection, intelligence gathering, and support of combat soldiers and combat operations.

Civilian police advisors do not have the lead role in Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team programs. In many cases, the international police advisors working within the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team feel marginalized and unable to make contributions commensurate with
their experience. This perceived marginalization is even more frustrating for the police advisors because they are better positioned to have influence in the Iraqi culture, which favors age; while most of the international police advisors are either retired or very senior law enforcement professionals, most military officers leading Police Transition Teams are captains or majors who are too young to merit their Iraqi partners’ respect.

**Recommendation:** Leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.

The departments of Defense, State, and Justice should move quickly to establish a revised division of labor for the Iraqi police training program that would enable a senior civilian law enforcement officer with professional experience comparable to that of a two-star general to lead the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team. The level of violence in Iraq dictates that the police training programs remain indivisible from the broader military Coalition effort in Iraq in the near term; at least initially, therefore, the civilian leader of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should continue to report to the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq.

The key reform needed at this time is to ensure that a senior civilian law enforcement official is providing the day-to-day leadership of Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team activities. A major responsibility for the civilian head of this organization should be to work in close partnership with the MOI on developing and approving a strategic plan for civilian policing that includes the phased transition of the police development process to full Iraqi control.

Consistent with shifting leadership of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team from the military to the civilian law enforcement community, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should also work with Multi-National Corps–Iraq to put international police advisors in charge of the Police Transition Teams in the field. Today the Police Transition Teams are led by military officers, with civilian international police advisors serving as deputies. In the future, Police Transition Teams should be led by civilian international police advisors, with military police officers serving as deputies. Because many areas of Iraq remain dangerous, Coalition forces should continue to provide force protection for the civilian police training effort and the Police Transition Teams.

As part of the recommendation above, and to assist the overall Coalition effort to train and mentor the Iraqi Police Service, the Commission recommends establishing an international advisory board to monitor the civilian police transition program, track its progress, and make recommendations to the Government of Iraq and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team. This advisory board would be composed of senior civilian law enforcement personnel with experience establishing and training indigenous police forces. Not only would this body provide an additional perspective on civil policing issues for the Iraqi government and the Coalition, it also could help ensure that lessons learned from past experiences are properly brought to bear as Iraq continues to develop its police force.

Over the longer term and if the security situation in Iraq improves sufficiently, it would be appropriate to transfer lead responsibility for police training in Iraq out of the Department of
Defense entirely. The departments of State and Justice both have extensive experience with civilian policing and the training of indigenous police forces. Ideally, the lead agency with responsibility for police training in Iraq would be determined after careful study of the utility of making a single agency in the U.S. government responsible for this task. During this study, consideration must be given to the ongoing and future tasks that address the rule of law, such as upgrading Iraqi courts, strengthening the Iraqi prison system, and training an Iraqi marshals system.164

**Finding:** The number of civilian international police advisors is insufficient to the task of training the Iraqi Police Service.

When Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq was initially established in 2004 and envisioned training a force of about 135,000 Iraqi police, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team requested funding for 6,000 police advisors for that training effort. Congress provided authority and funds to hire only 1,000 personnel. Today there are more than 230,000 police in the Iraqi Police Service, and it appears likely that the force will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. To assist the Ministry of Interior with development and training of this force, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team relies on just over 900 international police advisers and approximately 3,500 military personnel serving in Police Transition Teams.

The number of international police advisors currently working in Iraq is simply insufficient to the task. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team’s emphasis on placing advisors out in the field wherever possible and on partnering advisors with police at police colleges and training centers is significantly improving the quality of the Iraqi Police Service and is facilitating the transition of responsibility to Iraqi police trainers. However, there are not enough police advisors to establish these partnerships in the depth and breadth that is needed to support the development of a 230,000-person force in a country as large as Iraq.

**Recommendation:** The Coalition—not just the United States—should fund and recruit the requisite number of international police advisors.

Fielding more international police advisors is essential to the police training effort. The White House and the Department of State should aggressively encourage Coalition partners to fund and recruit at least another 2,000 advisors as part of a broader effort to support reconstruction efforts. To create momentum, the U.S. Congress and Department of State should work closely to fund at least 1,000 of those 2,000 additional police advisors positions, drawing more extensively than in previous years on the very large pool of law enforcement officials in the United States.

**Finding:** Training programs to date have emphasized quantity of police trained over quality of training, thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of the force in favor of force generation efforts.

Since 2004, there has been considerable focus on building up the Iraqi Police Service as quickly as possible. Reporting by the Department of Defense on the Iraqi Police Service has emphasized the numbers of police trained by Coalition forces—even after it became clear that neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior knew how many of those Coalition-trained police were remaining in the force. The Iraqi Police Service has grown dramatically as provincial chiefs of police have become more independent from the central government, hiring thousands of recruits directly into the force at the provincial and local levels. In discussions with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials, it was clear that balancing the police force’s goals for quantity and quality is a constant struggle. This balancing act is made more difficult by the significant shortage of police force leaders, a result of the passive police culture under Saddam and the more recent de-Ba’athification process. Meanwhile, there are too few international advisors to establish field training officer programs and other similar quality initiatives on a large scale.

**Recommendation:** Particularly in light of a significantly high number of personnel in the Iraqi Police Service who have not yet undergone Coalition training, the Ministry of Interior and Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should seek higher-quality police recruits and vet them more carefully as they continue to address the training backlog.

Emphasizing quantity over quality of police recruited and trained is likely to result in a less effective Iraqi Police Service over the long term. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the MOI and provincial authorities to establish a plan for putting the more than 65,000 direct-hire police through the 10-week shurta training course. In discussions with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials, Commissioners noted several instances in the past two decades when major urban police departments in the United States responded to short-term security needs by deciding to emphasize quantity of police over quality. In each case cited, the short-term emphasis on numbers resulted in weak vetting and training of recruits, and those weaknesses in turn led directly to major police scandals years later that had lasting negative effects on those police departments and on their effectiveness in their communities. To ensure that quality is the focus in developing the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition may want to consider a comprehensive audit of the police training program that will clearly establish its breadth, depth, and consistency.

**Finding:** The Iraqi Police Service lacks a formal police leadership academy, a deficiency that impedes leadership development.

The Commission observed that most if not all Iraqi police leaders are former military officers and have no formal training or experience in civil policing. The absence of any leadership training for these senior officers is significantly slowing the development of a corps of strong, capable leaders in the Iraqi Police Service. This lack of senior leaders with training in civil policing is impeding the effectiveness of the service as a whole. A particular shortfall is the absence of a training program to develop first-line supervisors (generally officers at the sergeant level in the United States). First-line supervisors are invaluable to any police force and provide a vital bridge between senior police leadership and junior officers.
**Recommendation:** The Iraqi Police Service should work with its Coalition advisors to establish a formal Iraqi Police Academy that is focused on developing civil policing skills in senior officers and includes a separate first-line supervisor training program.

A leadership academy focused on providing training for senior Iraqi police officers would complement the existing police academies offering nine-month and three-year programs for entering police officers and would enable the more rapid development of a leadership corps across all levels of the Iraqi Police Service. A program aimed specifically at developing first-line supervisors would be an important part of the curriculum for such an academy and would ensure continuity of leadership from junior officers all the way up to senior police leaders. All such advanced courses should incorporate a clear set of standards that outline what the Iraqi people can expect from the Iraqi Police Service. This set of behaviors will become the foundation of a disciplinary code, based on a fundamental respect for human rights, and will help to promote confidence in the Iraqi Police Service overall.

**Equipment**

**Finding:** The Iraqi Police Service is underequipped to combat the threats it faces and suffers persistent shortfalls in vital equipment.

There is a stark contrast between the lightly outfitted Iraqi police and the Coalition patrols that move around cities like Baghdad in armored Humvees or Stryker vehicles manned with soldiers outfitted in 60–80 pounds of full body armor and bristling with weapons. Reflecting this contrast in equipment levels, members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Iraqi Police Service, are killed at three times the rate of Coalition forces in Iraq. The day the Commission met with the Baghdad chief of police, two policemen had already been killed; and the day before, police in five patrol vehicles were killed. This casualty rate, which would make national headlines in the United States, was clearly not unusual for Baghdad.

Not only are the Iraqi police ill-equipped in the face of heavily armed terrorist groups and sectarian militias—particularly in Iraq’s urban areas—but in many areas they have not received all of their basic equipment and supplies and lack sufficient spare parts to keep equipment in working order. The Baghdad police chief told the Commission that more than 50 percent of his vehicles are non-operational at any given time. At the Habaniyah police training center, the local police chief and international police advisors told the Commission that requests to the MOI for ammunition for marksmanship training had gone unanswered for months. Because the Ministry of Oil routinely fails to provide required fuel to the Ministry of Interior, many police departments are not able to conduct vehicle patrols. Many of these shortfalls are linked to the lack of administrative capacity in the MOI—particularly the absence of systems to track personnel and their equipment—that was discussed in the preceding chapter. They could be resolved if the MOI established a more capable sustainment system.

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165 Interestingly, one day before the Commission’s visit to the training center, 200,000 rounds of ammunition arrived.
**Recommendation:** Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the Iraqi government to provide adequately armored vehicles and heavier weaponry to the Iraqi Police Service, particularly to police stations in urban areas or other areas where improvised explosive device (IED) and explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks are prevalent.

Culturally, Iraqi police are far more tied to the station house than are American police. To establish security in Iraqi neighborhoods, the shurtas will have to leave the stations and go on patrol. Iraqi police will be more inclined to conduct patrols if they feel protected, and they will be far better protected in armored vehicles than in Nissan trucks. Many mid-level Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials and Police Transition Team leaders told the Commission that they had recommended the provision of armored vehicles for the police and expressed uncertainty as to why these recommendations had not yet been acted on. Similarly, as long as Iraqi police are confronting rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and other forms of indirect fire, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should move quickly to find a mechanism to get far more armored vehicles and at least some quantity of heavier weapons to the Iraqi Police Service.

**Information Sharing**

**Finding:** Quality intelligence is central to the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to take the lead for security, but intelligence supporting police operations is limited and information sharing with other security agencies is weak.

The Iraqi Police Service has its own intelligence system, but it is largely confined to the tactical level. There is very little understanding in the Iraqi armed forces or in the Ministry of Interior (where many senior officials are former military officers) of how to use intelligence effectively to support policing operations. Information sharing between the Iraqi Police Service and other elements of the security forces in Iraq—primarily the Iraqi Army and the National Police—is spotty due to security concerns (fueled by deep and long-standing mistrust) and the absence of a solid information technology infrastructure to enable secure communications.

Establishing Police Transition Teams and Military Transition Teams to work with the Iraqi Army has helped the flow of information from Coalition forces to the Iraqi Police Service, but this information flow is largely internal within each province. There is very little communication between police forces in different provinces, a lack that is particularly troublesome in light of the need to conduct effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and to track organized and other criminal activity.

The joint security stations in Baghdad and the partnering of Coalition forces with security forces in the provinces have significantly strengthened intelligence operations, but in many areas the general public remain reluctant to cooperate with the Coalition or Iraqi security forces. Tips hotlines are now widely advertised throughout the country, but they are not always widely used. At one joint security station in Baghdad, police and local community leaders highlighted the distribution of tips hotline cards; however, U.S. military police noted privately that most people in the neighborhood were far too fearful of retribution from Jaysh al-Madhi (often referred to as JAM or the Madhi Army) to use the hotline.
**Recommendation:** All Iraqi security agencies and the Iraqi Police Service must work together to establish information-sharing systems, practices, and protocols that meet their requirements. The MOI should work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information from the national level down.

