Last updated on: 5/19/2008 1:34:00 PM PST
US - Iraq War Home Page > Source Biographies > >Brent Scowcroft, PhD
Brent Scowcroft, PhD Biography |
Title: |
Former National Security Advisor |
Position: |
Con to the question "Should the US Have Attacked Iraq?" |
Reasoning: |
"But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them...
He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail--much less their actual use--would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor...
Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken...
But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence."
"Don't Attack Saddam," Wall Street Journal Online, Aug. 15, 2002
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Theoretical Expertise Ranking: |
Experts Individuals with PhD's, JD's, or equivalent advanced degrees in fields relevant to the US - Iraq conflict. Also top-level government officials (such as foreign leaders, US presidents, Founding Fathers, Supreme Court Justices, members of legislative bodies, cabinet members, military leaders, etc.) with positions relevant to the US - Iraq conflict. |
Involvement and Affiliations: |
President and Founder, Forum for International Policy President, Scowcroft Group, Inc., 1994-present Trustee and Counselor, Center For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Chairman, Pacific Forum at Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Chairman, American-Turkish Council Director, Pennzoil-Quaker State Director, Qualcomm/Qualcomm (since 1994) Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman, 2001-2005 Retired, Lieutenant General, US Air Force National Security Advisor, under President George H.W. Bush, 1989–1993 National Security Advisor, under President Gerald Ford, 1974–1977 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in the Nixon and Ford administrations |
Education: |
PhD, Columbia University MA, Columbia University BS, West Point |
Other: |
Boardmember, Gerald R. Ford Foundation
Boardmember, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Boardmember, Atlantic Council of the United States
Boardmember, International Republican Institute
Boardmember, National Defense University
Member, Council on Foreign Relations
Member, Atlantic Institute
Member, Advisory Board, School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University
Member, Advisory Board, OILspace
Honorary Advisor, US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce |
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