The ministries of Interior and Defense, with assistance from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team and the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team, need to work together to develop the means to share intelligence with the Iraqi police in a way that protects operational security but retains information that will be useful to local police. This is not an easy problem to solve, as the United States itself has recently been reminded—the events of September 11 have spurred a renewed focus on the best ways to share information between the military, national intelligence services, and the police. That said, information sharing in Iraq between the military, the intelligence services, the police, and Coalition forces is rudimentary at best. It needs to be significantly developed and strengthened if the Iraqi police are ever to be the main providers of internal security for Iraq.

The MOI and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team also need to work with the provinces to establish mechanisms to share information among the provincial police departments. Today it is almost impossible to track criminal activities from one province to another, or to verify trans-province patterns of activity. Iraq will not be able to establish a mature policing system in the absence of mechanisms to share information between provincial departments of police. Creating these mechanisms would also contribute to a sense of a national policing effort in Iraq.

**Investigations and Forensics**

**Finding:** The Iraqi Police Service has extremely weak investigative and forensic capabilities that greatly limit its effectiveness.

The Commission was struck in its interviews and site visits by the weakness of the Iraqi Police Service’s investigative and forensic capabilities. The day before the Commission arrived in Iraq for its first visit, a suicide vehicle bombing in Irbil killed more than 150 people—yet it was not clear in interviews what organization within the Iraqi Security Forces had the responsibility to investigate the crime, or even whether the crime would be investigated at all.

When Iraqi police are on patrol, or are called to a crime scene, they have very little ability or legal authority to secure a crime scene; collect, secure, and analyze evidence; and question witnesses or suspects. A partial explanation for their relative powerlessness is that in the Iraqi criminal justice system, unlike the American criminal justice system, the lead role in criminal investigations is held by the judiciary rather than by the law enforcement community. Moreover, the Iraqi criminal justice system traditionally puts tremendous emphasis on securing a confession in order to convict an individual of a crime, which in turn encourages the use of torture to avoid acquittals. Because confessions are seen as all-important, there is almost no appreciation for the value of physical evidence or corroborating witness statements.
The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team is working with the MOI to change this cultural bias, but it is a slow process and the need for enhanced investigative training is urgent. The Baghdad Crime Lab was devastated in the wake of the invasion in 2003, but it has rebuilt some of its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), ballistics, and fingerprint database capabilities with support from the British. In addition, the Baghdad Police College now offers courses in criminal investigation that cover subjects ranging from the basics of securing a crime scene to analyzing physical evidence such as footprints. The criminal investigation training facilities that the Commission visited at the Baghdad Police College and police training center at Sulaymaniyah in the north were comparable to many facilities in the United States. The challenge for the future is clearly going to be putting sufficient numbers of police through these training courses so that the Iraqi Police Service can quickly and dramatically improve its ability to investigate and analyze crime scenes.

An impressive example of the Coalition’s efforts to enhance the investigative capabilities of Iraq’s civil security forces is the Major Crimes Task Force in Baghdad. Following a wave of high-profile murders in 2004 and early 2005 that essentially went uninvestigated, the U.S. Department of Justice approached the MOI and proposed a joint U.S.–Government of Iraq task force to build an indigenous capacity to investigate and prosecute these types of high-profile assassinations. The task force is composed of 12 American law enforcement agents and 11 vetted Iraqi officers, as well as five translators. One Iraqi investigative judge is assigned to the task force full-time. The Task Force has successfully investigated a number of very high profile murder cases and has broken up a number of covert, unsanctioned interrogation centers. It is highly professional, but it does not have the capacity to handle the volume of cases generated in Baghdad, much less the entire country. Moreover, the high visibility of the task force’s investigations has forced all of its Iraqi personnel to live inside the International Zone, and it has become apparent that they cannot safely resettle in Baghdad when their tenure ends.

**Recommendation:** As the Iraqi Police Service continue to develop, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq should work with the MOI to increase the investigative and forensic capabilities of the police service by expanding the Major Crimes Task Force, increasing the number of crime lab facilities in major cities, increasing training courses for criminal investigators, and establishing an investigator rank within the police service.

No police force can be effective if it cannot secure and investigate crime scenes. The Ministry of Interior, with support from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, needs to make development of investigative and forensic skills within the Iraqi Police Service a major area of emphasis and must give the police greater authority to conduct investigations. The Major Crimes Task Force should be expanded significantly so that it can at least begin to handle the large volume of cases in Baghdad. Ideally, each province would have its own Major Crimes Task Force, equipped with an automated database to track criminal activity and facilitate information sharing. In light of the substantial history of terrorists using criminal activity to fund acts of terror, the Major Crimes Task Force should also expand its efforts into investigating significant criminal financial activities, as well as murders and other violent crime. Finally, the Iraqi Police Service should create an investigator rank so that it can begin training police to specialize in investigative and forensics skills.
Creation of a Justice System

Finding: The Iraqi Police Service is but one element of a broader justice system that is not yet well established in Iraq.

The Commission did not conduct a detailed assessment of the overall judicial system in Iraq as such an investigation was beyond the scope of its mandate, but interviews made clear that a major challenge to effective policing is the absence of a well-developed judicial system. To establish lasting security in Iraq, the police must be linked to a functioning court and prison system. Police must be able to put suspects in jail while they await trial; sufficient numbers of investigative judges need to be able to conduct investigations thoroughly and without fearing for their lives; and when the legal system succeeds in convicting a suspect, criminals need to be able to serve out their sentences in well-run prisons. Iraq currently lacks this kind of coherent judicial framework. Fundamentally, the rule of law does not yet exist in Iraq. Police and judicial officials often view each other with mutual suspicion, jails are woefully overcrowded, investigative judges and their families are often targets of intimidation and violence, and courthouses are run down and poorly secured.

Recommendation: The Government of Iraq, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, should collaborate to create and implement a framework to enable the rule of law in Iraq. The Coalition should continue to strongly support these efforts.

Like the Iraq Study Group, the Commission strongly recommends that the Government of Iraq launch a major initiative to establish a functioning judicial system in Iraq, and that the Coalition strongly support that program.166 A new focus on developing the rule of law in Iraq could build on ongoing Coalition initiatives, such as the relatively new rule of law compound that establishes a “safe zone” for members of the judiciary and their families, as well as the European Union rule of law mission in Iraq (EJUST LEX) that has trained almost 1,500 senior Iraqi criminal justice officials. Establishing the rule of law will require expanding the number and improving the quality of detention centers, rebuilding courthouses and improving their physical security, training many more prosecutors and judges, providing for the safety of judicial system officials and their families, and establishing mechanisms to root out corruption and political influence in the judicial system.

A Long-Term Vision for Policing in Iraq

Finding: The police are central to the long-term establishment of security and stability in Iraq. Today, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence.

Although today the Iraqi Army has a considerable role in providing internal security in Iraq, ultimately the Army will focus on external defense of the country and it will be the Iraqi police who will safeguard the country’s internal security. The Iraqi police today are operating in what is essentially a battlefield environment while trying to prepare for the day when more traditional civil

policing is possible. Given this challenge, the Iraqi policing strategy will likely need to follow an evolutionary process, much like the police experience in Northern Ireland.

At the height of The Troubles, the police in certain parts of Belfast were restricted to responding to calls from the public and conducting limited patrols. As many as 16 British Army soldiers were required to support just two police officers on patrol, when under normal conditions these police would patrol alone. Over time, as the security situation began to improve, police officers conducted patrols in groups of two armored vehicles with three officers in each. Later, police could patrol in armored SUVs, and today police officers are starting to patrol on bicycles in what used to be the most dangerous neighborhoods. This transformation did not happen quickly; the British Army only recently ended its support to police activities in Northern Ireland after 38 years of military operations. Reductions in the military presence supporting police activities in Northern Ireland were linked to increased security on the ground, which in turn was the result of increasing political stability over time.

**Recommendation:** The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to develop a detailed strategic plan to transition primary responsibility for internal security in Iraq from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service.

Working closely with the ministries of Interior and Defense, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team should help the Government of Iraq develop a detailed plan to shift primacy for Iraq’s internal security from the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Police Service. This plan should outline core policing principles as well as milestones for the evolution of the policing process. One core principle should be the requirement that an Iraqi police officer is always the face of a patrol for the public, and is in charge of the patrol, regardless of the size of the military escort. Another core principle should be that the military provides a secure platform to enable police to execute their primary function of upholding the rule of law until that secure platform is no longer necessary. This kind of strategic plan would include benchmarks to assess the evolution of policing away from the Army and toward the Iraqi Police Service. Such benchmarks might include the ability to replace Army units with police personnel without loss of control over an area, or the ability to rely on military capabilities only for specialized functions such as helicopter support. Whatever the milestones, a central concept in the policing plan needs to be the establishment of civil policing as the standard. Even if for many years this civil police force can function only with substantial military support, as was the case in Northern Ireland, the concept of a civil police force responsible for public security must be instituted from the outset as a societal norm.

**Conclusion:** The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combating the threats that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.
CHAPTER 9: THE NATIONAL POLICE

Despite efforts to reform the Iraqi National Police, the organization remains a highly sectarian element of the Iraqi Security Forces and one that for the most part is unable to contribute to security and stability in Iraq. The Iraqi National Police is almost exclusively Shi’a. Trained for counterinsurgency operations, the force is constituted largely of former soldiers. The National Police suffers from significant quality problems and a lack of clarity about whether it should be a paramilitary or a police organization.

Overview of the Iraqi National Police

In addition to the Iraqi Police Service, Iraq also has just over 25,000 National Police, organized into two divisions. Intended to serve as a bridging force between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army, the National Police is widely viewed as highly sectarian and is mistrusted by the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi public.

The roots of the National Police are varied. As the insurgency in Iraq grew more violent toward the end of 2003, the Coalition decided to create what it called “heavy police units” using former Iraqi soldiers. These public order battalions and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) were composed largely of Sunnis and reported to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). In September 2004, under the leadership of Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, the MOI created Special Police Commandos that were largely Shi’a units; then in January 2005, the MOI created the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade.\(^\text{106}\) In April 2006, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq persuaded the MOI to combine all of these different units into a single organization, the National Police. The Shi’a-dominated Special Police Commandos became the 1st National Police Division, and the public order battalions became the 2nd National Police Division.

Like the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police is part of the Ministry of Interior. The National Police Commander is Major General Hussein al-Awadi, who reports to Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani. The National Police today comprises eight brigades organized into two divisions, a single mechanized brigade, a quick reaction force battalion, and a national-level Emergency Response Unit containing about 600 personnel. The Coalition has trained more than 31,000 National Police, but it appears that only about 25,000 are still serving. National Police missions include counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, military assistance for civil disturbances, and protection of high-level dignitaries. The original concept for the National Police was to use it as a reinforcement force for the Iraqi Police Service. If an incident in a province could not be adequately addressed by local police, the MOI could deploy a National Police brigade to assist and bring the situation under control. If the National Police and the police combined still could not bring the situation under control, the MOI could request deployment of Iraqi Army forces. In this way the National Police was conceived as being employed domestically in a fashion somewhat similar to

\(^{106}\) Some experts assert that the various units created by Minister Jabr were made up of fighters from Shi’a militia organizations. See Robert M. Perito, “Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007.
how the National Guard can be used in the United States, but it is not clear whether the National Police in its current form can execute this kind of mission effectively (for its operational readiness, see Figure 19).

![Figure 19: MOI National Police Forces’ Operational Readiness](image)

The National Police achieved 100 percent of its authorized equipment levels at the end of 2006. National Police personnel are outfitted with small arms, medium machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and body armor. National Police units have light, medium, and heavy pickup trucks, as well as sport utility vehicles. In recognition of the need for heavier equipment, given National Police involvement in counterinsurgency operations, plans have been made to up-armor more than 1,300 of the SUVs and trucks. The 1st Mechanized National Police Brigade has approximately 60 M-1117 armored security vehicles, 50 Ukrainian armored personnel carriers derived from the Soviet BTR-80, and 115 South African–made Reva armored personnel carriers. In the future, the National Police aspires to have rotary wing aircraft, cargo planes, more armored vehicles, mortars, mine detectors, and unmanned aerial vehicles, but it is not clear when or whether this equipment will be acquired.

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Until late 2006, training for the National Police was not standardized, and it focused largely on counterinsurgency and paramilitary operations. In October 2006, the Coalition removed the entire 8th Brigade of the 2nd National Police Division from operations and arrested its officers, who were implicated in the kidnapping of 26 Sunnis and the death of 7 of those individuals. This incident made clear the need for standardized training and reorientation of the National Police. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq launched the National Police Transformation Program, which in its initial stages included limited vetting and three weeks of traditional police training—the first police training that any members of the National Police had received.

The National Police Headquarters, in cooperation with the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, now operates three major training facilities. New recruits undergo six weeks of basic training at the National Police Academy in Numiniyah. Basic, officer, and noncommissioned officer training is offered at Camp Solidarity, located in northern Baghdad. Finally, more specialized training, such as SWAT (special weapons and tactics) training and Emergency Response Unit training, is offered at Camp Dublin, just south of Baghdad. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team started a mandatory four-week training course to address concerns about National Police activities after the 8th Brigade was taken out of operations. This process, sometimes referred to as “re-bluing,” is a month-long basic training program in policing skills, such as human rights training and policing in a democracy, as well as tactical training, such as patrolling and checkpoint operation.169 All nine National Police brigades will have completed the re-bluing training by early October 2007.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Multi-National Corps–Iraq provide important technical advice, training, and mentoring to the National Police. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team plays a key role in National Police training and capacity building within the MOI to support the National Police. Multi-National Corps–Iraq is responsible for 41 National Police Transition Teams, 38 of which are partnered with National Police battalions, as well as 2 teams that are partnered with the division headquarters, and 1 team assisting National Police Headquarters. Fourteen international police advisors work with the National Police. The National Police Transition Teams work with National Police units on a daily basis, providing mentoring and assistance in the field. A major recent focus for the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team and the National Police Transition Teams has been implementing the first two phases of the four-phase National Police Transformation Program. Under Phase 1, the National Police Transition Teams conducted technical inspections of each of the National Police battalions to identify deficiencies in areas such as personnel accountability, uniforms, fuel supplies, spare parts, and maintenance capabilities. The teams also conducted quick-look inspections and command climate surveys to get a more qualitative assessment of the National Police units.

Challenges for the National Police

The National Police is the subject of considerable concern both inside and outside Iraq. The Commission was struck by the almost universally negative descriptions of the National Police

voiced by Iraqi police, Army officers, and members of the general public. The National Police has been regularly accused of sectarian abuse and illegal activities. Reports of Iraqi security forces’ involvement in death squad activities have most frequently been traced to this organization, particularly its former commando units.\textsuperscript{170} Members of the National Police were also heavily implicated in the 2005 prisoner torture scandal, and the most recent former Commanding General of Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, remarked in late 2006 that “the National Police is the biggest worry, about 20 to 25 percent of them probably need to be weeded out.”\textsuperscript{171} The Commission also observed that the Coalition’s sheer need for large numbers of security forces to bring the fight to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the militias may be hindering its ability to consider, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, what makes the most sense for the future of the National Police.

**Finding:** In its current form, the National Police is not a viable organization. Its ability to be effective is crippled by significant challenges, including public distrust, sectarianism (both real and perceived), and a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically, whether it is a military or a police force.

**Sectarianism**

National Police members are largely recruited from Baghdad and the largely Shi’a southern provinces of Iraq. Efforts to recruit Sunni men into the National Police have generally been unsuccessful. As a result, the National Police force is 85 percent Shi’a, 13 percent Sunni, and 2 percent other affiliations; given its composition and past activities, it is widely perceived as highly sectarian.

In an effort to curb sectarian behavior, the National Police Commander has recently replaced 8 of 9 brigade commanders and 17 of 27 battalion commanders—but serious perception problems remain. As part of the Baghdad Security Plan that began in February 2007, two National Police battalions were supposed to deploy to Baghdad, one from the northern part of Iraq and another from the Tikrit/Samara region, but ultimately political resistance prevented their transfer.\textsuperscript{172}

The Commission heard police chiefs and senior police officials describe the National Police as “very sectarian,” “making daily mistakes with the Iraqi people,” “a burden on the MOI,” and “not a national force at all.” Even with the re-bluing training largely completed, sectarianism in the National Police may still be more than just a perception problem. The MOI is seeking to establish an additional National Police brigade in Samarra; but while the National Police leadership has proposed that its composition be 45 percent Sunni and 55 percent Shi’a, the Office of the


\textsuperscript{172} CPATT briefing, July 2007.
Commander in Chief (which reports directly to the Prime Minister) has proposed that the personnel be 1 percent Sunni and 99 percent Shi’a.\textsuperscript{173}

**Quality**

The National Police faces many of the same challenges in maintaining quality forces as do the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. For example, the National Police struggles to ensure that sufficient personnel are present for duty; the existence of ghost payrolling also complicates determinations of present-for-duty numbers at any given time. And like the other forces, the National Police faces a shrinking pool of quality recruits, it lacks sufficient leaders and noncommissioned officers, and it does not have an effective logistics system.

Of the approximately 25,000 National Police authorized by the MOI, on average only about 65 percent are actually present for duty on a given day. While a handful of National Police units are assigned a full complement of personnel, only two of these units have more than 80 percent of their assigned personnel present for duty.

Meetings with Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team officials highlighted additional quality concerns regarding the National Police. The pool of sufficiently high quality recruits is shrinking; identifying literate recruits has become a big challenge. In 2007 the replenishment goal for the National Police is 14,000 recruits—more than half of the entire standing National Police force. Unless this replenishment goal is an aberration, the high percentage of new recruits annually will make it hard to maintain the quality of the National Police over time. The absence of sufficient leaders is another serious concern for the National Police, where officer strength is less than 45 percent of what is authorized by the MOI. Like the Iraqi military, the National Police does not have noncommissioned officers, who could assume some of the leadership responsibilities in the organization. Finally, like the Iraqi military and Iraqi Police Service, the National Police lacks a functioning logistics or supply chain management system. As a result, the National Police struggles to maintain and repair equipment, and its operational readiness is degraded.

**Future Missions and Command and Control Arrangements**

There is considerable debate within the Coalition and in the broader defense community about the future of the National Police. Should it be a light infantry, a counterinsurgency force, or a civil police force? The National Police has largely been trained as a counterinsurgency force, although the Phase 2 re-bluing training places much greater emphasis on traditional police activities and includes a focus on human rights and the rule of law. At the same time, Phase 3 training under the National Police Transformation Plan is centered on a 90-day course with an emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. Presentations from Iraqis on the future of the National Police tended to emphasize “preventing rebellions,” undertaking counterterrorism operations, and preventing the movement and activities of militias.\textsuperscript{174} The lack of clarity surrounding the National Police mission is

\textsuperscript{173} CPATT briefing, July 2007.

\textsuperscript{174} Meetings with Iraqi National Police officials, July 2007.
further reflected in how the National Police is equipped. An American general noted that “we ask the National Police to fight as Iraqi Army, but they are equipped like regular police.”

Command and control arrangements for the National Police are part of the broader debate about this organization’s future. Some argue that the MOI needs a set of security forces under its control that can deploy nationwide, but the National Police is not well-embedded in the ministry. There are five deputy ministers in the MOI, one of whom is responsible for security, including the provincial police—but this deputy minister is not responsible for the National Police. The National Police commander reports directly to the Minister, an arrangement that may, whether fairly or unfairly, fuel perceptions of sectarianism. Others argue that the National Police is essentially composed of soldiers, not police, and should be brought under the Ministry of Defense. Senior police officials noted that under the Baghdad Security Plan, the National Police in Baghdad are already under the operational control of the Ministry of Defense.

**Recommendation:** The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized under the MOI. It should become a much smaller organization under a different name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance disposal, urban search and rescue, special threat action, and other similar functions.

Although the National Police cannot be effective in their current form, there is a need for the Ministry of Interior to have a security force under its control that can augment provincial police forces when necessary. The MOI, with support from the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, should dissolve the National Police and draw on a portion of its former personnel to establish a network of National Emergency Support Teams (NESTs), with one team in each province. To avoid many of the problems with the current National Police, NEST units should be ethnically and religiously diverse and should reflect the population makeup of their provinces.

These NEST teams would focus on providing capabilities to the police forces in each province that are necessary but too specialized in most instances to be maintained at the local level—for example, explosive ordnance disposal; consequence management for chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological events; urban search and rescue; air support; marine/riverine patrol; and civil disturbance response. To sustain the high level of capabilities associated with these specialized missions, NEST teams would require specialized training and equipment similar to that available to the existing national-level Emergency Response Unit.

The NEST teams, while provincially based, could be deployed nationally if an area of the country needed substantial infusions of specialized capability. If deploying to assist the Iraqi Police Service, provincial NEST teams should come under the authority of the local police commander.

The existing national-level Emergency Response Unit in the National Police contains 600 personnel. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team personnel spoke highly of the ERU and indicated that it was a very competent organization. If each province were to have a NEST team of about 300 people, the overall size of the NEST network would be about 6,000 personnel—only 25 percent of the existing National Police force. Former National Police personnel that did not remain as part of the NEST forces could be readily absorbed into the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi Police Service. In light of the sectarian problems that have plagued the National Police, it would be important to
ensure that all former National Police members seeking to transfer to the Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police Service are sufficiently vetted prior to being accepted into either of those organizations.

**Conclusion:** The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be disbanded and reorganized.
CHAPTER 10: THE DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT

The Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate are showing uneven but improved capabilities in some locations in Iraq. Although both entities have some effective top-level leadership and have improved Iraqi border security since 2003, considerable challenges remain. For example, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which oversees the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), does not have authority over the nation’s sea and air ports of entry. In addition, border forts, border fort annexes, and land ports of entry have only modest levels of the basic equipment they need for their personnel and daily operations, and they lack the larger pieces of equipment necessary for inspecting and monitoring the people and cargo crossing the nation’s borders. Border enforcement personnel often work in conditions lacking adequate life support services and are without sufficient logistical support to meet requirements. The importance of effective border enforcement to Iraq’s overall security necessitates substantial improvements in these areas and a significantly greater sense of urgency on the part of the Iraqi central government and Ministry of Interior, as well as the continued assistance of Coalition Border Transition Teams for the foreseeable future.

Overview of the Department of Border Enforcement

Iraq has 2,268 miles of land border in addition to 36 miles of coastline. Although the Department of Border Enforcement existed during the Saddam era, border security functions at that time were performed mainly by the Iraqi military and the comprehensive network of secret police. At present, the Department of Border Enforcement has a force of only 37,710 personnel to secure the border.\textsuperscript{175}

In the wake of the 2003 invasion, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq built the new Department of Border Enforcement from scratch.\textsuperscript{176} The Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement, which was created under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 26 on August 24, 2003, is part of the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{177} Although the MOI is responsible for all border forts, annexes, and land ports of entry, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) maintains control over sea and air ports of entry. On several occasions, both Coalition and Iraqi officials told the Commission that the reasons for this division of responsibilities have more to do with ministries consolidating power than with advancing the overall mission of border security. Eventually, they agreed, all ports of entry should be under the MOI’s domain.\textsuperscript{178} Accordingly, in 2008 the responsibility for air and sea ports of entry will shift to the MOI.

The Director of the Department of Border Enforcement is Major General Moshen, whom Coalition officials view as resourceful, effective, and an excellent administrator. Brigadier General Farhoud, who was acting director for the Ports of Entry Directorate when the Commission first

\textsuperscript{175} CPATT Support Forces briefing, July 2007.
\textsuperscript{176} Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.
\textsuperscript{178} Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.
visited, is also very highly regarded. He had been replaced by Brigadier General Ali by the time of a subsequent visit. Despite the current strength of its top-level leadership, the department has experienced a high level of turnover. For example, as of July 2007, the Ports of Entry Directorate had functioned under 10 different directors in a 15-month period.179

The Department of Border Enforcement is organized into five divisions, one for each of Iraq’s five geographic regions (as determined by the department). Each division has two to three brigades.180 Today, there are a total of 12 brigades and 42 battalions, 38 of which are dependent on Coalition support.181 At present, there are 258 Coalition-constructed and supported border forts, 112 department-constructed annexes, and another 47 annexes under departmental construction. The Department of Border Enforcement and its Coalition partners have a five-year plan to bring the total number of constructed border forts and annexes to 723,182 and to reduce the distance between forts to an average of 6 to 9 miles.

The Department of Border Enforcement generally recruits from local populations near its facilities to man land border crossings. Some current border enforcement agents are former Ba’athist-era military, and most joined the Department of Border Enforcement because its jobs are considered easier and safer than those in the Iraqi Army. The Department of Border Enforcement addressed chronic personnel shortages in 2006 by cross-leveling manpower from existing Department of Border Enforcement facilities and by increasing hires. As a result, staffing levels are now at 98 percent across the department and its facilities, though its personnel are not necessarily equally trained. The Department of Border Enforcement did not establish a comprehensive training program until August 2004, and its training capacity remains modest.183

While the Department of Border Enforcement has overall authority for Iraqi border security, the Ports of Entry Directorate is the component within the Department of Border Enforcement that has responsibility for the land ports of entry into the country. The Ports of Entry Directorate was only recently moved under the jurisdiction of the Department of Border Enforcement, but it was transferred without a budget—an oversight that presents a significant problem. Currently, the Department of Border Enforcement is able to provide for some but not all of the Ports of Entry Directorate’s needs. There are 17 land ports of entry in Iraq, 12 of which are currently functioning; 4 were closed in February 2007 as part of the enhanced security measures then put into place in an effort to focus border resources on the Iranian and Syrian crossings where they are most urgently needed.184 One additional crossing at Al Qa’im will open in November 2007. Although some have been closed, other land ports of entry are receiving significant investments. For example, the Ports of Entry Directorate intends to make Al Qa’im on the Syrian border a model border crossing and has invested $21 million into a construction project to make the facility state-of-the-art.185

180 Interviews with DOD officials, July 2007.
181 Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, p. 35 (reports of this title, submitted to Congress in accordance with section 9010 of various Department of Defense appropriation acts, are cited hereafter as 9010 Report).
183 CPATT briefing, July 2007 (staffing levels); MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007 (training).
184 9010 Report, June 2007, p. 35.
Today the Department of Border Enforcement has about 87 percent of the basic equipment it requires. In some areas, such as firearms and radios, the department appears to have 100 percent of its needed equipment. At the same time, some required equipment has never been issued at all. Equipping rates for the Ports of Entry Directorate are lower—about 68 percent on average, with particular shortages in patrol vehicles, flatbed trucks, uniforms, generators, and body armor.\textsuperscript{186} In addition, major items of equipment, including technology-based systems used to track people and cargo coming across the borders, are insufficient in both quantity and quality, as will be detailed later in this chapter.

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq works with the MOI and the Department of Border Enforcement to provide training and advice, primarily through advisors from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Border Transition Teams working in the field. Most Border Transition Teams are composed of about 13 personnel—a mix of military personnel, contractors, and DHS employees. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq has identified a total requirement for 70 Border Transition Teams amounting to more than 900 people, but the Coalition has not been able to fill this requirement.\textsuperscript{187} Today there are just 28 Border Transition Teams distributed across the Department of Border Enforcement’s five geographic regions.

Although Border Transition Teams are stationed throughout Iraq, the Coalition has chosen to focus its 28 existing teams on difficult border crossings and rely on decent relations with countries such as Turkey and Kuwait to ensure sufficient border security in more stable areas.\textsuperscript{188} The more successful land ports of entry have Border Transition Teams (also called Ports of Entry Transition Teams) that live and work with their Iraqi counterparts. For example, the port of entry director at Trebil indicated that the Border Transition Team assigned there was critical to their mission, a sentiment echoed by Iraqi officials at the Zurbatiya Port of Entry.

### Challenges for the Department of Border Enforcement

The Commission met with several officials in the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate, held discussions with many Coalition Border Transition Team advisors, and visited multiple land ports of entry, including Zurbatiya, Trebil, and Walid. Though it is clear that border security is better today than it was in the wake of the invasion, when people and goods flowed unchecked across borders, the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate face significant challenges and are not yet providing adequate border security for Iraq.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Interview with DOD officials, July 2007.
Ministry of Interior

**Finding:** The overall capacity of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate is undermined by weak MOI capacity. Further, border security commanders have little confidence that the MOI will address their needs and concerns.

The MOI is often not in control of the land ports of entry under the Ports of Entry Directorate’s jurisdiction. The Deputy Minister of Interior for Support Forces, Major General Admed al-Khafaji, told Commissioners that the Kurds, not the MOI, administer the land ports of entry in the Kurdish autonomous region. Even more troubling, in separate meetings with the Director of the Ports of Entry Directorate and Deputy Minister al-Khafaji, it was made clear to the Commission that four land ports of entry in the south are run by militia and are not under MOI control. Furthermore, efforts to install department-assigned directors at those land ports of entry were thwarted by the militia in place. The sea port of entry at Umm Qasr as well as other, smaller sea ports of entry are also reportedly controlled by militia. None of the tariffs collected at these militia-run ports of entry end up in the national coffers, and the Department of Border Enforcement has little insight as to how these ports are administered.

Both the Deputy Director of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Director also expressed immense frustration with their inability to obtain funding from the MOI for infrastructure development, fuel, ammunition, and personal equipment. Border forts and annexes often experience difficulty getting required fuel and lack reliable access to electrical power. Some border fort commanders pay for fuel out of their own pockets to enable their forces to patrol. In extreme cases, Border Transition Teams have facilitated fuel delivery from Coalition resources. It is common for requests to languish for months at the MOI without explanation, and local commanders are sometimes ignored by the MOI for secular reasons.

**Finding:** The divided responsibility for land, sea, and air ports of entry between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation, together with the lack of unity of effort between these ministries, undermines the effectiveness of the Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.

The systemic weakness of the MOI is exacerbated by the lack of MOI jurisdiction over Iraq’s sea and air ports of entry, which are currently controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. It is the Commission’s assessment, based on numerous observations and discussions, that the Ministry of Transportation is equally as corrupt and dysfunctional as the Ministry of Interior. As a result, there are no MOI personnel present to even monitor activities at the sea and air ports of entry, which are likely the entry points for foreign fighters as well as equipment for improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and are the staging grounds for smuggling operations.189

Even at those land ports of entry where the MOI is responsible for border security, the lack of definition regarding ministerial responsibilities continues to undermine border security. Land ports of entry, though under MOI authority, involve up to 15 other ministries with border security–

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189 Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate overview briefing, July 2007.
related functions. When the MOI appoints a port director, for example, that individual typically has no control over the non-MOI ministries and agencies (Finance, Transportation, Customs, Justice, etc.) that also operate at the border crossing. Without unity of command, or even unity of effort between the MOI, MOT, and other ministries, the Ports of Entry Directorate personnel have no choice but to compete for authority with representatives of other ministries.

**Recommendation:** The Government of Iraq should establish clear guidelines to facilitate unity of effort between the MOI and MOT for border security and move quickly to consolidate overall responsibility for border security under the MOI.

Bringing unity of effort and centralized authority to all Iraqi ports of entry—land, sea, and air—will likely require the direct involvement of the Deputy Minister of Interior for Support Forces, the Minister of Interior, and possibly the attention of the Prime Minister as well. Because the current division of responsibility between the MOI and the MOT regarding land, sea, and air ports of entry has more to do with politics than with a logical, functional division of labor, a solution will not come overnight. In the near term, a good start would be allowing MOI personnel to work with MOT personnel at sea and air ports of entry and to participate in some aspects of inspection and administration.

**Finding:** The MOI has not created standardized concepts of operations, operating procedures, or processes for the Ports of Entry Directorate to apply at Iraq’s land ports of entry; each appears to be run according to the initiative—or lack thereof—of the local commander.

Policies and procedures at land ports of entry often defy logic. For example, at land ports of entry with Iran and Jordan, the contents of trucks from those nations are loaded into Iraqi-licensed vehicles and driven by Iraqi drivers through the land port of entry. Since the invasion in 2003, this downloading at the Iranian border has been conducted on the Iranian side of the border behind berms and fencing that block the view of Iraqi security forces. When the Iraqi trucks subsequently arrive at the Iraqi border, the inspections are cursory at best. Commissioners witnessed officials looking at the documentation provided by the driver and occasionally opening the door of a tractor-trailer, looking inside a van, or climbing over the loaded cargo. However, there was no evidence of cranes or forklifts to off-load and inspect cargo. Although the coordination now occurring between Iraqi and Jordanian land ports of entry will likely result in some improved efficiency, steady gains in effectiveness nationwide are unlikely absent standardized procedures and processes across all land ports of entry.

**Equipment**

**Finding:** Many land ports of entry have neither the quantity nor the quality of monitoring and detection systems required for border security operations to function effectively.

The distribution of major security equipment to track people and goods crossing the borders at land ports of entry throughout the five regions is uneven and inadequate. Most land ports of
entry use outdated, inefficient systems to monitor cargo and track people. At many border crossings, even this substandard equipment is either broken or nonexistent, as the Commission observed during visits to Zurbaṭiya, Trebil, and Walid. Backscatter radars, if assigned, are often inoperable, and there is a dire lack of the forklifts or cranes required to access cargo for inspection. The Commission saw no logical method for apportioning even this outdated equipment. Further, even if adequate and functioning systems were in place to screen cargo and track people, loopholes would remain. For example, there are limited mechanisms in place for the personnel working at the border crossings to share intelligence with local police, so that even a functioning watch list might prove somewhat ineffectual.

Lack of adequate security equipment has an immediate impact on the Ports of Entry Directorate’s capacity to function. The Deputy Director of the Department of Border Enforcement estimated that 95 percent of all traffic entering or leaving Iraq by land passes through the land ports of entry. However, only a small amount of all traffic entering these ports of entry is inspected. Port directors do not have adequate technical or mechanical means to inspect a higher volume, and the lack of technological solutions and equipment causes huge backups at the land ports of entry—waiting lines of vehicles from neighboring countries sometimes exceed 10 miles. When commissioners visited the crossing at Walid, the backup from Iraq to Syria was estimated at 15 miles, and Border Transition Team members at Trebil on the Jordanian border estimated the wait to enter Iraq at three weeks.

**Recommendation:** The Coalition should continue to emphasize to the MOI that the territorial integrity of the country relies heavily on the Department of Border Enforcement’s ability to secure the borders and that funding for detection and monitoring equipment for those forces should be accorded a very high priority to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of ports of entry security forces.

The Ports of Entry Directorate requires facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that can better check incoming personnel and cargo at the land ports of entry; its needs include concrete ramps, tarmacs, and space to conduct inspections as well as equipment such as forklifts, cranes, backscatter radar, lighting systems, and metal detectors that will enable personnel to inspect cargo. Indeed, current backscatter systems may not be sufficiently rugged or powerful enough to make an impact at Iraqi border crossings. Gamma-ray scanners such as the VACIS machine—often used in the United States—would be more useful, but also far more costly for the MOI. A senior Ports of Entry Directorate official told the Commission that if Iraqi land ports of entry were equipped with even 10 percent of the equipment used by neighboring countries, the ports of entry would function adequately. In addition to direct inspection equipment, the Department of Border Enforcement needs technical solutions such as electronic surveillance to monitor sections of the borders not covered by the department’s current forts and annexes. In short, infiltration of foreign fighters, contraband, and weapons through the land ports of entry will likely continue until the necessary equipment, technology, and personnel to screen and inspect a greater percentage of incoming traffic and people are provided.

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190 MNSTC-I Border Forces briefing, July 2007.
Support Systems

Finding: The Department of Border Enforcement lacks sufficient logistics, support systems, and infrastructure to sustain many of its forces in the field.

Many of the logistics and support system challenges that plague the Army and other elements of the Iraqi security forces are also major problems for the Department of Border Enforcement. Maintaining equipment can be difficult, particularly because in some areas it is simply too dangerous to move vehicles and other large pieces of equipment to repair facilities. Centralization of distribution in the MOI can mean that access to appropriate quantities and types of arms and ammunition is impeded. Weapons are obtained by submitting a request memo to the director general of logistics, and units must pick up the requested goods at the MOI in Baghdad. Obtaining fuel is similarly complex, time-consuming, and bureaucratic. Logistics support exists at the local level with little assistance from the MOI. Port directors and Department of Border Enforcement commanders are generally left to their own devices to support their forces with what little money they receive from the central government.

Finally, living conditions and capacity appear problematic in some border stations. In some regions, there are significant challenges related to poor life support services and lack of area Forward Operating Bases, particularly in the southeast. There is also significant unevenness in quality among the installations at different ports of entry—ranging from adequate infrastructure and staffing at some to a lack of even basic buildings at others.192

Recommendation: Coalition forces should strongly encourage the Department of Border Enforcement to implement its national Headquarters Distribution Plan while continuing to provide logistical and maintenance support in the near term so that Department of Border Enforcement and ports of entry personnel can accomplish their mission.

The Department of Border Enforcement needs to establish a logistics system that is driven from the top down, satisfies the requirements of provincial and local commands, and accounts fully for all personal and unit equipment. Central to this system is a mechanism that reduces the need to travel great distances from the Department of Border Enforcement forts and annexes for vehicle maintenance. Another important element of a functioning distribution and support system would be a communications network that links Department of Border Enforcement locations with one another and with the nearest land ports of entry, providing a means to pass intelligence between port directors, Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate personnel, and the MOI. This system should also be centrally linked to the Iraqi Army and police.

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Corruption

Finding: Corruption is a serious problem at many land ports of entry. This fact has not yet been adequately addressed.

Corruption continues to erode the territorial integrity of Iraq by reducing the ability of the central government to legitimately collect import tariffs, by enabling contraband to pass undetected, and by undermining the efforts of the Department of Border Enforcement. The Commission found that even points of entry under Iraqi and Coalition control suffer from pervasive corruption. In addition, the presence of several ministries at a single land port of entry fosters corruption because multiple parties at each land port of entry can maneuver for a cut of a particular type of good (e.g., agricultural commodities). Moreover, it is likely that at least some ministries view border crossings permissively once they receive their own share of kickbacks. In addition, Iraqi and Coalition officials told the Commission that personnel at the border crossings are often discouraged from doing their jobs “too well,” lest they disrupt lucrative smuggling operations that benefit senior-level officers in the MOI. To address these issues, the central government has changed leadership in some areas, taken punitive action in some instances, and at times has even sent delegations to try to address corruption at the border crossings, but these efforts have not been particularly successful. Coalition forces are trying to stem existing corruption by training all border crossing personnel to a common standard and by using a “train the trainers” approach.

Two additional areas that provide ample opportunity for corruption are the taxation of people and goods entering the country and the transportation of fuel across the border. Border Transition Team members told the Commission that large amounts of tax revenues never make it to the MOI, and in some cases tax revenues that arrive at the MOI are not ultimately deposited in the national treasury. Transport of refined fuel into Iraq is another major source of corruption. The movement of fuel back and forth across borders for refinement and distribution provides ample opportunities for payoffs and fuel “skimming.” Efforts to reduce opportunities for tampering with fuel distribution have been rejected as too expensive, but such dismissals may simply reflect an unwillingness to build new systems that reduce opportunities for corruption.

Recommendation: Eliminating corruption will most likely be a generational undertaking in Iraq, but Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, and civilian agencies should work together to try to increase Border Transition Team oversight of Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate facilities, as well as to develop a standardized training program emphasizing leadership and professional ethics.

Some short-term solutions can be put in place, such as an increased Border Transition Team presence at land ports of entry and more consistent punitive actions for those involved in corrupt practices at the border. However, corruption cannot be eliminated with a single training course or

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193 Corruption was so prevalent in Region 2 that the central government sent members of the Commission for Public Integrity to the port of entry; but because the investigators were Shi’a in a Sunni region, little was accomplished.
194 Interviews with former Coalition Brigade Transition Team leads, June 2007.
195 For example, one port of entry in May 2006 recorded collecting $2.3 million in taxes on the basis of a specific amount of traffic across the border. Seven months later, in December 2006, the same port of entry processed the same amount of traffic and collected only $300,000, with no explanation given for the discrepancy.
the implementation of an isolated new policy. It is a pervasive problem that will require real change within the Department of Border Enforcement and increased capacity—and, more importantly, will—in the MOI to exert central government authority over Iraqi border security.

**Conclusion:** Iraq’s borders are porous. The Department of Border Enforcement suffers from poor ministerial support from the MOI. Border forces often lack the equipment, infrastructure, and basic supplies to conduct their mission. Overall border security is further undermined by the division of responsibilities between the MOI and the Ministry of Transportation. Corruption and external influence and infiltration are widespread. Absent major improvements in all these areas, Iraq’s borders will remain porous and poorly defended.
CHAPTER 11. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Having responded to our Congressional tasking, the Commission would like to offer some additional thoughts relative to the findings and conclusions of our work. Though we were not asked specifically to comment on such related subjects as Iraqi governance, or the general trends associated with our ongoing national efforts, the three weeks the Commission spent on the ground in Iraq, coupled with the extraordinary access it was provided, enabled Commissioners to arrive at informed opinions with regard to the overall trends on Iraq. This final chapter offers a compendium of our thinking on the subject and provides some answers to the unasked question: “What does this all mean in terms of the future in Iraq?”

Assessment Recap. Though the overwhelming conclusion of the Commission is that the Iraqi government holds the key to the most pressing problem of sectarian violence, the progress of the Iraqi Army is certainly real. It is, however, limited to an increased capability to combat the internal security threats in Iraq. While still lacking in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces (most especially the Army) show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability.

The Ministry of Defense is assessed as being one of the better functioning agencies of the Iraqi government. There is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state, with some exceptions remaining along ethnic lines. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from Coalition forces. While a more advanced ability to function independently remains in the future, there is currently great focus on the requirements and capabilities necessary to achieve this long-term goal.

As the pace of development continues, we wish to underscore that the standard for acceptable Iraqi military readiness should not be “mirror imaged” to the U.S. standard. “Good enough” in terms of Iraqi military capabilities will indeed be “good enough.” This is particularly true with regard to the development of logistics capacities.

The difference between the new Iraqi Army’s ability to meet and overcome internal threats vice being capable of defending Iraq against external aggression is significant and must be well understood. While Iraq’s Army, in particular, is moving toward greater capacity to achieve the former capability, the latter remains a future goal. This is to be expected, given the relatively short timeframe and the enormous task of rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces, which were defeated in 2003 and dismantled by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policy directive.

The Commission noted the adverse effects of duplicate chains of command and intelligence structures within the government and concludes that they are redundant and unnecessary. They also fuel the perceptions of mistrust and sectarianism throughout the national defense community.

Offsetting the positive direction of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense is the less positive trend of Iraqi police development, and the distinctly negative trend found in the Ministry of
Interior. Sectarian partisanship, bureaucratic inefficiency, the Ministry of Interior’s reputation for corruption, a near universal rejection of the National Police as currently formed and administered, and a weak and ineffective Department of Border Enforcement continue to impede Iraq’s overall progress towards security and stability.

Bureaucratic bungling and ministerial incapacity are often perceived as intentional acts of sectarian bias. Achieving competence and transparency in ministerial operations and decision-making can ease this problem. While there have been some recent efforts by the Minister of Interior to reshape his ministry, much remains to be done.

The most visible sign of police success remains at the local level, where police units are organized along ethnic lines representative of their communities. The Commission believes that it should be acceptable for local police to reflect the ethno-sectarian makeup of the communities they serve. This pragmatic accommodation may be necessary until such time that national reconciliation efforts have succeeded in making sectarian and ethnic associations secondary to a prevailing sense of Iraqi national identity. The makeup of Iraq’s police forces is key to bringing stability to the neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the Commission cannot report favorably on the current situation. This is due in large part to the government’s failure to achieve consensus in establishing policies and practices that promote national reconciliation.

There are still too few indications that police units, the armed forces, and their respective ministries, work well together in the aggregate. National reconciliation efforts must recognize and seek to address perceptions, whether fact or fiction, that fuel sectarian animosity by improving ministerial capacity, increasing governmental transparency, and establishing more effective lines of communication between the government and all constituencies.

The Commission wishes to underscore the problems and delays associated with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system, as other official visitors to Iraq have recently reported. Any prolonged delays in providing equipment for which the Iraqi government has already paid directly hampers progress in developing Iraq’s military capabilities. The Commission was surprised by the magnitude of the Foreign Military Sales problem in Iraq, and noted the extreme frustration it has caused our military commanders and the Iraqi government. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have been made aware of this problem. Commissioners who have significant career experience with the Foreign Military Sales system believe it is in need of major reform if it is to support our global policies. Foreign Military Sales as a national program is in need of overall reform, a fact well known to those of us who have served previously in senior positions.

The Surge. Much has been said about “the surge” in operations in the Baghdad region. Though not fully recognized, there have always been two principal participants in the implementation of this tactic; the Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition forces. The Iraqi component of the surge began in January 2007, and the U.S. surge contribution became operational in May of this year. The Commission wishes to underscore that the surge should not be viewed as the introduction of a new strategy. It is more accurate to describe it as a tactic supporting our overall national strategy in Iraq.
The surge, if successful, will play an important role in enabling the evolution of our strategy. There are signs of encouraging tactical successes in the Baghdad capital region, which remains the epicenter of enemy focus and of their competing strategy. Unable to achieve conventional military victory, the opposing forces must rely on spectacular bombing attacks on innocent Iraqi citizens, as well as ISF and Coalition forces. As the international media is mostly Baghdad-based, successful attacks receive disproportionate coverage relative to some very real progress achieved in other areas of the country, such as Anbar province. The result, unfortunately, is enemy momentum in the battle of strategic messaging despite the growing popular rejection of terrorist ideology in that region. The people’s outrage at al Qaeda’s savagery and their realization that it is a movement not of liberation but of occupation, has helped transform this province from being the most violent to being one of the least violent in Iraq. Coupled with the emerging capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and the promise of the Coalition’s “clear, hold, and build” tactic, there are some encouraging indications of a positive trend in this region.

**Strategic Shift.** The strategic implications of such continuing successes are encouraging. Coalition forces could begin to be adjusted, realigned, and re-tasked as the Iraqi Army is able to take on more responsibility for daily combat operations. The Commission finds it reasonable to believe that such adjustments could begin in early 2008, depending on the continuing rate of progress of the Iraqi Security Forces.

The circumstances of the moment may continue to present the opportunity for considering a shift in the disposition and employment of our forces. This could be characterized as a transition to a “strategic overwatch” posture. Such a strategy would include placing increasing responsibilities for the internal security of the nation on the ISF, especially in the urban areas. Coalition forces could be re-tasked to better ensure the territorial defense of the state by increasingly concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense of the critical infrastructures essential to Iraq. Existing threats from Syria, coupled with the alarming increase in Iranian presence, and their combined threats to Iraq’s stability, more than justify new strategic thinking. Though Iraq’s armed forces are currently incapable of countering both internal security missions and the nation’s external threats simultaneously, the Commission believes that the Iraqi Army has taken an important first step in proving its increasing competence in combating the nation’s internal threats. The next step will come in time.

The Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran’s increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. Left unaddressed, this escalating threat will most certainly have the effect of delaying efforts to resolve sectarian difficulties, provide security and stability in the nation, stimulate economic reform, enhance the rule of law, and fight corruption. The current rise of the Jaysh al-Mahdi in the region is evident, and the Iranian influence over the militant arm of this militia is increasing. It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to “defeat” our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity.

The Syrian border is more generally associated with the flow of foreign fighters, who are entering Iraq at an estimated rate of 75–80 per month. There are allegations that training camps for these fighters exist in Syria. Any increased Coalition presence capable of bringing focus to the border regions will help reduce the external threats facing Iraq and, the Commission believes, will
cause the two nations in question to reassess their current destabilizing policies and practices. The Commission believes that an “overwatch” strategy, focusing on the border regions, will more comprehensively address the most serious threats facing Iraq. A key to implementing any future plans to assist Iraqi Security Forces lies in maintaining the presence and the critical contributions of the various transition teams assigned by the Coalition to work with, train, and help develop Iraqi Security Force units; they represent indispensable links in our overall effort to transform the ISF.

Perceptions and reality are frequently at odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq’s problems and progress. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics “footprint,” our many installations, and the number of personnel (military and civilian), especially in and around the Baghdad region. The unintended message conveyed is one of “permanence”, an occupying force, as it were. What is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less massive, and more expeditionary. The decision to occupy Saddam Hussein’s former palace complex with our military headquarters, while expedient in 2003, has most likely given the wrong impression to the Iraqi population. We recommend that careful consideration of the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered with regard to its efficiency, necessity, and its cost. Significant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent.

The Commission believes that it would be important to establish an Iraqi-Coalition Transition Headquarters designed to shape, coordinate, and monitor all aspects of transition efforts. Such a headquarters should be composed of Iraqi and Coalition civilian and military personnel, and should be jointly led by senior civilian authorities. In this manner, momentum of transition could be carefully monitored, recorded, and future plans could be more visible than they are at present. For all of its great work, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq is not designed to be such a headquarters, though it would certainly play a critical role were one to be established. Visible and consistent progress toward transition ought to be one of the most important efforts of our presence in Iraq.

**Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).** To further reinforce the image that we are not “occupiers” in Iraq, the Commission recommends that consideration be given to implementing two additional efforts. The first is to reform the system by which we transfer authority to the Iraqi government. The current process seeks to apply standard criteria to each of Iraq’s 18 provinces in order to determine when total responsibility should be transferred to regional authorities.

To date, 7 out of 18 provinces have been transferred under this system. Upon close inspection however, the Commission was unable to conclude that current metrics for transfer of control were being uniformly applied to each province. Further, the Commission became convinced that the conditions in many of Iraq’s 18 provinces are so diverse that a uniform standard cannot be achieved, to include those pertaining to security and stability. Disparities are most visible when conditions in northern Iraq (Kurdish region) and southern Iraq (Shi’a region) are compared. In the north, three provinces have been transferred to Provisional Iraqi Control and one finds evidence of good governance, stability, security, a functioning police force, a developing economy, and public order. In the south, where four provinces have been transferred to Provisional Iraqi Control, conditions are completely different as evidenced by the rise of the Iranian-influenced Jaysh al-Mahdi, Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, and excessive militia influence. Recently, as if to underscore the
point, two southern governors have been assassinated. Nonetheless, considerations are under way to transfer Basra to Provincial Iraqi Control. Such a decision would be enthusiastically supported by the British Regional Coalition commander (Multi-National Force–South) who considers his forces to be an impediment to progress in the region.

The Commission believes that each of Iraq’s provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control as a matter of policy. The existing PIC system is not an effective vehicle; it is difficult to understand, impossible to apply uniformly, and actually impedes momentum and progress toward goals which should be to cede to Iraqi governmental institutions at the local, regional and national levels as much authority and responsibility as possible.

Such transfer of authority should be supplemented by the necessary levels of mentoring and assistance to ensure success. The Commission has discovered that the Government of Iraq wishes to be given control and responsibility for all of its provinces. Our current policy of determining when a province may or may not be controlled by its own government reinforces the popular perception of the Coalition as an occupation force. This may contribute to increased violence and instability. Granting Iraq full control of its provinces is symbolically important and vests the Iraqi government with the responsibility it needs in order to mature and develop. The workload of the Coalition resulting from such a policy would be unchanged.

The Commission wishes to emphasize that there is a fine line between assistance and dependence. Identifying those areas in which Iraqis can do things on their own, even if in ways different from those we prefer, should be acceptable wherever possible. Additional focus and help in improving the infrastructure of the country, and an increasing capability to ensure general access to basic needs such as water, power, fuel, schools, and public sanitation, will have a large impact in gaining popular support for the central, regional, and local governments.

**Status of Forces Agreement.** The second recommendation the Commission wishes to offer is that consideration be given to pursuing an agreement akin to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Iraq. Appropriately drawn, it would have the effect of codifying our relationship with the host nation, reinforcing its sovereignty and independence, and would be consistent with other such agreements we enjoy with many nations where we have a military presence. Ancillary to such an agreement, we believe that all our bases in Iraq should demonstrate evidence of Iraqi national sovereignty (Iraqi headquarters and national flag). Placing Iraqi units close to Coalition forces, when and where possible, will have a positive effect on the development of national security forces.

**Goals and Benchmarks.** Before closing, the Commission emphasizes the vital importance of setting strategic goals, benchmarks, and metrics designed to serve the needs of all “stakeholders”, including commanders, public policymakers, and the public. Such goals must be part of all planning and implementation efforts and must be among the most visible aspects of our mission to restore Iraq to its rightful and respectable place among nations.

**Concluding Thoughts.** The Commission wishes to thank Congress for the opportunity to conduct an independent review of the capabilities of the security forces of Iraq. While much remains to be done before success can be confidently declared, the strategic consequences of failure, or even
perceived failure, for the United States and the Coalition are enormous. We approach a truly strategic moment in this still young century. Iraq’s regional geo-strategic position, the balance of power in the Middle East, the economic stability made possible by the flow of energy to many parts of the world, and the ability to defeat and contain terrorism where it is most manifest are issues that do not lend themselves to easy or quick solutions. How we respond to them, however, could well define our nation in the eyes of the world for years to come.

At the end of the day, however, the future of Iraq and the prospects for establishing a professional, effective, and loyal military and police service, hinges on the ability of the Iraqi people and the government to begin the process of achieving national reconciliation and to ending sectarian violence. For the time being, all progress seems to flow from this most pressing requirement.
APPENDIX A: MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.)

General James L. Jones (Ret.) is currently president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 21st Century Energy. On February 1, 2007, General Jones completed 40 years of active duty service in the Marine Corps. His most senior assignments in uniform included duties as Commandant of the Marine Corps (1999-2003), Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (2003-2006), and Commander, U.S. European Command (2003-2006). During a period of great transformation of the Alliance’s expeditionary capabilities and seeking to increase better agility and mobility in the forward presence of U.S. forces in Europe and Africa, General Jones advocated for greater strategic focus and understanding of the 21st century threats to our nation and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

General John Abrams, USA (Ret.)

General John Abrams, U.S. Army (Ret.), currently serves on the Board of Directors of the Virginia National Defense Industrial Authority. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2003. General Abrams commanded the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and was one of the primary architects of the “Army of the 21st Century.” He began his military career as a tank crewman in 1966 and, over the next 36 years, rose from private to four-star general. He is also President of Abrams Learning and Information Systems, Inc.

Lieutenant General Martin R. Berndt, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Martin R. Berndt (Ret.) retired from the Marine Corps in October 2005, having served for 36 years. He was privileged to serve as an infantry officer in a variety of service and joint billets, completing his career as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Europe, and South. He currently serves as a senior mentor to the Marine Corps and U.S. Joint Forces Command. Additionally, he serves on the North Carolina Military Foundation and as a director with several private and public businesses.

General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.)

General Charles G. Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), became president and CEO of Business Executives for National Security (BENS) in May of 2002. Before joining BENS, he served as Senior Vice President and Washington Program Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. General Boyd was commissioned through the aviation cadet program in July 1960 and retired in 1995 after 35 years of service. General Boyd was the only Vietnam POW to achieve four-star rank, and his final military
Command Sergeant Major Dwight J. Brown, USA (Ret.)

Command Sergeant Major Dwight J. Brown, a native of Lexington, Kentucky, enlisted in the Army in January 1973. He is a graduate of the United States Army Sergeant Major Academy, First Sergeants Course, Army Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Drill Sergeant School, Operations and Intelligence (Battle Staff) Course, and the Joint Fire Power Air Ground Operations Course. His assignments have included five tours in the Federal Republic of Germany: the 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment, Fulda/Bad Hersfeld; three tours in 1st Armored Division, Katterback/Ansbach, Erlangen, and Bad Kreuznach; and the 8th Infantry Division, Mainz. His deployments include Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia; Operation Restore/Continue Hope, Somalia; Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti; Hurricane Andrew Relief, Florida; Operations Joint Guard/Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Enduring Freedom; and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Command Sergeant Major Brown served as the Command Sergeant Major, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, from August 4, 2000, to August 1, 2004. He retired from the military on August 1, 2004, after more than 31 years of military service and went on to found D. Brown and Associates, a small, service-disabled veteran-owned business.

The Honorable Terrance Gainer

Terrance Gainer is a decorated veteran who served in the Vietnam War and as a captain in the United States Naval Reserve until 2000. During his law enforcement career, Gainer served as Deputy Inspector General of Illinois, Deputy Director of the Illinois State Police, and in the United States Department of Transportation before he was appointed as Director of the Illinois State Police in March 1991. Chief Gainer spent 20 years as a homicide detective with the Chicago Police Department. Ultimately his superior legal skills were put to use as the department’s Chief Legal Counsel. Gainer went on to serve as Executive Assistant Police Chief, second in command of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, beginning in March 1998, and as Chief of the United States Capitol Police from June 2, 2002, to March 3, 2006. On November 14, 2006, Gainer was appointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) as the Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. Senate for the 110th United States Congress.
The Honorable John J. Hamre

John Hamre was elected CSIS president and chief executive officer in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and development programs; defense budget issues; and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its Deputy Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Colonel Michael Heidingsfield, USAF (Ret.)

Colonel Michael Heidingsfield served from 1991 to 1998 as the Chief of Police and Director of Public Safety for the City of Scottsdale, Arizona. Following his first three years of law enforcement service with the University of Texas System Police, Colonel Heidingsfield served with the Arlington (TX) Police Department from 1978 to 1991, leaving there as the Senior Deputy Police Chief after having been selected through a nationwide recruitment process to lead the Scottsdale Police Department. At the time of his retirement from the City of Scottsdale, he was accorded the title of Chief of Police Emeritus. Prior to the start of his law enforcement career, Colonel Heidingsfield served as an active duty Air Force officer and retired in 2004 as a full colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve assigned to the Security Forces Directorate at the Pentagon. Following his retirement from the military, he served from 2004 to 2006 as the State Department’s first Contingent Commander for the Police Advisory Mission in Iraq. Colonel Heidingsfield is currently the president and CEO of the Memphis Shelby Crime Commission in Memphis, Tennessee.

Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, U.S. Navy (Ret.), served as former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. Since retiring in December 2004, Admiral Johnson has founded Snow Ridge Associates, which provides strategic advice and counsel. While in the U.S. Navy, he oversaw the successful implementation of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, assumed command of the NATO Response Force at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, and was responsible for the establishment of NATO’s training support mission in Iraq. He was also assigned to several senior policy positions in Washington, most notably serving as the executive assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (1992 to 1993) and military assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1999 to 2000). Admiral Johnson also is also chairman of Snow Ridge Associates, which provides strategic advice and counsel; is active in community and civic affairs; and serves on several for-profit and nonprofit boards.
General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.)

General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army (Ret.), is currently President of One Team, Inc., a strategic consulting firm. He retired from the Army in 1997 after 40 years of service in war and peace, including two combat tours of Vietnam. From 1990 to 1997, he was the Commander in Chief of both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command, as well as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In 1992 he helped facilitate a peace agreement with the FMLN insurgents and the government of El Salvador. He also developed a successful strategic counternarcotics plan linking more than 40 U.S. agencies and several Central and South American nations. In 1995, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Joulwan was the architect of NATO’s Bosnian Operation, which ended the vicious atrocities in that country without one NATO hostile fatal casualty in over ten years of engagement. General Joulwan was also instrumental in developing the U.S. State Partnership Program and NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, which included former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine among them.

Lieutenant General James C. King, USA (Ret.)

Lieutenant General King is the President and CEO of Athena Innovative Solutions, Inc. During his 33 years in the U.S. Army, he was involved in foreign and national security policy formulation and implementation, intelligence operations, and leadership of large organizations. He led the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a Department of Defense and National Intelligence Agency composed of 13,000 employees and contractors, created as a result of the merger of eight distinct organizations. He served as the principal architect for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance input for information superiority and information operations planning and implementation for the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was responsible for implementing one of the largest digital information management acquisition programs in government, and led the Department of Defense and intelligence community effort to establish a national collaborative environment.

Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland, PSNI

Duncan McCausland joined the Northern Irish Police Service in 1983 and served as a Constable and Sergeant in Belfast and Dungannon. He was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1991 and to Chief Inspector in 1995. He was transferred on appointment to Superintendent in 1998 and took charge of Dungannon as Sub-Divisional Commander. In 2000, he returned to Headquarters as Head of Command Secretariat. From February 2001 until April 2002 he was Staff Officer to the Chief Constable. In March 2002 he was promoted to Chief Superintendent. On October 6, 2003, he was appointed Assistant Chief Constable Urban Region, including Belfast City, based at Castlereagh. As ACC Urban, he is responsible for the provision of effective professional policing within 12 District Command Units, utilizing some 4,600 police and civilian support staff.
Lieutenant General Gary S. McKissock, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Gary S. McKissock (Ret.) is the former Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics. Since leaving active service, McKissock has served on the board of both the Sapient Corp. of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Acorn Growth Companies of Midwest City, Oklahoma. Additionally, he has served as an executive fellow at the Institute for Defense and Business in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and is founder and principal of CorpsStrategy LLC, a consulting firm specializing in organizational planning.

Sergeant Major Alford McMichael, USMC (Ret.)

Alford L. McMichael is the founder and president of the 4-DREW Foundation, a foundation that supports children at risk. He also provides counseling to young men at two Catholic high schools in Harlem and the Bronx, where he teaches the importance of pursuing excellence in all endeavors in life. He has served on three congressional task forces on sexual assault in the military services, on the military academies, and on domestic violence and sexual harassment. Sergeant Major McMichael served as the 14th Sergeant Major of the United States Marine Corps from 1999 to 2003, and from 2003 to 2006 served as the 1st Sergeant Major in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He retired from the United States Marine Corps in October 2006 after 36 years of service.

Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)

Brigadier General Richard Potter, U.S. Army (Ret.), currently serves as a senior advisor to Sierra Nevada Corporation–Integrated Mission Systems. After a distinguished 35-year career in the military, Brigadier General Potter retired in 1994 from his post as Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command. Since 1995, he has provided independent consulting services specializing in high-tech firms and companies within the defense industry, including Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Jacobs-Sverdrup, ACS Defense, Gray Hawk Systems, Inc., and Areté Associates. Additionally, he has served as a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence (ASDC4I), the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), as well as with the Department of the Army and other government agencies on special projects both domestically and abroad.

Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (Ret.)

Arnold Punaro is a retired Marine Corps Major General who served as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division (1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Marine Corps
Headquarters during the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first Gulf War, to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and Macedonia, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn and served as his Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. He is currently Executive Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation. He is also chairing the Independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves established by Congress in 2005.

Chief Charles H. Ramsey

Charles H. Ramsey served as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department from April 1998 to December 2006, making him the longest-serving chief of the MPDC since home rule was granted to the District of Columbia in 1973. He has since served as consultant to the U.S. Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Under Chief Ramsey’s leadership as Chief, the MPDC regained its reputation as a national leader in urban policing; crime rates declined by approximately 40 percent, community policing and traffic safety programs were expanded, and MPDC recruiting and hiring standards, training, equipment, facilities, and fleet were all dramatically upgraded. His notable initiatives included a September 1998 reorganization of the Department that put more police resources in the community, cut bureaucracy, and enhanced accountability by creating a system of Regional Operations Commands. The Chief also oversaw a multimillion-dollar upgrade to district stations and other Department facilities, as well as new communications and information technology, including mobile data computing and the 3-1-1 non-emergency system. Chief Ramsey redefined the Department’s community policing mission to focus on crime prevention. The program he instituted, Policing for Prevention, encompassed law enforcement, neighborhood-based partnerships and problem solving, and systemic prevention efforts. Prior to joining the Metropolitan Police Department, Chief Ramsey served for 29 years in the Chicago Police Department (1968–1998), retiring as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. While serving in this capacity he developed the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) that has been internationally recognized as an innovative community policing model.

Chief John F. Timoney

John Timoney was appointed Chief of Police of the Miami Police Department on January 2, 2003, after serving one year as CEO of an international private investigation and security company in New York City. He has served four years as the Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, where he commanded a diverse police force of approximately 7,000 officers and over 900 civilian employees in the fifth-largest metropolitan city in the United States. Prior to that Chief Timoney spent more than 29 years with the New York Police Department, eventually becoming the youngest four-star chief in the department’s history.
Lieutenant General John A. Van Alstyne, USA (Ret.)

John A. Van Alstyne is a career infantry officer with 36 years of service. In his last assignment on active duty, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy. He currently serves as Commandant, Corps of Cadets, Texas A&M.

General Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)

A career infantry officer and a veteran of combat operations in Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia, General Wilhelm commanded Marine units at every level, from Rifle Platoon and Company Commander in Vietnam to Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force and all Marine forces in the Atlantic, Europe, and South America. In his final military assignment, he served as Commander of the United States Southern Command, where he was responsible for all U.S. military activities with the 32 nations of the Caribbean and Central and South America. General Wilhelm currently serves as Vice President and Director of Battelle’s Office of Homeland Security.
APPENDIX B: ENABLING LEGISLATION

SECTION 1314(e)(2) – Page 14

ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPABILITIES OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense, $750,000, that the Department, in turn, will commission an independent, private sector entity, which operates as a 501(c)(3), with recognized credentials and expertise in military affairs, to prepare an independent report assessing the following:

(i) The readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, and bringing greater security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and bringing an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.

(ii) The training, equipping, command, control and intelligence capabilities, and logistics capacity of the ISF.

(iii) The likelihood that, given the ISF’s record of preparedness to date, following years of training and equipping by U.S. forces, the continued support of U.S. troops will contribute to the readiness of the ISF to fulfill the missions outlined in clause (i).

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the designated private sector entity shall provide an unclassified report, with a classified annex, containing its findings, to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations/International Relations, and Intelligence.
APPENDIX C: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED DURING ASSESSMENT

Current and Former United States Officials

U.S. Civilian Officials

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns – Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Ambassador Ryan Crocker – U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Ambassador Charles Snyder – Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Ambassador Marcie Ries – Political Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad

Ambassador David Satterfield – Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Rice and Coordinator of Iraq Policy

Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan – National Security Council


Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Kimmitt – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East

U.S. Military Officials

The White House

Lieutenant General Douglas Lute – Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan Policy and Implementation

The Joint Staff

General Peter Pace – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani – Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Plans and Policy, J-5

Lieutenant General John Sattler – Director, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

Major General Philip Breedlove, USAF – Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

Colonel Joseph di Salvo – Iraq Division Chief, J-5

Colonel Sean MacFarland – Iraq Division Chief, J-5

Lieutenant Colonel Larry Reeves – Iraq Division, J-5

Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Begel – Iraq Division, J-5

Central Command

Admiral William Fallon – Commander, U.S. Central Command

Multi-National Force–Iraq

General David Petraeus – Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Major General John Paxton – Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Major General Mastin M. Robeson – Multi-National Force–Iraq

Major General Douglas Stone – Deputy Commanding General, Detainee Operations, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Major General Michael Barbaro – Multi-National Force–Iraq

Brigadier General Kevin Bergner – Spokesman, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Colonel Lawrence Morris – Law and Order Task Force, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Colonel Ken Tovo – Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

Colonel M. Fugues -- Multi-National Force–Iraq, G-5

Commodore Nicholas Lambert (U.K.) – Combined Task Force 158, Royal Navy

Captain Robert Sanguinetti (U.K.) – Combined Task Group 158, Royal Navy
Lieutenant Commander Nicholas Wheeler (U.K.) – Combined Task Force 158 Liaison Officer to Multi-National Division South East

Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill – Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Michael F. Walther – Law and Order Task Force, Multi-National Force–Iraq

Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Lieutenant General James Dubik – Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and Commander, NATO Training Mission–Iraq

Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey – Former Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Major General Berraghan (U.K.) – Chief Coalition Advisor, Baghdad Operations Center

Rear Admiral Edward Winters – Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Colonel Michael Fuller – Training and Education, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Colonel Juan Arcocha – J-4, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Colonel David Dornblasser – FMS, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Mr. John Cochrane – Coalition Advisor, Ministry of Defense Transition Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Mr. Dan Maguire – Intelligence Transition Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Command Sergeant Major Tommy Williams – Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq

Coalition Police Assistance Training Team, MNSTC-I

Major General Ken Hunzeker – Former Commanding General, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Mike Jones – Commanding General, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Pettit – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Robert Weighill (U.K.) – Deputy Commanding General for MOI Capability, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team
Brigadier General David Phillips – Deputy Commanding General for MOI Forces, Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Colonel Alexander – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Colonel Mark French – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Colonel Brown – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Colonel Buechler – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Colonel Galloucis, Police Training Team Leader, Baghdad

Lieutenant Colonel Tye – Coalition Advisor, Ports of Entry Directorate

Lieutenant Colonel Goodrich – Coalition Advisor, Border Security

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Winn – Former Lead, Border Transition Team, Region 2

Major Bain – Ports of Entry Transition Team, Walid

Major Yi – Ports of Entry Transition Team, Trebil

Major Anthony Lamb – Border Transition Team Leader

Major Tom Harris – National Police Transition Team Chief

Major Phil Stauffacher – Former Border Transition Team Lead, Trebil Port of Entry

Captain Padill – Border Transition Team, Trebil

First Lieutenant Michael Warren – Aamel Iraqi Police, Police Transition Team Leader

Mr. Stephen Mangino – U.S. DHS, Attaché and DHS Country Coordinator

Mr. Walter Redman – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Ms. Kimberly Riffe – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Mr. Rick Andy – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Mr. George Murray – Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

Mr. James Davis – Legal Attaché, Major Crimes Task Force
Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Robin Swan – Iraqi Army Coordinator, Commander, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Brigadier General Dice Allardice – Commander, Coalition Air Force Training Team

Captain Keith Harvey (U.K.) – Advisor to the Head of the Iraqi Navy

Captain Tim Stockings (U.K.) – Commander, Naval Transition Team

Colonel Andrew Bristow – 10 Iraqi Army, Military Transition Team Chief

Colonel Pat Matlock – Commander, Blackjack Military Transition Team, 4-9 Cavalry

Colonel Pollock – Military Transition Team Commander, 6th Iraqi Army

Colonel Diemer – Director, COIN Academy

Colonel Mike Smith – Chief, 3rd Iraqi Division Military Transition Team

Colonel Steed – Chief, Military Transition Team with Iraqi Ground Forces Command

Colonel Chris Mitchell – Chief, 2nd Iraqi Division Military Transition Team

Colonel Amato – Chief, Iraqi Army Division Military Transition Team

Colonel Hall – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Colonel Ferral – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Colonel Johnson – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Colonel Bryant – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Lieutenant Colonel Shell – Deputy Chief, Military Assistance Team, 1st Brigade, 3rd Iraqi Army Division

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Walsh – Military Transition Team, 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division

Lieutenant Dildar – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Major W. Caldwell – Team Leader, Military Transition Team

Major Kevin Nicholas – Iraqi Army, Military Transition Team
Captain Ferguson – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Captain Shrewsbury – Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

Lieutenant Biet – Department of Border Enforcement Military Transition Team

Ms. King – Ministry of Defense Transition Team

Mr. Chessnoe – Ministry of Defense Transition Team

Mr. Horne – Ministry of Defense Transition Team

Mr. Prince – Ministry of Defense Transition Team

Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno – Commander, Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Lieutenant General Rich Zilmer – Former Commander, Multi-National Force-West

Major General Robert Neller – Former Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Multi-National Force-West

Major General Walt Gaskin – Commander, Multi-National Division West, U.S. II Marine Expeditionary Force

Major General Rick Lynch – Commander, Multi-National Division Center, U.S. 3rd Infantry Division

Major General Randy Mixon – Commander, Multi-National Division North, U.S. 25th Infantry Division

Major General Graham Binns (UK) – Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Brigadier General Jim Huggins – Deputy Commander, Multi-National Division Center

Brigadier General James Yarbrough – Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group

Brigadier General John Allen – Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Brigadier General Vincent Brooks – Acting Division Commander, Multinational Division Baghdad, U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division

Brigadier General Charles Gurganus – Commanding General, Ground Combat Element, Multi-National Force-West
Colonel Charlie Flynn – 82nd Airborne, Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Colonel John Charlton – Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division

Colonel Paul Funk – Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division

Colonel Richard Simcock – Commander, Regimental Combat Team 6, Multi-National Forces-West

Lieutenant Colonel Swindell – Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Multi-National Division-Center

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr – Commander, Command Operations Post Cleary, 1-15 Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Frank – Battalion Commander, 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Command Sergeant Major Clifford Dockter – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Sergeant Major Rodney Lewis – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Captain Sean Lyons – COP Attack, Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Chief Warrant Officer 5 Terry Walker – Multi-National Forces - West

Command Sergeant Major Citola – Multi-National Corps Iraq

Command Sergeant Major Burrows – Iraqi Assistance Group

First Sergeant Jeffrey Griffith – COP Attack, Multi-National Corps–Iraq

Sergeant Smith – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Specialist Benner – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Specialist Riahi – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

Private First Class Graff – 1-28 IN, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division

NATO Training Command–Iraq

Major General Pomegnani – Commander, NATO Training Command–Iraq
Current and Former Iraqi Officials

Iraqi Civilian Officials

President Jalal Talabani – State President of Iraq

Deputy Minister Barham Salih – Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

His Excellency Abdul-Qader al-Obaidi – Minister of Defense

Deputy Minister Maliki – Deputy Minister of Defense

Major General Mahmood – Director General of Programs and Budgets, Ministry of Defense

Dr. Mumtaz – Director General of Personnel, Ministry of Defense

Mr. Abid Ali Jasim – Director General of Armaments and Supply, Ministry of Defense

Mr. Mudhfar – Director General of Contracts and Purchases, Ministry of Defense

Major General Kamal – Director, National Information and Investigation Agency

His Excellency Samir Shakir M. Sumaida’ie – Iraqi Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Bassima Al Jaidri – Advisor to Prime Minister Maliki

Iraqi Military Officials

General Faruq – Office of the Commander in Chief

General Mohan – Iraqi Commander, Basra Operations Command

Lieutenant General Ali – Commander, Iraqi Ground Forces Command

Lieutenant General Aboud – Commander, Baghdad Operations Center

Lieutenant General Talib Kinani – Commander, Counter Terrorism Bureau

Lieutenant General Abdulrazzak – Joint Headquarters, M-3

Lieutenant General Aboud – Commander, Baghdad Operations Center

Lieutenant-General Kamal al-Barzanji – Commander, Iraqi Air Force
Major General Khorsheed – Commander, 3rd Division Iraqi Army

Major General Abu Ghani – Commander, Government of Iraq Counter-Terrorism Command

Major General Abdul Amir – Commander, 6th Iraqi Army

Major General Ala’a – Deputy Head of Iraqi Air Force

Major General Jassim – Joint Headquarters, M-7

Major General Kamal – Joint Headquarters, M-2

Major General Othman – Joint Headquarters, M-1

Major General Jawdat – Joint Headquarters, M-4

Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhim – Head of the Iraqi Navy

Brigadier General Kahleel – Iraqi Air Force

Brigadier General Qaid – Iraqi Air Force

Brigadier General Kareem – Iraqi Air Force

Brigadier General Fadhl al Berwari – Commanding Officer, Iraqi Special Operations Forces

Brigadier General Alaa – Comptroller, Joint Headquarters

Brigadier General Muttah – Commander, 2nd Iraqi Army Division

Colonel Abdul Rahim – Commanding Officer, Iraqi Counterinsurgency School, Iraqi Army

Commander Ahmed Maarij – Operational Commander, Iraqi Navy

Captain Nasir – Patrol Base Whiskey 1, Iraqi Army 6th Division

Sergeant Major Kassam – Iraqi Ground Forces Command
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior

Ministry of the Interior Officials

His Excellency Jawad al-Bolani – *Minister of the Interior*

Major General Admed al-Khafaji – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Support Forces*

Deputy Minister Adnan al-Assadi – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Administration*

Deputy Minister Hala Shakir – *Deputy Minister of the Interior for Financial Affairs*

Major General Jihan – *Director of Training and Qualification, Ministry of the Interior*

Major General Jodah – *Assistant Deputy Minister, Iraqi Police Service Affairs/Security*

Major General Jawad – *Director of Contracts, Ministry of the Interior*

Brigadier General Farhoud – *Ports of Entry Directorate, Ministry of the Interior*

Brigadier General Jasim – *Ports of Entry Directorate, Ministry of the Interior*

Iraqi Police Service and National Police

Major General Mahdi Juma’a Salma al-Salami – *Dean, Baghdad Police College*

Major General Jasim Hassam Attia – *Dean, High Institute, Baghdad Police College*

Major General Ameer – *Director of Logistics, Baghdad Police College*

Brigadier General Khalid Adulani – *Dean of Police Academy*

Major General Khadim Hamid Shi’wa al-Mohammadadawi – *Baghdad, Provincial Director of Police*

Brigadier General Baha – *Commander, 5th Division 2nd Battalion Iraqi National Police*

Deputy Minister Sinjari – *Deputy Minister of Interior, Kurdish Region*

General Jamal Ahmad Muhamad – *Provincial Police Chief, Sulaymaniyah*

Major General Hussein al Awadi – *National Police Commander*
Outside Experts

Dr. Jon Alterman – Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

General John Abizaid (Ret.) – Former Commander, U.S. Central Command

Dr. Stephen Biddle – Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. Anthony Cordesman – Center for Strategic and International Studies

Colonel Paul Hughes (Ret.) – Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan – Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Dr. Phebe Marr – Leading U.S. Expert on Iraq, Author of The Modern History of Iraq

Mr. Robert Perito – Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Ms. Sarah Farnsworth – Strategic Advisor

The Honorable Patrick T. Henry – Strategic Advisor

Mr. John Raidt – Strategic Advisor

Colonel Arthur White, USMC (Ret.) – Strategic Advisor

Note: The Commission has made every attempt to list all individuals consulted during the course of its work. Despite best efforts, the Commission recognizes this list does not include many of the members of the U.S. and Coalition forces and the Iraqi Security Forces who spent time with the Commissioners on the ground in Iraq.
APPENDIX D: REVIEW OF MAJOR REPORTS & ANALYSES

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Dr. Phebe Marr
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